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PART IV: THEORY 
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
'The very founda tion of every rule which haB been applied to 
inBurance law iB thiB, namely, that the contract of inBurance ... iB a 
contract of indemnity, and of indemnity only, and that this contract 
means that the aBsured, in caBe of a 10BB againBt which the policy has 
been made, Bhall be fully indemnified, but Bhall never be more than 
fully indemnified.' 
Castellain v Preston l 
THEORY: THE INDEMNITY PRINCIPLE 
INTRODUCTION 
The marine insurance contract may be defined as a 
contract in terms of which the insurer undertakes, 
against payment of the premium, to indemnify the 
assured against loss caused by marine perils2. At 
(1883) 11 QBD 380 (CA). 
Ivamy, Marine Insurance, 4th ed, (1985), (cited as Marine InBurance) 4. 
Roccus, De NavibuB et Naulo, item de ABBecurationibuB Notabilia, (1708), 
not 1 defined insurance as follows:- 'ABsecuratio est contractus que 
quiB alienae rei periculum in Be BUBcepit, obligando se sub certo pretio 
ad eam compenBandam Bi ilIa perieri t'. (' Insurance is a contract in 
terms of which one accepts the danger to another's property against an 
undertaking to pay him a certain price as compensation if it should 
perish.') Article 246 of the Dutch Wetboek van Koophandel ('the WVK') 
defines insurance as 'eene overeenkomBt bij welke de verzekeraar zich 
aan den verzekerde, tegen genot eener premie, .verbindt om denzelven 
schadeloos te Btellen wegenB een verlies, schade of gemiB van verwacht 
voordeel, welke dezelve door een onzeker voorval zoude kunnen lijden.' 
Emerigon's definition of marine insurance in Chapter I of his Traite deB 
ASBuranceB et des ContratB a la GroBBe, (1783), (Boulay-Paty's edition 
of 1827), (or in the translation by Meredith under the title A Treatise 
on InBuranceB, (1850),2) is to the same effect. See also the definition 
of marine insurance in section 1 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 ('the 
MIA'): 'I. A contract of marine insurance iB a contract whereby the 
insurer undertakes to indemnify the assured, in the manner and to the 
extent thereby agreed, against marine losses, that iB to say, the 10BBeB 





Part IV: Chapter 11: Theory : The Indemnity Principle 
the heart of marine insurance3 and all other types 
of indemnity insurance is the principle of 
indemnity4. Virtually every other rule or 
principle of those types of insurance aimed at 
compensating for a loss in the patrimony of the 
assured is linked, directly or indirectly, to the 
indemnity principle. Abandonment was described 
earlier as a special method of claiming the full 
indemnity5. There is thus an obvious link between 
abandonment and the indemnity principle which 
renders a review of the indemnity principle itself 
The marine insurance contract is regarded as a commercial contract, in 
that it is generally concluded between persons engaged in commercial 
activities; Van Niekerk, An Introduction to and some perspectives on the 
sources and development of Roman -Dutch Insurance Law, (1988), 
( ' Introduction'), 21 . In the codes of the countries which have codified 
their law the legal principles on marine insurance are invariably 
contained in the commercial code, in a special section. The marine 
insurance contract is mainly distinguished from other forms of indemnity 
insurance by the type of risks covered by it , namely marine or maritime 
perils, and some concepts like abandonment which apply to marine 
insurance contracts but not to other forms of indemnity insurance . 
See generally : Ivamy, Marine Insurance, 4, 11 and 164; Hofmann, 
Privatversicherungsrecht, (1991) , Chapter 3; Prolss-Martin, 
Versicherungsvertragsgesetz, (1992), 383 et seq; Bruck-Moller, Kommentar 
zum Versicherungsvertragsgesetz, (1980), 56 et seq; Lambert-Faivre, 
Droit des Assurances, 8th ed, (1992), 332 et seq; Dorhout Mees, 
Nederlands handels- en faillissementsrecht, 7th ed, (1987), (cited as 
Handelsrecht), 87; Joubert , (ed) , The Law of South Africa, (1988), Vol 
12, (Insurance), (cited as 'LAWSA') , para 202; Rankin v Potter (1873) 
6 AC 83 (HL), 118; Simpson v Thompson (1877) 3 App Cas 279 (HL), 284; 
Burnand v Rodocanachi (1882) 7 App Cas 333 (HL), 339; Castellain v 
Preston, supra. Since Benecke's treatise, System des See-Assekuranz- und 
Bodrnerei Wesens, (1805 - 1821) the indemnity principle has been the 
backbone of German insurance law. Pothier , Traite du Contrat 
d'Assurance, (1768-1778) , para 166 pointed out that allowing the assured 
to recover the full sum insured while retaining the remains of the ship 
or goods insured would be contrary to the spirit of the contract of 
insurance. See also De Groot's definition of insurance in De Jure Belli 
ac Pacis , (1625), ii, 12 as a contract 'praestandae indemnitatis circa 
casus fortuitos', (to provide an indemnity against accidents') and Park, 
A System of the Law of Marine Insurances, (1786), 164, (the edition used 
here being the 1789 edition published from the same plates in 
Philadelphia) . Lambeth in Templeman on Marine Insurance, 5th ed, (1981) , 
1 exp~essed . the. opinion that it is a contract of indemnity in theory 
only ~n mar~ne ~nsurance because the insured value is in certain cases 
taken as the measure of indemnity . This subject is discussed in the text 
infra . 
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essential for a proper understanding 
of 
abandonment. The indemnity principle is so wide 
and has so many facets that it deserves a study of 
its own which cannot be performed here. In what 
follows the broad principles falling within the 
ambit of the indemnity principle are considered so 
far as a discussion of those principles is helpful 
in the analysis of the concept of abandonment. 
It was argued earlier that the original reason for 
the birth and development of the marine insurance 
contract was the commercial necessity to make 
provision for the losses arising from ordinary 
transport risks 6. From the earliest time the 
purpose of insurance was therefore not to make a 
profit out of the event insured against but to 
achieve a recoupment by the assured of the loss 
contemplated by the insurance 7 • This recoupment 
was not intended to and did not exceed the actual 
loss suffered by him. The insurer's obligation has 
thus been limited from the outset to the actual 
loss suffered by the assured8 . The principle has 
been applied in the earliest decisions in English 
Chapter 4 supra. 
Straccha, Tractatus de Assecurationibus et Proxenetis, (1569), 20.4, 
(from Tractat~s Illustrum in utraque tum Pontifici tum Caesarei juris 
facultate Iur~sconsultorum, De Contractibus licitis, (1631) . See also 
Marshall, A Treatise on the Law of Insurance, (1802), Book I, 80. 
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law9 , and formed the subject of Benecke's famous 
treatise10 • 
The indemnity principle, like marine insurance, 
was not created overnight. It was also not until 
Benecke's thesis that its principles were analysed 
and explained in full. Initially the principles or 
rules of indemnity appear to have developed as 
responses to particular malpractices and frauds 
employed by the assured. Thus, when the simulated 
sale contract was still in use, the assured could 
only sell the goods to be insured once as he could 
not deliver the same goods to two or more buyers, 
which he would have had to do if the risk 
materialised. There was thus no question of 
'double-insurance' in the simulated sale. However, 
when the marine insurance contract proper came to 
be employed it did not take long before some 
unscrupulous merchants saw the opportunity of 
making a profit by taking out multiple insurance 
contracts on the same goods and against the same 
risk. This obviously undesirable practice was soon 
met by the rules against double-insurance. Similar 
Like Hamilton v Mendes (1761) 2 Burr 1198, where Lord Mansfield said the 
following at 1214: 'The insurer .. . ought never to pay less upon a 
contract of .indemnity, than the value of the loss, and the assu;ed ought 
never to ga~n more.' 
A Treatise on t~e Principles of Indemnity in Marine Insurance, Bottomry 
and Respondent~a, (1824), the English version of his work which was 
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practices and rules to combat them include over-
insurance, deviation and average . Slowly but 
surely, over the years, the principles of 
indemnity crystallised into a substantial body of 
rules and principles which, it will be 
demonstrated later, includes the principles of 
abandonment. 
THE PRIMARY OR GENERAL RULE OF INDEMNITY 
THE NATURE OF THE INDEMNITY PRINCIPLE 
The indemnity principle is an implicit rather than 
an explicit principle11 . It is seldom mentioned 
by name in the policy or applicable statute. 
Nevertheless, its spirit is ever present and all-
pervasive12 • The likely reason for the failure of 
insurers and legislators to mention it by name in 
their policies and statutes is that the indemnity 
principle is simply taken for granted13 • 
The indemnity principle consists of three separate 
yet inseparable elements namely the concepts of 
Kremer, Bet Indemni tei tsprincipe, een juridiscbe (ber)waardering, 
. (1988), 17 and 211. 
Its pre~e~c~ lurks even in the definition of indemnity insurance; see 
the def1n1t10ns of marine insurance in fn 2 supra. 
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interest, value and 10SS14, which are in effect 
different aspects of the same ideals. According 
to Marshall , (t) here cannot be an indemnity 
without loss, nor loss without an interest.,16 He 
went on to add that the extent or quantum of the 
loss is determined by the value of the 
interest17 . Put another way, the amount 
recoverable by the assured is restricted to the 
extent of his pecuniary loss, which is determined 
by the value of his interest, which in turn 
depends on the nature of the interest in the thing 
at risk18 • The indemnification to which the 
assured is entitled is therefore the product of 
the interaction between the elements of interest, 
value and 10SS19. 
Van Oven, 'De begrippen belang, waarde en schade in het verzekeringsrecht 
van heden en morgen', March 1977 Bouwrecht 225, point 2 . 
Kremer, op cit, 19. 
Op cit, (1802) Book I, 80 . 
Marshall, op ci t, Book IV, 685 . The extent of the loss is not 
necessarily related to the value of the thing at risk, but is limited 
by the value of the assured's interest in the thing at risk . 
Ivamy, General Principles of Insurance Law, 5th ed, (1986), (cited as 
'Principles'), 9 . 
When the subsidiary rules of indemnity are discussed in the text below 
the extent to which these three concepts are tacitly recognized will 
become apparent. For example, the discussion of insurable interest 
clearly centres around the concept of interest. The concepts of value 
~nd loss a~e nevertheless equally apparent in the rules relating to 
1nsurable 1nterest. Each of the other rules of indemnity has each of 
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THE FUNCTIONS AND RATIO OF THE INDEMNITY PRINCIPLE 
The indemnity principle is two-sided and has two 
aims; on the one hand its seeks to prevent the 
recovery of more than the actual amount of the 
loss; on the other hand it seeks to ensure that 
the assured is compensated to the full extent of 
the 10ss20. 
There appear to be two main reasons for the 
principle that the assured should not recover more 
than his loss. The first is that it is the policy 
of the law to prevent the use of a gaming or 
wagering agreement in the guise of insurance21 . 
The second reason is that the policy of the law is 
also to eliminate or reduce the temptation to the 
assured to bring about the event insured against 
if it could or would result in his being 
benefitted thereby22. The second principle namely 
that the assured should be allowed to recover the 
full amount of his loss has not been questioned 
Kremer, op cit, 19 ; Wery, Hoofdzaken van be t Verzekeringsrecbt , 4th ed, 
(1984), 15; Lambert - Faivre, op cit , 332 - 333 . 
Kremer , op c i t, 18 . This particular policy could be expressed in another 
way, namely that the law does not countenance the notion that the 
'a~sured' should be enriched by the insurance . This is the way Lambert-
Fa~vre sees public policy ; op cit, 333. So does Dorhout Mees, Scbets van 
bet Nederlands Handels- en Faill i ssementsrecbt, (1990), (cited as 
Scbets) , 213 . 
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and is in accordance with the roots of insurance 
in the simulated sale . The first of these 
principles has however given rise to various 
difficulties in theory and practice, as will be 
demonstrated in the discussion below of the 
various secondary rules of indemnity. 
THE ORIGINS OF THE INDEMNITY PRINCIPLE 
It was concluded earlier that the maritime loan 
and simulated sale contracts gave insurance the 
indemnity principle and insurable interest, while 
the simulated sale contract also gave birth to the 
concept of an abandonment 23 . Insurable interest, 
abandonment and the indemnity principle, 
interlinked as they are, were integral parts of 
these simulated contracts, and were introduced to 
the contract of insurance via these devices. 
While the indemnity principle was not mentioned by 
name in the works of the earliest authors on 
insurance matters, it was certainly recognized by 
them that the assured could not be allowed to 
recover more than a full indemnity. Santerna24 
In Chapter 4 supra . 
Writing at a time when the contract was still using the terminology of 
the contract of sale . 
411 
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asserted that the assured had to prove the 
casualty as well as the value of the ship or goods 
before he was allowed to recover 'according to the 
value,25 of the goods insured26 . This statement 
implied the presence of the indemnity principle as 
the amount which could be recovered was clearly 
linked to proof of the 'value' of the loss. 
Straccha was more explicit where he wrote: 
'Assecuratus non quaeritlucrum, sed agit ne in 
damno si t. ,27 This statement constitutes a more 
direct reference to the indemnity principle. 
Almost a century later Casaregis, in his careful 
analysis of the nature of insurance, removed any 
uncertainty that may still have been present28 . 
He declared that the insurer was bound to make 
good the value of the thing insured when it was 
totally destroyed or partly lost and partly 
ut tunc valeat.' 
De Assecurationibus et Sponsionibus Mercatorum, (1552), 4 . 46, (available 
in Tractatus ,Illistrum in Utraque tum Pontiiici tum Caesarei juris 
iacultate Iur~sconsultorum, De Contractibus licitis, (1631)). Another 
collection in which Santerna's work was available to me is Straccha's 
De Mercatura Decisiones, et Tractatus varii, (1621). 
('Insurance does non produce a profit, but in truth strives to 
ind7mnify . ') Tractatus de Assecurationibus et Proxenetis, (1569),20.4 . 
(Th1s work was also taken up in the collection Tractatus Illistrum in 
Utraque tum Pontiiici tum Caesarei juris iacultate Iurisconsultorum De 
CODtractibus licitis, (1631).) , 
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saved29 , and in a case of a partial loss owed 
only that sum which represented the proportion of 
the goods laden on board and lost, even if the 
d d th 1 f the goods30. insured sum excee e e va ue 0 
The essence of the indemnity principle was thus 
stated centuries ago in these short passages. 
The earliest compilations of insurance customs and 
usages as well as the earliest legislation on the 
subject also contained provisions which served to 
maintain the principle that the amount which could 
be recovered by the assured must not exceed the 
value of the thing insured. The Guidon de la Mer 
of the middle sixteenth century asserted that the 
assured could not reap benefit from the 
impoverishment of others, meaning the insurers31 . 
Article 2 of the Amsterdam Ordonnance of 1598 
expressly forbade the insurance of goods otherwise 
than by taking account of 'de oprechte en de 
gemeene waerde van di en', and even then forbade 
Disc 1 num 101 : 'Assecurati liquidare tenentur valorem assecuratae, vel 
quando tota peremptae est, vel quando in parte salva est, et in parte 
perempta.' (' The insurer is liable to make good the value of the insured 
thing, whether it is totally lost or whether it is partly saved and 
partly lost.') He could say this with regard to what appears to be a 
partial loss with confidence because the insurer acquired the salvage 
as a result of the abandonment which invariably followed the loss . 
Disc 7 num 8: ' ... quia si est assecurationis debetur solum damnum ad 
ratam mercium oneratarum, et deperditarum ... ' (' ... hence in the case 
of insurance only the loss to the extent of the merchandise laden on 
board and which perished is owing .. . ') 
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the insurance of the goods beyond nine tenths of 
their true value32 , so jealously was the 
principle guarded. The Ordonnance de la Marine of 
1681 maintained the prohibition against insurance 
beyond nine tenths of the value of the ship or 
goods insured33 • It further prohibited the 
insurance of the goods beyond their true value, 
whether by way of over- insurance or by way of 
double-insurance, on pain of invalidity of the 
policy and confiscation of the merchandise34 • It 
also forbade the insurance of freight, seamen's 
wages and the anticipated profits of the 
voyage35 • The idea behind this approach was 
apparently that the French took a strict line36 , 
regarding as valid objects of insurance only those 
which the assured ran the risk of losing during 
the voyage, and not profits which he might fail to 
De Groot, Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleerdbeid, (1631), 
(' Inleidinge') 3.24 . 4; Van der Keessel, Theses Selectae Juris Hollandici 
et Zelandici, (1800), (' Theses Selectae'), 717; Bynkershoek, Quaestiones 
Juris Privati, (1744), 1.iv.c.4 at 550 and c.13 . at 626. The subsequent 
ordonnances passed in Amsterdam and Rotterdam in 1744 and 1721 
respectively allowed insurance to the full value. See Van der Keessel 
Theses Selectae, 717 . ' 
Chapter I , Title IV, article 18. This provision later fell into disuse, 
and was not reproduced in the Code de Commerce of 1807, ('the CdeC'); 
Pardessus, Collection de Lois Maritimes anterieures au XVIIre Siecle, 
(1837), Vol IV, 372 fn 7 . 
Chapter I, Title IV, article 22. The provisions of this article were 
taken up in article 357 of the CdeC; Pardessus, op cit, Vol IV, 373 fn 
.1. 
Chapter I, Title VI, article 15. See also Emerigon, op cit, (Meredith 
edition), 13-14. 
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realize37 • 
When and by whom the term 'indemnity principle' 
was first introduced, is not entirely clear. It 
has been suggested the term has its origins in 
English and French terminology38. It is submitted 
however, that the Latin origins of the word aside, 
Benecke's treatise probably not only gave birth to 
the terminology39 but also made the concept of 
indemnification an indispensable part of the 
language of indemnity insurance4o • 
THE INDEMNITY PRINCIPLE IN OTHER COUNTRIES 
THE NETHERLANDS 
The indemnity principle was recognized in Dutch 
legislation as long ago as the Amsterdam 
Ordonnance of 1598, a trend continued in later 
Dutch insurance ordonnances, for example, the 
In this respect a different approach has been followed in England and 
America from the earliest time, in that insurance of conunissions, 
profits and freight was legally valid in those countries. See Meredith's 
conunent in Emerigon, op cit, (Meredith's edition), 14 fn (a). 
Kremer, op cit, 17. 
Benecke's work was the first scientific analysis of indemnity as a 
separate and overriding concept applying to all insurance contracts . 
The principle of indemnity is the aspect of indemnity insurance which 
~OBt appropr~ately distinguishes it from life or non-indemnity 
~nsurance, wh~ch does not link the amount of the insurance to the amount 
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Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1721, which forbade the 
conclusion of contracts amounting to wagers or 
contracts on " profl'ts
41 lmaglnary and further 
forbade the insurance of ships beyond seven-
eighths of their value42 • 
In the draft Burgerlijk Wetboek of 1801 the 
draftsman (Walraven) included a number of 
provisions which would have had the effect of 
expressly maintaining or protecting the indemnity 
principle43 • These principles were further 
developed in the draft Wetboek of 1808 and 
subsequent drafts until they were taken up in 
Wetboek van Koophandel of 1838, ('the WvK'). 
Although the indemnity principle is not mentioned 
explicitly in the WvK its presence is apparent in 
Article 28 . 
Article 31. 
Kremer, op cit, 7. Walraven's draft article 3 provided that no insurance 
was to be valid unless the assured had a recognized and immediate 
interest in the thing insured. The draft article 5 provided that the 
insurance could never result in profit and only in 'schadeloosstelling' . 
Article 9 reinforced the notion that there could be no valid insurance 
unless the assured had an interest in the thing insured. An insurance 
concluded contrary to that provision would be null and void from the 
beginning. Article 14 proposed that the same interest could not be 
insured against the same risk, during the same voyage or for the same 
period unless the first insurer became insolvent during the currency of 
the policy. Article 26 provided that, where more than one policy was 
taken out on the same interest, the second and further policies were 
void, unless they specifically and expressly mentioned the first policy . 
Lastly, the draft article 77 provided that any insurance made against 
the nature of the contract of insurance, as for example a contract of 
wager, a policy 'interest or no interest' or without proof of interest, 
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form part of the general section of the WvK 
dealing with indemnity insurance in general. The 
supremacy of the indemnity principle has also been 
recognized in various treatises in Dutch law since 
188246 . 
The matter is simplified considerably in the 
provisions of the Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek
47
• 
Article 7.12.2.1 defines indemnity insurance as 
'de verzekering strekkende tot vergoeding van 
vermogensschade die de verzekerde zou kunnen 
lijden, de vergoeding van kosten die hij zou 
kunnen maken daaronder begrepen.' 
Nolst Trenite, 'Beboeven de beginselen van scbadeverzekeringsrecbt 
opgenomen in de artikelen 246-283 WvK wijziging?', an advice published 
before the Annual Meeting of the Nederlandse Juristen-Vereniging, 1939, 
has identified the principal articles of the WvK in which the indemnity 
principle is protected and maintained as the following: articles 250, 
252, 253(1}, 274, 275, 277, 278, 279 and 284. See also Kremer, op cit, 
20. 
The most important articles of the WvK in which the indemnity principle 
is now enshrined, are the following: article 246, which defines the 
insurance contract in such a way that it is clear that it is one of 
indemnity (, ... om denzelven scbadeloos te stellen wegens een verlies 
... '); article 250, which prohibits insurance without an interest in the 
thing insured; article 252, which regulates the situation when there is 
double insurance; article 253(1}, which prevents the recovery of more 
than a true indemnity in cases of over-insurance; article 277, which 
also prevents the recovery of more than a true indemnity in a case of 
double-insurance; and articles 273-275 and 288-289 which regulate the 
determination of the value of the thing insured and the quantification 
of the loss. Another important provision is found in article 254, which 
makes the provisions of the articles mentioned above compulsory. 
Kremer, op cit, 23-27. 
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Article 7 . 17.2 . 24-1 provides specifically that the 
assured is not entitled to any compensation which 
would have the effect of enriching him . By these 
two articles the relationship between interest, 
value and loss is fully maintained48 • 
GERMANY 
The indemnity principle has been recognized in 
German law for a long time. Benecke's treatise 
analysing the indemnity principle was first 
published in German at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century49 . The indemnity principle is 
referred to as the , Bereicherungsverbot' or the 
, Entschadigungsprinzip' 50 . 
The principle is not mentioned expressly in the 
Versicherungsvertragsgesetz (' the VVG'), nor in 
the marine insurance section of the 
Handelsgesetzbuch (' the HGB') 
specifically, however, in 
Versicherungsbedingungen or 
provisions (' the AVB' ) 51 
Kremer , op c i t , 53 . 
It is mentioned 
the Allgemeine 
general insurance 
of the German 
System des See -Assekuranz - und Bodmerei - Wesens, 5 vole , (1805 - 1821 ). 
Kremer, op cit, 174 . 
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Association of Fire Insurers, where the principle 
is stated in article 13(2) that 'Die Versicherung 
solie nicht zu einer Bereicherung fuhren,52. 
Articles 1 and 55 of the VVG contain important 
provisions which import the indemnity principle 
into the VVG by implication53 . Article 1 defines 
the contract of insurance in such a way that the 
indemnity principle is implied54 . Article 55 on 
the other hand provides that the insurer is not 
obliged to pay the assured more than the amount of 
the loss even if the insured sum exceeds the value 
at the time of the occurrence55 . According to 
article 49 of the VVG the indemnity has to be 
given in money56 and the loss therefore has to be 
one which can be expressed and compensated in 
money. 
'The insurance shall not result in any enrichment (of the assured)' . See 
also Kremer, op cit, 174-175. 
Kremer, op cit, 175 . 
'Bei der Schadensversicherung ist der Versicherer verpflichtet, nach dem 
eintritt des Versicherungsfalls dem Versicherungsnehmer den dadurch 
verursachte Ver.mogensschaden nach Massgabe des Vertrags zu ersetzen.' 
('In ind~mnity insurance the insurer is obliged, after the occurrence 
of the l.nsured event, to pay to the assured the amount of the 
patrimonial loss caused by that event to the extent (provided for) in 
the contract . ') 
'Der Versicherer ist ... nicht verpflichtet ... mehr als den Betrag des 
Schadens zu ersetzen.' (' The insurer is not obliged to pay more than the 
amount of the loss'.) 
'Der Versicherer hat den Schadensersatz in Geld zu leisten.' (' The 
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FRANCE 
From the outset French law applied the indemnity 
principle in insurance contracts. The Guidon de la 
Mer provided specifically that the assured was not 
to reap advantage from the loss of others57 . 
Emerigon relied on Straccha and Targa for his 
statement that the very nature of the contract of 
insurance demands that it should not be a source 
of profit to the assured and concluded that any 
contract of insurance which deviated from that 
principle was void58 • 
The customary law embodied in the Guidon de la Mer 
forbade wagers dressed up as insurance 
contracts59 , an approach echoed in the provisions 
of the Ordonnance de la Marine of 168160 and the 
Code de Commerce of 1807 (' the CdeC') 61. 
The most modern French insurance legislation is to 
be found in the Code des Assurances of 1976, ('the 
CdA') which is bas'ed on the law of the 13th July, 
Chapter 2 article 13 . 
Op cit, Chapter I, Section IV; (Meredith's translation, 13.) 
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1930 and covers non-marine insurance62 • Article 
L 121-1 repeats article 28 of the law of 13 July, 
1930 and provides specifically that the contract 
is one of indemnity, and that the indemnity due by 
the insurer to the assured may not exceed the 
value of the thing insured at the time of the 
casual ty63. The principle is also recognized in 
the treatises on the sUbject64 . Law 522 of 1967, 
which deals only with marine insurance, does not 
explicitly mention the indemnity principle. 
However, article 15 implicitly recognizes the 
indemnity principle by providing that the insurer 
is liable for physical damage caused to the 
insured objects by marine perils or force 
majeure65 • 
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 
In English law the indemnity principle is mainly 
Kremer, op cit, 189. 
Article L 121-1.1: 'L'assurance est un contrat d'indemnite; 
l' indemni te due par l' assureur a. l' assure ne peut pas depasser le 
montant de la valeur de la chose assuree au moment du sinistre.' 
('Insurance is a contract of indemnity; the indemnity due by the insurer 
to th~ assured may not exceed the full value of the thing insured as at 
the t~me of the casualty . ') See also Lambert-Faivre op cit 332' 
Kremer, op cit, 189. ' " 
Kremer, op cit, 190; Picard and Besson, Les Assurances Terrestres, 5th 
ed, (by Besson), (1982), Vol I, 281 and 284. 
Article 15: 'L'assureur repond des dommages materiels causes aux objets 
a~suree: par to~te ~ortune de mer ou par un evenement de force majeure'. 
~ The ~nsurer ~s l~able for the material damage caused to the objects 
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preserved by the common law, although two Acts of 
Parliament namely the Life Assurance Act of 1774 
and the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (' the MIA') 
contain provisions thereon. The fact that the 1774 
Act was known as the Gambling Act gives a hint of 
the reason for that act, namely to prevent 
wagering under the guise of insurance
66
• That 
act, however, was not applicable to fire 
insurance. 
The indemnity principle is implicit in sections 1 
and 3 of the Life Assurance Act of 1774. Section 
1 provides that no insurance may be made 
, wherein the person or persons for whose use, 
benefit or on whose account such policy or 
policies shall be made, shall have no interest, or 
by the way of gaming or wagering' . 
Section 3 further provides that the amount payable 
shall not be greater 'than the amount of the value 
of the interest of insured in such ... event or 
events' . 
In these short provisions the three aspects of 
indemnity namely interest, value and loss come to 
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provisions of this act were already in force when 
the American Colonies won their freedom from the 
Crown, and since then these principles of 
indemnity in English marine insurance law have 
been part of American law too67 • Section 1 of the 
MIA defines insurance as an undertaking by which 
, the insurer undertakes to indemnify the insured' , 
which emphasises the nature of the contract as one 
of indemnity. This principle is also recognized 
explicitly in American marine insurance law68 • 
THE SECONDARY OR SPECIAL RULES OF INDEMNITY 
The indemni ty principle encounters, on the one 
hand, a number of problematic circumstances, and 
is served on the other hand, by a number of rules 
whose function it is to ensure that a proper 
indemnification occurs in all the diverse cases 
which may arise. In each of these cases a true 
indemnity is difficult to achieve, and it may well 
be said that the indemnity principle is an 
imperfect principle because it cannot, in all 
cases, achieve its aim69 • While the principle may 
The same does not , of course, apply to the provisions of the MIA . 
46A C.J.S . Insurance para 1460; Pacific Fire Ins . Co v Pennsylvania 
Sugar Co . 72 F 2nd 958. 
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be less than perfect, it seeks to achieve its aims 
through these subsidiary principles or rules, each 
of which plays its role in the particular 
circumstances for which it is designed. The rules 
concerned deal with such diverse situations as the 
absence of insurable interest, double-insurance, 
over-insurance, under-insurance, valued policies, 
replacement value insurance, sue and labour 
clauses, the quantification of the loss, and also 
the areas covered by subrogation and abandonment. 
In the inter-play between the concepts of 
interest, value and loss, these special or 
secondary rules of the indemnity principle guard 
the indemnity principle at all its corners, always 
seeking to ensure that the assured recovers a full 
indemnity but no more than that . Nevertheless, 
there appears to be an area where public policy as 
exemplified by the judgments of the courts and the 
pressures of modern insurance practice have 
created circumstances where the assured is allowed 
to recover more than a strict indemnity. 
INSURABLE INTEREST 
The assured can, of course, suffer no loss unless 
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insurance which, as a result of the loss or 
damage, adversely affects him in his patrimony70. 
This interest is referred to as an insurable 
interest7l . The extent of the indemnity can not 
exceed the value of the assured's insurable 
interest . 
While the assured had an interest in the thing 
which was subject to the risk from the birth of 
indemnity insurance, as was pointed out 
earlier72 , it was not until much later that 
Casaregis analysed the nature of the contract of 
insurance, compared it to other contracts such as 
wager and guarantee 73, and concluded that the 
contract of insurance is to be distinguished from 
other contracts on the basis that in the former an 
interest in the thing at risk is always present, 
whereas such an interest is absent in wagers and 
Insurable interest is broadly defined in Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol 44, 
Insurance, (cited as 44 C.J.S. Insurance). para 175 as follows: 'A 
person usually has an insurable interest in the subject matter insured 
where he will derive pecuniary benefit or advantage from its 
preservation, or will suffer pecuniary loss or damage from its 
destruction, tennination, or injury by the happening of the event 
insured against.' 
See generally Ivamy, Principles, 19-29; LAWSA, para 102. 
See Chapter 4 supra. 
Discursus Legales et COlllll!ercio, (1707), discursus 1 Dum 24 and discursus 
7 Dum 5; 'Sponsionis contractus est diversus ab assecuratione nam ille 
valet etiam sine aliqua oneratione, vel risico.' ('The co'ntract of 
guarantee differs from insurance because it is effective without any 
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guarantees 74 . casaregis made it clear that 
without an interest in the object which is subject 
to the risk there could be no insurance 
contract 75 • 
Insurable interest is a requirement of Dutch law 
too76 • Dorhout Mees referred to the requirement 
of an insurable interest as ' het fundamenteel 
beginsel van alle schadeverzekering,77. Wagers in 
the form of insurance were prohibited in Holland 
under the Amsterdam78 , Rot terdam 79 and 
Middelburg80 ordonnances on insurance, and it 
follows that a contract contrary to the 
prohibition was unenforceable. It is not made 
entirely clear whether Dutch law requires that 
interest to be present at the time of the 
See also Marshall, op cit, Book I, 80. 
Discursue IV num 4 : ' Sicuti enim principale fundamentur aeeecurationie 
est risicum, eeu intereeee aeeecuratorum, eine quo non poteet eubeietere 
assecuratio.' (Indeed, just as the risk is a principal foundation of 
insurance, so is the interest of the assured, without which (interest) 
there cannot be an insurance . ) 
Article 250 of Chapter III, Title 9, Book I of the Wetboek van 
K~ophandel ('the WvK' ) provides as follows: '250 Indien hij, die voor 
z~ch ze~ven heeft laten verz~x:eren, of hij , voor wiene rekening door een 
ander ~e verzekerd, ten t~]de der verzekering geen belang in het 
verzekerd voorwerp heeft, ie de verzekeraarniet tot echadelooeetelling 
gehouden . ' 
Schete, 213 . 
Article 13 of the Amsterdam Ordonnance of 1744. 
Article 28 of the Rotterdam Ordonnance of 172l. 
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conclusion of the contract as the article of the 
WvK simply says 'ten tijde der verzekering' 81. 
Since Dutch law is quite specific about the rule 
that the assured may not recover any compensation 
beyond what he has actually 10st82 , the rule must 
logically be that the assured cannot recover 
unless he had an interest at the time of the 
casualty as he could not suffer any loss without 
such an interest. 
In German law83 it is not specifically provided 
that the contract is invalid if the assured does 
not have an insurable interest in the object which 
is subject to the risk, but it appears that the 
approach is similar to that which prevails in 
South African law, namely that the contract is 
valid but no loss which has to be indemnified 
arises84 • If, however, both parties knew that 
there was no insurable interest and that there was 
none likely to arise later, then the contract is 
not a valid insurance contract under German marine 
Article 250 of the WvK. See also article 7 . 17.2 . 1 of the NBW. 
Dorhout Mees , Handel srecht , 87. 
~ee gen~rally Chao-Kuo Chiang, 'Das Interesse im Seeversicherungsrecht ' 
1n_vers1che~ngsrech~liche Studien, Vol 3; Hofmann, op cit, 147 et seq; 
Prolss- Mart1n, op c1t, 283 et seq; Bruck-Moller, op cit, 56 et seq. 
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insurance There is an 
apparent 
contradiction between articles 51 and 52 of the 
VVG in that the former mentions the value of the 
insured interest86 whereas the latter refers to 
the value of the thing insured87 • Article 68 of 
the VVG indirectly provides that future interests 
may also be insured, but is equally clear that if 
the contemplated interest does not come into 
existence then the assured is released from his 
obligation to pay the premium and the insurer 
becomes entitled to recover only his reasonable 
expenses88 • In terms of article 52 of the VVG the 
value of an insured obj ect is regarded as the 
insurable interest unless the circumstances 
indicate otherwise89 • German marine insurance law 
appears to be to the same effect90 • 
Article 785(2) of the HGB. 
, . .. Wert des versicherten Interesses'. (' the value of the insured 
interest' ) 
' ... der Wert des Sache.' ('the value of the insured thing') 
The requirement of insurable interest is thus postulated indirectly. 
Kremer, op cit, 177 . 
Article 785 of the HGB provides as follows: ' (1) Aut die Giiltichkeit des 
Versicherungsvertrags hat es keinen Eintluss, dass zur Zeit des 
Abschlusses die Moglicbkeit des Eintritts eines zu ersetzenden Scbadens 
~chon ausgeschl~ssen ode~ der z~ ersetzende Schaden bereits eingetreten 
~st. (2) Waren ]edoch be~de Te~le van dem Sachverbaltnis unterrichtet 
so ist der Vertr~g als Versicherungsvertrag ungiiltig.' ('The validit~ 
of the contract ~s not affected if, at the time of conclusion of the 
contract, the event insured against can no longer occur, or has already 
occurred . . If, however,. both parties had knowledge of the true facts, the 
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In French law article L 121-6 of the CdA of 1976 
provides that every person who has an interest in 
the preservation of the thing may insure it. Every 
interest, whether direct or indirect, in relation 
to the 'non-realisation' of the risk may be the 
subject of insurance. It therefore appears that 
there is a very wide circle of persons with such 
an interest 91 • In French law wagers in the form 
of insurance contracts were prohibited from the 
earliest times, by the Guidon de la Mey92, the 
Ordonnance de la Marine of 168193 and by the 
CdC94 • Such contracts were therefore not 
enforceable, as in Holland . 
Insurable interest is defined in English law in 
respect of marine insurance95 , but that 
definition is regarded as responsible for the 
difference between English law and American law, 
in that English law insists that there should be 
a 'legal or equitable relation' between the 
Kremer, op cit, 190 . 
Article 5, Chapter 1. 
Article 22 . 
See also Boulay -Paty, Droit Commercial, (1822), Vol III, 238 . 
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assured and the adventure or property96. Unless 
such an interest existed and vested in the assured 
at the time of the loss, there can be no call for 
an indemnification97 . The existence of an 
insurable interest is thus the first requirement 
determining the insurer's obligation to indemnify. 
Insurable interest is a requirement for the 
validity of the contract not only in English 
marine insurance law98 but also in other legal 
systems based on it99 • American law100 takes a 
much wider approach to the concept of insurable 
interest than English law, principally because the 
old English statutes which came into effect after 
American independence in 1776 did not apply in 
MacGillivray & Parkington, Insurance Law (relating to all risks other 
than marine), 8th ed, (1988), para 44. 
'In property insurance an insurable interest generally must exist both 
at the time of the contract and at the time of the loss ... '; 44 C.J.S. 
Insurance, para 175 . This rule may express English and American law 
correctly, but not continental law. There the rule seems to require no 
more than that the interest must exist at the time of the loss. 
Section 4 of the MIA provides as follows: '4 (1) Every contract of marine 
insurance by way of gaming or wagering is void. 
'4 (2) A contract of marine insurance is deemed to be a gaming or 
wagering contract-
a where the assured has not an insurable interest as defined in this 
Act, and the contract is entered into with no expectation of acquiring 
such interest; or 
b where the policy is made "interest or no interest" or "without proof 
of further interest than the policy itself" or "without benefit of 
salvage to the insurer" or subject to any other like term: 
Provided that, where there is no possibility of salvage, a policy may 
be effected without benefit of salvage to the insurer . ' 
Instances of insurable interest are given in the sections of the MIA 
following upon this section . 
See, in relation to American law, Phillips, A Treatise on the Law of 
Insurance, 4th ed, (1854), Vol II, Chapter III; Gilmore and Black The 
Law of Admiralty, 2nd ed, (1975), 59; Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime 
Law, (1987), 569. In Canada, Australia, New Zealand and even India the 
marine insurance legislation is based on the English MIA, and the law 
with regard to insurable interest is the same as English law. 
See generally 44 C.J.S. Insurance, para 218 et seq. 
430 
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America101 • For example, the prohibition against 
ppi policies in section 4 of the MIA is unknown in 
American law102 • 
South African law leans toward the approach that 
insurable interest must exist at the time of the 
loss as without such interest at that time there 
could be no diminution in the patrimony of the 
assured which needs to be compensated103 • There 
is a wealth of authority dating back to the Roman-
Dutch law of the province of Holland requiring an 
insurable interest104 • 
Whether the requirement of an insurable interest 
is seen as an independent requirement without 
which the contract is invalid, as in English and 
American law105 , or is seen as a demonstration of 
the operation of the indemnity principle, as in 
South African law106 , does not matter in 
practice, as the assured can in either system only 
MacGillivray & Parkington, op cit, para 39. 
MacGillivray & Parkington , op cit, para 39 . 
Reinecke , 'Versekering Bonder Versekerbare Belang?' 1971 CILSA 193, 338 . 
These are discussed in De Jager, The Roman -Dutch law of Marine Insurance 
applicable in South Africa, LLM thesis , Cape Town, (1987-1988), Chapters 
9 and 12. 
Ivamy, Principles, 22 ; 44 C.J.S. Insurance, para 175 . 
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recover if he has such an interest at the time of 
the loss. Indeed, it has been suggested that there 
is no need for the concept of insurable interest 
and that it may safely be done away with as the 
finding on the question whether the assured has 
suffered an indemnifiable loss will inevitably 
determine whether he had an insurable interest in 
the first place107 • 
It is not within the scope of this work to analyse 
the precise ambit of the different forms that an 
insurable interest may take108 , but the general 
statement may be made that the assured has an 
insurable interest in the object of the insurance 
if the loss or destruction of, or prejudice to, 
that obj ect may result in a diminution of the 
patrimony of the assured or in his patrimony not 
being increased109 • The link between the 
indemnity principle and this definition is 
immediately apparent. The following examples of 
See Reinecke, 'Versekering Bonder Versekerbare Belang?', 1971 CILSA 193; 
Van Niekerk, 'Insurable Interest 1, Legal Certainty 0', (1995) 7 SA Merc 
LJ 262 and the authorities there cited . 
For extensive examples of interests regarded as insurable under American 
law, which appears to be wider than English law in this regard, see 44 
C.J.S. !nsuranc~, paras 175-2~2; Phillips, op cit, Vol I, Chapter III . 
. For an 1nterest1ng demonstrat1on of the problems which may arise in FOB 
and CIF sales, see the Australian case of N.S.W. Leather Co. Pty Ltd v 
Vanguard Insurance Co. Ltd. (1991) 25 NSWLR 699 and the discussion 
thereon by Davies, 'Australian maritime decisions 1992', 1993 LMCLQ 253 
at 261 et seq. 
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persons who are regarded as having an insurable 
interest in the subject-matter of a typical marine 
insurance policy may suffice: the owner or part 
110 d' A' 1 a shareholder in owner an l.n merl.can aw, 
the company or corporation which owns the thing 
insured111 ; a charterer of the ship; a trustee; 
a surety in respect of debts secured by the thing; 
a cessionary; the carrier in respect of the goods 
in his custody or care; a mortgagee; lienholders; 
a lender on bottomry or respondentia; and a buyer 
under an executory contract112 . 
DOUBLE-OR MULTIPLE-INSURANCE113 
The Guidon de la Mer provided a simple if drastic 
solution to any attempt by an assured to gain from 
the insurance by taking out more than one policy. 
It recorded the customary rule that the first 
The part owner has an insurable interest only to a proportionate part 
of the value of the thing ; BareIs, Advysen over den Koophandel en 
Zeevaart , (1780-1781), Advys 27 . 
44 C.J.S. Insurance, para 246; Seamen v Enterprise Fire & Marine Ins. 
Co . 21 F 778 . 
See Bruck-Moller, op cit, 288 et seq for examples of insurable interest 
in German law and Ivamy, Marine Insurance, 4th ed, (1985), 16-29 for 
examples in English marine insurance law . In French law the discussion 
appears to centre around the concept of loss rather than whether an 
insurable interest exists. Lambert-Faivre, op cit, for example, does not 
even devote a chapter to a discussion of the nature of the interest 
required. Logically there cannot be a loss without an interest, and the 
determination of the question whether the assured suffered a loss also 
determines whether there was an insurable interest which was affected 
by the event insured against. The French approach therefore supports the 
notion that the concept of insurable interest be done away with . 
The phrase double insurance is commonly used to include both multiple 
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Subsequent POll' cies did policy alone attached. 
not114 • The assured was thus prevented from 
recovery and the making a double 
principle prevailed. 
indemnity 
Other legal systems found slightly different 
answers to the same problem, but all the solutions 
have the same result as the Guidon in mind, namely 
that the assured should not benefit from the 
insured event115 . 
Double- or multiple-insurance is said to exist 
when the assured is covered by two or more 
policies on the same subject, the same risk and 
the same interest116 . It only amounts to double-
insurance if the total amount insured exceeds the 
value of the assured's insurable interest l17 • All 
the insurances are generally valid in double-
Articles 16 and 18, Chapter 2 and article 3, Chapter 3 . 
In English law, for example, double-insurance is valid, but makes 'but 
one insurance' , which is good to the value of the goods at risk ; 
Marshall, A Treatise on the Law of Insurance, (1802), Book I, 116 . 
Mustill and Gi lman , Arnould's Law of Marine Insurance and Average, 16th 
ed, (1981), (cited as 'Arnould') , para 406; 45 C.J.S. Insurance, para 
951 ; LAWSA, para 238; Getz and Davis , op cit, 274; American Surety Co 
of New York v Wrightson (1910) 103 LT 663. Lambert-Faivre, op cit, 340-
341 . Park, op cit, 320 defined it as follows : 'A double insurance is 
where the same man is to receive two sums instead of one or the same 
sum twice over, for the same loss, by reason of having made two 
insurances upon the same goods or the same loss.' 
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insurance1l8 , unless concluded fraudulently1l9. 
In a case of double-insurance the assured is at 
liberty to claim the full amount from anyone of 
the insurers, or a portion from each of them, but 
once he has been compensated in full, he no longer 
has a claim against any of the others120 . Even 
if, as may be under strict Roman-Dutch law, the 
insurer were only liable for his pro rata share of 
the loss, the assured would recover no more than 
each insurer's pro ra ta share from him121 . The 
assured thus cannot recover more than a full 
indemnity122 in either event. It has been said 
that the purpose of the rule is to 'prevent fraud, 
lest the desire of gain should occasion unfair and 
wilful losses.' 123 The true reason seems to be, 
however, that the contract of insurance does not 
brook a recovery by the assured beyond the actual 
loss. Once he has been indemnified under the one 
That is not the case in the Netherlands ; see the discussion of the 
position in that country in the tex t infra . 
Arnould, para 406 . 
Park, op cit, 320; 46 C.J.S. Insurance, para 1207 ; LAWSA , paras 238 and 
242; Getz and Davis , op c i t, 274. 
LAWSA, para 239 fn 8; Bynkershoek, Quaestiones Juris Privati, (1744), 
4.2; Van der Keessel , Praelectiones Juris Hodierni ad Hugonis Grotium 
Introductionem ad Jurisprudentiam Hollandicam, (published in 1961-1967) 
('Praelectiones') , 3.24 .17; Van der Linden , Regtsgeleerd, practicaal: 
en Koopmans Handboek , (1806), (' Koopmans Handboek'), 4.6.3 . 
Ivamy, Principles, para 487 ; Morgan v Price (1849) 4 Exch 615; LAWSA, 
para 242. 
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policy, there can be no claim under any of the 
others because there is no longer a loss to be 
made good. 
When an insurer has discharged his liability to 
the assured124 he becomes entitled to call upon 
the other insurers to contribute their pro rata 
shares of the amount already paid by him in terms 
of his policy125. In English law this right to a 
contribution arises from equity126, not from 
contract, as there is no contract between the 
various insurers. The right to a contribution also 
exists only in indemnity insurance127 . There are 
detailed rules relating to the apportionment of 
the loss between the insurers128 , but these are 
not relevant here. It should be noted, however, 
that the insurer has to enforce his right to a 
contribution against the other insurers in his own 
name, and not in the name of the assured129 . This 
demonstrates that the right to a contribution does 
Williams v North China Insurance Co (1876) 1 CPD 757 (CA) . 
Ivamy, Principles, 487-488; 46 C.J.S. Insurance, para 1208; LAWSA, para 
343; Getz and Davis, op cit, 276; Lambert-Faivre, op cit, 346-347 . 
Park, op cit , 321; Ivamy, Principles, 488 ; Godin v London Assurance Co 
(1758) 1 Burr 489 . 
LAWSA, para 242 . 
Ivamy, Principles, 493 et seq . 
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nor arise from some form of subrogation. 
The conditions which must be present for the right 
to a contribution to arise are basically the same 
in English, American, South African, German and 
French law130 and are the following: All the 
policies must cover the same interest or subject-
matter131 i all the policies must cover the same 
peril132 i all the policies must be in favour of 
the same assured133 i all the policies must be in 
force at the time of the 10SS134 i and all the 
policies must be valid contracts of insurance135 . 
In South African law the right to a contribution 
existing between insurers would not exist if 
Dutch law appears to be the odd man out as a result of the provisions 
of articles 252 and 277 (1) of the WvK, which make the second or 
subsequent policy void or ineffective except so far as the first policy 
does not result in a full indemnification of the assured; See Scheltema-
Mijnssen, Algemeen Deel van het Schadeverzekeringsrecht, 4th ed, 167 et 
seq. 
Ivamy, Principles, 488; Getz and Davis, op cit, 276; Godin v London 
Assurance Co, supra; Bruck -Moller, op cit, 462 ; Lambert-Faivre, op cit, 
342 . 
Ivamy, Principles , 489; Getz and Davis, op cit, 277; North British and 
Mercantile Insurance Co v London, Liverpool and Globe Insurance Co 
(1877) 5 Ch D 569 (CA); Bruck- Moller, op cit, 462; Lambert-Faivre, op 
cit, 341-342. 
Ivamy, Principles, 489-490; Godin v London Assurance Co, supra; Bruck-
Moller, op cit, 462. 
Ivamy, Principles , 491; Getz and Davis, op cit, 277; Weddell v Road 
Transport and -General Insurance Co Ltd [1932] 2 KB 563; Bruck-Moller, 
op cit, 462; Lambert-Faivre, op cit, 342 . 
This states the obvious, but see in any event Ivamy, Principles, 492; 
Arnould, para 406; Getz and Davis, op cit, 277; Woods v Co-operative 
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certain passages in the works of Bynkershoek, Van 
der Keessel and Van der Linden are construed to 
refer to double-insurance rather than co-
insurance. The assured would then be limited in 
his claim against each insurer to a pro rata share 
onlyl36. The matter is not entirely clear, but 
there is a strong indication that the Roman-Dutch 
rule was intended to refer only to the situation 
where more than one insurer bound himself under 
the. same policy (co-insurance) as opposed to the 
case where more than one policy is taken out as in 
the standard case of double-insurance. As Van der 
Linden put it, 
, (e)ene Polis van Assurantie kan geteekend worden 
door verscheiden Assuradeurs, zelfs op 
onderscheiden tijden: en zijn zij allen even zeer 
voor de vergoeding der schade aansprakelijk, in 
evenredigheid van de somme, waar voor elk hunner 
geteekend heeft.' 137 
If the right to a contribution did not exist under 
South African law the insurer who paid the full 
amount of the loss before he learned of the 
existence of the other policy or policies would be 
LAWSA, para 239 fn 8. 
Koopmans Hanciboek, 4.6.3. 
438 
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unable to recover from the other insurers on the 
grounds of enrichment because the assured is the 
one who is enriched by the overpayment, not the 
other insurers138 . 
The general position of English law regarding 
double-insurance has been stated above and 
compared with South African law, leading to the 
conclusion that the two systems lead to the same 
result. German139 and French
140 law treat 
double-insurance similarly and regard a second 
policy as valid but limit the right to recover to 
the amount of the loss. In these two legal 
systems, as in English law, the insurers are also 
granted a right to a contribution inter se. A 
second policy taken in bad faith is invalid also 
in these systems. Current Dutch law differs from 
the other legal systems mentioned in that it 
provides that the second insurance contract is 
Phillips v Hughes; Hughes v Maphumulo 1979 1 SA 225 (N). 
Articles 58-60 of the VVG. The assured who takes out double-insurance 
has to inform each insurer of the fact and of the identity of the other 
insurer, as well as the amount insured by such other insurance; article 
58. The insurers are jointly and severally liable, but the assured 
cannot recover more than the amount of the loss; article 59(1). The 
insurers have a right of contribution inter se; article 59(2). Double-
insurance effected with a fraudulent intention is void; article 59(3). 
Under certain circumstances the assured may effect a cancellation of the 
second or later policy and recover or save part of the premium; article 
60. See also Hofmann, op cit, 177-180; Bruck-Moller, op cit, 459 et seq. 
Article L 121-4 of the CdA, as amended by article 8 of the law of 13 
J';lly 19.82. See generally Lambert-Faivre, op cit, 340 et seq for a 
d1scuss10n of double-insurance and the insurer's right of contribution 
in general indemnity insurance and Rodiere and Pontavice Droit 
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void141 . 
Notwi thstanding this distinction between Dutch law 
and the other systems mentioned, the ultimate 
result remains the same so far as the indemnity 
principle is concerned: The assured is prevented 
from recovering more than a full indemnity by 
taking out a second policy and is restricted to 
the amount of his actual loss. Since the second 
policy is not valid in Dutch law there is no need 
for .a right of contribution between the insurers 
in that system. 
So far as marine insurance is concerned, the rules 
relating to double-insurance and the right to a 
contribution are regulated by the marine insurance 
legislation in force in England142 , Germany143 
and France144 . French and German law differ 
markedly from English marine insurance law in that 
Article 252 of the general insurance section of the WvK: '252 
Uitgezonderd die gevallen bij de wet bepaald, mag geene tweede 
verzekering gedaan worden, voor denzelfden tijd en voor hetzelfde 
gevaar, op voorwerpen, welke reeds voor dezelver volle waarde verzekerd 
zijn, en zulks op straffe van nietigheid der tweede verzekering.' 
Sections 32(1) and 80 of the MIA. 
Article 787 of the marine insurance section of the HGB . See also 
articles 59 and 60 of the VVG . 
Articles 12, 13 and 34 of Law 522 of 1967. Harrel-Courtes, op cit, 37 
makes three points about article 34. In the first place the insurers are 
~ot liable in solidum. In the second place, each insurer is liable only 
7n proportion to the amount insured by him . In the third place, that sum 
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each insurer is only liable for his pro rata share 
of the loss, whereas in the English law the 
assured may sue anyone of the insurers, who then 
has to pay and recover a contribution from the 
other insurers. American law is the same as 
English law on this matterl45 • 
The rules relating to the limitation of the 
assured's right of recovery to the actual loss 
suffered and the insurer's right to a rateable 
contribution from other insurers in the case of 
double-insurance have their basis in equity rather 
than contract l46 • This means that the contract 
cannot validly include a stipulation which would 
enable the assured to recover more than a full 
indemnity by whatever means. Nor can the assured 
and his insurers validly agree that there will be 
no right to a contribution among the insurers if 
there is double-insurance. 
See 46 C.J.S. Insurance, paras 1207-1208. 
LAWSA, para 242, where the view is expressed by the author that the 
~imitat~on .of t~e assured's recovery to the full indemnity and the 
~nsurer s r~ght ~nter se to a rateable contribution are naturalia of the 
c~ntract .. This view appears to be erroneous, as it cannot explain the 
7~ghts wh~ch the insurer~ hav~ i~ter se. After all, they do not stand 
7n any contractual relat~onsh~p ~n relation to each other. The answer 
~s probably that the primary rule (relating to the limitation of the 
re~overy to the actual loss) has its origin in the indemnity principle 
wh~le. th~ se~ondary rule (relating to the insurers' right to a 
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OVER- AND UNDER-INSURANCE 
The assured is over-insured when the insured 
amount exceeds the value of the insured interest. 
In such a case the assured is prevented from 
recovering more than the actual amount of the 
loss. The insured amount thus serves no purpose 
beyond determining the maximum extent of the 
insurer's liability147. It is also used to 
calculate the amount of the premium148 • The 
insured amount should not be confused wi th the 
agreed value under a valued policy149. 
Where the assured is insured for less than the 
value of his insurable interest, he is said to be 
under-insured. In such a case, in marine insurance 
at any rate, he is regarded as co-insurer for the 
balance, and his recovery from the insurer is 
tempered by that proportion of the loss he has to 
bear himself 15o . 
Dorhout Mees, Schets, 214. It is customary in the Netherlands that the 
insurer also pays the cost of determining the amount of the loss; Ibid . 
Dorhout Mees , loc cit. 
It is discussed separately infra. 
In the Netherlands, articles 253-2 of the WvK; See also Dorhout Mees, 
Schets, 215; In Germany, articles 792 of the HGB and 56 of the VVG' See 
also Hof~, op cit, 174-175; Bruck-Moller, op cit, 318 et seq; In 
France, art~cle 14 of Law 52~ of 1967; See also Lambert-Faivre, op cit, 
348 et seq; In E~gland, sect~on 81 of the MIA; See also Lambeth, op cit, 
124; Ivamy, Mar~ne Insurance, 437; For the position in America, see 45 
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There appears to be an area in marine insurance 
where the assured could well receive more than a 
full indemnity as a result of the rule that the 
value of the insured interest is determined as at 
the commencement of the voyage. This gives rise to 
an imperfection in the strict application of the 
indemnity principle in those cases where the 
insured interest may decrease in value during the 
voyage as a result of circumstances not insured 
against151 . Otherwise statutory provisions in the 
Netherlands152 , Germany153, France154 and 
England155 and the American common law156 
It appears that a blind eye has been turned to this transgression by 
insurance practice and the law for the practical reason that it is 
difficult to determine the ever-changing value of the insured interest 
as the voyage progresses. 
Article 253 of the general insurance section of the WvK provides: '253-1 
Verzekering, welke het beloop van de waarde of het wezenlijk belang the 
bowe gaat, is aileen geldig tot het beloop van hetzelve.' Dorhout Mees, 
Handelsrecht, 92 is of the opinion that the insurance remains valid even 
if the insured sum exceeds the true value of the thing insured, but in 
such a case the recovery is determined by reference to the to the actual 
value. Article 612 of the marine insurance section provides: '612. 
Goederen mogen verzekerd worden voor de volle waarde, welke dezelve 
hebben ten tijde en ter plaatse der verzending, met aile onkosten tot 
aan boord, de premie van verzekering daaronder begrepen, zonder dat eene 
afzonderlijke begrooting van ieder voorwerp kan gevorderd worden.' (The 
insured value may be increased, in terms of article 613, by the addition 
of the freight, import duties and other expenses which have to be paid . ) 
See also Dorhout Mees, Schets, 215; Dorhout Mees, Handelsrecht, 92. 
Article 52 of the VVG; Article 786 of the HGB. See also Hofmann, op cit, 
172-173; Prolss-Martin, op cit, 298 et seq; Bruck-Moller, op cit, 188 
et seq . 
Article L 121-3 of the CdA. Lambert-Faivre, op cit, 338-339 points out 
that the article contemplates two distinct situations. In the first, 
where the over-insurance is taken in an attempt to defraud, the 
insurance as a whole is invalid and the assured is further penalised in 
damages and interest. In the second, where there is no fraud, the 
insurance is valid, but the amount which can be recovered is limited to 
the actual loss, and the premium is adjustable to the premium for the 
actual value. Article 10 of Law 522 of 1967 is to the same effect in 
respect of marine insurance. 






Part IV: Chapter 11: Theory: The Indemni t y Pr i nciple 
prevent the recovery of an amount exceeding the 
value of the insured interest in the case of over-
insurance, but special provisions regulate the 
case of valued policies where the rule may be 
breached. 
VALUED POLICIES 
The practice of inserting an agreed value in the 
policy has its roots in the difficulties 
experienced by the insurer and assured alike when 
the value had to be found after the ship or goods 
had been lost, damaged or destroyed. Over and 
above that, the ship or goods may appreciate or 
depreciate in value during the voyage. Their value 
may even differ from port to port with the result 
that the amount recoverable by the assured and 
payable by the insurer often depends on precisely 
where the loss occurs. By agreeing the value in 
advance the assured and the insurer are both 
protected against such increases and decreases in 
value157 • However, as a result of the acceptance 
of this practice, some say with some justification 
that the contract of marine insurance is only 
theoretically a contract of indemnity because it 
45 C. J.S. Insurance , paras 944 and 950. 
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allows a claim for the agreed value in the case of 
a valued pOlicy158. In Irving v Manningl
59 
the 
following was said: 
'A policy of assurance is not a perfect contract 
of indemni ty. It must be taken wi th this 
qualification, that the parties may agree 
beforehand in estimating the value of the subject 
assured, by way of liquidated damages, as indeed 
they may in any other contract to indemnify.' 
The principle seems to be that the prior agreement 
between the insurer and assured on the value of 
the insured thing binds them, subj ect to the 
agreement being voided by fraud160 or for lack of 
insurable interest161 , but that the contract 
remains a contract of indemnity with this proviso 
that the extent and amount of indemnity are 
capable of being agreed between the parties162 • 
The argument that valued policies may offend the 
indemnity principle is also encountered in 
Lambeth, op cit, 1. 
(1847) 1 HL Cas 287 at 307 . 
Haigh v De la Cour 3 Camp 318: 'The fraud entirely vitiates the 
contract. ' 
Lewis v Ruckn'er 2 Burr 1167 . 
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continental legal systems. 
In the Netherlands the insurer is only bound by 
the valuation of the insured ship in a valued 
policy if that value does not exceed the true 
value by virtue of the provisions of articles 
253(3)163 and 619 164 of the WvK. Article 253(1) 
provides that the parties may agree that the 
agreed value be paid notwithstanding that the true 
value may be higher. In the converse situation 
where the agreed value exceeds the true value, the 
insurer is entitled to approach the court for a 
proper determination and, if appropriate, 
reduction of the value165 • It therefore appears 
that Dutch law will prevent an agreed value from 
being recovered where it exceeds the proven true 
value and thus offends the indemnity principle. 
There are, however, two kinds of prior valuations 
in Dutch law. The first is the one conunonly 
encountered in marine insurance and already 
referred to. The second is the case of 
'253 - 1 Ret Btaat echter aan partijen vrij uitdukkelijk te bedingen, dat, 
onaangezien de meerdere waarde van het verzekerd voorwerp, de aan 
hetzelve overkomene Bchade, tot het beloop der verzekerde Bom, zal 
worden vergoed. ' 
'619 De volle waarde op de kiel of het caBCO van een Bchip verzekerd 
zijnde, kan, hoezeer bevorenB getaxeerd, door geregtelijke uitBpraak, 
deB noodB na berigt van deBhundigen, nader bepaald of venninderd 
worden. ' 
Dorhout Mees, SchetB, 216 is of the opinion that the effect of a valued 
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'voortaxatie' or prior valuation where the insured 
value is determined by experts before the risk 
attaches. In a recent decision the Hoge Raad has 
ruled in such a case of 'voortaxatie' that, in the 
absence of fraud, the effect of the agreed value 
was that the insurer was not allowed to avoid 
paying the agreed amount by relying on the 
indemnity principle, however much such reliance 
would otherwise be justified166 . Some erosion of 
the indemnity principle thus appears to have 
occurred in Dutch law in this particular 
respect 167 . 
While German law allows the amount of the loss to 
be determined in a valued policy by the agreement 
between the parties, article 57 of the VVG allows 
the insurer to prove that the amount agreed upon 
was in fact excessive168 . In marine insurance the 
same principles apply169. The result is that the 
M van MarIe v Wereldhave NV 1994 NJ 243. 
This rule cannot, it is submitted, defeat the express wording of article 
619 of the WVK referred to in fn 165 supra and the problem should 
therefore not enter marine insurance law . 
Bruck -Moller, op cit , 380 et seq . 
The provisions of the HGB regulate the position as follows : '793(1) Wird 
durcb Vereinbarung der Parteien der Versicberungswert auf eine bestimmte 
Summe (Taxe) festgestellt (taxierte Police), so ist die Taxe unter den 
Parteien fur den Versicberungswert massgebend. 793(2) Der Versicberer 
kann jedocb eine Herabsetzung der Taxe fordern wenn sie wesentlicb 
Ubersetzt ist . . . ' ( ' If the parties agree the in~ured value in a fixed 
sum, that sum is binding on them as the insured value. The insurer may 
nevertheless claim a redetermination of the amount if it has been 
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insurer bears the onus of proving that the loss 
was not as high as the amount agreed upon, 
contrary to the usual position where the assured 
1 170 has to prove the quantum of the oss . 
In French law the amount of the loss is not 
defined in the CdA. While valued policies are 
known in France, the CdA is silent on the subject. 
It is mentioned, however, in article 29 of the 
1930 law in relation to over-insurance. In 
principle the agreed value stands, unless the 
insurer proves that it exceeds the actual value. 
There is thus, as in Germany and the Netherlands, 
a shift l.n the onus of prooe71 • In France the 
rule that a fraudulent over-insurance is invalid 
also applies where the insured value is an agreed 
value172 • The parties are bound by an agreed 
value unless there has been a fraud173 , but there 
is authority for the proposition that the 
agreement as to the value means no more than that 
Kremer , op c i t , 179. 
Kremer, op c i t , 192. 
Article 10 of Law 522 of 1967 contains the following rider: 'II en est 
ainsi .de mem~ s i la valeur assuree est une valeur agreee.' ('It is the 
same ~f the ~nsured value is an agreed value . ') See also Emerigon, op 
cit, Vol I, 264. 
Article 11 o f Law 522 of 1967: 'Eo I 'absence de fraude Ie contrat est 
val~le a concurrence de la valeur des choses assurees et, si elle a ete 
agreee I pour tou te la somme assuree.' ( , In the absence of fraud the 
~on~ra~t is valid to the extent of the value of the insured things and, 
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the onus of proof shifts from the assured to the 
insurer once a loss occurs. The limit of the 
indemnity therefore remains the proven value of 
the insured interest, whether that proof is found 
in the agreement of the parties or in contrary 
evidence adduced by the insurer174 • 
Under English law the measure of indemnity for a 
total loss is determined according to Section 68 
of the MIA175. Under English law the amount 
recoverable by the assured is the value of his 
insured interest which mayor may not be an agreed 
value, depending on whether the policy was an 
unvalued or valued policy. According to section 
27(3) of the MIA the agreed value is conclusive in 
the absence of fraud. In English marine insurance, 
therefore, the contract of insurance may well be 
less than perfect as the agreed value may be more 
than the true value without the insurer being able 
to dispute it176 . In this respect there is a 
sharp contrast between English and continental 
Lambert - Faivr e, op cit, 334 - 335; Rodiere & Pontavice, op cit, para 547. 
'Subject to the provisions of this Act, and to any express provision in 
the policy, where there is a total loss of the subject matter insured -
(1) If the policy be a valued policy, the measure of indemnity is the 
sum fixed by the policy; 
~2) If the pol icy be an unvalued policy, the measure of indemnity is the 
~nsurable value of the subject matter insured.' 
See Ivamy, Marine Insurance , 94 - 96 for a discussion and a selection of 
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law. 
In American law the valuation of the subject-
matter of the insurance as agreed upon in the 
policy is also considered to be conclusive in the 
absence of fraud, mistake or accident177 , but the 
agreed value is not absolute for all purposes, and 
no estoppel is created which prevents the parties 
from resorting to any other value in appropriate 
circumstances178 . 
The Roman-Dutch law expounded by Bynkershoek179, 
Van der Keessel 180 and Van der Linden181 , and 
consequently South African law, is to the effect 
that the agreed value stipulated in the policy 
binds the assured to the extent that he cannot 
recover more than that amount, while the insurer 
is not bound by the valuation and may prove the 
true value182 . The agreement on the value 
therefore has no more effect than to relieve the 
45 C . J . S. Insurance, para 950; St Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co v Pure 
oil Co 63 F 2d 771 . 
45 C.J.S. Insurance, para 950 . 
Quaestiones Juris Privati, 4.3, 4.6, and 4.17. 
Theses Selectae, 738; Praelectiones, 3.24 . 6 . 
Koopmans Handboek, 4.6.8. 
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assured of t~e burden of proving the value of the 
object affected by the peril insured against183 . 
REPLACEMENT VALUE OR 'NEW-FaR-OLD' INSURANCE 
After the First World War a demand for replacement 
value insurance arose184 which has led to an 
extensive and intensive discussion over the 
permissibility of such insurance in the light of 
the indemnity principle. Such insurance may be 
regarded as contrary to the indemnity principle as 
the assured may gain from the insurance. 
In marine insurance a 'new for old' deduction has 
always been made in the case of partial loss or 
damage185 . In the case of total losses, whether 
actual or constructive, (the latter embracing all 
abandonment cases) , the indemnity has 
traditionally been determined on the basis of the 
market value of the insured ship or goods in their 
condition at the commencement of the insurance. 
Nevertheless, so far as replacement value 
insurance may have encroached into marine 
insurance, an indemnification which allows the 
LAWSA, para 309. 
Kremer, op cit, 177. 
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assured to recover more than the market value at 
the time of the loss is regarded as offensive to 
the indemnity principle and is therefore still 
prohibited in the laws of various countries. 
In the Netherlands the approach of article 
7.17.2.21-4 of the NEW seems to be that 
replacement value insurance is valid but it is 
enforced in such a way that there is no gain to 
the assured. The insurer has the choice to pay 
either the cost of repair plus any diminution in 
value which may remain notwithstanding repair, or 
the insured value. In neither case does the 
assured receive more than the full value of the 
thing insured186 . Article 7.17.2.24 of the NEW 
expressly precludes any recovery which would 
result in the assured being 'in een duidelijk 
voordeliger posi tie' 187. Two problematic rulings 
were given in recent years by the Hoge Raad, but 
they are nevertheless reconcilable with the 
indemnity principle. The problem has apparently 
not reared its head in marine insurance. 
D~rhout.Mees, Handel srecht , 91; see also Kremer, op cit, 71-84 for a 
~~scus~~~n o~ th~ Maring and Kraaybeek cases, where the principles of 
~ndemn~f~cat~on ~n Dutch law were considered by the Hoge Raad. 
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In Jacob Maring v La Confiance188 the assured had 
replacement value insurance on his farm which had 
been let to a tenant subj ect to the owner's 
obligation to restore the buildings thereon in 
case of their destruction189 • The cost of 
rebuilding exceeded the inherent value or market 
value of the farm after a fire. The insurance 
company contended that the limit of its liability 
was the inherent value but the court held that the 
full reinstatement cost had to be paid. The crux 
of the matter was found to be the fact that the 
assured had the obligation to restore the 
buildings in terms of the Pachtwet. That being so, 
the assured clearly had an insurable interest 
which exceeded the mere value of the farm. By the 
same token his loss in case of fire would not have 
been limited to the value of the farm. In these 
circumstances the finding of the court cannot be 
faul ted190 , especially as the obligation to 
rebuild meant that the assured could not be in 
'een duidelijk voordeliger positie'. 
1972 NJ 339. 
This obligation arose by operation of law, the Pachtwet. The case might 
have been decided differently had this obligation not rested on the 
assured . 
The case elic~,'ted cO,nsiderable academic interest. See Kremer, op ' t 
79 f c~ , 
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In Land v Ret Rollandsche Kruis191 , also known as 
the Kraaybeek case, an old age home insured for 
reinstatement cost without an obligation to 
reinstate burnt down. The assured claimed an 
indemnity based on the cost of reinstatement 
although reinstatement had not taken place. The 
insurer contended that such an indemnification 
would offend the indemnity principle. The court 
ruled that there was no threat to the indemnity 
principle because the assured would not 
necessarily be in 'een duidelijk voordeliger 
positie' because the cost of reinstatement would 
either be reflected in the cost of finding 
alternative premises or in the lesser price 
received for the insured property if it were to be 
sold to a buyer who intended to restore. 
Kremer192 interpreted the Maring and Kraaybeek 
rulings as restricting the indemnity to the value 
of the pre-existing property. Seen from this angle 
the decisions confirm the supremacy of the 
indemnity principle rather than to negate it193 , 
but it is doubtful whether Kremer's interpretation 
of the rulings is correct. It appears rather that 
1978 NJ 577. 
Op cit , 83. 
Nevertheless, Kremer, op cit, 83 is at pains to point out that the 
Kraaybeek d~cision was based on the peculiar facts of that case and may 
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the Dutch courts will allow some inroads to be 
made into the strict application of the indemnity 
principle in reinstatement value policies, with 
each case being decided on its own peculiar 
circumstances. 
In German law the basic principle is stated in 
article 55 of the VVG, which is to the effect that 
the insurer is not obliged to pay more than the 
amount of the 10SS194. Article 52 of the VVG 
leaves no doubt that the loss is limited to the 
value of the thing insured195 • While replacement 
value insurance is regarded as valid, a 'neu fur 
alt' deduction is made to ensure that the assured 
does not gain by the insurance196 • 
French law follows a similar pattern. Replacement 
value was first introduced in 1928 in respect of 
the insurance of buildings and movables. Although 
there has been some debate about the question 
whether such insurance does not offend the 
indemnity principle, that debate was stifled by 
Kremer, op cit, 177-178 . 
'Bezieht sich die Versicherung auf eine Bache, so gilt .. . der Wert der 
Ba~he als Versicherungswert.' ('So far as the insurance relates to an 
obJect .. the value of that object is regarded as the insured value ') 
See also Prolss -Martin, op cit, 305 et seq . . 
('new for old'). No fixed percentage is prescribed by articles 86 and 
88 of the VVG, unlike the position in the Netherlands . See Kremer, op 
cit, 177. 
455 
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the standard clause in insurance policies that 
replacement value would only be recoverable in the 
event that the assured actually rebuilt. However, 
there may still be some enrichment accruing to the 
assured in such a case, and to meet this criticism 
a new for old deduction continues to be made, with 
a shift in the onus of proof197 • 
In English law the concept of replacement value 
insurance has been known since the First World 
War. Although it is acknowledged that it may lead 
to enrichment, it is nevertheless not regarded as 
impermissible. There is no case law on the 
question, however, and the question must be 
regarded as an open one198 although the position 
perforce has to be the same as in marine 
insurance199 . In marine insurance cases of 
constructive total loss no deduction 'new for old' 
is made
20o
, but in cases of partial loss section 
69 (1) of the MIA provides that the 'customary 
deductions', which include the 'new for old' 
See Kremer, op cit, 191 . 
Kremer, op cit, 187-188. 
see . Ivamy, Fire and Motor Insurance, 4th ed, (1984), 171; Ewer v 
Nat~onal Employers' Mutual General Insurance Association Ltd [19.37] 2 
All ER 193. 
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deduction201 , have to be made. 
SUE AND LABOUR 
'The duty of an assured to avert and minimize a 
loss and the concomitant liability of the insurer 
to recompense him for expenses incurred in 
compliance with this duty is an ancient principle 
of insurance law ... ,202. 
This principle is found in English law in the so-
called sue and labour clause of English marine 
insurance policies. The principle is not limited 
to English law, however, although a similar result 
may be achieved in continental legal systems by 
the application of the Roman law action of the 
negotiorum gestor. 
Whether the assured's rights and obligations in 
this regard are founded upon the contract or upon 
the provisions of a statute or the common law, it 
seems clear that they form an entirely separate 
set of rights and obligations between the 
Lambeth, op cit, 258. 
LAWS~, para 310 . See also Ivamy, Marine Insurance, Chapter 39; Lambeth, 
?p ~~t , 153 et seq; 45 C.J . S. Insurance, para 953 and Van Niekerk, 
Su~ng, labouring and the insured's duty to avert or minimise loss' 
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parties203 . The assured is further entitled to 
recover only those expenses actually incurred 'by 
him in the course of the performance of his right 
or duty to avert or minimise the loss within the 
terms of the relevant contract or principles204 • 
He therefore does not benefit financially and his 
situation is more akin to that of a negotiorum 
gestor who incurs expenses in the process of 
managing another person's affairs and then 
recovers only those expenses. 
The assured is not merely entitled to labour and 
incur expenses in order to avoid or minimise loss, 
he is under a positive obligation to do so. In the 
Netherlands article 283 of the WvK and article 
7.17.2.18 of the NEW expressly impose such a duty 
on the assured205 • Section 78(4) of the MIA is to 
the same effect. As Van Niekerk demonstrated, 
South African law follows a similar position2 0 6 • 
Thus, although it may appear at first blush that 
the practice to compensate the assured for 
expenses incurred in avoiding or minimising loss 
infringes the primary rule of the indemnity 
Ivamy, Marine Insurance, 447; Lambeth, op cit, 153-154. 
Ivamy, Marine Insurance, 444; Lambeth, op cit, 156-157. 
See Dorhout-Mees, Schets, 218 . 
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principle by allowing the assured to recover more 
than a full indemnity, the indemnity principle 
actually prevails as the assured does not recover 
anything other than that expended by him. 
THE MEASURE OF INDEMNITY 
The process of quantifying the loss suffered by 
the assured is another area where there are checks 
and balances to ensure that he receives a full 
indemnity but no more than that. Over and above 
the particular rules resorting under the indemnity 
principle and discussed thus far, the ordinary 
rules of what is called the measure of indemnity 
assist in the determination of the indemnity. The 
measure of indemnity varies according to the 
nature of the 10ss207. This study has no interest 
in the measure of indemnity in cases of partial 
and other losses. The interest of this study is 
solely in cases of total loss, whether the total 
loss should be an actual total loss or a 
constructive total loss, as it is called in 
English law, or the economic type of loss 
discussed earlier. The amount of the loss is, for 
example, unliquidated until agreed by the insurer 
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or determined by the court or arbitrator
208
, and 
has to be proved by the assured
209
. This 
principle is in consonance with the oldest 
authority on the subject of insurance210 , and has 
been enforced ever since. 
In each of the countries under discussion there 
are also elaborate provisions relating to the 
measure of indemnity211, all designed to ensure 
that a full indemnity is arrived at without 
exceeding the actual loss. It is not within the 
scope of this study to analyse the minutiae of the 
principles which are applied. It will suffice to 
mention that they are considered in the standard 
textbooks on insurance212 . 
Ivamy, Principles, 9 . 
Ivamy, Princi ples, 9; Van Niekerk, Subrogasie in die Versekeringsreg, 
('Subrogasie ' ) , LLM thesis, Unisa, (1979), 9. 
Santerna, op cit, 4.46 . 
In the Nether lands, articles 696-721 of the WvK; In Germany, articles 
872-881 of the HGB; In France, articles 28-30 of Law 522 of 1967· In 
England, sections 67 - 78 of the MIA; For the position in American law, 
see 45 C.J.S. Insurance, paras 944-965 . 
See for example in respect of Dutch law, Molengraaff, op cit, 679 et 
seq ; Dor~out -Mees , Scbets, 221 et seq; Dorhout-Mees, Handel srecbt , 89 
et s~q; ~n respect of German law, Prelss-Martin, op cit; Bruck-Meller, 
op c~t; 1n resp~ct of French law, Lambert-Faivre, op cit, 332-356; in 
respect of .Engl1sh and related legal systems, including American law, 
Ivamy, Ma7~ne Insurance, Chapters 31 to 39; Lambeth, op cit, Chapters 
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OTHER CONTRACTS OF INDEMNITY 
Other forms of indemnity are known to South 
African law. Of these three may be briefly 
mentioned as examples. 
The first of these arises from the contract of 
suretyship. A contract of suretyship is a contract 
in terms of which one person, the surety, binds 
himself in favour of another, the creditor, for 
the due performance of the obligations of the 
third party, the principal debtor213 • The 
liability of the surety is accessorial, with the 
result that he may not be liable for more than the 
principal debtor214 • The liability of the surety 
is lightened by three beneficia215 , of which the 
second and third are of relevance here. In terms 
of the beneficium divisionis the surety who is but 
one of a number of sureties who guaranteed the 
same debt may demand that the creditor should 
divide the debt between the sureties who are 
liable, with the result that he is only liable for 
De Wet & Van Wyk, Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg, 5th 
ed, (1992), Vol I, 391; See also De Groot, Inleidinge, 3.3.12; Johannes 
Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas, 46.1 . 1 . 
De Wet & Van Wyk, op cit, 394 ; De Groot, Inleidinge, 3.3.23. 
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his pro rata share216 . The second benefit is the 
beneficium cendarum actionum, in terms of which 
the surety, who is held liable for the whole of 
the debt by the creditor, may demand from the 
latter that all the rights and securities which 
the creditor holds against the debtor and other 
sureties be ceded to him. This enables the surety 
who is held liable for the whole debt to recover 
his whole outlay from the principal debtor, to 
excuss such securities as the principal debtor may 
have held, and to claim directly from the other 
sureties as cessionary of the creditor rather than 
as a co-surety. Over and above these beneficia the 
surety who has paid the debt in whole or in part, 
has an automatic right of recovery of a pro rata 
share from each of the co- sureties217 • The end 
result is that the surety, who in effect 
indemnifies the creditor in the event of non-
payment of the principal debt by the principal 
debtor, is able to recoup his loss from the 
principal debtor and to claim a pro rata 
contribution from other sureties by operation of 
law. This puts the surety in a very similar 
position to that of multiple insurers in a case of 
De Wet & Van Wyk, op cit ; 396; De Groot, Inleidinge, 3.3 . 28; Voet, 
CommentariuB, 46.1.21 . 
De Wet & Van Wyk, op cit, 399 - 400; De Groot, Inleidinge, 3.3.30; Voet, 
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double- or multiple-insurance. 
A second but similar situation arises in the law 
of negotiable instruments, with regard to the 
position of the aval. The aval is a suretyship 
undertaking given by a stranger to a bill or note 
whereby he guarantees payment of the instrument by 
one or more of the parties liable thereon
218
. 
Because an aval is tantamount to a guarantee or 
suretyship, the aval' S219 right of recovery 
against the persons whose obligations he 
guarantees are the same as under an ordinary 
suretyship, and for the same reason he enjoys a 
right of contribution against other avals or 
sureties for the same debt. 
The third example is to be found in section 156 of 
the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936220 • In this case 
the rules relating to subrogation and double-
insurance would still apply as the insurer's 
position is not changed by the fact that he has to 
Moti & Co v Cassim's Trustee 1924 AD 720. 
The word aval 
undertakes it. 
signifies both the undertaking and the person who 
'15~. Whe~ever any person (hereinafter called the insurer) is obliged 
to ~ndemn~fy. ~oth~r person (hereinafter called the insured) in respect 
of any l~ab~l~ty ~ncurred by th~ insured towards a third party, the 
lat~er shall, on the sequestrat~on of the estate of the insured, be 
e~ t~ ~l ~d to recover from the insurer the amoun t of the insured's 
l~ab~l~ ty towa~ds the third party but not exceeding the maximum amount 
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pay the indemnity to which the assured would be 
entitled to the party entitled to recover from the 
assured. The section does not appear to import 
more into the law than that the concursus 
creditorum is not allowed to share in the proceeds 
of the insurance at the expense of the party who 
has the primary claim against the assured221 • 
CONCLUSION 
The elaborate principles discussed thus far in 
this chapter demonstrate to what extent the common 
or ordinary principles of indemnity insurance have 
been developed with the purpose of ensuring that 
the dual aims of the indemnity principle are 
satisfied in every possible case. In the process 
the paramountcy of the indemnity principle is 
reinforced and emphasised, but it is also clear 
that the indemnity principle is neither absolute 
There is an important difference between South African and English law 
with regard to the procedure to be adopted by the third party who wishes 
to recover from the insurer under the section. In English law the third 
party first has to establish his right to the indemnity against the 
assured by action, arbitration or agreement. Only after he has done so 
can he recover from the insurer . See section 1 of the Third Party 
(Rights against Insurers) Act, 1930; Post Office v Norwich Union Fire 
Insurance Society Ltd [1967] 1 All ER 577 (CA); Bradley v Eagle Star 
Insurance Co Ltd [1989] 1 All ER 961 (HL). Under section 156 of the 
local act the third party has a direct action against the insurer, and 
does not have to institute an action or arbitration proceedings against 
the assured, nor does he have to establish his right to an indemnity by 
wayan agreement. See Woodley v Guardian Assurance Co Ltd 1976 1 SA 758 
(W); Supermarket Haasenback (Pty) Ltd v Santam Insurance Ltd 1989 2 SA 
790 (W); Gypsum Industries Ltd v Standard General Insurance Co Ltd 1991 
1 SA 718 (W); Supermarket Leaseback (Elsburg) (Pty) Ltd v Santam 
Insurance Ltd 1991 1 SA 410 (A); Przybylak v Santam Insurance Ltd 1992 
1 SA 588 (C). 
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nor perfect, especially in marine insurance. The 
question inevitably arises whether abandonment 
fulfils any function within the ambit of the 
indemnity principle. 
The same question also arises with regard to 
subrogation, which appears to share common ground 
with abandonment. Abandonment and subrogation are 
similar in that the assured may, but for their 
operation, and by virtue of particular 
circumstances, recover more than the full value of 
the insured interest by either recovering from 
both the insurer and from a third party, or by 
retaining part of the insured thing whilst at the 
same time receiving its full value. Abandonment 
and subrogation also appear to be related 
concepts, with an entirely different pedigree to 
the other subsidiary rules of indemnity already 
discussed. Their relationship inter se and their 
functions will be considered next in an endeavour 
to determine whether they are indeed related 
concepts and whether they fit in within the broad 








THEORY: SUBROGATION, ABANDONMENT AND THE INDEMNITY 
PRINCIPLE 
INTRODUCTION 
Abandonment has to be distinguished from other 
methods of conferring rights upon the insurer, 
such as subrogation, cession and assignment1 . The 
latter two are methods of transferring personal 
rights and are not peculiar to marine insurance2 • 
In an insurance relationship rights transfer 
through abandonment or subrogation. There are some 
obvious similarities between subrogation and 
abandonment. 
A curious aspect of the law of indemnity insurance 
is that subrogation was not expressly mentioned as 
a separate concept or doctrine in early treatises, 
decisions and statutes. How a concept so essential 
to the preservation of the indemnity principle 
could have been obscured from view and scrutiny 
for so long after the birth of marine insurance is 
not entirely clear. Perhaps the parallels between 
Mustill and Gilman, Arnould's Law of Marine Insurance and Average, 16th 
ed, (1981), (cited as 'Arnould'), para 1301 . 
For that reason they will not be discussed here, save for mentioning 
that rights could be transferred by these means entirely independent of 
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abandonment and subrogation may give a clue. This 
chapter will therefore be devoted to the origins 
of subrogation, its function as a servant of the 
indemnity principle, its main principles, and the 
features which distinguish it from abandonment. 
THE DEFINITION OF SUBROGATION3 
Subrogation means substitution4 . In law it denotes 
the process whereby one person so takes the 
position of another that he becomes entitled to 
enforce the rights of the latter in relation to a 
particular claim or cause of actions. While it is 
The detailed principles of subrogation are set out in the standard 
textbooks on insurance and marine insurance, as well as theses examining 
the subject in greater detail. Helpful works in the different countries 
include the following: In South Africa, Joubert, (ed) The Law of South 
Africa, Vol 12, (cited as LAWSA); Getz and Davis, The South African Law 
of Insurance, 4th ed, (1993); Van Niekerk, Subrogasie in die 
Versekeringsreg, LLM thesis, Unisa, (1979), (cited as Van Niekerk, 
Subrogasie); In the Netherlands, Dorhout Mees, Nederlands handels-en 
faillissementsrecht, 6th ed, (1987), (cited as 'Handelsrecht'); Van 
Barneveld, Inleiding tot de Algemene Assurantiekennis, lOth ed, (1978); 
Mulder, Subrogatie, doctoral thesis, Leiden, (1988); Scheltema-Mijnssen, 
Algemeen Deel van het Schadeverzekeringsrecht, 4th ed, (1991): In 
Germany, Ritter-Abraham, Das Recht der Seeversicherung, 2nd ed, (1967); 
Hofmann, Pri va tversi cherungsrecht , (1991); PreIss-Martin, Versicherungs-
vertragsgesetz, (1992); Bruck-Meller, Kommentar zum Versicherungs-
vertragsgesetz, (1980); In France, Danjon, Traite de Droit Maritime, 
(1914); Ripert, Precis de Droit Maritime, 7th ed, (1956); De Smet, 
Traite Theorique et Pratique des Assurances Maritime, 2nd ed, (1959-
1960); Rodiere and Pontavice, Droit Maritime, lOth ed, (1986); Lambert-
Faivre, Droit des assurances, 8th ed, (1992); In England, Ivamy, 
Principles of Insurance Law, 5th ed, (1986); Ivamy, Marine Insurance, 
4th ed, (1985); Arnould; Lambeth, Templeman on Marine Insurance, 5th ed, 
(1981); Halsbury, Laws of England, 4th ed, Vol 16, (Equity) ; 
MacGillivray and Parkington, Insurance Law, 8th ed, (1988); Khoury, 
Subrogation in Marine Insurance, thesis, University College of London, 
(1961); Derham, Subrogation in Insurance Law, (1985); Mitchell, 'The law 
of Subrogation', 1992 IMCLQ 483; In America, 46 C.J.S. Insurance; 
Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law, (1987); Gilmore and Black, The 
Law of Admiralty, (1975). 
The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, (1987), Vol 2, 
3126, s.v. 'subrogate' and 'subrogation'; Mitchell, op cit, 483; LAWSA, 
para 222. 
Lambert-Faivre, op cit, 377; LAWSA, para 222; Getz and Davis, op cit, 
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particular claim or cause of actions. While it is 
in indemnity insurance that the concept is best 
known, it also occurs, although not necessarily in 
the same form, in other circumstances6 • 
subrogation has been said to apply to all 
contracts of indemnity7. In this broader context 
subrogation may be said to be a 'restitutionary 
remedy for unjust enrichment' 8. In insurance, 
however, subrogation is perhaps better described 
as the right which the insurer has against the 
assured to recoup himself out of the rights and 
remedies which the assured may have against third 
parties in respect of the The word 
subrogation is used also to describe a wider set 
of rules namely the set of rules which determine, 
Lambert-Faivre, op cit, 377; LAWSA, para 222; Getz and Davis, op cit, 
243; Mitchell, op cit, 483. 
It suffices to mention that subrogation also occurs in the contract of 
suretyship, certain types of liability attaching to peculiar 
transactions involving negotiable instruments, cases of j oint and 
several liability and the transfer of rights under section 156 of the 
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
In Burnand v Rodocanachi, (1882) 7 App Cas 333 (HL) Lord Blackburn 
said: 'The general rule (and it is obvious justice) is that where there 
is a contract of indemnity (it matters not whether it is a marine 
policy, or a policy against fire on land, or any other contract of 
indemnity) and a loss happens, anything which reduces or diminishes that 
loss reduces or diminishes the amount which the indemnifier is bound to 
pay; and if the indemnifier bas already paid it, it becomes an equity 
that the person who has already paid the full indemnity is entitled to 
be recouped by having that amount back.' 
Mitchell, op cit, 486. 
LAWSA, para 222; Ivamy, Principles, 465; Castellain v Preston (1883) 11 
QBD 380 (CA) , 388; Avex Air (Pty) Ltd v Borough of Vryheid 1973 1 SA 617 
(A) . 
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once the insurer has indemnified the assured, what 
the respective rights and obligations of the 
insurer and assured are inter se, on the one hand, 
and what the rights of the insurer are against the 
third party responsible for the loss, on the 
other . 
The difference between subrogation in its narrow 
and wider senses can best be explained by 
reference to the three different scenarios which 
are possible. In the first the assured suffers an 
insured loss but recovers that loss from a third 
party. The insurer, without knowledge of that 
prior payment, then also pays for the loss . In the 
second, the assured suffers an insured loss, and 
the insurer fully indemnifies him. In the third, 
the assured suffers an insured loss and is paid by 
the insurer for that loss, but thereafter also 
recovers the same loss from a third party. Of 
these scenarios only the second is a true case of 
subrogation, or subrogation stricto sensu10 • In 
the first and third scenarios the indemnity 
principle is protected by other rules which form 
part of subrogation in its wider sense, or, as it 
has been put, within subrogation latu sensu11 • 
Mitchell, op cit, 194 - 195 ; Van Ni ekerk, SubrogaBie, xii - xv . 
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In the course of his judgment in Kal tenbach v 
MacKenzie12 Brett LJ made some controversial
13 
statements about abandonment . He asserted that: 
'(a)bandonment is not peculiar to policies of 
marine insurance; abandonment is part of every 
contract of indemnity. Whenever, therefore, there 
is a contract of indemnity and a claim under it 
for an absolute indemni ty, there must be an 
abandonmen t on the part of the person claiming 
indemnity of all his right in respect of that for 
which he receives indemnity.' 
These statements have to be seen in context. In 
the first place, since the case dealt with a 
marine insurance policy, the statements are obiter 
dicta so far as other contracts of indemnity are 
concerned. In the second place, it appears that 
Brett LJ did not properly distinguish between 
abandonment and subrogation14 in a case where he 
must have had subrogation in mind rather than 
abandonment in its marine insurance sense. Brett 
LJ must have been aware of the distinction between 
(1879) 3 CPD 467 (CA). 
Van Niekerk, Subrogasie , 329-330 . 
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subrogation and abandonment since he referred 
specifically to the 'abandonment' which occurs 'at 
the time of settlement' in contradistinction to 
the abandonment which required in the case of a 
constructive total loss. This is made clearer by 
his statement that , (a)bandonment is 
applicable ... whether it be for an actual total 
loss or for a constructive total loss 
, 15 The 
confusion is therefore in the terminology, not the 
substance. The confusion is perhaps exacerbated by 
the fact that in English law real rights in the 
sense of the assured's proprietary rights in the 
thing insured may also be transferred by 
subrogation16 • 
The position was, it is submitted, correctly 
stated by Lord Atkin in Glen Line Ltd v AG17 
where he said: 
'(W)here the owners of an insured ship have 
claimed or been paid for a total loss, the 
property in wha t remains of the ship, and all 
rights incident to the property, are transferred 
This is clear from the position of English law that an abandonment is 
not required when ~othing remains to be abandoned, which would be the 
case when the loss ~s an actual total loss · Rankin v Potter (1873) 6 AC 
83 (HL) . ' 
See the text infra . 
(1930) 36 Com Cas 1 (HL) at 13. 
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to the underwri ters as from the time of the 
disaster in respect of which the total loss is 
claimed for and paid ... But the right of the 
assured to recover damages from third parties is 
not one of those rights which are incident to the 
property in the ship; it does pass to the 
underwriters in case of payment for a total loss, 
but on a different principle. And on the same 
principle it does pass to the underwri ters who 
have satisfied a claim for a partial loss, though 
no property in the ship passes.' 
2.7. Notwithstanding the differences between them, 
18 
abandonment and subrogation are so similar in 
their operation and purpose that the question 
inevitably arises whether they do not perhaps 
share co~on origins. This question has important 
repercussions for South African law as it was held 
in Ackerman v Loubseyl8 that subrogation has been 
received by South African law from English law. 
The result is that the South African courts and 
authors have ever since looked to English law for 
guidance on the principles of subrogation without 
questioning the correctness of that assertion. 
However, if subrogation were to have been part of 
a wider doctrine of abandonment when the Roman-
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Dutch law was vested as the law of the Cape of 
Good Hope in the seventeenth century, then the 
conclusion must be that subrogation entered South 
African law through its Roman-Dutch law component 
and that the Roman-Dutch law mayor must be looked 
at for guidance. There are important differences 
between English and continental law on the subject 
of subrogation and the question would gain further 
importance if the future of abandonment in the 
proposed Marine Insurance Act were to be 
considered. 
THE ORIGINS OF SUBROGATION 
Subrogation is part of the law of indemnity 
insurance of not only South Africa and England, 
but also of the Netherlands, Germany, France and 
America . Indeed, it is said to be part of the law 
of all countries where insurance is practised19 • 
While the basic principles of subrogation appear 
to be the same or very similar in these countries, 
there is some disagreement about its precise 
origins20 • 
Harrel-Courtes, Le Nouveau Droit Francais de 1 'ABBurance Maritime et deB 
EvenementB de Mer , (1968) , 37 . 
See Ivam~, pr~ncipl~B, 465 et Beq; Van Niekerk, SubrogaBie; and Khoury, 
Subrogat~on ~n Mar~ne InBurance, thes i s, University College London 
(1961! . Dover, A Handboo!, to Marine Insurance, 8th ed, (1975), 22 state~ 
~hat probably ~he earl~eBt reference to the principle of Bubrogation' 
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The concept of a subrogation was known to Roman-
law, not in the context of insurance, but in the 
context of the payment of a debt by a third party, 
who was then granted the rights of the creditor 
against the debtor whose debt the third party had 
paid21 . Subrogation is not mentioned by name in 
the sixteenth to eighteenth century ordonnances on 
marine insurance22 , nor, with the exception of 
Pothier and Emerigon, in the treatises of the 
famous lawyers of that period23 . The word appears 
to have surfaced in English cases only towards the 
last third of the nineteenth century24. 
what is now Belgium. I could not trace this reference, unless Dover had 
the case of Marc Gentil v Arnulphi, Lommelin & Tany which was discussed 
in Chapter 4 supra in mind. That case, however, dealt with abandonment. 
Van Niekerk, Subrogasie, 41 fn 20 states that the first decision in 
English law where the insurer's right was called the right to 
subrogation is Stringer v English & Scottish Marine Insurance Co (1869) 
LR 4 (QB) 676 and that the phrase was firmly in use after Castellain v 
Preston, supra was decided in 1883. The earliest express use of the term 
which I could find was in Pothier, Traite du contrat d'assurance, (1768 
-1778), paras 52 and 161 and Emerigon, op cit, Vol II, 230 et seq. In 
none of the treatises written before Castellain v Preston, supra, and 
to which I had access was there any scientific analysis of subrogation 
and its principles. Even Park, op cit, 8th ed, (1842), Phillips, op cit, 
(1854) and Arnould, op cit, (1857) did not treat it as a separate 
concept or rule . On the continent the earliest theses on subrogation I 
could trace are, in the Netherlands, Gualtherie van Weezel, De 
wettelijke subrogatie bij verzekering, doctoral thesis, Leiden, (1894); 
Van Asch van Wijk, De subrogatie van den verzekeraar, doctoral thesis, 
Utrecht, (1895); Ledeboer, Het recht van den verzekeraar tegen derden, 
doctoral thesis, Leiden, (1927); in Germany, Thut, Der Regress des 
Versicherers, (1924); and in France, Leproust, Du recours de l'assureur 
contre les tiers, (1914); Gautier, Du recours de l'assureur contre Ie 
tiers responsable du dommage, (1939); Vellieux, De 1 'application a 
l'assureur de la subrogation legale de I 'article 1251-3 du Code Civil 
thesis, Paris, (1948) . ' 
MacGillivray and Parkington, op cit, para 1151 . 
These ordonnances were discussed in Chapter 5 supra. 
These include Santerna, Straccha, Casaregis, Roccus, De Groot, 
Bynkershoek, Van der Keessel, Van der Linden Kuricke Magens, Benecke, 
Valin, Emerigon, Park, Marshall, Kent and Phillips. ' 
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By the end of the eighteenth century the English 
courts had come to recognize rights of subrogation 
in certain contracts of indemnity, including 
insurance25 . The precise origins of the doctrine 
have remained a controversial matter in English 
law26 . Some have argued that it is the product of 
equity27, others that it is a principle of 
law28 , either imposed as a rule of the law 
itself, or as a measure introduced to the contract 
by a term implied by law. The House of Lords now 
appears to have settled this argument so far as 
English law is concerned in favour of the latter 
view29 , but the question remains; when and where 
was subrogation introduced into insurance? 
The only explanation of reasonable substance 
appears to be that the concept of subrogation was 
at first locked inside a wider doctrine of 
abandonment but later emerged as a separate 
doctrine with its own field of operation3o . 
MacGillivray and Parkington, op cit, para 1163 . 
MacGillivray and Parkington, op cit, para 1163. 
MacGillivray and Parkington, op cit, paras 1164-1167. 
MacGillivray and Parkington, op cit, paras 1168-1169. 
Hobbs v Marlowe, [1978) AC 16 (HL); MacGillivray and Parkington, op cit, 
para 1170 . 
MacGillivray and Parkington, op cit, para 1171. 
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Dorhout-Mees31 expressed the opinion that the 
absence of reference to subrogation before the 
1825 draft of the Wetboek van Koophandel of 1838 
('the WvK') could be ascribed to two factors. The 
first is that there were seldom circumstances in 
marine insurance where a claim could be made 
against an identifiable or reachable third 
party32. The second lies therein that in the 
exceptional case where a claim could be made 
against the third party responsible for the loss 
a ready remedy was found in abandonment33 . A 
review of the historical landmarks the 
development of insurance principles provides 
circumstantial evidence for this view, albeit by 
virtue of the absence of evidence rather than the 
concrete presence of evidence. 
None of the early authors on commercial or 
insurance matters mentioned subrogation in their 
treatises34 . Bosco does not appear to have 
considered the distinction between the case of a 
Schadeverzekeringsrecht , 4th ed, (1967) , ('Schade'), 387. 
This must surely have been the consequence of the vast distances over 
which . shi~s traded, coupled with the lack of reliable means of 
commun~cat~on, the lack of reliable legal institutions in the distant 
ports where the ship or goods arrived, and the lack of representation 
on the part of the insurers in such places . 
Some authority for this view exists in opinion 247 in Van den Berg, 
Nederlands Advysboek, (1693 - 1698). 
These are referred to in Chapt er 4 supra. 
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loss of part of the goods insured under the 
simulated sale contract as opposed to a loss of 
all the goods. There is no reason to suppose that 
the condition (to which the sale was subject) was 
regarded as having been fulfilled in respect of 
all the goods if only a portion were lost or 
destroyed. In such a case (of partial loss) there 
was no need for the assured to relinquish 
ownership of the saved goods in order to give 
effect to the notional sale. However, in respect 
of the goods actually lost or destroyed the 
assured relinquished the goods to the insurer, who 
recovered as much as he could35 • This recovery by 
the insurer had to take place, if the fiction of 
the sale was to be given its full effect, in the 
insurer's own name because his title to sue 
emanated from the fact that he had acquired the 
goods by purchase. The concept of subrogation 
could thus exist within the simulated sale in that 
the right to sue third parties for delivery of the 
goods or for the loss arising from their wrongful 
actions in relation to that portion of the goods 
followed the goods to the insurer. 
3.6. The early ordonnances did not distinguish between 
partial and total losses and did not mention 
35 
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subrogation at al1 36 • According to mercantile 
custom as set out in the Guidon de la Mer the 
assured was required to 'quitter et delaisser ses 
droits, noms, raisons et actions de la propriete 
qu'il a en la merchandise,37. What had to be left 
and relinquished to the insurer was therefore more 
than mere ownership of the merchandise insured, 
and included the assured's rights, ( , droi ts' ) , 
title, (' noms'), causes of action, (' raisons') and 
claims of ownership, ('actions de la propriete'). 
Having regard to the wide application of the 
Guidon and the even wider sphere of its subsequent 
influence, it would not be unreasonable to assume 
that this statement reflected universal thinking 
of that time on the subj ect38 • Since the same 
text contains the oldest definition of 
abandonment, one may also conclude that 
abandonment and subrogation were not seen as 
separate concepts when the Guidon was compiled in 
the middle of the sixteenth century. 
These were discussed in Chapter 5 supra . 
The Guidon de la Mer, article 1. 
An interesting Canadian case, The Quebec Fire Assurance Company v 
Augustin St. Louis and John Molson [1851] 7 Moore 286 (PC), came before 
the Privy Council in 1851. French law applied to the province of Quebec. 
Upon receiving the indemnity the assured executed a document to 'assign' 
to the insurer its' right, title, interest, property, claim and demand' , 
(language re~iniscent of the Guidon de la Mer), against the wrongdoing 
steamboat wh~ch had caused the fire giving rise to the loss. The Privy 
Council ruled, on the authority of Emerigon and Pothier that this 
amo~ted to a ~alid subrogation even though the document ~ight not be 
val~d as a cess~on for want of authority and that the insurer therefore 
had the right to pursue the recovery up to the amount of the 
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The concept of subrogation was not mentioned in 
the works of any of the institutional writers on 
Roman-Dutch law39 but the Rotterdam Ordonnance of 
1721 contained an interesting provision dealing 
with the vexed question of deviation. Article 
52 40 of the ordonnance provided that, when a 
deviation had occurred without the knowledge of 
the assured, the insurer remained liable 
nevertheless but the assured then had to cede his 
rights to recover the 'schade ui t dezen hoofde 
veroorzaakt' from the shipper to the insurer. This 
provision was referred to by both Van der . 
Keesse1 41 and Van der Linden42 and it may 
therefore be argued convincingly that this is also 
South African law. It is notable that a cession 
was required so that there was not as yet an 
automatic or ex lege transfer of rights to the 
insurer. However, the roots of a subrogation are 
evident, it is submitted, in this provision43 • 
The principal institutional writers whose works are referred to herein 
are De Groot, Bynkershoek, Van der Keessel and Van der Linden. 
Article 54 of the Dordrecht Ordonnance of 1775 was to the same effect. 
Theses Selectae Juris Hollandici et Zelandici, (' Theses Selectae') 
(1800), 750; Praelectiones Iuris Hodierni ad Hugonis Grotii 
Introductionem ad Iurisprudentiam Hollandicam, ('Praelectiones') , 
(published only in 1961-1967), 3.24.11. 
Regtsgeleerd, Practicaal en Koopmans Handboek, ('Koopmans Handboek') , 
(1806), 4.6.10 . 
It is improbable that the requirement of a cession of action existed 
only i~ re~ation to the assured's claims arising from deviation and did 
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The provision, if it reflected insurance practice 
of the time, would be in consonance with the 
notions of the Guidon de la Mer, namely that the 
assured also had to cede his personal rights to 
the insurer under the broad umbrella of the 
concept of abandonment. 
Subrogation appears to have been introduced into 
Dutch legislation as a separate concept44 as late 
as 1838 by way of article 28445 of the Wetboek 
van Koophandel ('the WVK,}46. The article applies 
to insurance generally and not just to marine 
insurance47 • The article makes it clear, however, 
that it applies only to cases where the insurer 
has paid the loss in respect of a ' verzekerde 
voorwerp' and it is therefore limited to indemnity 
insurance. In the recent process of the 
modernisation of the WvK certain changes to the 
Mulder, op cit, Chapter 1 . The first mention of subrogation occurred 
when it was inserted in the draft Wetboek van Koophandel in 1825. The 
clause was adopted into the final version of the Wetboek which became 
law in 1838 'zonder veel parlementaire bespreking', according to Van 
Barneveld, Inleiding tot de Algemene Assurantieke=is, lOth ed, (1978), 
527 . 
'284 De verzekeraar, die de schade van een verzekerde voorwerp betaald 
heefd, treedt in aIle de reg ten welke de verzekerde, ter zake van de 
schade, tegen derden mogt hebben; en de verzekerde is verantwoordelijk 
voor elke daad welke het regt van de verzekeraar tegen die derden mogt 
benadeelen. ' 
Mulder, op cit, 1. 
It falls under the ninth title of Book I, Chapter III of the Wetboek van 
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law relating to subrogation were also made
48
• An 
express provision was added to article 284 that 
the rights of the assured against a third party 
responsible for the loss on a ground other than 
insurance pass to the insurer49 • A much wider 
provision is due to be taken up in the Nieuw 
Burgerlijk Wetboek ( 'the NEW') 50. The proposed 
article would prohibit the pursuit of the claims 
which are transferred to the insurer 'ten nadele 
van het recht op schadevergoeding van de 
verzekerde', and proposes that no rights are to be 
acquired through subrogation against the assured, 
a co-insured, the wife of the assured, relatives 
in a direct line of consanguinity, the members of 
the assured's household, or his employees51 • The 
proposal is in accordance with provisions already 
The new text is of temporary nature and is to be replaced by article 
7 . 17.2.25 of the NBW when that article comes into force . No change has 
been made to the basic principle, but the new article will be to the 
effect that the rei vindicatio will become available to the insurer. See 
Scheltema-Mijnssen, op cit, 256 . 
Mulder, op cit, xvi. 
'1. Indien de verzekerde terzake van door hem geleden schade anders dan 
uit verzekering vorderingen tot schadevergoeding op derden heeft, gaan 
die vorderingen bij wijze van subrogatie op de verzekeraar over voor 
zover deze, al dan niet verplicht, die schade vergoedt. De verzekerde 
moet zich onthouden van elke gedragen welke aan het recht van de 
verzekeraar tegen de derden afbreukt doet.' 
'2. De verzekeraar kan de vordering waarin hij is gesubrogeerd, of die 
hij door overdracht heefd verkregen, niet ten nadele van het recht op 
schadevergoeding van de verzekerde uitoefenen.' 
' 3. De verzekeraar krijgt geen vordering op de verzekeringnemer, een 
mede-verzekerde, de niet van tafel en bed gescheiden echtgenoot van een 
verzekerde, noch op de bloedverwanten in de rechte lijn van een 
ve~zekerde en hun niet van tafel en bed gescheiden echtgenoten, noch op 
hu~sgenoten of werknemers an een verzekerde. Deze regel geld niet vir 
zover zulk een persoon jegens de verzekerde aansprakelijk was wegens een 
omstandigheid welke, zo zij aan de verzekerde zelf was toe te rekenen 
aan diens recht op de verzekeringsuitkering afbreuk zou hebben gedaan.; 
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applicable in Germany and France52 • 
In German law the principle of subrogation appears 
first to have been mentioned, although not by 
name, in article 804 53 of the Handelsgesetzbuch 
(' the HGB') which came into effect in 1900. 
Article 804 applies only to marine insurance. 
Subrogation is regulated for all other types of 
indemnity insurance by the general provisions of 
article 67 54 of the Versicherungsvertragsgesetz 
('the VVG') of 30 May 1908, which also provides 
that the rights of the assured against third 
parties are transferred55 to the insurer upon 
See the text intra. 
'804(1) Hat der Versicherer seine Verptlichtung ertullt, so tritt er, 
soweit er einen Schaden vergutet hat, dessen Erstattung der Versicherte 
van einen Dritten zu tordern betugt ist, in die Rechte des Versicherten 
gegen den Dritten ein, jedoch unbeschadiget der Vorschritten des A 775 
Abs. 2 und des A 777 Abs. 2.' (The lastmentioned articles have since 
been repealed.) 
'804(2) Der Versicherte is verptlichtet, dem Versicherer, wenn er es 
verlangt, aut dessen Kosten eine 6ttentlich beglaubigte 
Anerkennungsurkunde uber den Eintritt in die Rechte gegen den Dritten 
zu erteilen.' 
'804 (3) Der Versicherte ist verantwortlich tur jede Handlung, durch die 
er jene Rechte beeintrachtigt.' ('804(1) If the insurer has fulfilled 
his obligations, he acquires, insofar as he has paid compensation for 
a loss for which the assured is entitled to claim compensation from a 
third party, the rights of the assured as against the third party, 
without prejudice however to the provisions of articles 775 (2) and 
777 (2). (2) The assured is obliged to furnish the insurer, if he so 
requests, with an authenticated deed of acknowledgement concerning the 
acquisition of the rights against the third party, at the insurer's 
expense. (3) The assured is liable for any act by which he harms the 
said rights.') 
Article 67 of the VVG contains the same principles as article 804 of the 
HGB, but also adopted the approach of the Netherlands, by providing (in 
article 67(2) that there will be no subrogation when the third party 
primarily liable for the loss is a close relative of the assured, except 
if the damage was caused intentionally . 
The German text uses the words 'geht Uber', which literally translates 
to 'passes', rather than' is subrogated'; Pfennigstorf, Gennan Insurance 
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payment of the loss. 
In French law the word subrogation was first 
mentioned by pothier56, as far as can be 
determined. There was no mention of subrogation in 
the Ordonnance de la Marine of 1681 upon which 
Pothier's commentary was mainly based, which tends 
to confirm that there was as yet no clear 
distinction between abandonment and subrogation 
before the end of the seventeenth century. The 
concept was also, strangely enough, not taken up 
in the Code de Commerce (' the CdeC') of 1807 in 
the chapter covering marine or other types of 
insurance57 • Article 1251 of the CdeC, however, 
contained a general subrogation provision 
applicable to contracts and obligations. Although 
not applied to insurance at first 58 , this 
provision was later utilised to justify the 
application of the concept of subrogation also to 
Op cit, para 52 where he said the following: ' ... il n'est pas douteux 
que les assureurs en doivent payer a l'assure la valeur, sauf a eux a 
exercer les actions de 1 'assure contre ceux qui sont tenus a. la 
contribution,' (' ... there is no doubt that the insurers while having 
to pay the assured the claim, do so without prejudice to the exercise 
of the actions of the assured against those who are held liable to 
contribute, ') and para 161: ' ... (l)orsque les assureurs ont indemnise 
1 'assure des pertes et donunages qui ont ete causes pour le salut commun, 
dans les merchandises assurees, ils doivent etre subroges aux droits de 
1 'assure, dans la contribution qui doit se faire en ce cas. (' ... when 
the insurers have paid the assured for the loss and damage which had 
been caused for the common benefit, in respect of the insured goods, 
they ~ust .be s~rogated in the rights of the assured, in respect of the 
contr~but~on wh~ch must be made in such a case . ') 
Khoury, op cit, 9. 
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insurance contracts59 . In the nineteenth century 
French insurers simply inserted a subrogation 
clause in their policies, which allowed them to be 
subrogated in the rights and actions of their 
assured against all persons responsible for the 
10ss60. In 1930 a statute reforming insurance law 
came into force, which gave statutory force to the 
existing custom and provided specifically for 
subrogation to apply in insurance contracts61 . 
This statute was in turn replaced by the Code des 
Assurances ('the CctA') of 1976, which -re-enacted 
most of the former's provisions without 
significant change. Article L 121-12 of the CctA62 
now regulates subrogation in insurance generally 
and article 33 of Law 522 of 196763 regulates the 
Khoury, op cit, 24-26. 
Lambert-Faivre, op cit, 376. 
Lambert-Faivre, op cit, 376; Khoury, op cit, 26-28. 
'L 121-12. L'assureur qui a paye l'indemnite d'assurance est subroge, 
jusqu'a concurrence de cette indemnite, dans les droits et actions de 
1 'assure contre 1es tiers qui, par leur fait, ont cause Ie dommage ayant 
donne lieu a la responsabilite de 1 'assureur . L'assureur peut etre 
decharge, en tout ou en partie, de sa responsablite envers l'assure, 
quand la subrogation ne peut plus, par fait de l'assure, s'operer en 
favour de l'assureur.' ('L 121-12. The insurer who pays the 
indemnification (of the insurance) is subrogated, concurrently with the 
said indemnification, in the rights and actions of the assured against 
the third parties who, by their action, have caused the loss which gave 
rise to the liability of the insurer. The insurer may be discharged, in 
whole or in part, from his liability towards the assured, when 
subrogation can no longer operate in favour of the insurer as a result 
of the action of the assured . ') The article also contains the familiar 
clause that there will be no subrogation in respect of the assured's 
claims against certain defined relatives, save where the damage has been 
caused intentionally . 
'33. L'assureur qui a paye l'indemnite d'assurance acquiert, a 
concurrence de son payement, tous lee droi ts de l' assure nes des 
dommages qui ont donne lieu a garantie.' ('The insurer who pays the 
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subject in marine insurance . 
In English law the concept of subrogation was 
recognized expressly in relation to marine 
insurance in Randal v Cockran64 in 1748, where it 
was held that the insurers, after indemnifying the 
assured, stood in his place in relation to the 
goods, the salvage and restitution65 • However, 
the first occasion when an English court discussed 
the distinction between abandonment and 
subrogation appears to have been in Simpson v 
Thomson66 in 1877. Still, it was only after the 
decision in Castellain v Preston67 in 1883 that 
the concept of subrogation achieved its own 
recognition in English law and practice. 
It has been suggested that South African law has 
received the concept of subrogation from English 
law68 and not from the Roman-Dutch law of the 
payment, all the rights of the assured ar~s~ng from the damages which 
gave rise to the indemnification in the first place.') 
(1748) 1 Ves Sen 99 . 
Khour~, op cit: 8. Park, op cit, 160 discussed Randal v Cockran, supra, 
but d~d not d~scuss the rules of subrogation in any detail probably 
because the doctrine had not yet been accorded a place outsid~ the ambit 
of abandonment at that time . 
(1877) 3 App Cas 279 (HL) . 
Supra. 
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seventeenth century , like the main body of South 
African law. This conclusion is a contentious one, 
as the concept of subrogation was probably present 
within the doctrine of abandonment from the birth 
of insurance itself, as previously suggested . If 
this conclusion is correct, subrogation must have 
entered South African law via the Roman-Dutch law 
of the seventeenth century which was vested here 
when the Dutch East India Company settled its 
refreshment station at the Cape of Good Hope in 
1652. At that time abandonment was firmly part of 
Dutch marine insurance law, as the Amsterdam, 
Middelburg and Rotterdam Ordonnances of 1598, 1600 
and 1604 respectively testify 69. The reason why 
subrogation was not specifically dealt with by 
these ordonnances, nor by the commentators on 
their provisions, is probably that subrogation was 
not yet seen as distinct from abandonment in the 
Roman-Dutch law of that time70 • Notwithstanding 
the absence of a direct reference to subrogation 
in Roman-Dutch law texts, there are some 
indications in the writings of the institutional 
writers on Roman-Dutch law, according to Van 
The abandonment provisions of these o r donnances are discussed in Chapter 
5 supra and in Chapter 16 infra . 
This also appears to be the position in French law; see the discussion 
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Niekerk71 , that the assured was obliged in 
certain specific cases to transfer his right of 
action against the third party to the insurer. 
These texts72 are insufficient, on their own, to 
allow a firm conclusion to be drawn that the 
doctrine of subrogation was applied in Roman-Dutch 
law in all cases where the insurer had indemnified 
the assured and then sought to pursue the claim of 
the assured against the third party responsible 
for the loss, but it is submitted that subrogation 
must have been part of the insurance law and 
practice of the time, not only in the Netherlands, 
but everywhere else where insurance was practised. 
Subrogation was mentioned by name for the first 
time in 1918 in South African jurisprudence in 
Ackerman v Loubser73 , although it was mentioned 
obliquely in earlier cases 74 • In Ackerman v 
Loubser it was concluded that the concept of 
subrogation was received into South African law 
from English law, a conclusion commonly accepted 
Subrogasie, 374 - 375 . 
De Groot, Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleerdheid (1631) 
('Inleidinge') , 3 . 24.11 and 3.29.18; Van der Keessel, Theses ~electae' 
717, 750 and 756 ; Lybrechts, Burgerlijk, Rechtsgeleerd, Notariaal e~ 
Koopmans Handboek, 3rd ed, (1761), 92; and Van der Linden, Koopmans 
Handboek , 4 . 6.10 . 
1918 OPD 31. 
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ever since. If this conclusion as to the origins 
of subrogation in South African law is correct, 
the principles of subrogation ought to be the same 
as in English law75 . 
THE FUNCTIONS OF SUBROGATION 
subrogation serves the indemnity principle in the 
situation where the assured would have been able, 
but for the insurer's right to be subrogated, to 
recover both the insurance money and any amount 
due to him by the third party responsible for the 
10ss76. The assured's right to claim the loss 
from the third party is therefore curtailed in 
such a way that the insurer receives the benefit 
of the recovery. At the same time the third party 
responsible for the loss is not released from 
liability to the assured, as that would allow a 
person not party to the insurance contract to 
benefit from it to the detriment of the insurer. 
It is doubtful whether insurance business could be 
conducted profitably or successfully were it not 
for these principles. Slightly divergent views are 
apparent on the exact purpose of subrogation. 
It is therefore not surpr~s~ng to find that South African academics 
freely refer to English cases as authority for the principles of 
subrogation in South African law; see for example LAWSA, paras 222-237. 
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In the Netherlands some authors and courts have 
expressed the opinion that the purpose of 
subrogation is to prevent a double recovery by the 
assured77 , while others hold the view that its 
purpose is also to give the insurer some form of 
redress against the third party who caused the 
loss or is primarily liable for it78 . More recent 
Dutch authority emphasises the fact that the third 
party would be unjustly enriched at the expense of 
the insurer if the latter were not given the right 
to pursue the assured's rights against the third 
party79. The final responsibility for the loss 
therefore remains with the third party primarily 
responsible for i t 80. The Hoge Raad has ruled 
that 
het bestaan van een sommenverzekering een 
aangelegendheid is die de schuldige aan het 
Mulder, op ci t, 6; De Naamlooze Vennootscbap Stoomboot Maatscbappij 
'Carsjens' v L. Groen ewegen , (Rechtbank Utrecht), 14 Dec 1910, W 9149; 
(Rechtbank s'Gravenhage), 21 Jan 1915, 1915 NJ 448. It was held, at 449 
of the Rechtbank s'Gravenhage's judgment, that article 284 of the WvK 
was an 'uitvloeisel van bet beginsel dat verzekering aIleen vergoeding 
van scbade, maar niet winst ten doel bet, (en) dat daardoor dubbele 
scbadevergoeding"worde voorkomen ... ' . 
Mulder, op cit, 6-7; Scheltema-Mijnssen, op cit, 256; De N.V. 
Verzekeringsbank De Nieuwe Eerste Nederlandscbe v De N.V. Hollandscbe 
Ijzeren Spoorweg Maatscbappij, (Hof Amsterdam), 28 Dec 1917, W 10223; 
(Hoge Raad) , 31 Dec 1931, 1932 NJ 419. 
Mulder, op cit, 8-9; A Visser en A M L van Wesenbeck v Assurantie 
Maatscbappij 'De Zeven Provicien' NV, (Hof Leeuwaarden), 6 Feb 1957, 
1957 NJ 644; (Hof s'Hertogenbosch), 14 March 1978; (Hoge Raad) 27 April 1979, 1981 NJ 139 . ' 
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ongeval niet aangaat ,81 
The reasoning applied by the court is equally 
applicable to indemnity insurance82 . 
German83 and French84 law also recognize the 
function and purpose of subrogation as the 
prevention of a double recovery by the assured on 
the one hand, and the unjust enrichment of the 
third party at the expense of the insurer on the 
other. The view appears to be the same as in Dutch 
law, namely that the existence of the insurance is 
irrelevant as between the assured and insurer on 
the one hand and the third party responsible for 
the loss on the other85 . 
In English law the right to be subrogated is based 
on equi ty86 , and is regarded as a natural 
consequence, corollary or sub-rule of the 
Derkx v IBC 1970 NJ 172. 
Mulder, op cit, 13 . 
Bru~k-Moller, op cit, ad article 67, Anm 5; Pralle-Martin, op cit, ad 
art~cle 67, note 1; Mulder, op cit, 12-14; Bundeegerichthof, 17 March 
1954, BGHZ Bd 13, 28. 
Mulder, op cit, 15; Lambert-Faivre, op cit, 374-375; Rodiere and 
. Pontavice, op cit, 728. 
Bruck-Moller, op cit, ad article 67, Anm 7. 
Khoury, loc cit; Lord Hardwicke, in Randal v Cockran, supra, thought 
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indemnity principle87 . The reason for the 
doctrine according to English law is 'to prevent 
the assured from recovering more than a full 
indemni ty' 88. This approach is also followed in 
America89 • The general rule of English law has 
been adopted in section of the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906 (' the MIA'). So far as the 
insurer's right to recoup himself by pursuing the 
assured's remedies against a third party is 
concerned, the approach of English law is that the 
burden of paying for the loss should ultimately be 
cast on the party primarily liable for it91 • 
Khoury, op cit, 12-14 ; Ivamy, Principles, 465-466; Arnou1d, para 1299; 
Getz and Gordon, op cit, 243 . McCardie J put it as follows in Edwards 
and Co Ltd v Motor Union Insurance Co Ltd (1922) 38 TLR 690, 692: 'The 
principle of subrogation is a latent and inherent ingredient of the 
contract of indemnity.' If this approach is correct subrogation must 
date back to the origins of marine insurance itself. 
Brett LJ in Caste11ain v Preston, supra, 387. This case has been 
criticised for its imprecise use of terminology: see for example, 
British Trader's Insurance Co. Ltd v Monson (1964) 111 CLR 86 at 95 
where the following was said : 'Caste11ain v Preston of course was not 
a case of subrogation in respect of an outstanding right of action and 
one might almost wish that some other word had been used as the label 
of a right which exists when it is too late for subrogation in the 
ordinary sense . ' 
Phillips, A Treatise on the Law of Insurance, 4th ed, (1854), Vol II, 
para 1712 . 
'79(1) Where the insurer pays for a total loss, either of the whole, or 
in the case of goods of any apportionab1e part, of the subject -matter 
insured, he thereupon becomes entitled to take over the interest of the 
assured in whatever may remain of the subject-matter so paid for, and 
he is thereby subrogated to all the rights and remedies of the assured 
in and in respect of that subject-matter as from the time of the 
casualty causing the loss . 
' 79(2) Subject to the foregoing provisions, where the insurer pays for 
a partial loss, he acquires no title to the subject-matter insured, or 
such part of it as may remain, but he is thereupon subrogated to all the 
rights and remedies of the assured in and in respect of the subject -
matter insured as from the time of the casualty causing the loss, in so 
far as the assured has been indemnified, according to this Act, by such 
payment for the loss.' 
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South African law is to the same effect. In 
Ackerman v Loubser92 Ward J said: 
, The plaintiff's contract wi th the underwri ters or 
insurers is res inter alios acta of which the 
defendant cannot avail himself. If it were so not 
the wrongdoer would take the benefit of a policy 
of insurance without paying the premium.' 93 
THE COMMON RULES OF SUBROGATION 
In English and South African law subrogation does 
not mean that the assured's rights to recover the 
loss from the third party are transferred to the 
insurer by a process like cession (assignment) or 
even by operation of some statutory provision of 
the law94 • All it means is that, after 
indemnifying the assured to the full extent of the 
loss, the insurer becomes entitled, as against his 
insured, to pursue and recover the loss from third 
parties in the name of the assured95 . In English 
1918 OPD 31, at 36 . 
The principle was confirmed in a number of subsequent decisions, 
including Millward v Glaser 19494 SA 931 (A) and Teper v McGees Motors 
(Pty) Ltd 1956 1 SA 738 (CPD). 
LAWSA , para 222 . 
LAW~A, para 222; Mitchell, op cit, 488; Ivamy, Principles, 466; Ivamy, 
Mar~ne Insurance, 458; Khoury, op cit, 11; Castellain v Preston, supra, 
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and South African law the effect of the 
subrogation is therefore that the insurer becomes 
entitled to enforce the assured's rights of action 
against the third party responsible for the loss 
in the name of the assured. This means in effect 
that the insurer becomes dominus litis in respect 
of the recovery process instituted against the 
third party 96. In continental legal systems (the 
Netherlands, Germany and France) the assured is 
vested with the right of recovery by statute, and 
makes the recovery in his own name. Important 
consequences flow from this difference between 
English law and continental law. 
Notwithstanding the differences between Engli~h 
and continental law on the subject of subrogation, 
the common and general requirements for the 
insurer's right to be subrogated to the assured's 
position to arise appear to be the same and are as 
follows: 
There must be a valid contract of insurance in 
The insurer's own identity, its very existence, is so completely ignored 
in the recovery action that the action is instituted with the assured 
as pla~ntiff, that there is, no reference in the summons or particulars 
of clal.m to the fact of the l.nsurance or the indemnification thereunder 
and that the discovery process discloses the existence of documents i~ 
the assured' possession, not the insurer ' s, The prinCiple goes so far 
that the assured as p,laintiff would, be liab,le for the costs of any 
';l1lsuc~esful legal actl.on, although l.n practl.ce the insurer (almost) 
l.nvarl.ably accepts liability for them and pays them to the third party 
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terms of which the insurer is obliged to indemnify 
the assured before the right to subrogation can 
arise97 . This is implicit in the relationships 
between the various parties. 
The insurer must have indemnified the assured by 
admitting liability98 and paying99 the full 
amount of the loss payable under the policy100. 
The insurer's right to subrogation exists whether 
the loss is total or partial, provided the insurer 
paid the loss to the full extent provided by the 
policy101. The right to be subrogated therefore 
only matures upon indemnification102 , although it 
Molengraaff, Leidraad bij de beoe£ening van het Nederlandse 
Handelsrecht, (1955), 689; Scheltema-Mijnssen, op cit, 257; Bruck-
Moller, op cit, ad article 67 of the VVG; Prolss-Martin, op cit, ad 
article 67 of the VVG; Lambert-Faivre, op cit, 377-378; 46 C.J.S. 
Insurance, para 1209; LAWSA, para 227; King v Victoria Insurance Co 1896 
AC 250 (PC). There is therefore no right to subrogation on payment under 
an invalid policy, or under a ppi (policy proof of interest) policy; 
Ivamy, Marine Insurance, 455; John Edwards & Co v Motor VDion Insurance 
Co Ltd [1922) 2 KB 249; Ivamy, Principles, 468; Arnould, para 1298 fn 
6. Under the provisions of article 7.17.2.25-1 of the NBW in the 
Netherlands the third party who is sued for the loss by the insurer 
exercising rights of subrogation may no longer dispute the insurer's 
right to claim on the basis that the insurer was not obliged to 
compensate the assured in the first place; Dorhout Mees, Handelsrecht, 
96 . 
Ivamy, Principles, 469; The Midland Insurance Co v Smith (1881) 6 QBD 
561. 
Lambert-Faivre, op cit, 378; Ivamy, Principles, 469; Getz and Davis, op 
cit, 245; Page v Scottish Insurance Corp Ltd, Foster v Page [1929) 33 
LLR 134 . 
Scheltema-Mijnssen, · op cit, 256-257; Ritter-Abraham, op cit, 888; Ivamy, 
Principles, 469; LAWSA, para 228; Mason v Sainsbury (1782) 3 Doug KB 61' 
Simpson v Thomson, supra, 293. ' 
Ivamy, Principles, 467; Simpson v Thomson, supra, 292. 
M~lengraaff, . op cit, 688~ Ritter-Abraham, op cit, 889; Bruck-Moller, op 
c~~, ad art~cle 67; Prolss-Martin, op cit, ad article 67; Lambert-
Fa~vre, op cit, 377; 46 C.J.S. Insurance, para 1209; Castellain v 
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exists from the conclusion of the contract itself. 
In German103 and French104 law the transfer of 
rights occurs ex lege and no cession is required. 
The loss must have been fully compensated so that, 
where the assured is underinsured, or has to bear 
part of the loss himself in terms of the policy, 
or suffers an additional but uninsured loss, the 
insurer has no right to be subrogated unless the 
policy provides otherwise. This is the position in 
English law105 , and presumably in South African 
law. In Dutch, German and French law the insurer 
who pays only a portion of the loss is subrogated 
to the rights of the assured to the extent that he 
has paid106 . 
The assured must have a right to recover the loss 
or part of it from the third party107. Usually 
By virtue of the prov1s1ons of article 859 (2) of the HGB; Ritter-
Abraham, op cit, 890. 
Lambert-Faivre, op cit, 383. 
LAWSA, para 229; National Fire Assurance Co v MacLaren (1886) 12 OR 682; 
Scottish Union and National Insurance Co v Davis (1970) 1 LLR 1 (CA). 
Mol engraaff, op cit, 689; Scheltema-Mijnssen, op cit, 257, 263; Nolst 
Trenite, Zeeverzekering, 2nd ed, (1930), Vol II, 689 et seq; Ritter-
Abraham, op cit, 892; Bruck-Moller, op cit, ad article 67· Prolss-
Martin, op cit, ad article 67; Lambert-Faivre, op cit, 378. ' 
Scheltema-Mijnssen, op cit, 259; Ritter-Abraham, op cit, 890; Bruck-
Moller, oP. cit, ad a~ticle 67; Prolss-Martin, op cit, ad article 67; 
Lambert-Fa1vre, op c~t, 379; LAWSA, para 230; Getz and Davis, op cit, 
245-246; Ackerman v Loubser 1918 OPD 31; Simpson v Thomson, supra. In 
Engli~h law the insurer's right to be subrogated extends even to 
donat10ns made to the assured by others with the intention to alleviate 
the loss; LAWSA, para 231; Arnould, para 1312; Randal v Cockran, supra; 
495 
5 . 3. 
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this right arises from contract or delict
1 08
. 
The insurer's right to subrogation matures when he 
has indemnified the assured and all the other 
requirements for subrogation have been 
fulfilled109 . Two principal consequences then 
follow. 
The first consequence of subrogation, although not 
its primary function or purpose, is that the 
insurer becomes entitled to enforce the assured's 
rights and claims against the third party 
responsible for the 10SS110. This means that the 
insurer may only enforce those rights against the 
third party to the extent that the assured himself 
could do S0111 and consequently any defences the 
third party may have against the assured may be 
raised against the insurer in the subrogation 
action. In the case of a valued policy, for 
example, the third party would be at liberty to 
Burnand v Rodocanachi, supra; Castellain v Preston, supra, 404. 
Molengraaff, op cit, 688. 
Scheltema-Mijnssen, op cit, 257 ; Ritter-Abraham, op cit, 889; Lambert-
. Faivre, op cit, 378 ; LAWSA, para 232 . 
LAWSA, para 233 . 
Dorhout Mees, Handel srecht , 97; Scheltema-Hijnssen, op cit, 259; Ritter-
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demand that the extent of the loss suffered by the 
assured be proved as the agreement between the 
assured and insurer fixing the value of the 
subj ect-matter of the insurance does not bind 
him112 . The extent to which the insurer is 
allowed to recover from the third party 
responsible for the loss is limited to the amount 
paid by the insurer to the assured113 • The rights 
which may be enforced by the insurer are personal 
rights arising from the acts of the third party 
which caused the loss and does not include, for 
example, the right to sue on a rei vindicatio for 
delivery of the thing insured as such a claim is 
based on ownership 114. The assured is obliged to 
allow the insurer to use his name in the 
proceedings115 , and the insurer becomes dominus 
Ii tis in the litigation116 . This is the position 
in English law and South African law117 • In 
Dorhout Mees, Handel srecht , 97. 
Scheltema-Mijnssen, op cit , 262; Lambert-Faivre, op cit, 378 . 
Dorhout Mees , Handelsrecht, 98. The problems which this principle have 
brought for the i nsurer have resulted in a special procedure for the 
transfer of movable property in Dutch law . By way of an agreement in 
~ermB of article 3.95 of the NBW transfer may now be effected to the 
~~su~er ,so t~at he can legitimately proceed with the actio rei 
v~~d~cat~o ~ga~n~t the thief or other person in possession of the stolen 
th~ng . See ~n th~s regard Scheltema-Mijnssen, op cit, 264. 
LAWSA, para 233 . 
LAWSA , para 233 ; Khoury, op c i t , 19; Edwards and Co Ltd v Motor Union 
Insurance Co Ltd, supra, 692. 
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continental law the insurer sues in his own name. 
The second consequence of the subrogation is that 
the insurer recoups himself out of the proceeds of 
the claim to the extent that he has paid the loss 
under the policy118. The insurer is entitled to 
retain only so much of the proceeds of the claim 
against the third party as equals the amount paid 
by him. The balance must be paid to the 
assuredl19 . By the same token, the assured has to 
account to the insurer for any proceeds of his 
claims against third parties which may come into 
his hands120 . In English law a trust is then 
created in favour of the insurer121. If the 
assured receives payment from the third party 
before also being paid by the insurer for the same 
loss, the insurer may recover what he has paid 
without knowledge of the third party's payment to 
the extent that the aggregate exceeds the actual 
LAWSA, para 234. 
LAWSA, para 234; Getz and Davis , op cit, 250; Ivamy, Principles, 478; 
Arnould, paras 1302-1303; Yorkshire Insurance Co v Nisbet Shipping Co 
Ltd [1962) 2 QB 330. 
Molengraaff, op cit, 689; Bruck -Moller, op cit, ad article 67 , Anm 6, 
114 and 116 : 46 C.J.S. Insurance , para 1209; LAWSA, para 234. There was 
some controversy in English law on the question whether the insurer has 
a personal rather than a proprietary right to the funds so received by 
the assured ; see Mitchell , op cit . 
Morley v Moore [1936) 2 KB 359 (CA). The question has now been 
determined authoritatively by t h e House of Lords in Lord Napier and 
Ettrick v Hunter [1993) 2 WLR 42 (HL) and [1993] 1 All ER 385 . In 
Ackerman ~ Lo.ubser, supr~, at 36 Ward J suggested that this principle 
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10SS122 . This claim is an enrichment action in 
South African law123 , and is a claim for money 
had and received, paid by mistake of fact in 
English law124 . Such a claim is not strictly a 
claim under the insurer's right of subrogation. 
The application of the relevant principles have 
given rise to complicated problems in cases of 
excess clauses coupled with different tiers of 
insurance, as the case of Lord Napier and Ettrick 
v Hunter 25 testifies. 
The rights and remedies in respect of which the 
insurer is subrogated in the position of the 
assured arise mainly from delict126 (tort) , 
contract127 (or breach of contract) , rights 
vested in the assured by virtue of some statutory 
provision128 , and, in English law, the assured's 
In continental law the insurer is not allowed to recover from the third 
:l?arty when the third party has paid the assured without knowledge of the 
1nsurance ; Molengraaff, op c i t , 689; Dorhout Mees, Handelsrecht 100-
101 . ' 
The applicable action is the condictio indebiti which ought also to be 
part of Dutch, German and French law by virtue of the common Roman law 
component of those legal systems . 
Mitchell, op cit, 195; Lord Napi er and Ettrick v Hunter, supra . 
Supra . 
Ivamy, Principles, 470-471; 46 C.J.S. Insurance, para 1209 . 
Ivamy, Principles, 471-473 ; 46 C. J.S. Insurance, para 1209. 
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rights in the subject-matter of the insurance129 • 
The assured is obliged to give assistance to the 
insurer in enforcing his claims130 , otherwise the 
insurer's rights may well be worthless . The 
assured is further obliged to refrain from acting 
in any manner which would prejudice the insurer in 
his pursuit of recoupment131 • 
There is one important difference between American 
law and English law with regard to subrogation. In 
American law the insurer who has been subrogated 
to the rights of the assured is entitled to 
institute action against the third party primarily 
liable for the loss in his own name132 • In this 
regard American law follows continental rather 
than English law. This is not entirely surprising 
when account is taken of the high regard with 
which the Guidon de la Mer has been held in early 
American jurisprudence, and the Guidon, it is 
submitted, is the likely source of the insurance 
Ivamy, Principles , 473 - 474. 
Ivamy, Pri nci ples , 476 . 
Molengraaff, op cit, 689; Dorhout Mees, Handelsrecht, 101-102; article 
804(3) of the HGB; Lambert-Faivre, op cit , 380; Ivamy, Principles, 476 -
477 ; 46 C.J . S. Insurance, para 1209; Getz and Davis, op cit, 249. If the 
assured shou~d, . fc:>r example, release the third party responsible for the 
~oss from l~~~l~ty, ~hether before or after indemnification by the 
~nsurer, the ~nsurer w~ll be released pro tanto from his own liability 
to indemnify the assured . 
Schoenbaum, op cit, 589; Gilmore and Black, op cit, 91; Aetna Insurance 
Co v S . S. Orti guera 583 F Supp 671; Bohemia Inc v Home Insurance Co 725 
F 2d 506. See also Van Niekerk, Subrogasie, 106 fn 53 . 
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practice on the continent which vested in the 
insurer the right proceed in his own name against 
the third party responsible for the loss. 
Subrogation and its principles are, however, not 
applicable to non-indemnity insurance such as life 
or personal accident or disability insurance
133
• 
subrogation rather takes its place as one of the 
handmaidens or servants protecting the indemnity 
principle against the threat of a double recovery 
by the assured134 • Since the forms of non-
indemnity insurance referred to are not aimed at 
an indemnification, subrogation has no role to 
play in them135 • Abandonment, however, appears to 
fulfil a similar function, and a comparison 
between it and subrogation becomes inevitable. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ABANDONMENT AND 
SUBROGATION 
While both abandonment and subrogation are 
Dorhout Mees , Handelsrecht, 97 ; Ivamy, Principles, 465. 
~t is pr~bably the most important concept fulfilling that function. It 
1S certa1nly the one which is applied most often in practice. 
There ~re some limited exceptions to this principle in some continental 
co~tr1es where some recourse i s allowed to insurers in certain types 
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consequences of the indemnity principle136 , there 
are a number of differences between them. The 
following main differences are apparent: 
Abandonment only applies to contracts of marine 
insurance137 , but subrogation applies to all 
contracts of indemnity138. 
While abandonment applies only to total loss 
cases, whether such loss is an actual or 
constructive or presumed total loss, subrogation 
applies to all cases of indemnification where any 
loss, whether partial or not, is reimbursed139 • 
All proprietary rights incidental to ownership are 
transferred in the case of abandonment140 , while 
all the rights and remedies of the assured in and 
in respect of the subject matter of the insurance 
pass to the insurer. There is one qualification to 
this distinction. In English marine ins~rance law 
Van Niekerk, Subrogasie, 332; Castellain v Preston, supra, 386-387: 'But 
grafted upon the doctrine of constructive total loss came the doctrine 
of abandonment .. . in order that the assured may not recover more than 
a full indemni ty. ' 
Whether this statement is indeed correct, and the reasons for this 
situation, are discussed in Chapter 13 infra. 
Arnould, para 1298; Van Niekerk, Subrogasie, 333. 
Arnould, paras 1298 and 1300; Van Niekerk, Subrogasie, 333; Simpson v 
Thomson, supra, 292. 
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subrogation also operates in cases of total loss 
in respect of proprietary rights141 • Generally, 
however, abandonment t ransfers ownership of the 
thing insured, while through subrogation the 
insurer becomes vested with all the rights and 
claims which may exist independent of 
ownership 142 . 
In abandonment the transfer occurs when the 
abandonment is made or accepted or judged to have 
been validly made143 , while the insurer is only 
subrogated in the assured's rights and claims upon 
payment of the claim144 • 
Once an abandonment has taken place, the insurer 
has rights in rem and can sue in respect of the 
thing abandoned as owner. After being subrogated, 
the insurer has the rights and remedies of the 
assured, and sues (in English and South African 
Section 79(1) of the MIA provide s that the insurer who pays for a total 
loss becomes entitled to take over the assured's interest in what 
remains of the subject-matter of the insurance . The wording is similar 
to that of the abandonment section, (section 63(1)), and the effect must 
therefore be the same. This provision only operates in respect of total 
loss; see section 79(2). 
Arnould, para 1300; Van Nieker k, Subrogasie, 325-326; Dorhout-Mees, 
Nederlands bandels- en faillis s ementsrecbt, ('Handelsrecbt') (1987) 
89-90 . ' , 
Whether the transfer occurs even earlier, or retro-actively, is 
discussed in Chapter 14 infra. See also Chapters 6-10 supra for the 
position in individual countries. 
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law) in the name of t h e assured145 • If a cession 
of action occurred, however, the insurer has to 
sue in his own name1 4 6 . The insurer's right to 
salvage is not an independent or additional right, 
but a consequence of his being subrogated in the 
rights and remedies of the assured or by his 
receiving transfer of t he assured's real rights in 
This the thing insured t hrough abandonment. 
enables the insurer to follow up what remains of 
the ship or goods insured and to claim possession 
of them from third parties and even from the 
assured. 
In an abandonment case the insurer recovers, if he 
can, the remains of the insured things, without 
limitation in respect of the value he may recover 
in relation to what he has paid the assured147 • 
In a subrogation case, however, the insurer's 
right of recovery against third parties is limited 
to the amount he has paid the assured148 • If he 
recovers more he has to account to the assured for 
the excess. 
Van Niekerk, Subrogasie, 333-334. 
The ~ssured ~s divested of his right to claim from the third party and 
the 1nsurer 1S the sole holder of the right; LAWSA para 222' Chi v Lodi 
1949 2 SA 507 (T). " 
Glen Line Ltd v A G (1930) 36 Com Cas 1 (HL) at 14; Derham, op cit, 17. 
Yorkshire Insurance Co Ltd v Nisbet Shipping Co. Ltd (1962) 2 QB 330 
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CONCLUSION 
It is apparent from the discussion thus far that 
subrogation fulfils an essential role in 
protecting and preserving the integrity of the 
indemnity principle. In the words of McCardie J: 
'The principle of subrogation is 
inherent ingredient of the 
indemni ty. ' 149 
a latent and 
contract of 
This means of necessity that subrogation must have 
been part of indemnity insurance from the very 
beginning, as was abandonment. Subrogation also 
appears to be essential for insurance business in 
the broad sense, as insurers would certainly 
require far higher premiums simply to be able to 
survive financially if they did not have the right 
to recoup themselves out of the assured's rights 
against the third part i es responsible for the loss 
in the first place. Generally there would in all 
likelihood be a relaxation of standards too as 
many persons would be prepared to gamble in the 
hope that foreseeable damage caused by their 
actions would be suffered by a person with 
insurance. This is clearly against public policy. 
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Notwithstanding their differences, abandonment and 
subrogation complement each other in their service 
of the indemnity principle. In an abandonment 
case, the insurer may pursue the remains of the 
abandoned ship or goods as owner, having become 
the owner thereof by way of the abandonment 150 • 
However, in those cases where the loss is such 
that it does not give rise to the right to 
abandon, the insurer becomes entitled to pursue 
the salvage under his rights of subrogation, which 
he may exercise after indemnifying the assured. In 
both cases the salvaged remains enure to the 
benefit of the insurer and the indemnity principle 
is honoured. 
Subrogation thus appears to be related to 
abandonment and even to share the same origins. 
The theories which have been advanced to explain 
abandonment and the question to what extent 
abandonment must also be regarded as one of the 
servants of the indemnity principle will therefore 
be considered in the next chapter. 









THEORY: INDEMNITY, ECONOMIC LOSS AND PROOF OF LOSS 
INTRODUCTION 
De Smet's definition of abandonment 1 alerts one to 
the fact that abandonment has two main aspects. 
The first is that it is an exceptional method by 
means of which the assured is allowed to claim the 
full indemnity provided by the policy in certain 
special cases against an offer on his part to 
transfer his proprietary rights in the subject-
matter of the insurance to the insurer. In this 
sense abandonment is linked to the question of 
proof of an indemnifiable loss which is tota1 2 • In 
its second aspect abandonment is a unique method 
of transfer of real rights3 • The discussion in 
this chapter will be confined to abandonment as a 
special remedy operating in the sphere of the 
indemnity principle and its links in that sphere 
with the law of evidence. Abandonment as a method 
of transfer will be discussed in the next chapter. 
De Smet, Traite Theorique et Pratique des Assurances Maritime, 2nd ed, 
(1959~1960), Vol I, para 527 . As was pointed out in Chapter 1 supra, De 
Smet 1S not the only proponent of this definition, which appears to 
encompass all the main aspects of abandonment. 
That the loss is regarded as total is evidenced by the fact that the 
full, or total, indemnity is claimable . 
See Chapter 1 supra for a discussion of the authors who look upon 
abandonment as such. 
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1.2. The discussion of abandonment principles in the 
foreign countries considered in Chapters 6 to 10 
has brought to light the essence of abandonment, 
namely that it operates only in relation to a 
special kind of loss, which can best be described 
as a loss which is total in the economic sense as 
opposed to a loss which is total in a real or 
actual sense. This distinction exists in the 
difference between the situation where the 
subject-matter of the insurance is completely 
destroyed and the situation where it continues to 
exist in some form or place or another but is 
beyond the assured's reach or control so that it 
has become economically worthless to him, for the 
foreseeable future at least. This aspect of 
abandonment shows certain obvious parallels with 
the concept of a 'pure economic loss' in the law 
of contract and of delict. An investigation of 
these parallels may be helpful in determining 
whether abandonment is compatible with the rest of 
the body of the law. 
1.3. Abandonment also has obvious links with the 
indemnity principle as it fulfils a similar but 
not identical role to the concept of subrogation. 
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operates in the sphere of the law of evidence as 
a presumption which creates an total loss where 
proof of an actual total loss is in fact absent or 
impossible4 . An examination of the theories which 
have been put forward to explain the phenomenon of 
abandonment is necessary in order to find its true 
place and meaning in the law of marine insurance 
and in order to determine whether it still has a 
role to play. 
There appear to be three main theories for the 
introduction, existence and function of 
abandonment 5 • 
The first theory links abandonment directly to the 
indemnity principle and has it that abandonment is 
merely a manifestation of the indemnity principle 
at work. 
The second theory links abandonment to the concept 
of an economic loss which is regarded as total. 
See Chapter 1 supra . 
Sarlis, Abandonment in Marine Insurance, thesis, University of London, 
(1960), 2-8 . menti~ns a fourth, namely that espoused by Rokas, 
Abandonment ~n Mar~ne Insurance Law, (1951), 19 to the effect that 
~andonment was an essential part of the simulated sale and early 
1nsurance. contrac~s of the fourteenth century, but this 'theory' does 
not expla1n~he eX1stence of abandonment, only its origins. (Rokas' work 
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According to this theory abandonment was 
originally introduced in order to do away with 
proof of an actual loss or diminution in the 
patrimony of the assured in cases where the 
assured would have had difficulty or would have 
experienced delay in producing the kind of proof 
which was usually required. The reason for 
dispensing with such proof was to allow the 
assured to recover his venture capital as soon as 
possible for re-investment in a fresh venture, in 
the interests of trade6 • This approach appears to 
adopt the theory that abandonment operates as a 
presumption which creates an indemnifiable loss 
when one would not otherwise exist. 
The third theory postulates that abandonment 
originally developed out of the missing ship 
provisions of the Barcelona Ordonnance of 1435 and 
its successors and was designed to deal with the 
difficulty of proving a loss by a peril insured 
against in the case of the ship which disappeared 
without trace or news. In such a situation the 
assured would ordinarily have no realistic means 
This theory has found favour on both sides of the Atlantic: See for 
example, Pollock & Bruce, A Compendium of the Law of Merchant Shipping, 
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of proving an 
also appears 
indemnifiable 10ss7. This theory 
to embrace the notion that 
abandonment operates as a presumption. 
THE INDEMNITY THEORY OF ABANDONMENT 
Sir James Allan Park was of the opinion that 
abandonment was merely an illustration of the 
indemnity principle at work8 : 
, (B)ecause insurance being a contract of 
indemnity, the assured can recover no more than 
the amount of the loss actually sustained; but if 
he were allowed to recover for a total loss, and 
might also retain the property saved, he would be 
a considerable gainer, which the law will not 
allow. ' 
The twin purposes of the indemnity principle, 
namely to ensure that the assured receives a full 
indemnity but does not receive more than a full 
indemnity, are both satisfied by the concept of 
abandonment. On the one hand the assured is 
allowed to recover the sum insured when there is 
De Smet, op c i t, Vol I , para 527 . 
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a loss, albeit a loss of a special kind . On the 
other hand he is required to transfer to the 
insurer his proprietary rights in the subj ect-
matter of the insurance so that he cannot, in the 
Park's words, become 'a considerable gainer'. Seen 
from a different angle, abandonment would appear 
to serve the same purposes as the indemnity 
principle, and Park's observation that abandonment 
is a manifestation of the indemnity principle at 
work would therefore be correct. 
Benecke9 disagreed with this view. In his opinion 
abandonment is inconsistent with a correct 
understanding of the contract of marine insurance 
as a contract of indemnity because, he argued, a 
concept which makes the insurer the 'proprietor of 
a thing for which he ~as only become a guarantee' 
is contrary to the strict application of the 
indemnity principle10 • He shared this view with 
A Treatise on the Principles of Indemnity in Marine Insurance, Bottomry 
and Respondentia, (1824), 336 et seq . 
Op cit, 338. There appears to be an obvious flaw in this argument. The 
insurer is not a guarantor. There are many differences between the 
institutions of insurance and guarantee or suretyship. For one thing, 
th7re . need be no contract between the guarantor or surety and the 
pr~nc~pal debtor for a suretyship to come into being. For another 
neither the pr~ncipal debtor nor the creditor needs to pay any premiu~ 
for a suretysh~p to be valid. Lastly, the liability of the surety is 
acc;:e~sorial, t1;-at is for the. debt of another and upon that person 
fa~l~ng to pay ~t, whereas the ~nsurer is liable for his own debt being 
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Emerigonll and Tecklenborg12 , who were of the 
view that it is unnecessary for the purpose of 
providing the assured with a proper indemnity that 
the insurer should acquire the ship or goods 
insured. Benecke therefore bemoaned the fact that 
the 'odious remedy of abandonment' had been 
allowed to become part of the law, but he accepted 
that it had already become 'so interwoven with the 
whole system of indemnification' that it could no 
longer be abolished13 • His final conclusion, 
however, was that abandonment constituted a 
special kind of indemnity which was applicable 
only in special cases and formed a distinct branch 
of the principle of abandonment14 • Therefore, in 
spite of Benecke's criticism of abandonment, he 
appears to have accepted the principle that 
abandonment properly resorted under the broad 
umbrella of the indemnity principle. His views 
therefore appear at least to be compatible with 
Park's. 
Traite des Assurances et des Contrats a la Grosse (1783), (Boulay- Paty 
edition of 1827), Vol II, 207. ' 
System des See-Versicherungswesens nach der Natur des Sache, (1862), 
358. 
Op cit, 338-339. 
Op ci t, 345. Helberg, op ci t, 16 appears to share the view that 
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Martin15 criticised abandonment on a different 
ground, namely that it offended against the 
indemnity principle in that the payment of the 
full amount of the insurance could lead to a 
disregard for the distinction between indemnity 
and non-indemnity insurance. To understand this 
argument fully, one has to keep in mind that the 
ship or goods are not necessarily destroyed 
completely in a physical sense in an abandonment 
case. If it were otherwise there would be nothing 
to abandon and no need for the requirement of an 
abandonment. However, Martin's criticism does not 
take proper cognizance of the fact that the event 
which gives rise to the right to abandon causes a 
loss which is in some way or to some extent of an 
economic nature . The effect of such an event on 
the patrimony of the assured is the same as if the 
ship or goods have irretrievably sunk in the 
deepest part of the ocean or have been completely 
consumed by fire. The assured's loss is thus as 
real in effect as would be the case of complete 
destruction of the thing insured and he would 
therefore not gain from the payment of the full 
Die Haftung des Versicherers fur Guter aus deutschen Schiffen in 






Part I V: Chapter 13 : Theory of Abandonment 
amount of the insurance16 , provided of course 
that he abandons his proprietary rights in the 
ship or goods to the insurer. Therefore, and 
notwithstanding Martin's criticism, abandonment is 
entirely in consonance with the ideals of the 
indemnity principle. The true burden of Martin's 
complaint appears to be that a loss in the nature 
of an economic loss is compensated rather than an 
actual or real 10SS17. Whether that criticism is 
valid may be determined by examining the economic 
loss theory . 
There is substance in Park's explanation that 
abandonment is an illustration or manifestation of 
the indemnity principle, but that explanation does 
not appear to constitute a complete one. 
In the first place, if Park's explanation were a 
complete theory of abandonment one would have 
expected to find abandonment in all forms of 
indemnity insurance, which one does not. This 
contention does not lose sight of the fact that 
abandonment and subrogation were not yet seen as 
Helberg, op cit, 17 . 
This contention is considered in the text infra where abandonment's 
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separate concepts at the time Park enunciated his 
theory . Park ' s theory is thus more suited to 
explain abandonment and subrogation than to 
explain abandonment as a separate concept . 
In the second place, virtually every substantive 
rule of insurance is linked in one way or another 
to the indemnity principle . Such rules include the 
principles relating to insurable interest, double-
or multiple insurance, over-insurance, valued 
pol icies , replacement value insurance, sue and 
labour and the rules relating to the measure of 
indemni t y 18 • Abandonment and subrogation are 
therefore not unique in this regard . Park's theory 
does not explain the narrower or unique function 
of abandonment as opposed to the functions of the 
other servant rules of the indemnity principle . 
THE ECONOMIC LOSS THEORY: A PRESUMPTION OF TOTAL 
LOSS 
In terms of this theory, referred to herein as the 
economic loss theory, abandonment is a device 
which is utilised in order to allow the assured to 
The rule relating to these concepts and their links to the i ndemnity 
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recover for an economic as opposed to an actual or 
real total loss. This theory is espoused by 
theorists and legal historians like Schook19 , 
Mens Fiers Smeding2o , Dorhout Mees 21 , 
Aschenheim22, Barkhausen23, Helberg24 and 
Rodiere and Pontavice25 . Some of the proponents 
of this theory also espouse a particular theory 
about the origins and development of abandonment. 
According to them the concept of abandonment 
developed in stages as follows: 
While the main purpose of marine insurance is to 
compensate the assured for loss or damage actually 
suffered, in the sense required by the actio legis 
Aquiliae, it was soon realized that some events do 
not necessarily cause physical damage to nor the 
final and irretrievable loss of the subject-matter 
of the insurance, yet they affect the assured's 
Ret Abandonnement, doctoral thesis, Utrecht, «1858) , 13. 
Eenige Opmerkingen over het Recht van Abandonnement, doctoral thesis, 
Leiden, (1895), 28-29 . 
Schadeverzekeringsrecht , 4th ed, (1967 ), ('Schade') , 637-638 . 
Der Abandon des Versicherten in der Seeversicherung, (1893), 2-3. 
Voraussetzungen und Wirkungen des Abandon bei der Seeversicherung, 
doctoral thesis , Erlangen, (1895), 5. 
Der Abandon in der Seeversicherung auf Rechtsverglei chender Grundlage 
(1925), 14 -15. ' 
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interests just as severely as the case where there 
has been a complete physical destruction of the 
subject-matter of the insurance. The main 
characteristic of these events is that they so 
deprive the assured of his power to dispose of his 
property that he either does not know whether loss 
or damage has actually occurred, or does not know 
if or when it will finally occur26 . Because of 
this uncertainty the assured is unable to claim on 
the insurance and is also unable to enj oy the 
benefits of his ownership or use of the subject-
matter of the insurance27 . 
Further, as Phillips put it: 
, (I)n cases of capture and detention, insurance 
would afford a very inadequate indemnity to the 
assured without the right to abandon; and in many 
cases of sea-damage the indemnity would be long 
delayed and very difficult to adjust. The object 
of the insurance is, to enable the merchant to 
throw the adventure off his hands as soon as his 
enterprise is frustrated, and embark his capital 
Helberg, op c i t , 13 . See also Moore v Evans [1918] AC 185 . 
In t~ese cases . the ship or goods insured continue to exist , or may 
~ont1nue to ex1st, but they are for practical and economic purposes 
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in a new one.' 28 
If the assured could not abandon but had to wait 
for an actual loss to eventuate, his venture 
capital would be tied up for a long time, which 
would stifle the enterprising spirit required for 
successful trade29 and would work adversely on 
the interests of the insurer as the assured may be 
tempted to wait for an actual loss to occur or may 
even be tempted to assist an actual loss to occur 
when an early abandonment would give the insurer 
an opportunity to take steps to minimise his 
losses. 
The combination of these two factors, namely the 
continuing uncertainty and the prejudice suffered 
as a result of the consequent delay in the 
settlement, led to the search for a method which 
would allow such capital to be released to the 
assured sooner. The system or fiction was 
therefore introduced which presumed loss in 
certain circumstances and allowed the assured to 
A Treatise on the Law of Insurance, 4th ed, (1854), Vol II, para 1492. 
Arnould, A Treatise on the Law of Marine Insurance and Average, 2nd ed, 
(1857), ,10l4 pu~ it ~s ,follows: 'To have his funds locked up during the 
whole t~me he ~s wa~t~ng the ultimate issue of the accident would be 
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claim the sum insured30 . At first the payment by 
the insurer was provisional, and repayment had to 
be made upon any subsequent recovery of the ship 
or goods, but this was unsatisfactory as the 
uncertainty about his final position vis-a-vis the 
funds restricted the assured's ability to utilise 
the money31. 
Instead of provisional payment the radical system 
of abandonment was then introduced. Under this 
system the loss remained a fictitious or 
presumptive 10ss32 which was total and whose 
effect is that the assured is relieved of the onus 
of proving that he has suffered an actual 
diminution in his patrimony to the extent of the 
value of the thing insured, that is that the event 
has actually caused him a loss which is tota133 . 
This allowed the assured to claim without the risk 
of repayment and allowed him to re- invest his 
Helberg , op cit, 14-15 ; Bewer, 'Das Herrschattsgebiet des Abandons', 
(1891) 38 Zeitschrittt tur das Gesammte Handelsrecht, 373 and 425 . 
Helberg, op cit, 15; Bewer, op cit, 373 . 
A 'tingierten ' or 'prasumierten Totalverlust' , as it has been referred 
to in German treatises. 
Schook, op cit, 13; Mens Piers Smeding, op cit, 28-29; Dorhout Mees, 
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capital in a fresh venture34 • However, in order 
to make use of this radical system the assured had 
to offer up his proprietary rights in the subject-
matter of the insurance to the insurer35 • In this 
system the indemnity principle is thus served and 
protected by the requirement of an abandonment. 
Benecke acknowledged that one of the principal 
reasons for the introduction of abandonment was to 
avoid the situation where the assured had to wait 
an indefinite period before he recovered his 
venture capital in those cases where a speedy 
set tlement could not be achieved. However, he 
maintained that that obstacle could be overcome by 
obliging the insurer to make a payment on 
account36 . Helberg convincingly disposed of this 
argument by pointing out that such a payment would 
by its nature still be provisional and that the 
undesirable uncertainty would continue with the 
result that the assured's ability to utilise the 
money in a fresh venture would still be 
Aschenheim, op cit, 2-3; Barkhausen, op cit, 5,' Helberg, op c ' t 15 
~, ; 
Bewer, op cit , 373-374. 
Dorhout Mees, Schade, 637-638; Bewer, op cit, 374 . 
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compromised37 . Benecke also contended that the 
assured could be obliged to assist the insurer by 
co-operating in the endeavours to salvage the ship 
or goods so that there would be no real advantage 
to the insurer in an abandonment38 . The problem 
with this approach, however, is that it ignores 
the advantage which abandonment provides the 
assured where the effect of a particular kind of 
casualty is that it destroys or diminishes his 
ability to utilise the ship or goods which 
constitute his investment to trade. If his 
investment were to be tied up for a long time 
without his being able to convert it to cash, he 
would be in the position where his investment has 
become practically useless or lost. There is 
therefore a clear advantage to the assured in the 
right to abandon and thereby to recover his 
investment sooner. If the insurer does not want to 
stand good for this kind of loss, he may exclude 
it from the cover granted. 
Abandonment also came under attack from another 
qp cit, 15. 
qp cit, 345. This was in fact the position under article 4, Title 11 of 
the Hamburg Ordonnance of 1731 and article 388 of the Code de Commerce 
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quarter. Tecklenborg39 and others40 were of the 
opinion that abandonment had served its purpose 
and was no longer necessary. This criticism was 
partly met by the events of World War I shortly 
after Tecklenborg's comments were published. 
During and after the war large numbers of claims 
based on abandonment principles were made on 
insurers41 • More recently the conflicts in the 
Middle East between the Arab countries and Israel 
and between Iraq and Iran have similarly resulted 
in abandonment claims on insurers42 • 
Tecklenborg's approach also negates or minimises 
the essential role of abandonment in cases of 
economic loss. 
It is submitted that Tecklenborg and Benecke's 
arguments are not cogent enough to outweigh the 
advantages of abandonment to both the assured and 
insurer. But for the doctrine of abandonment the 
assured would not have been able to recover the 
full extent of his loss in cases of economic loss 
Op cit, 358 . 
See Helberg, op c i t , 16-17. 
Helberg, op cit , 16 . 
See Khurram, ' Total Loss and Abandonment i n the Law of Marine Insurance' 
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and there would have been a grave shortcoming in 
the law. However, Chalmers put the matter in 
perspective in 1903 when he wrote: 
'Constructive total loss lies midway between 
actual total loss on the one hand, and partial 
loss on the other. It is in effect a hybrid loss, 
and its dual character has complicated the 
decisions. ,43 
This duality is found in the fact that abandonment 
treats as a total loss a loss which is in physical 
terms a partial loss at the most. It does so 
because in economic terms the loss is total. 
The economic loss theory of abandonment does not 
appear to be in conflict with the indemnity 
theory. It relies on and supplements the indemnity 
principle by requiring an indemnification in the 
case of an economic loss against an abandonment. 
Maclou44 explained that abandonment gives rise to 
two rights; the assured's right to the full amount 
of the insurance and the insurer's right to the 
Chalmers and Owen, A Digest of the Law relating to Marine Insurance, 2nd 
ed, (1903), 83-84 . 
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. f h' 45 remains of the subJect-matter 0 t e lnsurance . 
This extraordinary right (to claim the full amount 
of the insurance) is granted in order to allow the 
assured to recover his investment and to re-invest 
it as soon as possible. This succinct explanation 
of abandonment at once recognizes its function 
within the ambit of the indemnity principle and 
demonstrates its economic purpose . 
Economic loss can be contrasted with physical 
damage. In the case of physical damage there is, 
as the words suggest, physical damage to a thing, 
such as a dent or hole in the side of the ship, 
which requires to be repaired. The cost of repair 
is usually, but not always, the measure of the 
damages in such a case as the patrimony of the 
shipowner is reduced to the extent of such cost. 
In the case of economic loss, however, there may 
be no physical damage to the ship at all, but she 
may be so removed from the assured's control that 
she might as well have been physically destroyed. 
In some abandonment cases there is no physical 
damage to the ship or goods, as in cases of 
capture or perhaps even some instances of missing 
ships . In others there may be physical damage but 
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not a complete destruction. The decisive feature 
is that the loss suffered by the assured is not 
limited to the cost of repairing the damage or the 
mere diminution in value of the insured thing. 
The concept of economic loss has been described as 
'patrimonial loss that is not the result of injury 
to property,46, or 'a financial loss which is not 
cau.sally consequent upon physical injury to the 
. .. property.' 47 In the case of marine insurance, 
particularly in respect of those events which give 
rise to the right to abandon, these statements 
have to be qualified to take account of the fact 
that abandonment relates to total loss. Therefore 
the notion of an economic loss in this sphere 
includes those cases where the loss is only partly 
of an economic nature. An example of such a case 
is where the cost of repair exceeds half or three 
quarters of the insured value, as is recognized by 
American and French law respectively. 
The law pertaining to delicts and contracts 
recognizes that a person may suffer patrimonial 
Visser and Potgieter, Law of Damages, (1993), 54-55 and 353 et seq. 
Feldthusen, Economic Negligence: The Recovery of Pure Financial Loss, 
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loss as a result of being deprived of the use of 
his property48. If the deprivation is temporary, 
the damage is assessed at the cost of hiring a 
substitute for the relevant period49 . If, 
however, the deprivation is permanent, the loss is 
the value of the thing together with such damages 
as may have been suffered as a result of the loss 
of its use between the time of its removal from 
the claimant's use to the time of its 
replacement 50. In the typical abandonment case 
the assured is to similar effect deprived of the 
use of his property, which deprivation continues 
in some form or another . Indeed, De Courcy 
described abandonment cases as cases of 
'depossession par fortune de la 
graphically demonstrates the basic 
that in abandonment cases the 
mer' 51 , which 
idea, namely 
assured is 
dispossessed of his property but that the property 
continues to exist . Such a deprivation of 
possession causes a loss, but not the same type of 
loss which results from the destruction or actual 
loss of the thing insured . 
Visser and Potgieter, op cit, 334 . 
Visser and Potgieter, op cit, 335. 
Visser and Potgieter, op cit, 335 fn 46. 
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Recent South African decisions have made it clear 
that the principles of the actio legis Aquiliae 
are applicable to and include the type of loss 
described as a pure financial or economic 10ss52. 
What these decisions emphasise is that liability 
in cases of economic loss, while falling within 
the principles of the actio legis Aquiliae, are 
tempered by public policy53. In this respect the 
relief granted by the institution of abandonment 
is of the same nature and public policy also plays 
a role. This is apparent from the history of 
abandonment principles, especially when one takes 
into account that the right to abandon has always 
been limited, whether by statute or by the English 
common law, to the cases falling within a specific 
class of loss which was regarded as worthy · of 
being indemnified. 
One may therefore conclude that abandonment is 
indeed, as Park explained, a manifestation of the 
Herschel v Mrupe 1954 3 SA 464 (A); Suid-Afrikaanse Bantoetrust v Ross 
en Jacobz 1977 3 SA 184 (T); Greenfield Engineering Works (Pty) Ltd v 
NKR Construction (Pty) Ltd 1978 4 SA 901 (N); Administrateur, Natal v 
Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk 1973 3 SA 824 (A). See also Pauw, 
'Aanspreeklikheid vir 'suiwer vennoEmsskade' in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg' 
1975 De Jure 23 . 
Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk, supra ; Pilkington 
Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners 1983 2 SA 
157 (W). It is not possible to formulate a general principle which will 
cover all type of cases where the law allows the recovery of an economic 
loss. Feldthusen, op cit, has identified six categories in the field of 
the la~ of delict alone. See also Sheller, 'Pride and Precedent: 
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indemnity principle, but that its essential nature 
is that it operates in the sphere of economic 
loss. In this function abandonment is unique and 
differs from the other servants of the indemnity 
principle, including subrogation. 
THE PRESUMPTION THEORY OF ABANDONMENT 
The proponents of the theory that abandonment 
operates by way of a presumption which turns into 
an indemnifiable loss what otherwise would not 
have given rise to a claim at all appear to accept 
the justice of allowing a claim in the typical 
abandonment circumstances because the assured has 
suffered an economic 10ss54. Their very theory 
supports the notion that abandonment operates in 
its special sphere as a remedy allowing an assured 
who has suffered an economic loss to recover the 
full indemnity from his insurer. However, they 
classify abandonment as being part of the so-
called 'Beweissystem,55, literally the 'system of 
proof'. Whether abandonment can be reduced to a 
mere rule of evidence so easily is open to 
Bewer, op cit, 373; Aschenheim, op cit, 2; Barkhausen , op cit, 1 ; 
Helberg , op ci t ; 14 - 15 . 
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question as such a classification explains the 
manner in which it functions rather than its 
origins and purpose. 
According to the presumption theory abandonment 
was introduced in the form of a presumption of 
loss which operated in given cases56 • The nature 
of the presumption which is said to operate 
requires some thought. There are three types of 
presumptions. The distinction is of the utmost 
importance for South African marine insurance law. 
South African law of evidence is essentially 
English law57 , which would mean that abandonment 
would be regulated by English law if it were the 
mere manifestation of a presumption. On the other 
hand, if abandonment were a concept or principle 
of substantive law, it would be regulated, subject 
to one qualification, by the ordinary 'Roman-Dutch 
law of the Republic' 58. 
The first type of presumption is called an 
irrebuttable presumption of law, but it is in 
See para 3 . 5 Bupra . 
Zeffertt, The South African Law of Evidence, 4th ed, (1988), Chapter 1. 
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. 1 59 essence a rule of substantlve aw . 
The second type of presumption is a rebuttable 
presumption of law . In such a case the presumption 
creates only a provisional state of affairs which 
may be overturned by evidence to the contrary60. 
The third type of presumption is a presumption of 
fact, which is really no more than 'an inference 
of common sense, based on what usually happens or 
is assumed to happen. ,61 
If abandonment were indeed the manifestation of a 
presumption, it would have to be a presumption of 
the first kind as, once the circumstances 
permitting an abandonment are present, it is not 
open to the insurer in any of the legal systems 
discussed earlier to avoid liability on the 
grounds of the existence of any extraneous facts 
or circumstances which he might be able to prove. 
Emerigon made this clear, stating that 
Zeffertt, op cit, 530 - 531 . 
Zeffertt, op cit, 534 - 535 . 
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la perte entiere est presumee ... et cette 
presomption, qui est juris et de jure, suffit 
pour donner ouverture l'action de 
delaissement. ,62 
Abandonment is therefore more than just a 
presumption of loss which operates in given 
circumstances in the sphere of the law of 
evidence: It is a rule of substantive law. 
It also appears that the presumption theory is in 
any event compatible with the economic loss 
theory, but is open to the criticism that it 
reduces a rule of substantive law to the mere 
formalism of a presumption in evidence. Such over-
elaboration is unnecessary and of little use in 
casting light on the institution of abandonment. 
THE MISSING SHIP THEORY OF ABANDONMENT 
The theory that abandonment developed out of the 
missing ship provisions of early marine insurance 
ordonnances has, it is submitted, already been 
dispatched by the historical evidence, especially 
Op cit, Vol II , Zl1. (' ... the total loss is presumed .. . and this 
pre~umption, which is juris et de jure, suffices to give room to the 
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the evidence contained in the earliest marine 
insurance ordonnances and the compilations of 
insurance customs which were discussed earlier
63
• 
The logical presence of abandonment or something 
akin to it in the simulated sale transaction also 
militates against this theory. Further, 
abandonment and the missing ship provisions 
existed side-by-side for a considerable period 
before the missing ship also became a case for 
abandonment64 • The missing ship case should 
rather, it is submitted, be seen as a typical 
abandonment case arising in the event of an 
economic loss rather than an actual or real loss, 
where the uncertainty with regard to the fact or 
cause of the disappearance coupled with the delay 
in the settlement would otherwise have resulted in 
the insurance falling short of its target65 • 
The missing ship case confirms some important 
conclusions which have been reached thus far with 
regard to the reasons for the introduction and 
continued existence of abandonment as well as its 
function. 
See Chapters 4 and 5 supra . 
This was also demonstrated in Chapter 5 supra. 
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In the first place, it demonstrates abandonment's 
role as a servant of the indemnity principle, 
since it gives a clear demonstration of the double 
recovery which would be possible if the ship were 
to be found after the indemnification and would 
accrue to the assured if there were no requirement 
of an abandonment. 
In the second place, it is a good example of an 
economic rather than an actual loss, since there 
is an absence of proof that the ship has in fact 
been lost in such a case. The ship may well 
continue to exist and to remain in the ownership 
of the assured. 
Lastly, it is the prime example of the device 
which insurance law has adopted in order to 
rectify what was perceived to be a shortcoming in 
the law by relaxing the otherwise strict rules of 
the law relating to proof if loss, which made it 
almost impossible to prove a loss by an insured 
peril when the assured had no evidence at all of 
the cause of the ship's disappearance. That device 
was clothed in the form of a presumption, but it 
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. 1 66 rule of substantl ve aw . 
THE APPLICATION OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS THEORY 
The economic loss theory can be demonstrated to 
operate in all the different categories of cases 
where the laws of the countries discussed in 
Chapters 6 to 10 allow an abandonment. The 
circumstances which entitle an assured to abandon 
can be placed in four categories67 . Each of the 
causes recognized in the countries under 
discussion falls into one of these categories and 
can be distinguished from those falling in the 
other categories by virtue of some difference in 
their essential nature. 
The first category comprises those causes which 
involve the loss of the ship through its physical 
disintegration or breaking up, whether accompanied 
by its actual sinking or not, namely shipwreck and 
The missing ship was treated as a case of presumed loss in the 
ordonnances of the Dutch port towns, under the Wetboek van Koopbandel 
of 1838 ('the WvK') (article 667) and is still treated as such a case 
in English law under section 58 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 ('the 
MIA') . 
This classification is not necessarily followed by the legislatures of 







Part IV: Chapter 13 : Theory of Abandonment 
stranding with breaking Up68. The second category 
comprises damage to the ship or cargo and 
unseaworthiness of the ship which does not result 
shipwreck or stranding but makes the ship unfit 
for use as a ship or makes the ship or goods 
impossible or uneconomical to repair69 . The third 
category comprises those causes which involve the 
removal or withdrawal of the ship or goods from 
the possession or control of the assured by some 
person or persons or a state or government through 
arrest, capture, detention or embarg070 • The last 
category is that of the ship which disappears 
without trace or news, the so-called missing ship, 
and the cargo on her 71 • 
These cases all have three essential features, 
which cannot be divorced completely from one 
another. The first is that the loss or part of the 
In the Netherlands, France, England and America causes falling in this 
category are recognized which could lead to a valid abandonment but not 
in Germany, where shipwreck and stranding are regarded as instances of 
actual total loss, or 'TotalverluBt'. 
This category is recognized in the Netherlands, ('onbruikbaarbeid door 
zeeBcba~e' and' vergaan of bederf door zeeramp'), France, (impossibility 
of repa~r, damage or deterioration beyond three quarters of the value 
and unseaworthiness through a maritime peril), and England and America, 
but again not in Germany. 
This category is recognized in all five the countries under 
consideration, whether the cause is called arrest, detention, capture 
or embargo. 
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loss is in the nature of an economic or financial 
loss 72 . The second is that the insured thing is 
not completely destroyed nor lost for certain 
beyond all hope73 . The third is that the loss is 
to all intents and purposes total. A review of the 
facts which fall in the four categories enumerated 
confirms this74. 
CATEGORY ONE: SHIPWRECK AND STRANDING WITH 
BREAKING UP 
Shipwreck and stranding with breaking up were 
specifically mentioned in the Netherlands75 as 
causes which entitled the assured to abandon. In 
France they are regarded as species of total loss 
entitling the assured to abandon76 . In Germany 
In each case the facts will determine whether the assured has suffered 
such a loss. 
If it were, there would be nothing to abandon and the case would, by 
definition, not be an abandonment case. 
What is also significant is that there does not appear to be any large 
practical difference between Anglo-American law and continental law in 
the precise circumstances which give rise to the right to abandon. 
Article 663 of the WvK . The relevant provisions relating to abandonment 
have been repealed with effect from 1 January 1992, but for the sake of 
completeness and comparison the pre-existing provisions of Dutch law are 
referred to here . See Chapter 6 supra for a complete history of Dutch 
abandonment provisions from the nineteenth century . 
They are no longer mentioned by name as causes entitling the assured to 
abandon, but have been retained as such causes under the 'perte totale' 
provision of Article 48 of Law 522 of 1967; Harrel-Courtes, Le Nouveau 
Droit Francais de 1 'Assurance Maritime et des Evenements de Mer, (1968), 
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the shipwreck and stranding do not give rise to 
right to abandon, but they may amount to a total 
loss, depending on whether the ship has 
irretrievably sunk77, or has been destroyed78 . In 
England and America shipwreck and stranding may 
give rise to a constructive total loss or an 
actual total loss, depending on the facts 79 . 
The words , shipwreck' 80, , na ufrage' 81, 
, schipbreuk, ' , Schiffbruch' and , skipbreuk' 82 
have the same etymological components and the same 
meaning83 . Notwithstanding some 
It is not enough for the ship to have sunk, she must be 
gesunken', ('sunk irretrievably'); Ritter-Abraham, Das 




The ship must be 'in seiner ursprfrnglichen Beschaffenheit zerstort', 
(destroyed in her nature), so that even though some debris may remain, 
she no longer exists as a ship; Ritter-Abraham, op cit, Vol II, 869. 
Mustill and Gilman, Arnould's Law of Marine Insurance and Average, 16th 
ed, (1981), (' cited as Arnould'), para 1191; Cambridge v Anderton (1824) 
1 B & Cr 691 . 
The common dictionary meaning of the word is 'the destruction of a ship 
at sea' and 'wreck' as a verb 'to break, spoil or destroy completely'; 
Collins Paperback English Dictionary, sv 'shipwreck'. 
, Naufrage' derives from the Latin words 'navis' (ship) and 'fractio' (a 
breaking) . 
Odendal et aI, Verklarende Handwoordeboek van die Afrikaanse Taal, 
(1981), 984 defines ' skipbreuk' as ' (d)ie vergaan, stranding van 'n 
skip' and the phrase 'skipbreuk ly' as 'met jou skip strand'. It is not 
without significance that the destruction of the ship is equated with 
its stranding, as this approach lends support for the classification of 
shipwreck and stranding with breaking up as a single category. 
While the words for shipwreck in the different languages all tend to 
indicate the same t~ing, namely that the ship has become a wreck, or has 
been broken, there 1S some vagueness in that it remains uncertain when 
a ship is to be regarded as wrecked or broken. The literal meaning of 
these words, however, is to the effect that the ship has ceased to exist 
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vagueness84 , the legislatures who have codified 
their marine insurance laws have not attempted a 
definition85 . Similar difficulties atta~h to the 
precise meaning of the word , stranding' 86, which 
happens to be spelled the same in English, Dutch 
and Afrikaans, and its French and German 
equivalents, , echouement' and 'gestrandet' The 
essence of these concepts is apparent from their 
treatment in different legal systems. 
Shipwreck has been defined as an accident which 
breaks up the ship and leads to her sinking87. 
This definition is accordance with the 
etym0logical roots of the word as well as with the 
cormnon or usual sequence of events88 where the 
ship is broken up to a greater or lesser extent 
and sinks. It has also been said that there can be 
Danjon, Traite de Droit Maritime, (1915-1916), para 1516. 
Except for Russia, who defined shipwreck as a total loss which arises 
when a ship sinks, strands, is collided with or breaks up, or springs 
a leak which cannot be repaired; Abbink , Het Zeerecht en de Zee-
Assurantiewetten aller Volken, (1847), Vol I, para 116 fn 110 . 
The word could be used as a noun or a verb meaning 'to leave or drive 
a ship ashore'; Collins Paperback English Dictionary sv 'stranding' . 
'Le naufrage, c'est, ecrit M. Ripert, au sens etymologique du mot, 
l'accid~nt qui ~rise Ie navire et entraine par consequent sa 
submers~on'; ('Sh~pwreck, wrote Mr Ripert, in the etymological sense of 
t~e ~ord, means an accident which breaks the ship and sets in motion her 
s~nk~ng' .) De Smet, Traite Theorique et Pratique des Assurances 
Maritime, 2nd ed, (1959-60), Vol I, para 542. 
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no shipwreck without sinking and no sinking 
without the event also constituting shipwreck
89
. 
If this is correct the breaking up of the sunken 
ship is not necessary for the event to constitute 
shipwreck. However, the mere sinking of the ship 
is not sufficient as the ship may be able to be 
refloated. The complete submersion of the ship is 
not required as she may be irretrievably broken in 
shallow water, but in the latter case the event 
constitutes stranding with breaking Up90 . While 
the sinking usually follows sooner or later as the 
natural result of shipwreck, the sinking is 
therefore not the only important factor91 . 
Stranding with breaking up can therefore be 
compared to shipwreck as its effect is the 
same92 , but it differs from shipwreck in that, in 
the case of shipwreck the ship founders and leaves 
no remains on the surface while in the case of 
De Smet, op cit, Vol I , para 542 . 
That is precisely what occurred in the case of Durand de la Beduandiere 
et comp v Sellier et Autres ('Le Juste') 1858 (1) DJG 392 (Cour de 
Cassation) where the ship sank but was raised to the surface after three 
days . The policy restricted the right to abandon to shipwreck and the 
court held that the event did not constitute shipwreck but stranding 
with breaking up. 
De Smet, op cit, Vol I, para 542. The Declaration of 15 June 1735 to the 
effe~t that shipwreck was equal to the sinking of the ship as a result 
of v~olent wave action, wind, storm or lightning, whether the ship is 
~ompletely engulfed or some wreckage remains afloat, is therefore 
~ncorrect; De Smet , loc cit. 
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stranding water gets into a stranded ship and 
fills it without the ship disappearing93. 
English and American law, in keeping with their 
concept of a constructive total loss, emphasise 
the effect of the event insured against rather 
than its precise nature, as long as it falls 
within the insured perils. As a result of this 
approach, there is no strict definition of 
shipwreck or stranding, nor any particular 
distinction between them. If a ship is completely 
broken up by a peril insured against so that her 
hull is dismembered and her planks or plates 
scattered on the sea, she is regarded as a wreck 
and the assured is entitled to claim for an actual 
total 10ss94. The same applies where she retains 
the shape of her hull but has been reduced to a 
'mere congeries of planks' 95, so that she would 
require reconstruction rather than repair to make 
Stranding in this context means she is grounded and fills with water ; 
Kent, Commentaries on American Law, (12th ed) (1896) Vol III 516 fn 
(b) . ' , , 
45 C.J.S. Insurance para 955 ; Carr v Providence Washington Insurance Co 
109 NY 504. 
45 C.J . S. Insurance para 955; Burt v Brewers' & Maltsters' Insurance Co 
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her capable of navigating the sea again
96 
• 
Notwithstanding the approach of English and 
American law with regard to constructive total 
loss, there appear to be two recognized or 
identifiable kinds of shipwreck. In the first the 
ship actually sinks and is so broken that there is 
nothing to retrieve, or she is dashed to pieces or 
is burnt to a cinder. In such cases there is an 
actual total loss and the assured may claim the 
sum insured without any abandonment 97 . In the 
second she sinks or is stranded. If the event does 
not result in a shipwreck amounting to an actual 
total loss, the ship may still be left in a 
position where she may be salved, preserved to 
some extent yet unable to be refloated and 
repaired except by the expenditure of an amount 
which would exceed her value when repaired, or, in 
American law, an amount which would exceed half 
her repaired value98 • In such a case a 
Arnould, para 1191; Cambridge v Anderton (1824) 2 B & Cr 691; 
Continental Insurance Co v Clayton Hardtop Skiff 239 F Supp 815 . In the 
lastmentioned case the ship was known to have been fully destroyed or 
so f~agmente~ that she was no longer a ship, although the wreckage 
rema~ned und~scovered. The court held that the circumstances justified 
the conclusion that either an actual total loss or a constructive total 
loss had occurred . The court held further that the precise definition 
of the loss depended on the elapsed time since the loss, the 
circumstances of the loss and the type of ship involved. 
Carr v Providence Washington Insurance Co, supra. 
Bradlie v Maryland Insurance Co (1838) 12 Pet 378; Continental Insurance 






Part IV : Chapter 13 : Theory of Abandonmen t 
constructive total loss arises entitling the 
assured to abandon and claim the full sum 
insured99 • The mere sinking or stranding of the 
ship is not enough . If the ship can be refloated 
and rendered fit to continue the voyage, and the 
cost of doing so does not exceed the repaired 
value, or half the repaired value in America, the 
assured is limited to an average 10SS100. When 
one works with the concept of a constructive total 
loss, the difference between shipwreck and 
stranding becomes unimportant, except in relation 
to the definition of the perils insured against, 
and it is in this context that a number of 
decisions have been reported on the peculiar 
circumstances of a variety of cases where an 
endeavour was made to determine each time whether 
the loss arose from a stranding. However, these 
cases depend so much on the facts of each case 
that no precise definition or universally 
applicable rule can be given101 • 
The comparative situation is thus as follows: In 
English law : Section 60 (1) of the MIA; Arnould , para 1191. American law: 
Appleman & Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, (Revised Vol 6) , para 
3705; Peele v Merchants ' Insurance Co 3 Mason 27 . 
Appleman & Appleman , op cit , para 3708; 45 C. J . S. Insurance para 955 ; 
Wood v Kennebec Insurance Co (1810) 6 Mass 479. 
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Germany, England and America shipwreck and 
stranding may give rise to an actual total loss, 
a 'Totalverlust' as it is known in German law. In 
such a case no abandonment is necessary. The 
reason is obvious: There is nothing of value left 
to abandon. However, the shipwreck or stranding 
may not completely destroy the ship. In such a 
case the loss is a constructive total loss in 
England and America, and an abandonment has to be 
made if the assured wishes to recover for a total 
loss. In Germany the claim is for a partial loss 
only. In the Netherlands and France shipwreck and 
stranding with breaking up are regarded as 
abandonment losses notwithstanding the possibility 
that in certain cases there may be nothing left to 
abandon. This incongruity does not stand in the 
way of the theory that the abandonment is required 
because the loss is total by reason of its 
economic effect in contrast to an actual total 
loss of the insured thing102 . 
The fiction is therefore to presume a total loss, 
It occurs to me that the reason for this incongruity in French and Dutch 
l';tw is that ,th,ey do not, I ike Engl ish law, recognise that the real 
7~ghts , perta~n~ng to ~he ship or goods in respect of which a full 
~ndemn~ty h~s b~en pa~d ~y be enforced by the insurer as part and 
parcel of h~s r~ghts obta~ned by subrogation . If French and Dutch law 
had recognised a similar principle there would have been no need for the 
requi~ement of an abandonment ,in all cases of shipwreck and stranding, 
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not merely that a loss has occurred. There is 
after all actual damage to the ship in the case of 
shipwreck and stranding, as the earlier discussion 
of the nature of these causae demonstrates. This 
damage causes a diminution in the patrimony of the 
assured which is equal to the difference between 
the before and after values of the insured ship 
and goods 103 • However, from an economic point of 
view the assured's patrimony is reduced further in 
that the cost of recovery and repair makes the 
exercise not worthwhile. To him the loss is 
therefore equivalent to the total loss of the ship 
or goods, as would have occurred had they sunk in 
the deepest part of the ocean or had been burnt to 
a cinder. It is this additional loss, which is 
economic in nature, which abandonment allows the 
assured to recover in the case of shipwreck and 
stranding. 
CATEGORY TWO: INNAVIGABILITY 
Innavigability or irreparable damage caused by an 
insured peril are regarded as a cause for 
abandonment in the Netherlands, France, England 
This, dim~n~tion is directly related to the value of the ship or goods 
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and America, but not in Germany. In the 
Netherlands the ship was regarded as innavigable 
or unfit if she had been damaged to the extent 
that she could not reach her destination except by 
the expenditure of an amount exceeding three 
quarters of her insured val ue
104 
. Damage or 
perishing of the goods as a result of a marine 
peril was also a cause giving rise to the right to 
abandon the cargo so affected105 • In the case of 
destruction or perishing of the ship or goods, the 
assured could not abandon unless the damage 
exceeded three-quarters of the insured value106 • 
In France damage to the extent that the repair 
costs exceed three quarters of the agreed 
value107 and impossibility of repair give rise to 
the right to abandon the ship and total loss, loss 
Schook, op cit, 29-37; Mens Fiers Smeding, op cit, 56-58; Dorhout Mees, 
Schadeverzekeringsrecht, 638. The Amsterdam Ordonnance of 1744 used the 
phrase 'innavigabel geworden is' (article 28) and the Rotterdam 
Ordonnance of 1721 the phrase ' vergaan of innavigabel geworden' 
(articles 60 and 62), while the CdeC used the phrase' innavigabili te par 
fortune de mer' (article 369). These words and phrases convey the same 
meaning, namely that the ship or goods must become incapable of being 
used as a ship as a result of a maritime peril . See also Enschede, op 
cit, 150-151. Unfitness appeared to Schook, op cit, 35 to be a case of 
an actual total loss, as the ship loses her character as a ship when she 
is no longer seaworthy. It is submitted that what Schook meant is that 
the assured's patrimony must definitely be diminished . 
Schook, op cit, 37 regarded this cause as equivalent for the cargo what 
stranding and breaking up constituted for the ship . 
Article 666 : ' Ret abandonnement in geval van vergaan of bederf kan niet 
gedaan worden , dan wanneer het verlies of de schade drie vierden van de 
verzekerde waarde bedraagt of te boven gaat.' In the draft of 1809 it 
was two-thirds; Enschede, op cit, 152. The equivalent provision of the 
CdeC was article 369. 
A deduction ' new for old' is made in the computation; Rodiere and 
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or damage to three fourths of the value of the 
goods108 , sale of the goods during the voyage due 
to material damage to the goods insured by a peril 
insured against, and innavigability of the ship, 
if the progress of the goods through such means of 
transport there may be has not commenced within 
three months109 , all give rise to the right to 
abandon the goods. English law allows an 
abandonment in the case of the ship if the repair 
cost would exceed the value of the ship as 
repaired110 and in the case of the goods where 
the cost of repair and the cost of forwarding them 
to their destination would exceed their value on 
arrival 111 • In American law an abandonment is 
allowed if the costs exceed half the value of the 
ship or goodS112 • 
See the 'Djurdjura' (1975) 27 DMF 123 (Tribunal de Corrmerce de Paris 
13/2/74). In the 'Ismene' (1988) 18 DMF 170 (Cour d' Appel de Paris 
29/5/87) the court ruled that the abandonment of the goods insured on 
the ground that the damage thereto exceeded three quarters of their 
value still had to be in accordance with the terms of the policy. Thus, 
where the policy restricts the right to abandon or imposes conditions 
the assured is bound by those terms . 
In the 'Giota's ' (1985) 37 DMF 613 (Cour d'Appel de Paris 29/10/84) the 
assured abandoned the goods insured on the ground that the ship could 
not complete the voyage as a result of innavigability and that the goods 
could not be carried on without a delay of more than four months. The 
court found in favour of the assured in that the facts justified the 
assured's contentions . 
Section 60(2) (ii) of the MIA. 
Section 60(2) (iii) of the MIA . 
See Chapter 19 supra . 
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What is important in this scenario is that it is 
recognized that the ship or goods continue to 
exist and may even be capable of being repaired in 
order to complete the contemplated voyage, but it 
is no longer a realistic economic decision to do 
so. This exposes the true nature of the right the 
assured has been granted to make an abandonment 
and to claim the full amount of the insurance in 
these cases where the ship or goods have been 
damaged: The loss is of an economic nature, at 
least to the extent that the value of the damaged 
ship or goods is exceeded by the full amount of 
the insurance, being the value of the ship or 
goods in undamaged condition . 
6.4. CATEGORY THREE: CAPTURE, ARREST AND DETENTION 
6.4.1. All five the countries under consideration 
recognize this category of loss as giving rise to 
the right to abandon. In " this category the 
economic nature of the loss is the most obvious as 
the ship or goods continue to exist but they are 
no longer in the assured's possession or under his 
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or goods even though he is still their owner113. 
CATEGORY FOUR: DISAPPEARANCE WITHOUT NEWS OR 'THE 
MISSING SHIP' 
The same applies to the case of the missing ship, 
or, to put it in the terms of the various 
ordonnances and statutes, the case of absence of 
news. All five the countries under consideration 
recognize this as a case for abandonment 114 and 
the indemnification of the assured for a total 
loss. Yet the ship or goods may continue to exist 
and if they do they remain the property of the 
assured. The loss is again exposed as an economic 
rather than an actual loss affecting the ship or 
goods. 
SUMMARY 
It is thus apparent that the cases where the law 
allows an abandonment and the indemnification of 
the assured as for a total loss are in reality 
cases of economic loss. Various legal systems have 
In some cases the assured is actually deprived of his ownership too, as 
by a valid confiscation order or an order for the sale of the ship or 
goods followed by a sale, but in such cases the loss is actual. 
Although there is no express requirement for a abandonment in terms of 
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found different phrases to explain or distinguish 
this kind of loss, but the essence is the same in 
each case: The loss is economic in nature and it 
is made recoverable by the fiction or presumption 
of total loss. 
In the Netherlands abandonment losses were 
regarded, in insurance practice, as cases of 
'wettelijk geheel verlies' 115, a concept which 
demonstrates that there is a fiction introduced by 
operation of law which makes the loss a total 
loss. German insurance practice also adopted the 
phraseology of English law, referring to 
abandonment cases as cases of 'constructiven 
Totalverlusts' to the same effect as Dutch 
practice. 
Even French law created a total loss in 
abandonment cases by way of a fiction, l.n the 
words of Emerigon, 'la perte entiere est 
presumee' 116. It is only in England and America 
that such losses are described in legislation, in 
Molengraaff, Leidraad hij de Beoefening van het NederlandBe 
Handel Brecbt, (1955), Vol III, 679. Mens Piers Smeding, op cit, 33 
pointed out that the concept of a 'wettelijk geheel verlieB' had been 
taken over from English law . 
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the case of England117 , and in case law, in the 
case of America, for what they are, namely 
constructive total losses. It is nevertheless 
difficult to find an all-encompassing theory which 
will work for economic loss in al spheres of the 
law, including contract, delict and insurance
l18
. 
THE ORIGINS OF ABANDONMENT 
There does not appear to be sufficient evidence 
that the evolution of the concept of abandonment 
occurred in the clear cut increments proposed by 
some of the supporters of the economic loss 
theory. This theory is defeated in any event by 
the overwhelming probability that some form of 
abandonment was already required in the simulated 
sale transaction which preceded the insurance 
contract 119 . 
It appears instead that abandonment developed out 
of the simulated sale transaction120 and was 
The same applies, of course, to Australia, Canada, New Zealand and 
India . 
Sheller, 'Pride and Precedent: Economic loss- the search for a bright 
new line', 1995 LMCLQ 203. 
See in this regard the discussion of the origins of insurance and of 
abandonment in Chapters 4 and 5 supra. 
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later retained in marine insurance because it was 
found to be commercially useful in the interests 
of both the assured and insurer yet also satisfied 
the requirements of the principle of indemnity. 
THE RESTRICTION OF ABANDONMENT TO MARINE INSURANCE 
Insurance against risks other than marine 
transport developed at a much later stage than 
marine insurance121 • The great fire which 
devastated London in 1666 saw the first insurance 
companies who undertook fire insurance being 
formed. A similar event in Paris in 1750 caused a 
similar demand for fire insurance122 • Other forms 
of indemnity insurance of land risks followed. It 
is a fact that abandonment only applies in marine 
insurance. There appear to be a number of reasons 
why the right to abandon has not been imported 
into other forms of indemnity insurance. 
The first reason is related to the fact that fire 
insurance at first covered horne-owners in respect 
of the improvements on their land. Such property 
Holdsworth, A History of English Law, (1977) , Vol VIII, 294; Dorhout 
~~es, Schade, 24; Lambert-Faivre, Droit des assurances, 8th ed, (1992), 
Lambert-Faivre, op cit,S. 
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consisted of two main components, namely the land 
and the improvements in the nature of houses and 
outbuildings thereon. The land itself would 
continue to exist after a fire may have devastated 
the improvements, and the insurance was therefore 
intended to cover the assured in respect of the 
improvements only. Thus, when the house and other 
improvements burnt down, the assured still had the 
land and could use the proceeds of the insurance 
to rebuild his home in the same place as he had no 
desire to establish or acquire a new home on other 
land. Under these circumstances there was no need 
on the part of either the assured or the insurer 
to insure anything other than the improvements on 
the land nor to transfer the whole property, land 
and improvements, to the insurer against payment 
of the sum insured. This contrasts sharply with 
the cases falling within the ambit of abandonment 
in marine insurance where the assured was usually 
deprived of any control over or use of the ship or 
goods. In short, in land risks there was not the 
kind of total loss associated with the economic 
loss for which abandonment provided an appropriate 
remedy. 
8.3. Another distinction between marine insurance and 
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fire insurance which made it unnecessary to import 
abandonment into fire insurance is to be found in 
the sufficiency of subrogation as a remedy to 
pursue the insurer's right's against the third 
party responsible for the loss. Marine losses 
occurred away from the centres where the insurers 
found themselves and the pursuit of claims against 
third parties was little more than an idle dream 
in almost all cases123 • Not so with regard to 
fire insurance, as the wrongdoer could usually be 
found and sued at the place where the fire 
occurred. Thus, while subrogation was an adequate 
remedy for land risks, it was inadequate for 
marine risks and abandonment remained as a 
suitable remedy in marine insurance only. 
8 . 4. It may well be asked if an abandonment clause in 
a fire policy would be valid as it appears, prima 
facie, to offend the indemnity principle since it 
would allow the assured to recover payment for a 
substantial part of the subject-matter of the 
insurance (the land) which actually remains 
undamaged even in the event of a fire. It would, 
ironically when regard is had to the origins of 
the insurance contract, turn the contract into a 
123 Mens Piers Smeding, op cit, 36-39. 
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contract of sale again, with the insurer buying 
the insured property when it is damaged . There 
cannot be a question of total loss , as the land 
component survives any fire . There is no evidence 
of the desirability for such a device. 
Yet another reason why abandonment was not 
imported into other types of indemnity insurance 
relates to the quantification of the loss. In the 
context of marine insurance the quantification of 
the loss was in abandonment cases very often slow 
and problematic, and the fact that the loss was of 
an economic nature played a part . In the case of 
improvements on land these difficulties did not 
arise as the amount of the loss could be 
determined quite quickly and with a fair degree of 
accuracy124 . 
A reason which is advanced here with some 
reservation as it is not supported by any 
authority 125 is that the concept of subrogation 
was probably beginning to gain recognition as a 
remedy separate from abandonment at about the same 
the time when fire insurance became popular in 
Dorhout Mees, Schade , 643 . 
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England and Europe. For the reasons advanced in 
the preceding paragraphs, a less drastic remedy 
than abandonment was obviously required in fire 
insurance and subrogation appears to have been 
, '126 taylor made for the s1tuat1on . 
When other forms of land insurance developed 
later, they developed on the model of fire 
insurance rather than marine insurance and, since 
abandonment did not form part of the former, the 
new forms of indemnity insurance did not include 
it either. Nor was there any more reason for such 
new forms of insurance to include abandonment than 
for fire insurance127 • 
ABANDONMENT DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER CONCEPTS 
Abandonment differs from cession (or assignment as 
it is called in Anglo-American law) in a number of 
The possibility also exists that the converse situation applied, namely 
that the requirements of fire insurance were such that a lesser remedy 
than abandonment was sought, and in the search for such a remedy it was 
found that the body of rules which have since developed into the concept 
of subrogation were already contained within the far wider concept of 
abandonment. 
,A possible exception to this general statement would be the case of 
stolen property where the insurer has paid for a total loss and the 
thief is identified . Perhaps there ought to be some recognition of a 
direct claim based on ownership, as would be the case if an abandonment 
were allowed, enabling the insurer to reclaim the stolen property with 
the rei vindicatio. See Schlemmer, Verkryging van eiendomsreg deur 'n 
versekeraar in die geval van diefstal van 'n versekerde saak LLM 
thesis, RAU, (1991); Dorhout Mees, Scbade, 396. ' 
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respects. Abandonment operates only in marine 
insurance. Cession applies in all the branches of 
commercial law, including marine insurance. 
In 
operation the two concepts differ mainly in that 
ownership of real property, that is a thing such 
as a ship or goods, cannot be transferred by way 
of cession in legal systems based on Roman 
law128 • Abandonment is a necessary device in 
those legal systems to effect a transfer of 
ownership of the insured things to the insurer in 
the cases where the law allows an abandonment. 
Further, when the insurer seeks to recover the 
abandoned ship or goods he does so as owner, by 
way of the rei vindicatio if necessary, whereas 
the insurer or other person who seeks to recover 
them under a cession does not have the benefit of 
that action129 • 
Abandonment also differs markedly from negotiorum 
gestio and salvage. The gestor administers someone 
else's affairs or property for which he is allowed 
to recover certain out of pocket expenses. The 
salvor likewise saves someone else's property for 
See Chapter 14 infra . 
Dorhout Mees, Schade , 396 . This subject is discussed in more detail in 
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which he is granted an award determined by 
agreement or litigation. Both the gestor and the 
salvor have to account to the owner of the 
property administered or saved for their 
administration. The insurer who pursues the 
sal vage of the abandoned ship or goods is in a 
different position as he pursues his own property 
without accountability for his conduct and without 
having to re-imburse or compensate any other 
person in respect of the salvage operations. 
CONCLUSION 
Abandonment therefore appears to be inextricably 
linked to the indemnity principle as Park 
postulated. Yet that does not appear to be the 
full explanation as abandonment operates in a 
special sphere, namely that area where the 
assured, by virtue of risks which are unique to 
marine insurance, is at risk in respect of a 
special kind of loss which is of an economic 
nature . Thus, while abandonment serves a special 
function in the relationship between the assured 
and the insurer, it also serves as one of the 
handmaidens of the indemnity principle on which 
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Abandonment's function as a servant of the 
indemnity principle in the sphere of economic 
losses will ensure that it will always be part of 
marine insurance. In a neat summary of the 
situation Khurram stated: 
'Strandings, groundings, collisions, founderings, 
captures, and destructions in war are just as 
common today as they were during the times which 
gave rise to the jurisprudence in this area of the 
law. Recent cases arising from occurences, such 
as, for exampl e, the Iran - Iraq war, and cases 
involving ships trapped in the Suez Canal during 
the Arab-Israeli war, continue to invoke the 
classic cases of the past as authorities. The law 
of constructive total loss and abandonment will no 
doubt continue to challenge and inspire innovative 
legal minds as maritime events unfold and 
casual ties continue to occur. ,130 
qp cit, 117 . Se~ also, O'Keefe , 'Gold, Abandonment and Salvage', 1994 
LMCLQ 7 for a d1Scuss10n of a recent conflict relating to a cargo of 
gold abandoned more than 137 years ago . 
559 
CHAPTER FOURTEEN 
ABANDONMENT : THE TRANSFER OF RIGHTS AND 
OBLIGATIONS 
1 . INTRODUCTION 
1.1 . One of the consequences of an abandonment is that 
the insurer becomes entitled to the remains of the 
interests or effects which were insured and are 
abandoned. The insured effects which are required 
to be abandoned to the insurer may be real rights, 
jura in rem, or personal rights, jura in personam. 
This distinction is important for this study 
because different modes of transfer apply to real 
rights and personal rights. The question at the 
heart of the matter is whether the act of 
abandonment is sufficient to transfer the relevant 
real or personal rights to the insurer, assuming 
the insurer to be willing to receive them. The 
answer depends on the nature of the rights to be 
transferred, namely whether they are real or 
personal rights. 
1.2. The different categories of maritime property 
subj ect to marine insurance are mainly ships, 
their cargo, the freight earned or to be earned by 
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or commissions to be earned by or through the 
venture where these do not constitute part of the 
freight. The right to bottomry and respondentia 
moneys may be included in some jurisdictions1 . The 
ship and cargo are things, or real property in 
respect of which the most basic right is 
ownership, being the ultimate power to dispose of 
and over a thing. Freight is a personal right of 
the carrier to claim the agreed remuneration from 
the shipper in terms of their contract, whether 
that claim arises from a charterparty or a bill of 
lading or any other form of contract of carriage . 
The anticipated profits or commissions could be 
either a personal right like freight, or could 
amount merely to a spes or hope. So far as the 
hope of making a profit may develop into the 
situation where the assured would be legally 
entitled to recover that profit from a third 
party, that anticipation would mature into a 
personal right. The right to bottomry and 
respondentia moneys appears to fall into the same 
category as anticipated profits and commissions. 
Personal rights are transferred through the simple 
process of cession, as it is known in legal 
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systems based on Roman law, or assignment, as it 
is also known in English law and its related 
systems. There is no controversy about the way a 
cession or assignment operates, although there is 
some scope for confusion when it is recalled that 
there is a distinction between an agreement to 
cede and the cession itself. The former is the 
underlying agreement giving rise to the obligation 
to cede and its concomitant, the right to 
receive. The latter is the actual transaction 
transferring the rights in question, also known as 
the real transaction2 • In the context of 
abandonment, the personal rights of the assured to 
the freight or bottomry and respondentia moneys 
and commissions would therefore pass, in those 
legal systems which allow such rights to be 
abandoned3 , to the insurer by way of cession or 
something akin to cession. The proviso is that a 
cession is a bilateral act whereby the rights are 
transferred4 , whereas the transfer of rights could 
occur, in some jurisdictions, without the 
insurer's co-operation. The transfer of personal 
See generally De Wet & Van Wyk, Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg an 
. Handelsreg, 5th ed, (1992), 251 et seq. 
In German, English and American law, as well as in other systems based 
on English law. 
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rights by the process of abandonment is 
uncontroversial and occurs in the same way as the 
cession of other personal rightss . 
However, the notion that an abandonment may 
operate in marine insurance as a method of 
transfer of real property (things) without any 
recognized form of delivery to the insurer is a 
controversial one. Nevertheless, it will be 
demonstrated in this chapter that abandonment, 
properly understood, is not repugnant to the 
general principles of other branches of the law. 
Abandonment in its non-marine insurance sense is 
a unilateral act whereby the holder or owner of a 
right or property completely divests himself of 
that right or property without transferring or 
intending to transfer it to any other person6 • 
Such res derelictae becomes res nullius which in 
turn is capable of being acquired in ownership by 
It is relevant only in those countries where personal rights such as 
freight and profits may be abandoned, like Germany, England and America . 
See Chapters 7 an~ 9 supra in this regard. In Dutch law (prior to 1 
January 1992) and ~n French law the question of cession does not arise 
because only the ship or goods insured could be abandoned. See Chapters 
6 and 8 supra. 
In this context abandonment is a ' prysgawe of afstand van reg'; 
S~hlemmer, Verkryging van Eiendomsreg deur 'n Versekeraar in geval van 
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any third party by occupatio7 • Usually such an 
abandonment occurs without any outward 
manifestation of the abandoning person's will, 
except inaction8 , and there are no prescribed 
legal formalities to be complied with . This 
occurs, for example, where a person simply 
refrains from enforcing a claim or right without 
communicating with the other party, or physically 
abandons movable property. The abandonment of 
personal rights is called a waiver9 , while 
ownership of property is said to be abandoned10 
or relinquished. 
Van der Linden, Rechtsgeleerd, Practicaal, en Koopmans Handboek, 
('Koopmans Handboek ' ) , (1806), 1.7.2. 
Some express or tacit expression of the intention of the person 
abandoning is required, as there can be no legal consequences to a mere 
intention . 
Waiver has been described as the ' renunciation of a right'; Mutual Life 
Insurance Co of New York v Ingle 1910 TS 540 at 550; The requirements 
for a waiver in South African law are set out in Laws v Rutherfurd 1924 
AD 261 at 263 : 'The onus is strictly on the appellant. He must show that 
the respondent, with full knowledge of her right , decided to abandon it, 
whether expressly or by conduct plainly inconsistent with an intention 
to enforce it. Waiver is a question of fact, depending on the 
circumstances. ' Difficulties arise in cases where there is no 
communication of the decision not to enforce a right or the right is not 
enforced for a lengthy period; In Mutual Life Insurance Co of New York 
v Ingle , supra, Innes CJ said : 'When the intention to renounce is 
expressly communi cated to the person affected he is entitled to act upon 
it, and the right is gone. When the renunciation, though not 
communicated, is evidenced by conduct inconsistent with the enforcement 
of the right, or clearly showing an intention to surrender it , then also 
the intention may be acted upon, and the right perishes. But the mere 
mental resolve, not so evidenced, and not communicated to the other 
party, but discovered by him afterwards, seems to me . .. to have no 
effect upon the legal position of the person making the resolve . ' 
An abandonment of movable property amounts to a relinquishing of 
possession and control, with the result that it becomes res nullius . In 
the case of immovable property an abandonment may not be possible in 
s~stems where ownership is determined absolutely by entry in a register, 
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In 'marine insurance, however, an abandonment is an 
overt11 act, is required by law to be 
communicated to the insured, and is accompanied by 
the intention that no-one but the insurer should 
be entitled to become the owner of the rights or 
property so abandoned. By definition the abandoned 
thing thus cannot become a res nullius which any 
third party may seize to become the owner, but 
this question has led to some disagreement in 
English law12 • Further, the vesting of ownership 
in the insurer could have far-reaching 
consequences not only for the assured and insurer, 
but also for third parties and the State because 
ownership of some kinds of maritime property is 
accompanied by certain statutorily imposed 
obligations13 • Marine insurance has therefore 
sought its own means to deal with the unique 
situation which arises when the assured exercise 
the right to abandon to the insurer. These means 
are not necessarily in consonance with the general 
provisions of the law or similar processes. 
It is an overt act by its very nature because the notice of abandonment 
is only effective if it is communicated to the insurer. 
See Ivamy, Marine Insurance, 4th ed, (1985), 394. 
For example, the obligations of the owner of a ship or the owner of an 
obnoxious cargo like crude oil arising from local legislation pertaining 
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For example, the transfer of ownership of property 
and the cession of personal rights are generally 
regulated by that branch of the law known as the 
law of property or of things14. Generally the law 
requires some form of delivery for transfer of 
ownership of a movable like a car or a ship. In 
the case of a res the assured who has lost 
possession and control of the thing insured cannot 
transfer ownership of that thing to the insurer by 
delivery as he is unable to vest some form of 
control over that thing in the insurer. Marine 
insurance appears to have found a way to vest such 
ownership in the insurer without any delivery, 
namely the institution of abandonment. The focus 
of this chapter is how this situation developed 
and how it operates in different jurisdictions. 
HISTORICAL REVIEW: 1350 TO 1800 AD 
The seeds for abandonment's operation as a method 
of transferring or acquiring ownership were sown 
in the simulated sale transaction, and may even 
Ideally the legal principles regulating the transfer of ownership of 
property or personal rights should be the same for all types of 
~ontr~cts, but this may not be true for abandonment, as the discussion 
1Z: th1s chapt~r sho~s . So far as the transfer of such ownership or 
r1ghts may d1ffer 1n abandonment in marine insurance from other 
~ontracts may be the result of some unique feature of abandonment or 
1t may be dU,e to legislation. The answer will be sought in a comparison 
of the law 1n England (and other countries applying English law), the 
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have existed in earlier forms of insurance such as 
the Babylonian loan and the maritime loan. In the 
simulated sale the nature of the transaction 
required there to be a transfer of property to the 
buyer-insurer. BOSC015 I however I made it clear 
that the transfer was linked to the recoverability 
of the goods. He stated that: 
I (A)ssecurator solvit pretium et valorem pro quo 
assecuravi t, et ,recuperat merces quae sunt 
periculo a se emptae, si recuperati possunt 
I 16 
The Roman law on which the simulated sale was 
based required a recognized form of delivery for 
ownership to be transferred17 and such forms of 
Consilia, (written between 1390-1425), Consilium 191 at 612 . 
('The insurer pays the price and value of that which he insured, and 
recovers the goods which were sold to him by the occurrence of the event 
(literally' danger') insured against, if recovery is possible . ') (my 
underlining) 
The recognized forms of delivery in Roman law were: (a) traditio de manu 
in manum, that is to say, physical transfer from hand to hand; (b) 
traditio brevi manu, that is to say, the process whereby a person who 
already has possession but not as owner now continues to hold the thing 
as owner; (Digest 12.1.9 . 9) (c) consti tutum possessorum, that is to say, 
the process where the owner possesses the thing, parts with ownership 
thereof, and continues to hold possession as lessee, for example; 
(Digest 6.1. 77 and 41. 2 .18 prj (d) traditio longa manu, that is to say, 
where the thing is placed in sight of the transferee and he is enabled 
to take physical possession; (Digest 46.3.79, 41.2.1.21 and 18.2) and 
(e) symbolical tradition, that is to say, by the handing over of the 
keys to a building where the things are stored, thereby enabling the 
transferee to take control of the things delivered. See in this regard: 
Lee, Tbe Elements of Roman Law, (1944), 134-135; Van Warmelo, An 
Introduction to tbe Principles of Roman Civil Law, (1976) paras 255 to 
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delivery were impossible in the circumstances 
which prevailed. These forms of transfer all 
required two elements, namely the intention to 
transfer, animus, and the vesting of physical 
control, detentio, in the transferee. The problem 
was simply that the seller/assured was unable to 
pass physical control of the insured goods to the 
buyer/insurer as all the recognized forms of 
delivery under Roman law required . In the 
simulated sale the parties resorted to the device 
of a clause in their contract to the effect that 
the goods would be regarded as sold from the date 
of the contract if the risk materialised18 , upon 
which event the seller-insurer relinquished the 
goods to the buyer-insurer19. This did not amount 
to a delivery of the goods to the buyer-insurer 
and it would appear that the buyer-insurer only 
became owner of the goods so relinquished if and 
when he physically recovered them, ('si recuperati 
possunt'). Two separate legal acts are apparent in 
this process. The assured relinquished his rights 
in the goods in favour of the insurer and the 
insurer became owner by recovering them. 
quasi tamquam resvenditae ex die contracte assecurationis toto 
viagio fu~rint ipsorum ernptorum ... '; Bosco, Consilium 391, 612 . The 
retro-actl. ve transfer of ownership (to the date of the casual ty) in 
English and American law appears to be a remnant of this provision. 
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This process involved two steps or legal acts 
which were recognized by Roman law. Under Roman 
law a person could divest himself of ownership by 
relinquishing it20. Equally, a person could 
acquire ownership of the abandoned thing by 
assuming control of it with the intention of 
holding it in ownership21. The same two elements 
were necessary for a transfer to occur in this 
fashion. There first had to be the expressed 
intention to relinquish on the part of the seller 
and an intention on the part of the buyer to 
acquire, constituting the animus element. Then the 
buyer had to acquire control, detentio, of the 
abandoned thing. However, the transfer of 
ownership to the buyer/insurer in this manner 
encountered the same problem as transfer by 
delivery: there could be no transfer of ownership 
until the buyer/insurer had somehow acquired 
physical control, that is detentio, of the things 
concerned. 
There were two obvious shortcomings in this two-
step process postulated thus far. In the first 
Domat, Le lois civiles leur ordre naturel (1689), (translated by 
Cushings as The Civil Law in its Natural orde~ (1850)), at 855 and 863 
of the Cushings edition. ' 
Ibid. 
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place, if the conduct of the assured were to 
amount to a complete abandonment of his rights in 
the things insured so that they became res 
nullius, a third party could easily become their 
owner through occupatio. That was never intended 
to be the result of the relinquishing of his 
rights by the assured, who intended the goods to 
go to the insurer, if they could be recovered. In 
the second place, the insurer was unable to pursue 
the things insured or their remains in the hands 
of third parties, even the very parties 
responsible for the loss, because the assured's 
conduct in relinquishing his rights alone did not 
vest any rights in the insurer. These problems 
were solved in a unique manner. Firstly, the 
abandonment was understood to be one restricted to 
the insurer, so that it operated only in his 
favour. Secondly, the abandoned things were taken 
to vest automatically, ex lege, and without any 
form of delivery or seizure (occupatio) in the 
insurer. 
2 . 4. The early authors on insurance confirmed that the 
goods were relinquished with the intention that 
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and become their owner. Straccha22 , relying on 
Santerna23 , wrote that the insurer was only held 
bound to that 'quod dominus mercium didisset pro 
recuperatione,24. Casaregis25 stated that 
payment by the insurer had the effect that the 
goods vested in him. He mentioned that' ... dicit 
quod liquidatio rei salva spectat ad assecuratorem 
,26 but this statement, however, supposed 
that some of the goods were salvaged, (' rei 
salva'). The solution was introduced by statute. 
The Savona Ordonnances of 1503 and 1522 contained 
a provision obliging the assured to 'intimate, 
notify and give notice of suit,27 when he wished 
to claim from the insurer, using the word 
'denuntiare', which may also be taken to mean 'to 
renounce' 28 • The notion of a relinquishing or 
abandonment of the goods insured is contained 
Tractatus de Assecurationibus et Proxenetis, (1569), 1.1.145 . 
Tractatus de Assecurationibus et Sponsionibus Mercatorum, (1552), 4.27 -
4 , 28. 
(' ... which the owner of the goods had given up for recovery.') 
Discursus Legales de Commercio, (1740), 1.101. 
('It is said that upon payment (of the claim) the things saved vest in 
the insurers . ') 
'intimare, notificare et denuntiare'. 
This second interpretation is preferred as the words used would 
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within this second meaning of 'denuntiare'. There 
was no indication in this ordonnance that more 
than the mere notification and renunciation was 
required for it to be effective between the 
assured and insurer and against third parties. 
However, article 29 of the 1558 Ordonnance of 
Philip II of Spain expressly provided that the 
assured could recover the sum insured in the case 
of the missing ship 'on ... making a resignation 
to the insurers and giving them the necessary 
cessions and procurations.,29 This provision, 
which is the oldest direct reference I have been 
able to find, contains both the idea of an 
abandonment ('a resignation') and a formal cession 
or power of attorney which would enable the 
insurer to pursue the goods insured in the hands 
of third parties, either in his own name, in the 
case of a cession, or in the name of the assured, 
in the case of a power of attorney. This provision 
probably provides an answer to both the problems 
raised earlier. In the first instance the 
abandonment was not one which operated in favour 
of all the world, but a limited abandonment 'to 
The text of this article is found in translated form in Magens, An Essay 
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the insurers'. In the second instance, the insurer 
received a cession or procuration which entitled 
him to recover the things insured and relinquished 
to him, even from third parties. 
The question whether more than the mere 
relinquishing of the things insured to the insurer 
was required was still unresolved at the time of 
the Guidon de la Me~o. Article 1 of Chapter 7 of 
the Guidon defined abandonment as a 'quitting and 
abandonment of the assured's rights, ti tIes, 
claims and actions of ownership' 31. A transfer of 
ownership is not clearly apparent from this 
definition, which is in consonance with the idea 
that some additional step was still necessary for 
the insurer to become owner of the abandoned 
things. Article 12 of Chapter 7 of the Guidon 
provided further that, if the ship should arrive 
safely after an abandonment had been made, the 
insurer collected as his own the proceeds of the 
voyage, while the assured was not entitled to 
demand any part thereof32. This provision is also 
A mid sixteenth century compilation of the customs of the merchants of 
Rouen. 
, ... c'est-a-dire, quitter et delaisser Bee droits, noms, raisons et 
actions de la propriete ... ' . The words 'actions de la propriete' c~uld 
perhaps more accurately be translated as 'proprietary rights' . 
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in consonance with the notion that a second step 
was essential for the insurer to acquire ownership 
of the abandoned things. Indeed, article 3 of 
Chapter 7 of the Guidon expressly mentioned that 
there was a controversy about the question whether 
the abandonment itself was sufficient to transfer 
ownership to the insurer or whether a further act 
in the nature of a power of attorney 
(' procuration' ) was required. According to 
Valin33 , Emerigon34 and Pardessus35 no such 
additional act on the part of the assured was 
necessary36. 
Two early statutory instruments clarified the 
matter considerably. The Genoa Ordonnance of 
(or expressly provided for 
Commentaire sur 1 'Ordonnance de le Marine du Mois d'Aout 1681, (1760), 
(Becane edition 1829), 562, where the opinion was expressed that' .. . 
done le delaissement est signe, les effets assures sont devolus et 
acquis aux assureurs . . . et par la nature du delaissement, qui vaut 
cession et transport , sans qu'il soit besoin d'une procuration de la 
part de l ' assure ... ' ( ' .. . when the abandonment is signif ied, the 
insured effects devolve upon and are acqui red by the insurers . . . and 
by the nature of abandonment , which amounts to a cession and transfer, 
without it being necessary for a procuration on the part of the assured 
. . . ' ) 
Op cit , Vol II, 230-231 . 
Op cit, Vol II , 401 . 
However, these authors wrote on the subject after the Ordonnance de la 
Marine of 1681 which declared that to be the case and had been in force 
for a considerable time . 
According to Pardessus, Collection de lois Maritimes anterieures au 
XVII" siec1e, (1837), Vol IV, 256. 
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ownership to pass to the insurer without the 
intervention of any further legal act by enacting 
that 
, (t)he assured may ... demand the full insurance, 
and abandon the effects insured to the insurers, 
whose property they shall be in such a case.,39 
Almost a century later article 60 of the 
Ordonnance de la Marine of 1681 of Louis XIV of 
France also expressly provided that, 
'apres le delaissement signifie, les effets 
assurez appartiendront a l'assureur ,40 
Thus, in at least Genoa and in France, the 
legislature stepped in to provide that ownership 
of the abandoned things were vested in the insurer 
without delivery. 
It is important to note, however, that this 
vesting of ownership in the insurer occurred by 
According to Magens, op cit, Vol II, 66. 
Magens' translation . 
('After the notice of abandonment the insured effects belong to the 
insurer . ' ) 
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operation of law on the strength of the particular 
provisions quoted above. What is equally important 
is that the event which triggered the vesting of 
ownership in the insurer was the notification of 
the abandonment to the insurer. Henceforth it 
would therefore no longer be necessary for the 
insurer to recover possession or physical control 
of the goods abandoned to him in order to become 
owner of them. He could therefore pursue them in 
the hands of third parties in his own name and 
relying on his own title. The process involved 
still required two separate legal acts, although 
they now coincided. The first was the notification 
of the abandonment to the insurer. The second was 
the vesting of ownership in the insurer by 
operation of law. It also appears that it was not 
considered at that time that there could be any 
burdens attaching to the owner as a result of the 
mere fact of ownership, and the insurer's co-
operation or consent to this type of acquisition 
of ownership was therefore neither sought nor 
required. 
Whether these provisions merely restated the 
existing law merchant which regulated marine 
l.nsurance in Genoa and France respecti vely or 
576 
2.11. 
Part IV : Chapter 14 : Transfer of Rights and Obligations 
whether they were intended to bring an end to the 
existing controversy, is not clear. However, from 
the date of these enactments there could no longer 
be any doubt about the matter in the areas where 
these two ordonnances were applicable. Further, 
having regard to the fact that marine insurance 
was born in the northern Italian towns of which 
Genoa was one of the leaders, and further having 
regard to the international status and influence 
which the Ordonnance de la Marine of 1681 enjoyed, 
it is more than likely that the controversy must 
also have abated, if it ever existed, in the 
Netherlands, Germany and England. In respect of 
the province of Holland in the Netherlands there 
appears to be direct evidence for this conclusion. 
In the Netherlands there was, prior to the 
codification of Dutch commercial law in the 
Wetboek van Koophandel of 1838 (' the WvK'), no 
express provision in any of the local ordonnances 
in force in the various towns nor in the Customs 
of the Antwerp Exchange which preceded them that 
the abandonment resulted in ownership of the 
things abandoned vesting in the insurer. However, 
in the province of Holland there was a legal 
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given by Jacob de la Mine on 10 March 1677 in 
Amsterdam41 . A significant feature of the opinion 
is that it relied on a decision of the Rotae 
Genoa42 , the court of Genoa, as authority. The 
significance is found in the fact that, as was 
pointed out above, the Genoa Ordonnance of 1588 
(or 1610) expressly provided that the goods 
abandoned became the property of the insurer upon 
the abandonment. Further authority in Holland is 
readily found in the opinions of Abraham van den 
Ende43 • In his Advysen 14 & 2344 he pointed out 
that the abandonment may be made met 
volkoomen effect van rechte and in Advys 
1646 he stated that' ... overrnits door middel van 
45, 
dat Abandonnement en van dien afstand B. als 
Assuradeur en (sic) ontwyffelbaer recht van 
eigendom heeft verkregen.,47 For this latter 
Van den Berg, Nederlands Advysboek, (1693-1698). 
Decisio 101 . 
Contained in BareIs, Advysen over den Koophandel en Zeevaert, (1780-
1781) . 
Dated 6 May and 18 May 1715 respectively. Advys 23 was an explanation 
of Advys 24. 
BareIs, op cit, 130 . 
Dated 10 April 1715. 
BareIs, op cit, 88. The passage quoted in the text indicates that 
abandonment was seen by Van den Ende, not as a means of transfer but 
as ~ means by ~hi~h ownership vested, ex lege, in the insurer . The~e is 
an ~mportant d~st~nction. If abandonment were to be seen as a transfer 
578 
2 . 12. 
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opinion Van den Ende relied not only on Decisio 
101 of the Rotae Genoa and Jacob de la Mine's 
Consul tatie 52, but also on article 60 of the 
Ordonnance de la Marine of 1681. Therefore, so far 
as the province of Holland was concerned, the same 
legal acts, namely the notification of the 
abandonment and the vesting by operation of law, 
resulted in the insurer becoming the owner of the 
abandoned things. 
In England there was no legislation on the subject 
and no evidence that the matter was ever 
controversial, but the courts in any event held 
from the earliest times that the effect of the 
abandonment was that it transferred the whole 
property and interest in the thing insured to the 
insurer, and did so from the date of the 10ss48. 
American law inherited the same rules49 . The rule 
of the English cormnon law that the abandonment 
transferred property retro-actively to the date of 
from the assured to the insurer, one would expect compliance with the 
requirement of delivery. For a vesting of ownership in the insurer upon 
the giving of notice of abandonment by operation of law such compliance 
would become irrelevant and there would be no clash between marine 
insurance law and other branches of the law. 
Cammell v Sewell 3 H & N 617; S.C. in Cam. Scacc. 5 H & N 728 . See also 
Marshall, A Treatise on the Law of Insurance, 5th ed, (1865), Bk I, 487; 
Arnould , The Law of Marine Insurance and Average, 2nd ed, (1857), 1149 . 
Kent, Commentaries on American Law, 12th ed, ((1873), Vol III , 511-512; 
Phillips , A Treatise on the Law of Marine Insurance, 4th ed, (1854), Vol 
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the loss harks back to the days of the simulated 
sale when the happening of the event insured 
against triggered the transfer. In English and 
American law, therefore, the abandonment truly 
operated as a transfer from the assured to the 
insurer. The difference between English law and 
continental law in this regard may be a 
consequence of the fact that continental law was 
based on Roman law, which without exception 
required a delivery of the thing transferred, 
while English law had no such general requirement 
for ownership to transfer50 • 
While no similar evidence relating to the period 
prior to the Handelsgesetzbuch of 1900 ('the HGB') 
has been found in relation to the position in 
Germany, it is submitted firstly that, by virtue 
of the fact that the practice of marine insurance 
was taken to Hamburg by Dutch insurers, the same 
situation in all probability prevailed there as 
prevailed in Holland . It is further submitted that 
the subsequent provision of article 872 the HGB51 
confirms that in German legal theory the abandoned 
See generally Buckland and McNair, Roman Law and Common Law, 2nd ed, 
(1965), 110 et seq. 
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things vested in ownership in the insurer by 
operation of law. 
It is thus apparent that in the early, that is 
pre-1800 law of the Netherlands, France, England 
and America the abandonment had the effect of 
transferring real rights in the nature of 
ownership of the abandoned ship or cargo. German 
law may have been the same but followed the same 
pattern expressly from 1900. 
ABANDONMENT AS A METHOD OF TRANSFER: 1800 AD TO 
THE PRESENT 
It was pointed out earlier in Chapters 6 to 9 that 
the abandonment provisions of the European 
countries under consideration were taken up in the 
codification process which swept Europe after the 
Napoleonic conquests of the end of the eighteenth 
century. This occurred in France in the Code de 
Commerce of 1807 ('the CdeC'), in the Netherlands 
in the Wetboek van Koophandel in 1838 ('the WvK') 
and in Germany in the Handelsgesetzbuch of 1900 
(' the HGB'). In England there was no general 
codification but the Marine Insurance Act 1906 
(' the MIA') codified English marine insurance law. 
581 
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In America no such codification took place. 
Whether the codification process of the nineteenth 
century imported any changes to the position which 
had developed will be determined next. In the 
process the abandonment and transfer of rights 
outside the sphere of marine insurance will be 
compared to abandonment and transfer in marine 
insurance in the individual countries. 
3 . 2 . When the current effect of abandonment in marine 
insurance is contrasted with the general 
provisions of the law in the countries under 
consideration it becomes apparent that abandonment 
in marine insurance differs from the abandonment 
which operates in the law of property . The 
distinction lies mainly therein that the law of 
property still requires the two distinct legal 
acts required by Roman law before the transferee 
becomes the owner of the abandoned thing, whereas 
marine insurance does not. Central to the 
distinction is the centuries old problem of 
control or detentio . 
3 . 3. THE NETHERLANDS 
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Netherlands with effect from 1 January 1992, the 
result of a proper abandonment in marine insurance 
was that ownership of the insured and abandoned 
ship or goods transferred to the insurer in terms 
of article 678 of the WvK>2. The effect of the 
abandonment was therefore the , (g) eheele, 
onvoorwaardelijke, onherroepelijke overgang van 
het verzekerde en geabandonneerde op de 
verzekeraar.,53 This occurred ex lege, without 
any form of delivery mentioned in article 639 of 
the Burgerlijk Wetboek ('the BW') and without any 
form of acceptance by the insurer being 
necessary54. It also occurred without any entries 
Mens Fiers Smeding, Eenige Opmerkingen over het Recht van Abandonnement, 
doctoral thesis, Leiden, (1895); Van Barneveld, Inleiding tot de 
Algemene Assurantiekennis, (lOth ed), (1978), 485; Dorhout Mees, 
Schadeverzekeringsrecht, ('Schade'), 4th ed, (1967), 641. In the Roman-
Dutch law prior to the WvK the abandonment was also made 'aan de 
verzekeraar', and not to the world at large so that the ship or goods 
could become res nullius . The Customs of the Antwerp Exchange (1582) 
required an abandonment 'tot behoef van den verzekeraar', article 12 of 
the Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1604 -'ten behoeve vande Verseeckeraers' and 
article 60 of the Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1721 'ten behoeve van de 
Asseuradeurs' . Article 28 of the Amsterdam Ordonnance of 1744 was to the 
same effect . There was thus no question of an abandonment to the world 
at large, only a notificat i on to the other party to the contract of the 
assured's willingness to give up his rights in the insured ship or 
goods. The notice of abandonment therefore had legal consequences only 
between the assured and the insurer. 
Mens Fiers Smeding, op cit, 107 . 
Mens Fiers Smeding, op cit, 108 ; Dorhout Mees , Schade, 641. Schook, Bet 
Abandonnement, doctoral thesis, Utrecht, (1857), 69-70, questioned the 
conclusion that ownership transferred ex lege as a result of the 
abandonment prior to the advent of article 678 of the WvK. In the first 
place, he believed the contention was contrary to a passage in Roccus' 
work, De Navibus et Naulo, item de Assecurationibus Notabilia, (1708), 
not 9 . In the second place, he was of the opinion that the absence of 
a traditio was strange. However, the relevant passage in Roccus' work 
doe~ not deal ~ith owner~hip after an abandonment, but with ownership 
dur~ng the per~od of the ~nsurance. The absence of a recognized form of 
del~verr, on the other hand, is explained by the unique development of 
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having been made in the Shipping Register, which 
in ordinary circumstances would have been required 
for ownership to transfer55 . 
According to Molengraaff56 abandonment was 'een 
rechtsfei t, waardoor eigendomsovergang plaats 
grijp mitsdien een wijze van 
eigendomsverkrijging, niet een rechtsti tel van 
eig~ndomsoorgang. ,57 Dutch marine insurance law 
therefore maintained the process whereby the 
notice of abandonment to the insurer resulted in 
an ex lege vesting of ownership in the insurer. 
Article 678 of the WvK also solved a vexed 
question, namely from what date ownership in the 
abandoned property was acquired. It provided that 
upon a proper abandonment 'behooren de verzekerde 
voorwerpen aan den verzekeraar, te rekenen van de 
dag van de beteekening van het abandonnement ... ' 
It is not without significance that the particular 
Articles 318, 748 and 750 of the WvK . See also Cleveringa, Zeerecht, 4th 
ed, (1961), 89 et seq. 
Leidraad bij de Beoefening van het Nederlandse Handel srecht , 9th ed, 
(1955), 683. 
This statement may explain why it is futile to try and compare 
, abandonment to the acquisition of ownership by way of delivery. In the 
case of ~andon~ent Dutch law was to the effect that ownership vested 
ex lege, 1n the 1nsurer, Abandonment is thus a form of acquisition of 
ownersh1p, not a method of transferring ownership . Seen in this light, 
the act of abandonment on the part of the assured divests himself of 
ownership and ownership then vests, by operation of law, in the insurer. 
Ab~donmen~ may t~en not be contrary to the other provisions of the law 
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having been made in the Shipping Register, which 
in ordinary circumstances would have been required 
for ownership to transfer55 • 
According to Molengraaff56 abandonment was ' een 
rechtsfei t, waardoor eigendomsovergang plaats 
grijpt mitsdien een wijze van 
eigendomsverkrijging, niet een rechtsti tel van 
eigendomsovergang. ,57 Dutch marine insurance law 
therefore maintained the process whereby the 
notice of abandonment to the insurer resulted in 
an ex lege vesting of ownership in the insurer. 
Article 678 of the WvK also solved a vexed 
question, namely from what date ownership in the 
abandoned property was acquired. It provided that 
upon a proper abandonment 'behooren de verzekerde 
voorwerpen aan den verzekeraar, te rekenen van de 
dag van de beteekening van het abandonnement ... ' 
It is not without significance that the particular 
Articles 316-318 and 757 (unt i l 1992) of the WvK . See also Cleveringa , 
Zeerecht, 4th ed, (1961) , 89 et seq . 
Leidraad bij de Beoeiening van het Nederlandse Handel srecht , 9th ed, 
(1955), 683 . 
This statement may explain why it is futile to try and compare 
abandonment to the acquisition of ownership by way of delivery. In the 
case of ~bandon~ent Dutch law was to the effect that ownership vested 
ex lege . 1n the 1nsurer. Abandonment is thus a form of acquisition of 
ownersh1p, not a method of transferring ownership . Seen in this light, 
the act of abandonment on the part of the assured divests himself of 
ownership and ownership then vests, by operation of law, in the insurer. 
Ab~donmen~ may t~en not be contrary to the other provisions of the law 
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formula does not state that ownership 'transfers' . 
It would appear that the acquisition of ownership 
rather than a transfer was envisaged . The reason 
is not difficult to imagine. By giving notice of 
abandonment the assured expressed his offer to 
transfer his interest in the abandoned ship or 
cargo but the insurer could not, under strict 
Roman law and Roman-Dutch law principles, acquire 
ownership until he had actually obtained detentio 
of them. The law thus provided for him to 
'acquire' ownership without having brought or 
received the ship or goods in his physical 
possession. This provision therefore confirms the 
conclusion arrived at earlier, namely that the two 
steps in the process of transfer now co-incided. 
Outside marine insurance, the term 'afstand van 
reg' is used in different settings in Dutch law. 
The three main ways in which a right can move out 
of one's estate are firstly by way of delivery to 
another, secondly by removal from one's estate 
without delivery to another and thirdly by being 
lost through theft. The loss through theft or 
similar conduct is regarded as the opposite of 
acquisition of ownership 58. 







Part IV: Chapter 14: Transfer of Rights and Obligations 
The term 'afstand van reg' is used to denote an 
abandonment or waiver of a right, and is described 
as the legal act by which a right is removed from 
one's estate without transfer of that right to the 
estate of another59 • In the case of ownership, 
the Burgerlijk Wetboek ('the BW') does not refer 
to abandonment of ownership, but only to the 
relinquishing of possession60 • It is generally 
accepted, however, that the relinquishing of 
possession accompanies the relinquishing of 
ownership as long as the owner of the property 
makes his intention clear. Such movable property 
then becomes res nullius which can be acquired in 
ownership through occupatio61 • 
Such a relinquishing of possession and the 
subsequent acquisition of possession by a third 
party through occupatio does not result in the 
direct transfer of ownership. There are two 
Schlemmer, op cit, 73; Aaftink, Afstand van Vermogensrechten, (1974), 
14. 
Article 600 of the Burgerlijk Wetboek, ('the BW') and Book 3: Article 
117 (3.5.11) of the Nieuw Burgerlijk We tboek , (' the NBW') ; Article 3: 117 
of the NBWprovides as follows: 'Een bezitter van een goed verliest het 
bezit, wanneer hij het goed kennelijk prijsgeeft, of wanneer een ander 
het bezi t van het goed verkrijgt.' Haanappel & MacKaay, Nieuw Nederlands 
Burgerlijk Wetboek: Ret Vermogensrecht, (1990), 61 translated this 
~rticl~ as follows: 'A possessor of property loses possession when it 
~s ev~d~nt th~t ,he abandons the property or when another acquires 
p~ssess~on of ~t. I~ should be made clear that the article deals only 
w~th loss of possess~on by a possessor, and not with loss of ownership 
by an owner. 
Schlemmer, op cit, 73. 
586 
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separate legal acts which do not have any 
relationship with each other. The one relinquishes 
ownership, the other acquires ownership without 
the co-operation of the first 62 . The acquisition 
of ownership through occupatio is a form of 
original acquisition of ownership and does not 
derive from the ownership of the previous 
owner63. Aaftink describes 'afstand van recht' in 
this sense as 
, een rechtshandeling welke is gericht op het 
verlies van een recht door de rechthebbende, 
zonder tevens een overdracht van dit recht te zijn 
aan een ander.' 64 
The Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek ( , the NBW') also 
makes provision for the loss of ownership when an 
owner abandons it, but makes it clear that .the 
giving up of possession has to be accompanied by 
the intention to divest himself of ownership 65. 
The NBW further provides that the person who takes 
Schlemmer , op cit, 73 ; Aaftink , op ci t , 15 et seq. 
Ibid. 
Op cit, 18 . 
Article 5: 18 : ' De eigendom van een roerende zaak wordt verloren wanneer 
de eigenaar bet bezit prijsgeeft met bet oogmerk om zicb van de' eigendom 
te on tdoen. ' 
587 
3.3.7. 
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possession of property which does not belong to 
anyone becomes owner thereof 66 • This acquisition 
occurs through occupatio which was the oldest and 
original form of acquisition of ownership 67. 
Originally Dutch law required factual control or 
detentio to be passed to the transferee for 
ownership of movables to be acquired by him68 , as 
was the case in the Roman and Roman-Dutch law69 • 
Article 667 of the BW in its original French text 
made it quite clear, providing that 'la tradition 
s'opere par la seule deliverance de l'objet 
,70 This provision did not apply to 
immovables, which were transferred by entries in 
the appropriate registers, nor to ships which 
exceeded a given tonnage, which were similarly 
transferred by entries in the ships register71 • 
After considerable discussion in the legal 
journals and a number of cases, this position was 
Article 5 : 4 . 
Schlemmer, op cit , 74. 
Hofmann, Het NederlandBch Zakenrecht , 3rd ed, (1944) , 234 . 
Van der Linden , KoopmanB Handboek , 1 . 7.3 . 
('The transfer operates solely through delivery of the object . ') 
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watered down somewhat so that stolen property 
could be transferred to the insurer without giving 
him physical detentio, but in such cases the 
insurer had to be placed in the position where he 
could 'legitimate' his claim against the 
possessor72 • The NEW has confirmed this trend and 
allows ownership to transfer in certain cases 
where the transferor no longer has physical 
detenti073 • In such cases the transfer occurs by 
deed, which allows the transferee to legitimate 
his claim to possession against third parties 74. 
This process is available also in respect of 
ships, and theoretically an abandonment to the 
insurer could still achieve transfer of ownership 
in Dutch law by the procedure of article 3.95 of 
the NBW75. Thus, in Dutch law, the result 
achieved by abandonment in marine insurance for 
the past three or four centuries has now also been 
incorporated in the general law of property. 
Ownership is allowed to pass by means of a written 
See in this regard the discussion in Schlemmer, op cit, 28 et seq and 
the authorities there cited. 
Schlemmer, op cit, 32 et seq; Clausing, Korte inleiding tot het 
ver.mogensrecht onder het Nieuw BW, 95 et seq; Hartkamp, Compendium van 
het ver.mogensrecht volgens het nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek , (1990), 88-90 . 
Mijnssen and Schut, Bezit, levering en overdracht, 3rd ed, 99-100. 
Article 3 . 95 NBW: 'Buiten de in de artikelen 89-94 geregelde gevallen 
en beboudens bet in de artikelen 96 en 98 bepaalde, worden goederen 
geleverd door een daartoe bestemde akte .' 
589 
3.3.9. 
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deed, which is what the written notice of 
abandonment also achieved. 
Ownership passed only in respect of the ship or 
goods 76 insured77 and abandoned. There was some 
controversy about the question whether the freight 
earned before the abandonment accrued to the 
insurer. Schook78, Mens Fiers Smeding
79 and 
Molengraaff80 held the view that it did not. 
After the abandonment the ship belonged to the 
insurer with all benefits arising from such 
ownership with the consequence that freight earned 
after the abandonment accrued to the insurer. 
The abandonment transferred only the rights 
arising from ownership and did not include 
personal rights and claims against third 
parties81 . The rights relating to the loss or 
Article 663 expr essly provided that the ' v erzekerde schepen en goederen' 
could be abandoned. There was no provis i on for anything else to be 
abandoned in Dutch law. 
Schook, op c i t , 70 -71; Mens Fiers Smedi ng , op cit, 108 . 
Op ci t, 71-72 . 
Op cit, 112. 
Op cit, 683. 
Mens Fiers Smeding, op cit , 111 mentioned the interesting example of a 
salv,:,-ge clai~ which accrued before the abandonment , to which the insurer 
obta~ns no r~ght as such a claim arises from the effort made in saving 
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damage indemnified transferred under article 284 
of the WvK by means of subrogation8 2 • 
It was recognized in Dutch marine insurance 
practice that this type of transfer of ownership 
might not be desired by the insurer as it may be 
accompanied by obligations83 • This was partly 
responsible for the practice of Dutch insurers to 
exclude the right to abandon from their policies, 
which occurred so consistently that the Dutch 
Parliament eventually abolished the institution of 
abandonment with effect from 1 January 1992. 
GERMANY 
Aschenheim84 regarded the transfer of ownership 
as the essence of abandonment. In respect of 
marine insurance article 868(1) of the HGB 
expressly provides that all the rights the assured 
has in respect of the insured effects transfer 
'gehen auf') to the insurer. The transfer occurs 
at the moment notice of abandonment is given as 
salvage effort. 
This only occurred upon indemnification; Schook, op cit, 70. 
Van Barneveld, op cit, 485. 
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the article provides that the rights transfer by 
way of the notice of abandonment ( , durch die 
Abandon erklarung' ) 85 . The effect of the 
provision is that it preserves the process whereby 
two legal acts occur, namely the giving of notice 
of abandonment and vesting of ownership, ex lege, 
in the insurer. 
Article 959 of the Bundesgesetzbuch (' the BGB') 
deals with the abandonment of ownership of movable 
property outside marine insurance. In such a case 
the property does not devol ve upon any other 
person by virtue of the abandonment86 • The 
property becomes res nullius when the owner gives 
up possession with the intention to relinquish or 
renounce ownership. The intention of the owner is 
made apparent to the outside world by the 
expression of his intention to relinquish his 
ownership 87. Ownership of the property which 
becomes res nullius may then be acquired by 
another person through occupatio coupled with the 
Aschenheim, op cit, 31; Helberg, DerAbandon in der Seeversicberung aut 
recb~svergleicbender Grundlage, (1925), 94; Hagen, See-
vers~cberungsrecbt, (1938), 138 . 
Schlemmer, op cit, 77; Baur and Baur, Lebrbucb des Sacbenrecbts, (1989) , 
34. 







Part I V : Chapter 14 : Transfer of Rights and Obligat i ons 
appropriate intention88 . However, it is apparent 
that two separate legal acts are involved, as in 
Dutch law, namely the act of divesting the 
relinquishing owner of his ownership and the act 
of the new owner in acquiring control over the 
thing or right . 
Roman law was received into German law to a much 
greater degree than in the Roman-Dutch law and it 
is therefore not surprising that German law of 
property recognizes the same forms of delivery as 
Roman law and requires the transferee to acquire 
detentio of the thing to be transferred before 
ownership vests in him89 • 
The rights which are transferred are those which 
vested in the assured at the time of the 
abandonment, which rights are transferred together 
with such obligations as attach to the thing 
abandoned at that time90 . Anything which validly 
formed the subject-matter of the insurance may be 
abandoned, including the ship, her cargo, the 
freight, as well as bottomry and average monies, 
Schlemmer, op cit, 77; Baur and Baur , op cit , 522. 
Schwab, Sacbenrecbt, (1987), 135 et seq. 








Part IV: Chapter 14: Transfer of Rights and Obligations 
but not the expected profit of the venture
91
• The 
controversy about the freight earned prior to the 
abandonment is solved by article 868 (3) of the 
REG, which provides that the insurer of the ship 
shall be entitled to the freight earned after the 
abandonment 92 • The freight earned before the 
abandonment must therefore vest in the assured. 
The abandonment transfers all the rights the 
assured has in respect of the insured effects93 • 
Although it is not expressly so stated, the rights 
the assured has against the third party 
responsible for the loss, whether in delict or in 
contract or otherwise, are not rights 'in respect 
of', (' in Ansehung des' 94), the insured effects 
but rights arising from the event which caused the 
loss. Such rights are personal rights which 
transfer under the principles of subrogation when 
the assured is indemnified95 • 
Aschenheim, op cit, 33-43 . 
If the freight is separately insured the loss in respect of the freight 
earned after the abandonment falls on the insurer of the freight in 
terms of article 868(4) of the RGB. 
Article 868(1). 
Afrikaans: 'ten aansien van' . 
Art~cle. 804 of the RGB stipulates the requirements for subrogation in 
mar~ne .~nsurance and article 67 of the VersicherungsvertragBgesetz (' the 
VVG') ~n other forms of indemnity insurance. 
594 
3.4.6. 
Part IV: Chapter 14 : Transfer of Rights and Obligations 
While it is recognized in German law that the 
insurer may become owner of the insured property 
against his will as it may make him liable for 
certain obligations which arise from mere 
ownership of the abandoned effects, the lawmakers 





The marine insurance provisions of the Code de 
Commerce of 1807 ('the CdeC') departed from the 
provisions of the Ordonnance de la Marine of 1681 
by providing that, after the abandonment was 
signified and 'accepted or judged valid' 96, the 
things abandoned vested in the insurer with effect 
from the date of the notice of abandonment 97 • The 
qualification does not necessarily mean the 
abandonment had become a bilateral act between the 
assured and insurer. It means that the legal 
vesting of the property in the insurer is 
suspended until the abandonment is accepted by the 
insurer, or failing such acceptance, judged valid 
by the court. The time of transfer had been the 
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subject of some disagreement as some were of the 
opinion that it occurred at the time when notice 
was given by the assured while others were of the 
view that the transfer only occurred when the 
notice was accepted or judged valid by the 
court98 • Article 31 of Law 522 of 1967 laid this 
dispute to rest by stipulating expressly that the 
transfer operates as between the parties from the 
time the assured notifies the insurer of his 
election to abandon99 • There was some dispute 
about the precise wayan abandonment operated in 
French marine insurance law. 
According to De Smet the effect of an abandonment 
under the CdeC was to transfer to the insurer the 
proprietary rights which the assured had in the 
thing insured10o • De Smet I s statement does not 
alert the reader to the fact that ownership vested 
in the insurer ex lege, but is not incompatible 
Rodiere and Pontavice, op cit, para 640. De Srnet, Traite Theorique et 
Pratique des Assurances Maritime, (1959-1960), Vol I, para 630 was of 
the opinion that the transfer was retro-active to the time of the 
notice, which implies that he could not have regarded the transfer as 
a bilateral act. Emerigon, op cit, Vol II, 230, commenting on article 
60 of the 1681 Ordonnance, also expressed the opinion that the transfer 
operated with retro-active effect. Rodiere and Pontavice, op cit, para 
640 were hesitant to express any firm view on the matter. 
The article provides that: 'Les effets de ce transfert remontent entre 
les parties au mo~ent QU l'assure notifie a l'assureur sa volonte de 
delaisser.' See also Rodiere and Pontavice, op cit, para 640. 
'Le delaissement transmet a l'assureur les droits de l'assure sur les 
objets assures'; op cit, para 629. The reason for the transfer is to 
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with that fact. 
Danjon saw abandonment as a sort of cession by the 
assured to the insurer of all his rights in the 
things insured101 • This scenario entails a direct 
and independent transfer from the assured to the 
insurer by way of cession . There is no warrant for 
such a fiction for two reasons. The first is that 
in French law ownership of things (real property) 
is transferred by delivery, not cession. The 
second is that the French courts have consistently 
held that the transfer of rights to the insurer 
occurs ex lege and without the necessity for any 
special cession or subrogation102 . 
Ripert did not see abandonment as a method of 
transfer, but as a method of acquisition of 
ownership l03 . It is submitted that Ripert's 
statement is more accurate than those of De Smet 
Traite de Droit Maritime, (1914), Vol V, para 1583; 'Il comporte une 
sorte de cession iaite par l'assure a l'assureur de tous les droits 
qu' i l peut avoi r sur les objets assures .. . ' ; ('It constitutes a sort 
of cession made by the assured to the insurer of all the rights he could 
have in the objects insured .' ) 
Basse v Assureurs Maritime ('La Nanine') 1853 (2) DJG 4 (Cour Imperial) ; 
Comp o la Gironde v Amanieu (' La Louise-Marie') 1854 (2) DJG 15 (Cour 
Imperial) . 
Ripert, Precis de Droi t Mari time, 7th ed, (1956), para 719 described 
ab~d~nme~t a~ 'un mode d'acquisition de la propriete propre droit 
mar~t~me. Th~s approach was also adopted in the lOth ed of Ripert's 
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and Danjon . as it makes it clear that there is no 
direct or independent transfer from the assured to 
the insurer, but that the abandonment by the 
assured is a unilateral act whilst the 
intervention of the law constitutes the second 
component which makes the abandonment 'un mode 
d' acquisi tion de la propriete propre au droi t 
mari time' 104 • Ripert' s approach is also 
compatible with the underlying common law, based 
on Roman law, namely that delivery is necessary 
for the transfer of ownership. 
Article 31 of Law 522 of 1967, which replaced the 
marine insurance provisions of the CdeC, adopted 
fresh wording to restate the principle. It 
provides that the abandonment 'transfers' the 
rights of the assured in the things insured to the 
insurer10s • While this wording may, at first 
blush, appear to conflict with the view expressed 
earlier, the article does not detract from the 
notion that the transfer occurs ex lege. It may 
therefore be concluded that French law recognizes 
the difficulty of passing ownership to the insurer 
a method of acquiring ownership in maritime law' . 






Part IV: Chapter 14 : Transfer of Rights and Obligations 
without a proper delivery by treating the 
abandonment by the assured and the vesting of 
ownership in the insurer as separate legal acts. 
Some argued that the 'transfer' does not take 
place unilaterally, through the ' will' of the 
insured alone, but has to be accepted by the 
insurer or validated by the court
106
• The 
acquisition of ownership by the insurer is then a 
result of a contract (' convention' ) of 
abandonment107 • This argument is fallacious, it 
1S submitted, because it fails to take into 
account that the true effect of the provisions of 
the law is that the abandonment is a unilateral 
act and that the insurer in consequence of that 
act acquires ownership ex lege. The fiction of a 
contract of abandonment giving rise to the 
transfer is thus untenable. 
Pursuant to the Roman law principles on which the 
French law of property is based, French law also 
recognizes abandonment outside of marine insurance 
De Smet, op cit, Vol I, para 630, relying on article 239 of the CdeC . 
It was r 7cognized that the transfer is not necessarily to the advantage of .the .1.nsure7" . . It could expose him to charges resulting from the 
obll.gatl.ons arl.sl.ng from ownership of the things saved; De Smet, op cit, 
Vol I, para 629. 
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as a method of divesting one-self of ownership of 
the abandoned thing, which as res nullius may then 
be acquired in ownership by a third party who 
seizes the thing with the intention of owning 
it 108 . 
Further, French law, like the Roman law, 
originally required the detentio of the thing 
transferred to vest in the transferee before 
ownership vested in him109. However, the Code 
Civil of 1807 has not followed this approach and 
ownership of movables now transfers by virtue of 
the agreement alone by virtue of article 1138110 . 
For example, in terms of article 1583 ownership 
passes in the contract of sale as soon as 
agreement is reached as to the thing and the 
price, even though the thing has not been 
delivered or the price paid111 . In French law, 
therefore, the notion that ownership should pass 
by abandonment in marine insurance without any 
form of delivery is not at odds with the general 
Domat, op cit, 855, 859 and 863; Malaurie and Aynes, Cours de Droit 
Civil: ~eB ~ienB, (199?), 146, 166 .and 170. The source of this right of 
ownersh~p ~s possess~on; Malaur~e and Aynes, op cit, 166. This 
emphasises the detentio aspect. 
Domat, op cit, 860. 
Malaurie and Aynes, op cit, 145. 
Bermann, de Vries and Galston, Frencb Law, (1989), 4-108. 
600 






Part I V: Chapter 14 : Transfer of Rights and Obligations 
principles of the law of property or contract . 
Ownership of the things insured and abandoned 
(' les droi ts sur les objets assures') passes 
to the insurer together with all obligations 
attaching to the things abandoned themselves
112
• 
It goes without saying that only things which can 
validly be insured ('les objets assures') may be 
the abandoned. In French law that means the 
ship 113 and the goods114 , but not the freight, 
because, although the latter may also be insured, 
there is no longer any provision for the freight 
to be abandoned115 • To be effective against third 
parties, the election to abandon must be contained 
in a written deed, which 1S regarded as 
publication to third parties116 • In the case of 
the ship, the necessary entries have to be made in 
the mortgage register. In the case of cargo, the 
bill of lading has to be delivered to the insurer, 
as the bill of lading is a document of title. 
Danjon, op cit, Vol V, para 1583 bis. 
The ship may be abandoned under article 48 of Law 522 of 1967. 
The abandonment of the goods is provided for in article 55 of Law 522 
.of 1967 . 
Harrel - Courtes, Le Nouveau Droi t Francai s de L' Assurance Mari time et des 
Evenements de Mer, (1968), 3-4 . 
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Only rights of ownership vest by way 
of 
abandonment in the insurer. The rights in relation 
to any claims the assured has against the third 
party responsible for the loss pass under the 
principles of subrogation
117
• Originally the 
insurer was also entitled to the freight earned 
during the insured voyage118 as French law saw 
the freight as an adjunct to the ship l19. From 12 
August 1885 the freight could be insured 
separately and had to be abandoned to the insurer 
of the freight12o • This situation changed yet 
again as a result of the provisions of Law 22 of 
1967 which no longer mention a separate 
abandonment of the insured freight121 • 
Article 31 of Law 522 of 1967 introduced another 
welcome innovation, namely that the insurer may 
decline to accept the transfer of ownership of the 
subject-matter of the insurance, but without 
See article 33 of Law 522 of 1967 for subrogation in marine insurance 
and article L 121-12 of the Code des Assurances (' the CdA') for 
subrogation in other forma of indemnity insurance. 
Article 386 of the CdeC before its repeal in 1885. See also Lerna£tre et 
comp v Assurance Mutuelles ('La Ceres') 1853 (2) DJG 61 (Cour Imperial) . 
Danjon, op cit, Vol V, para 157~. 
Danjon, op cit, Vol V, para 1575; De Smet, op cit, Vol I, para 596. 
Although the freight may still be insured separately; article 3 of Law 
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affecting his obligation to pay the sum insured. 
This put an end to a long-standing problem 
for 
insurers who did not want to be saddled with the 
remains of the thing insured 122 • Further, the 
insurer retains the right to stipulate in the 
policy that no transfer was to occur upon 
acceptance of the abandonment 123 • 
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 
Under the English common law the effect of an 
abandonment in marine insurance was to transfer 
, the whole property and interest in the thing 
insured to the underwriter, as from the date of 
the loss.' 124 American law, having inherited the 
English common law of the latter part of the 
eighteenth century, is to the effect that the 
abandonment 'of itself, and without any deed of 
cession, and prior to actual payment of the loss, 
transfers the right of property and interest in 
the things insured to the insurer to the extent of 
From 1924 the insurers have stipulated in the policy that ownership 
~ould .not .pass to the insu:-er upon ,acceptance of the abandonment or upon 
1t be1ng Judged to be val1d; Rodiere and Pontavice, op cit, para 641. 
De Smet, op cit, Vol I, para 629 . 
Pollock and Bruce, A Compendium of the Law of Merchant Shipping, 4th ed, 
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the insurance. ,125 American law is therefore the 
same as the English common law before the latter 
was changed by the Marine Insurance Act 1906 ('the 
MIA') . 
Section 63 (1) of the MIA changed the automatic 
transfer to one depending on the co-operation of 
the insurer for it to be effective. It provides: 
'Where there is a valid abandonment, the insurer 
is enti tled to take over the interest of the 
assured in wha tever may remain of the subj ect-
matter insured, and all proprietary rights 
incidental thereto.' 
The rights transfer retro-actively to the date of 
the 10SS126, not in terms of an express provision 
of the MIA, but in terms of the underlying common 
law, which is preserved by section 91(2) of the 
MIA127. The rule enunciated in Stewart v Greenock 
Pollock and Bruce, op cit, Vol I, 541 ; Robinson v The United Insurance 
Company 1 Johnson (US) Rep 592; Continental Insurance Co v Clayton 
Hardtop Skiff , supra; Kent, op cit, Vol III, 511-512; Phillips, op cit, 
Vol II, para 1707. 
Phillips, op c i t, Vol II, para 1708 . 
91 (2) . 'The rules of the common law including the law merchant, save in 
so far as t~ey are inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act, 
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Marine Insurance C0128 therefore stands
129
• 
The result is that abandonment has become, in 
English law, a bilateral act requiring the 
insurer's acceptance before the proprietary rights 
and interests incidental thereto pass to the 
insurer13o • Therefore, whereas under the English 
common law the abandonment was a unilateral act 
which transferred the relevant rights to the 
insurer even against his will and without any form 
of delivery, under the MIA it is now a bilateral 
act requiring an acceptance by the insurer of 
those rights. Nevertheless, no form of delivery of 
the insured things or their remains is required. 
When abandonment is seen in the light of the MIA, 
it appears to be similar to the abandonment of 
continental law where the abandonment per se does 
not vest ownership of the property in the insurer. 
However, while ownership then vests in the assured 
by operation of law in German law, in English it 
only vests in the insurer if he elects to 'take 
(1848) 2 HL Cas 159 . 
See also Mustill and Gilman , AIIlould ' s Law of Marine Insurance and 
Average, 16th ed , (1981) , (cited as 'AIIlould'), para 1283 . 
AG v Glenn Line Ltd and the Liverpool and London War Risks Insurance 
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over' the assured's rights131 . 
It is a matter of controversy in English law 
whether the act of abandonment effectively divests 
the assured of his ownership, whether against the 
insurer alone or against all the world132 . 
Generally English law holds that a person cannot 
divest himself of ownership merely by saying he 
does not want it133. However, in some wreck 
removal cases the effect of some passages in the 
judgments was that the shipowner was released from 
obligations attaching to his ownership by the act 
of abandonment 134 . Whatever the position of 
English law outside of marine insurance, it is 
submitted that the act of abandonment in marine 
insurance must be distinguished from the 
abandonment of property which occurs in other 
contexts . 
The assured who abandons to the insurer has no 
intention that anyone other than the insurer 
In French law the vesting occurs unless the insurer elects otherwi se. 
Colinvaux, op cit, para 1290 . 
Vandervell v I.R . C. [1966] Ch 261 ; Arnould, para 1290 fn 66 . 
The Douglas (1882) 7 PD 151, 160; The Utopia 1893 AC 492, 498; The 
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should acquire title to the abandoned things. He 
may however, in particular circumstances, also 
give up his rights in and to the property 
concerned because he thinks they are beyond 
recovery, so that there may be an intention to 
abandonment against all the world if the insurer 
does not exercise his right to take over the 
property abandoned to him. In the first case the 
assured remains vested with a better title than 
any other person, and he may even withdraw the 
abandonment and claim for a average loss, in which 
event his title to the abandoned property remains 
as good as ever135 • In the second case, however, 
the assured's intention differs markedly. He there 
intends to relinquish his rights so completely 
that, if the insurer does not exercise his right 
to take them over, the property becomes res 
nullius, which may then be claimed by any person 
who obtains possession. 
This distinction has not been seen clearly in 
English law, resulting in the well-known 
conflicting dicta of Bailhache J, Greer LJ and 
Cohen LJ. Bailhache J thought there was a lot to 
be said for the view that a wreck abandoned to 
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underwriters who did not accept the abandonment 
became a res nullius136 • Greer LJ disagreed with 
this view, saying that 
, (i) t does not follow that, because notice of 
abandonment is given to an insurer, therefore the 
vessel, which may have some value, is abandoned to 
all the world, so that it has no owner at all, and 
becomes what lawyers prefer to describe ... as res 
nullius. ,137 
Cohen LJ preferred Greer LJ's view in the light of 
the fact that Bailhache J' approach was 
irreconcilable with the assured's right to treat 
the loss as a partial loss and with the doctrine 
of ademption138 • It is submitted that the 
approach of Greer LJ and Cohen LJ is correct and 
demonstrates that the abandonment in marine 
insurance differs from the abandonment in ordinary 
context in that the former operates only as 
between the assured and insurer. 
Boston Corpn v France Fenwick & Co Ltd [1923] 15 LLR 85 (KB) , 91. 
Khurram, , Total Loss and Abandonment in the Law of Marine Insurance' 
[~994] ~5 Journal of Marit i me Law and Commerce 95 at 114 supports this 
v~ew wh~lst acknowledging that it gives rise to anomalies . 
Oceanic Steam Navigation Co Ltd v Evans [1934] 50 LLR 1 (CA), 3. 
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The concepts of ownership and possession in 
English (and consequently American law) differ 
greatly from the principles of Roman law upon 
which the continental legal systems and South 
African law are based139 . Whereas Roman law saw 
and maintained a clear distinction between 
ownership and possession, English law does not do 
so. Factual possession is distinguished from legal 
possession, which usually connotes that the 
possessor has the right to possess140 . Legal 
possession may generally be given up without the 
intention of transferring the article concerned to 
another141 . As in other legal systems, English law 
recognizes that ownership may be acquired by the 
occupation of an abandoned thing142. 
Whereas ownership is seen as absolute in Roman 
law, operating against the world, in English law 
the emphasis is on possession so that the persop 
in possession need only defend his possession 
against the party who claims to be entitled 
It is beyond the scope of this work to explain the differences . 
Halsbury, LaWB of England, 4th ed, (1981), Vol 35, (Personal Property), 
paras 1111 and 1112. 
Halsbury'S Laws of England, Vol 35, para 1125. 
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thereto143 . 'No one is ever called upon to 
demonstrate an ownership against all men ... It is 
a relative ownership: "I own it more than you 
do'" 144. Conversely, in a dispute between two 
persons about ownership, neither has to prove 
title in the sense understood by continental and 
South African lawyers, namely ownership. The 
question is; who has the better title?145 This 
simple principle of English law makes it possible 
to explain that the notion that the mere 
abandonment transferred property under the English 
common law of marine insurance was not at variance 
with the common law relating to other branches of 
the law146 . 
When the abandonment is made and the insurer 
accepts it 147, the insurer ordinarily has a 
better right than any person who might claim 
possession of the abandoned effects, but his title 
Buckland and McNair, Roman Law and Common Law, 2nd ed, (1965), 66-71. 
Buckland & McNair , op cit, 67. 
Buckland and McNair, op cit, 69. 
Section 17(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 determines that ownership 
('property') in respect of specific or ascertained goods is passed in 
~he contract of sale' at such time as the parties to the contract intend 
~t to pass', ~king it cle~r that delivery is unnecessary and that the 
buyer who rece1ves ownersh1p does not have to acquire detentio of the 
goods before he can become their owner . 
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or right can be no better than that of his 
predecessor, the assured . In principle it is 
therefore possible that a third party could have 
a better title than the assured and may defeat the 
insurer in the contest . This result is a 
consequence of the principle which also applies in 
continental law, namely that the insurer receives 
transfer of the insured effects subj ect to any 
defects in title and also to the rights of third 
parties148 • 
Under English law anything which could validly be 
insured under a marine insurance contract may be 
abandoned . This includes the ship, goods, freight 
and anticipated profits . The freight earned by the 
abandoned ship in completing the voyage (after the 
casualty giving rise to the abandonment) accrues 
to the insurer as being part and parcel of the 
proprietary rights incidental to ownership149 if 
the insurer elects to take over the assured's 
proprietary rights . This is a logical consequence 
of the retro-active effect of the abandonment and 
its acceptance . 
See Arnould, para 1265 . 
Case v Davidson (1816) 5 M & S 79; AG v Glen Line Ltd and the Liverpool 
an~ ~nd0n. War Risks Insurance Association Ltd, supra, 61 . This 
pr~nc~ple :s alleged nev~r to have been doubted in English law since 
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The abandonment, if accepted, transfers only 
proprietary rights and rights incidental thereto. 
Personal rights and claims against third parties 
responsible for the loss pass upon indemnification 
of the assured according to the principles of 
subrogation, as provided by section 79 of the 
MIA150 • 
The amendment to the common law brought about by 
section 63(1) of the MIA tacitly acknowledges that 
there may be obligations accompanying the 
ownership received by the insurer, and allows the 
insurer to avoid them. Examples of such cases may 
be found in the legislation dealing with the 
owner's liability for the cost of removal of a 
wreck or navigational obstruction151 or in 
respect of the cost of combatting oil pollution. 
As in English law, whatever could be validly 
insured under a marine insurance contract may be 
abandoned in American law. The rights which 
transfer as a result of the abandonment are the 
property or ownership of the things abandoned 
AG v Glen Line Ltd and the Liverpool and London War Risks Insurance 
Association Ltd, supra, 61. 
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together with 'the rights identified wi th the 
insurable interest or depending upon the 
possession of it' 152 . The rights which transfer 
through abandonment are thus rights of ownership 
and rights arising from or being incidental to 
ownership. Claims and rights against the third 
party responsible for the loss pass upon 
indemnification under the principles of 
subrogation. The transfer is subject to the rights 
of third parties l53 • Obligations which accompany 
ownership also pass to the insurer. This may 
include the strict liability which accrues under 
the Clean Water Act 154 or the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 
Act 155 and also under a variety of State 
Acts l56 • 
THE TRANSFER OF OBLIGATIONS 
Ownership is accompanied by certain obligations, 
Phillips , op cit, Vol II , para 1707 . 
Phillips, op cit, Vol II, paras 1714 - 1721; 45 C.J.S. InBurance, para 
965; Delaware Mutual Safety InBurance Co v GOBBler 96 US 645. 
33 USC section 13 21; Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law, (1987) 
533-534. ' 
42 USC sections 9601-9675; Schoenbaum, op cit, 534 . 
Schoenbaum, op cit, 540 . 
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not only in general, but perhaps particularly so 
in the case of maritime property. The result is 
that there are instances where it may be 
inconvenient or financially risky for the insurer 
to receive or accept ownership of the insured 
things . As a consequence of this circumstance 
insurers have tended to exclude or limit the right 
to abandon in their policies and the legislatures 
of some countries have amended their law to leave 
the insurer with the choice whether he will accept 
transfer of ownership of the abandoned things or 
not. 
4 . 2 . Examples of obligations which accompany the 
ownership of the insured ship or goods include: 
the liability to pay a salvage reward to any 
person who saves the ship or goods; liability in 
respect of maritime and possessory liens; 
liability for the expenses of earning the pending 
freight; liability for the debts secured by 
mortgages over the ship or goods; statutory 
liability under the domestic legislation of 
various countries in respect of the removal of 
wrecks and the warding off and clearing up of 
pollution on their coasts; and the liability for 
customs and other duties payable in respect of the 
614 
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ship or goods. The list does not appear to be a 
numerus clausus as further liability could attach 
under the domestic law of the country within whose 
boundaries the abandoned ship or goods may be 
found. 
4.3. The fact that these obligations may attach to the 
157 
158 
ship or goods and may have to be met by the 
insurer who has become their owner as a result of 
the abandonment does not mean that the assured is 
relieved of all of them. In respect of civil debts 
or liabilities incurred by the assured before the 
abandonment, the insurer may recover from the 
assured those amounts he has been obliged to pay 
so far as they do not arise from the insured 
peril157. Whether the assured is completely freed 
from liability in the case of liabilities imposed 
by statute would depend on the precise provision. 
In Osaka Steamship Co Ltd v South African Railways 
& Harbours158 the South African Appeal Court 
interpreted a local provision which imposed 
liability for the expenses of wreck removal on the 
owner as meaning the owner at the time of the 
casualty. The liability therefore remained with 
Arnould, para 1288 . 
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the assured. In the English case of Barraclough v 
Brown1S9 the opposite result was achieved when 
the provision which imposed the liability imposed 
them on the owner at the time the expenses were 
incurred, being the insurer who had accepted the 
abandonment in that case. 
CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding the differences between the legal 
systems referred to in the precise manner they 
allow ownership of the abandoned things to be 
transferred to the insurer, the effect of their 
individual provisions is that the assured who 
claims the full amount of the insurance against an 
abandonment does not benefit by having the money 
as well as the goods or their remains. Thus, by 
requiring an abandonment and by providing that 
ownership thereafter vests in the insurer 
notwithstanding that no formal delivery has taken 
place, the law preserves and protects the 
indemnity principle. 
5.2. If abandonment did not have the effect of vesting 
ownership in the insurer, the insurer could suffer 
159 1897 AC 615. 
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severe prejudice, especially in the case where the 
assured simply gave up the chase and made no 
effort to save or salvage the insured property 
after abandoning them to the insurer. The 
assured's attitude in such a case may well be 
construed, at the place where the abandoned 
property is, as an abandonment operating against 
all the world with the result that the insurer has 
to compete with others for the salvage and has to 
suffer the interference of others in the salvage 
operations. In such a case there would also be 
unnecessary uncertainty as to the legal status of 
the abandoned property. 
5.3. Abandonment in marine insurance differs from 
abandonment in other branches of the law in three 
main respects. 
5.3.1. In the first place it gives rise to the right to 
claim the full amount of the insurance. This means 
that abandonment in marine insurance is bilateral 
in effect. It is founded upon the contractual 
relationship between the parties. In the absence 
of that contractual relationship the right to 
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In the second place, abandonment in marine 
insurance is intended to operate only if favour of 
the insurer and does not vest any rights in any 
person other than the insurer. It is thus 
bilateral in the sense that it is intended to 
operate and operates only between the assured and 
insurer. 
In the third place, abandonment in marine 
insurance has the effect or consequence that 
ownership of the abandoned things vest in the 
insurer automatically160, by operation of law, in 
some countries, but in other countries only if the 
insurer elects to accept such ownership 161. In 
this sense abandonment in marine insurance is also 
bilateral in effect. Ownership of the abandoned 
property passes directly from the estate of the 
assured to that of the insurer. Abandonment in the 
ordinary non-marine insurance sense, however, is 
a unilateral act which divests the owner of his 
property without it vesting in any other person 
unless a further and separate legal act takes 
place. That further legal act is also unilateral 
As, for example, in Germany and America . The same process operated in 
the Netherlands until it abolished the right to abandon altogether. 
As in France and England . 
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in that the person acquiring ownership does so by 
taking occupation of the abandoned thing without 
reference to the previous owner. 
5.4. In the Roman law and the Civil law based on it 
abandonment in marine insurance might have been 
seen as a unique method of acquiring ownership of 
real property, that is of things, but with some 
erosion of the requirement of physical control or 
detentio over the particular thing. Even in those 
legal systems which have strictly maintained the 
principles of the Roman law, such as Dutch and 
German law, it is debatable whether abandonment 
was indeed all that unique. Its uniqueness does 
not appear to extend beyond the fact that 
ownership of the abandoned things were vested in 
the insurer ex lege rather than by delivery or 
occupatio. 
5.5. It was demonstrated earlier that the transfer of 
ownership brought about by abandonment in marine 
insurance generally follows the same principles 
and process as the abandonment and acquisition of 
ownership of things in the law of property of 
individual countries. It is therefore submitted 
that abandonment as a method of vesting or 
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transferring rights of ownership in marine 
insurance should not be viewed as a foreign 
doctrine . Applying a label such as 'a unique 
method of transfer' to abandonment is likely to 
invite suspicion rather than to assuage the 
existing doubts about its pedigree, operation and 
right to exist. 
5.6. Before turning to an examination of the legal 
regime and sources of the law which regulate the 
principles of abandonment in South African law, 
the place and functions of abandonment may be 
restated briefly : 
5.6.1. 
5.6 . 2. 
The cornerstone of marine insurance is the 
principle of indemnity, which requires that the 
assured should receive a full indemnity but no 
more than that; 
Abandonment stands in the service of the indemnity 
principle by, on the one hand, allowing the 
assured to recover the full indemnity in the event 
of certain losses best described as economic loss, 
while on the other hand preventing the assured 
from recovering more than a full indemnity by 
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the insured property to the insurer; 
The consequences of a proper abandonment are that 
the insured becomes entitled to claim the full 
amount of the insurance while the insurer becomes 
entitled to the abandoned property in the fullest 
sense, that is to say by acquiring ownership of 
them; 
Abandonment is related to the concept of 
subrogation in that the latter regulates, in some 
countries, the transfer of personal rights from 
the assured to the insurer, and in other 
countries, the pursuance of the assured's rights 
against third parties in the interests of the 
insurer. 
5.7. Whether these general principles of abandonment 
and the principles of abandonment which are common 
to the countries under consideration are 
applicable in South African law remains to be 
seen. In order to answer that question, the 
ancestry and content of South African marine 
insurance law have to be determined first and that 






PART V: SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
CHAPTER FIFTEEN 
THE RESIDUAL COMMON LAW: ENGLISH LAW OR ROMAN-
DUTCH LAW? 
INTRODUCTION 
Whether English law or Roman-Dutch law is the 
residual common law for South African marine 
insurance law has recently become a controversial 
question1 • If English law applies, the law will 
have to be sought in English judicial decisions 
and perhaps in some statutes2 , and abandonment 
will fall squarely within the principles of the 
concept of a constructive total loss. An important 
question which would arise if English law were 
applicable is whether the English common law as it 
was before the Marine Insurance Act 1906 ( , the 
There is a distinction between the Roman-Dutch law which applied in the 
province of Holland in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries on the 
one hand, and the Roman - Dutch law which applies in the Republic of South 
Africa on the other . The former is an important, probably the most 
important component of the latter, especially so far as insurance law 
is concerned , but the Roman-Dutch law inherited from Holland when Jan 
van Riebeeck founded the Cape of Good Hope has been modified 
considerably by local legislation and case law in the last three 
centuries . For the sake of clarity the Roman-Dutch law applying in South 
Africa at the present time will be referred to as South African law or 
as the Roman - Dutch law of the Republic, as the situation requires . 
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MIA') applies or whether the MIA applies3 • If, on 
the other hand, Roman-Dutch law applies, the 
sources of the Roman-Dutch law of marine insurance 
will have to be identified and considered, and 
abandonment would be treated in the traditional 
continental manner. Other important questions 
would arise if Roman-Dutch law applies. What are 
the sources of Roman-Dutch marine insurance law? 
Are developments in the province of Holland after 
1652 relevant?4 If so, to what extent are 
subsequent developments relevant? Further, are 
these sources still adequate to meet the demands 
of the twentieth and even twenty first centuries? 
Not all of these questions can be answered in this 
chapter, which is devoted to the question whether 
English law or the 'Roman-Dutch law applicable in 
the Republic' applies. 
In 1973 Bamford SC wrote : 
'The sources of the South African law of marine 
insurance are (a) the Insurance Act 1943, (b) in 
the Cape Province, Orange Free State, South West 
It was pointed out in Chapter 9 supra that the MIA made a number of 
changes to the English common law, including some important changes so 
far as abandonment is concerned . 
Important developments after 1652 include the Rotterdam Ordonnance of 
1721, the Amsterdam Ordonnance of 1744, the works of Bynkershoek, Van 
der Keessel and Van der Linden, as well as the Wetboek van Koopbandel 
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Africa and Rhodesia, English law, (c) South 
African judicial decisions, and (d) the writings 
of the Roman-Dutch jurists. The Bri tish Marine 
Insurance Act of 1906 does not apply, even in the 
Cape Province and Orange Free State. In Transvaal 
and Natal, English law is merely of persuasive 
authority. ,5 
A scant ten years later the same author wrote: 
'The sources of the South African law of marine 
insurance are (a) the Insurance Act 1943, (b) 
South African judicial decisions, and (c) the 
writings of the Roman-Dutch jurists. The British 
Marine Insurance Act of 1906 does not apply. 
English law is merely of persuasive authority. ,6 
Two important questions arise in this situation. 
The first is how it came that English law was 
applicable and then ceased to apply, in the Cape 
Province and the Orange Free State . Allied to this 
question is the possibility that English law may 
have been installed as the law regulating marine 
insurance in any event. The second question is 
whether English law exerted such an influence 
The Law of Shipping and Carri age in South Africa, 2nd ed, (1973), 237 . 
The Law of Shipping and Carriage in South Africa, 3rd ed, (1983), 337 . 
624 
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during the time it applied that it can be said 
that the principles of abandonment have been 
modified thereby. The first of these questions can 
only be answered by recounting the history of 
South African marine insurance law. The second can 
only be answered when the content of South African 
law is considered, which task is undertaken in 
Chapter 18 infra. Section 6 of the Admiralty 
Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 of 1983 ( , the 
Act') has a considerable effect on the position 
and will be used as the point of departure. 
SECTION 6 OF THE ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION REGULATION 
ACT 105 OF 1983: ENGLISH LAW OR ROMAN-DUTCH LAW? 
2 . 1 . Section 6(1), read with certain other sections of 
the Act, makes it clear that either English law or 
the Roman-Dutch law applicable in the Republic 
regulates marine insurance. At a primary level, 
therefore, section 6(1) of the Act determines the 
sources of South African marine insurance law. The 
section is the product of the peculiar history of 
South African admiralty law which developed out of 
the grafting of English law and institutions onto 
the fabric of the Roman-Dutch law and courts in 
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Section 6 of the Act provides as follows: 
'6. Law to be applied and rules of evidence.-
(1) Notwi thstanding anything to the contrary in 
any law or the common law contained a court in the 
exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction shall-
(a) wi th regard to any matter in respect of 
which a court of admiralty of the Republic 
referred to in the Colonial Courts of 
Admiralty Act, of the United 
Kingdom, had jurisdiction immediately 
before the commencement of this Ace, 
apply the law which the High Court of 
Justice of the United Kingdom in the 
exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction 
would have applied wi th regard to such 
matter at such commencement9 , in so far as 
For a brief summary of the history of the admiralty court in South 
Africa see: Marnewick, A Critical Analysis of the Law to be Applied in 
respect of a Mari time Claim for Marine Insurance, wi th reference to Non-
Disclosure and Abandonment, and the need for codification, LLM thesis, 
University of Natal, (1991), 87 et seq. 
Bamford, op ci t, (1973), 140 succinctly listed the matters over which 
the Colonial Courts of Admiralty had jurisdiction as follows: 'Booty of 
war; Building of ships; Damage by a ship; Master's wages; Master's 
disbursements; Mortgagee's claims; Necessaries; OWnership of ships; 
Repair of ships; Salvage; Seamen's wages; Towage.' Marine insurance is 
conspicuous by its absence from this list. Staniland (pers. comm . ) is 
of the view that Bamford's list is oversimplified . Nevertheless, for the 
purposes of this study it is important to note only that marine 
insurance is absent from Bamford's list. 
Where English law has to be applied, it has to be the law as it was at 
the date of commencement of the Act, namely 1 November 1983. This would 
mean that the MIA has become the law of marine insurance of all four the 
provinces of the Republic (and, for that matter, the 'independent 
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that law can be applied; 
(b) with regard to any other matter, apply 
the Roman-Dutch law applicable in the 
Republic10 • 
(2) The provisions of subsection (1) shall not 
derogate from the provisions of any law of the 
Republic applicable to any of the matters 
con templa ted in paragraph (a) or (b) of that 
subsection11 • 
(3 ) 12 
( 4) 13 
(5) The provisions of subsection (1) shall not 
supersede any agreement relating to the system of 
law to be applied in the event of a dispute.' 
The Roman-Dutch law to be applied is that which is 'applicable in the 
Republic', which is not necessarily still the same as the original 
Roman-Dutch law which arrived here in 1652. This law is plainly the 
ordinary common law of the Republic. Unlike the situation where English 
law has to be applied, when the common law applies , the law is not fixed 
as it was at the date of commencement of the Act , with the result that 
the common law i s not stagnant and there remains room for development . 
The effect of this provision is to preserve South African statute law 
so far as it affects matters within the admiralty jurisdiction of the 
court, even if a particular matter should otherwise be determined by 
English law . 
Subsection (3) makes hearsay evidence admissible . 
Subsection (4) leaves the weight to be attached to such hearsay evidence 
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The Act defines a maritime claim as including a 
'claim for, arising out of or relating to 
marine insurance or any policy of marine 
insurance,14. The wording is necessarily wide as 
many different claims may arise under a marine 
insurance policy. Section 6 (1) of the Act thus 
determines whether English or the Roman-Dutch law 
of the Republic governs marine insurance 
contracts. 
A number of other factors are relevant to 
determine the precise sources of South African 
marine insurance law. These include some aspects 
of the history of marine insurance in Europe, 
aspects of the history of European settlement at 
the Cape of Good Hope and the subsequent history 
of the provinces which make up the Republic of 
South Africa15 • Important dates and events for 
the determination of the regime which prevails as 
the residual common law can be summarised as 
follows: 
By the end of the sixteenth century marine 
insurance was firmly established in practice in 
Section 1 (1) (iv) (u ) . 
Other factors are the sources of marine insurance law in England and 
J:I0llan~ and .local developments in judicial intezpretation of the law and 
~n leg~slat~on . These are discussed later in the text. 
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both the Netherlands and England16 . 
In the years 1598, 1600 and 1604 respectively the 
insurance ordonnances of the towns of Amsterdam, 
Middelburg and Rotterdam, all in the province of 
Holland, were passed into They were 
preceded by the two important ordonnances of 1563 
and 1570 respectively of Philip II of Spain18. In 
1631 De Groot's Inleidinge was published19 . 
In 1652 Jan van Riebeeck established a refreshment 
station for the Dutch-East India Company at the 
Cape of Good Hope and the Roman-Dutch law of the 
province of Holland became the law applicable at 
the settlement2o • From then until 1806 the Cape 
was administered and governed according to the 
Roman-Dutch law of its Dutch masters. 
In 1681 the important and influential Ordonnance 
See the discussion of the history of marine insurance in Chapter 4 
supra. 
These ordonnances were discussed in Chapter 5 supra . 
These were discussed in Chapter 5 supra and are the subject of more 
detailed analysis in Chapter 16 infra . 
Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleerdheid, (1631). 
De Wet, Die Ou Skrywers in Perspektief, (1988), 18 et seq; Hosten et al, 
Introduction to South African Law and Legal Theory, (1977), 186-194; 
Hablo and Kahn, The South. African ~egal System and its Background, 
(1973), 571-575 and 580; T]ollo Atel]ees (Edms) Bpk v Small 1949 1 SA 
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d · F 21 de la Marine of Louis XIV was passe ln rance . 
In 1721 and 1744 respectively the new insurance 
ordonnances of Rotterdam and Amsterdam became law 
in Holland22 • 
In 1795 England conquered the Cape of Good Hope. 
A Vice-Admiralty Court was created, which applied 
English admiralty law. England gave up the 
occupation in 1802, but finally took over the Cape 
in 1806. Notwithstanding that it had the power to 
impose English law on the Cape, England did not do 
so and the Roman-Dutch law already applicable at 
the Cape was preserved as the applicable law in 
terms of the principles enunciated by Lord 
Mansfield in Campbell v Hal1 23 • The English form 
of government and English institutions of 
government, including courts, were imposed. A 
short time later, 1820, large numbers of English 
settlers came from various parts of the British 
Isles and settled in the Eastern Cape. 
The ordonnance was discussed in Chapter 5 supra. Its influence was far-
rea~h~ng, . and it has been described as the most comprehensive 
cod~f~cat~on and fount of all modern marine insurance law . See Dover, 
A Handbook to Marine Insurance, 8th ed, (1975), 23 . 
See Chapter 5 supra . If Roman-Dutch law were to be the residual common 
law of South Africa in respect of marine insurance, the question arises 
whether these two ordonnances form part of that common law. 
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In 1838 the Wetboek van Koophandel (' the WvK') 
became law in the Netherlands. It contained a 
separate chapter dealing with marine insurance and 
replaced the provisions of the prior ordonnances 
on the subj ect24 • 
Between 1836 and 1840 Dutch-speaking colonists 
from the Cape settled in Natal, the Orange Free 
State and the Transvaal, and vested the Roman-
Dutch law of the Cape in those places too. While 
Natal was soon conquered by the British and was 
governed by the Governor of the Cape from 1845, 
the Roman-Dutch law applicable at the Cape was 
expressly acknowledged to apply in Nata1 25 • A 
Vice-Admiralty court was apparently also created 
for Nata1 26 • 
The Vice-Admiralty Courts Act of 1863 was enacted 
to regulate the jurisdiction of the Vice-Admiralty 
Courts. These courts were entirely separate from 
the municipal courts and applied English admiralty 
The WvK and its history were discussed in Chapter 6 supra . 
De Wet, op cit, 32-43 ; Hosten et al, op cit , 202 - 203. 
Natal was mentioned in the schedule to the Vice-Admiralty Courts Act of 
1863 as one of the colonies to which that act was to apply. See ' 
For~yth , 'Tbe Co~f!ict between modern Roman-Dutcb law and tbe law of 
Admiralty as admin~stered by Soutb African Courts ' , (1982) 99 SALJ 255 
260; Booysen, 'Admiraliteitsbowe in die SUid -Afrikaanse Reg', (1973) 36 
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law27 • 
In 1879 the General Law Amendment Act of 1879 made 
the law 'administered by the High Court of Justice 
in England' applicable to all cases , having 
reference to questions of marine insurance,28 in 
the Cape. A similar provision was enacted by the 
General Law Amendment Ordinance 5 of 1902 in 
respect of the Orange Free State after England had 
conquered the two independent republics, the 
Orange Free State and Transvaal, in 1902 29 . 
England maintained its long-standing practice, 
however, of not replacing the Roman-Dutch law 
applying in the conquered territories with her own 
law, and the Roman-Dutch law as the general common 
law was retained. The result was that Roman-Dutch 
law has continued to apply as the common law of 
all the provinces of the Republic of South Africa 
except where it was replaced by legislation30 • 
Booysen, op cit, 260 . 
For a detailed discussion of the provisions of this act, its history and 
consequences, see: Van Niekerk, The Decline , Revival and Future of 
Roman-Dutch Law of Insurance in South Africa , Monogram 3, Unisa, (1986) , 
(referred to as ' Decline' ) . 
Van Niekerk, Decline, 21 . English law also became applicable to South 
West Af r ica (now Namibia) and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) . 
Numerous examples can be given of South African statutes which have 
changed ,the common law considerably . Many of these acts were modelled 
on Engll.sh acts, for example, the various Companies Acts (1926 and 
1973), the various Criminal Procedure Acts (1917 1955 and 1977) and the 
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In 1890 the colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 
abolished the Vice-Admiralty courts and replaced 
them with Colonial Courts of Admiralty, which were 
no longer separate from the municipal courts. The 
jurisdiction previously vesting in the Vice-
Admiral ty courts was vested in the courts of 
unlimited jurisdiction in the colonies which 
previously had Vice-Admiralty courts. These 
include Natal and the Cape Colony. Although the 
staff and judicial officers of the Supreme Court 
and the Admiralty Court were the same, two 
different courts in fact existed, applying 
different laws31 , namely Roman-Dutch law and 
English law respectively32. 
In 1906 the MIA was passed in England. It changed 
the English common law in material respects, in 
particular so far as abandonment is concerned33 . 
In 1977 the act of 1879 and the ordonnance of 1902 
which made English . law applicable to marine 
insurance in the Cape and the Orange Free State 
respectively were repealed by the Pre-Union 
Booysen , op cit , 249 . 
The jurisdictional conflict between these two courts had to be addressed 
somehow, and section 7(2) of the Act was the result . 
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Statute Revision Act 43 of 197734 • 
The Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act of 1983 
thereafter consolidated the admiralty jurisdiction 
of the courts, and enacted the basis for the 
determination of the primary question in every 
h 1 1 · 35 admiralty action, namely w at aw app les . 
Until recently there was no dispute that the 
Roman-Dutch law was the residual common law 
regulating marine insurance36 • Only Staniland 
questioned the orthodox view. At first he was of 
the view that Roman-Dutch law was applicable on 
the basis that the pre-1983 South African Court of 
Admiralty did not exercise jurisdiction over 
contracts of marine insurance37 • After 
Incorporated General Insurances Ltd v Shooter t/a 
Shooter's Fisheries38 he re-stated his original 
Van Niekerk, Decline, 52-57 discusses the consequences of the repeal of 
the earlier act and ordonnance. 
Section 6 read with section 7(2) . 
See for example: Dillon & Van Niekerk , South African Maritime Law and 
Marine Insurance : Selected Topics, (1983),27; Bamford, op cit, (1983), 
337; Shooter t/a Shooter's Fisheries v Incorporated General Insurances 
Ltd 1984 4 SA 269 (D), 2721-273A; Staniland, 'Developments in South 
African Admiralty Jurisdiction and Maritime Law', 1984 Acta Juridica 
271, 275; Staniland, 'The Implementation of the Admiralty Jurisdiction 
Regulation Act in South Africa' 1985 [MeLQ 462, 466; Rycroft,' The 
"Morning Star": an Omen for the Law of Marine Insurance?', (1984) 8 
SAILJ 73; Marnewick, op cit, 95-96; Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice 
in South Africa, (1987), 4; De Jager, The Roots and Future of the South 
African Law of Marine Insurance, (1993), 7. 
, Developments in South African Admiralty Jurisdiction and Maritime Law' , 
1984 Acta Juridica 271. 
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Shooter's Fisheries38 he re-stated his original 
view on the authority of that decision of the 
. • • 39 
Appellate DlvlSlon . But then he questioned the 
applicability of Roman-Dutch law. On the one hand, 
he answered that 
'it may be argued that immediately prior to 1890 
the Admiralty Court in the Probate, Divorce and 
Admiralty Division did not exercise jurisdiction 
over contracts of marine insurance so that Roman-
Dutch law applies under s 6(1) of the 1983 
Act' .40 
On the other hand, he said that 
'it may equally be argued that the High Court of 
Admiral ty did exercise jurisdiction over contracts 
of marine insurance, that such jurisdiction was 
lost because of the prohibi tions which were issued 
against the Admiralty Court, that such 
1987 1 SA 842 (A). 
'The Implementation of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act in 
South Africa' 1985 LMCLQ 462 . 
'What is the Law to be applied to a Contract of Marine Insurance in 
Terms of Section 6(1) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 
of 1983?' (1994) SA Merc LJ 16 at 25 . An obvious typographical error in 
the quotation has been corrected. Since Staniland said that it may be 
argued that the Admiralty Court 'did not exercise jurisdiction over 
contracts of marine insurance' it follows that the remainder of the 
sentence should have read 'so that Roman-Dutch law applies under s 6(1) 
of the 1983 Act'. This error is also clear from the context of the 
paragraph as a whole where Staniland's intention was to juxtapose the 
application of Roman-Dutch law on the one hand with English law on the 
other. 
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prohibitions mayor may not have been lawful, and 
that the High Court of Justice (of which the 
Admiralty Court formed part) acquired jurisdiction 
over contracts of marine insurance prior to 1890' 
so that English law is applicable41 • He has 
recently - and finally, it seems - decided against 
the application of English law in an article which 
is yet to be published. It may therefore be 
concluded that by all accounts the Roman-Dutch law 
of the Republic is the law to be applied by virtue 
of section 6(1) of the Act . 
3. CONCLUSION 
3.1. Having concluded that the Roman-Dutch law is the 
residual common law in insurance matters in the 
Republic, it remains to determine precisely what 
the sources of that law are and to what extent 
those sources are helpful in determining the 
principles of abandonment in South African law . 
That task will be undertaken in the chapters 
dealing with the content of the inherited Roman-
Dutch law and the local development of those 
inherited principles. Before that is done, some 
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advance . 
Firstly, while South African law is referred to as 
'the Roman-Dutch law applicable in the Republic' 
in section 6(1) of the Act, it is more than just 
Roman-Dutch law. The words ' applicable in the 
Republic' make it quite clear that the Roman-Dutch 
law contemplated by the section is no longer the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century Roman-Dutch law 
of ~he province of Holland in the Netherlands, but 
the inherited Roman-Dutch law as that law has 
developed in South Africa over the last three 
hundred and forty years. Indeed, referring to 
South African law as Roman-Dutch law may be doing 
it a disservice as the suggestion inherent in the 
name Roman-Dutch law is that it is archaic, 
extraordinary and obsolete when South African law 
is in fact a modern system compatible with other 
modern legal systems42 • 
Secondly, South African law is a unique amalgam of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth century Roman-Dutch 
law of province of Holland and English law43 • The 
To what extent this holds true for marine insurance and in particular 
. the principles of abandonment will become clearer in the following 
chapters . 
On the history of South African law, see Wessels, History of the Roman-
~utch Law, (1908) ; Hahlo and Kahn, The South African Legal System and 
~ts Background, (1968) ; Van Zyl, Geskiedenis van die Romeins-Hollandse 
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influence of English law is visible in virtually 
every branch of the law, and English law is 
referred to as a helpful source of guidance so 
frequently that it no longer raises an eyebrow, 
especially in commercial cases. All but a small 
group of 'purists' on the bench and in the 
classroom accept the fact that English law is an 
important component of South African law44 . The 
influence of English law on the principles of 
abandonment in South African law will therefore 
have to be considered45 . 
Further, reliance was placed in earlier chapters 
on treatises of famous commentators like Bosco, 
Santerna, Straccha, Casaregis, Valin, Pothier, 
Emerigon, Baldasseroni, Park, Marshall and 
Phillips. It needs to be determined to what 
extent, if any, these authorities may be relied 
upon as sources of South African law on the 
subject of abandonment, over and above the 
traditional sources. 
Theory, (1977). 
Among these must be counted Professor J C de Wet, whose work, Die Ou 
Skrywt;rs .in Perspek.tief, (1988) , studiously avoids mentioning the 
contr1but10n of Engl1sh law to South African law . 
The need for such an exercise is exacerbated by the fact that English 
law was made applicable to marine insurance in the Cape of Good Hope in 
1879 and in the Orange Free State (now called the Free State) in 1902 
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Many important questions arise. What, for example, 
were the seventeenth and eighteenth century Roman-
Dutch principles of abandonment? How have those 
principles developed in South Africa since 1652? 
What role has English law played? These questions 
cannot be answered without reference to the 
sources of the Roman-Dutch law of marine insurance 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, nor 
without a review of the law in action, that is in 
the form of decisions of the courts and in the 
form of legislation, in the provinces which make 
up the Republic of South Africa46 • 
The sources . of the Roman-Dutch law of marine insurance of the province 
of Holland . ~nclude the ordo~ances of the towns and the mercantile 'us 







ROMAN-DUTCH LAW: CUSTOMARY LAW AND LEGISLATION 
INTRODUCTION 
The conclusion in the previous chapter that the 
residual cormnon law regulating marine insurance 
matters in South Africa is the Roman-Dutch 
component of South African law makes it necessary 
to identify the sources of South African marine 
insurance law and then to determine the content of 
South African law by reference to such sources. 
The relevant Roman-Dutch law is that which applied 
in the province of Holland during the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. That law may be found in 
custom, legislation, treatises and opinions. In 
this chapter the relevant customs and legislation 
will be identified and analysed in an endeavour to 
determine the basic rules and principles of 
abandonment in the early Roman-Dutch law. 
Professor J P Van Niekerk has already identified 
the principal sources of South African insurance 
law, with particular emphasis on Roman-Dutch 
authorities 1 . He described his work as an attempt 
An introduction to and some perspectives on the sources and development 
~f Roman-Dutch insurance law with appendices containing the more 
u!portant Roman-Dutch insurance legislation, monograph 5 Unisa (1988) 
(, Introduction' ) . ' , , 
640 
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'to put the principal sources of Roman-Dutch 
insurance law, namely legislation, treatises, 
decisions and opinions, and custom, in some 
perspective and to provide a general historical 
background against which they may be consul ted and 
evaluated. ,2 
By reason of Van Niekerk's pioneering work it is 
unnecessary for the purposes of this study to do 
an independent investigation into the sources of 
South African marine insurance law so far as those 
sources emanate from Roman-Dutch law. 
Nevertheless, Van Niekerk's work does not analyze 
nor evaluate the materials identified by him. That 
task will obviously have to be performed by the 
individual researcher who makes use of his 
bibliography. Van Niekerk's work is also not 
designed to identify the modern sources and 
materials which may be useful in the comparative 
process. Under the circumstances the materials 
identified by him will be used 'to provide a 
general historical background' as suggested by 
him . As a starting point, there will have to be a 
recounting of the applicable customs and 
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legislative provisions, after which the essential 
rules of abandonment which applied in the classic 
Roman-Dutch law may be distilled from the relevant 
sources. 
THE EUROPEAN JUS COMMUNE OF MARINE INSURANCE 
It was pointed out in earlier3 that a European jus 
conunune which included marine insurance principles 
had developed and was applied across the face of 
Western Europe during the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries . Whilst it is true that these mercantile 
customs and usages were reinforced by statutory 
enactments in many places, those statutes were 
seldom intended to replace the existing customs 
and usages completely except in so far as 
individual statutes or sections thereof were aimed 
at particular maipractices4 • The statutes 
themselves were not regarded as exhaustive and a 
residual common law based on the underlying 
mercantile customs and usages remained as a source 
of the laws. 
Chapter 4 supra. 
Van Niekerk, Introduction , 36 . 
Even the Marine Insurance Act 1906 ('the MIA') has not resulted in a 
complete codification of English mercantile custom relating to marine 
insurance and the English courts have fallen back on the underlying 
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During the fifteenth century the insurance law as 
practised at Bruges in what is now Belgium was 
still exclusively unwritten customary law although 
legislation on insurance matters which had already 
been passed in Italy and Spain might have had some 
influence on the established principles of 
customary insurance law as applied by merchants 
and the courts at Bruges6. The treatises of two of 
the earliest authors on the subject of insurance, 
Santerna7 and Straccha8, appeared in 1552 and 
1569 respectively9. Other notable treatises which 
concentrated on mercantile custom rather than 
statutory law were published in the seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries by Scaccia10 , 
Ansaldis11 , Casaregis12 and ROCCUS13 , but by 
subjects not covered by it. Section 91 (2) of the MIA specifically 
preserved the 'rules of the common law including the law merchant' to 
the extent that they are not inconsistent with the MIA. 
Van Niekerk, Introduction, 13 . 
Tractatus de Assecurationibus et Sponsionibus Mercatorum, (1552). 
Tractatus de Assecurationibus et Proxenetis, (1569) . 
Johannes Voet , Commentari us ad Pandectas, (1698-1704), 22.2.3. 
identified Santerna and Straccha as sources of the Roman-Dutch law of 
marine.i~surance of his time. This is an example of the ease with which 
aut~or1~1es from across national boundaries were accepted in respect of 
mar1ne 1nsurance. 
Tractatus de Commerciis et Cambio , (1619). 
be Commercio et Mercatura Discursus Legales, (1689) . 
Discursus Legales et Commercio , (1707) . 
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that time legislation had taken its place next to 
mercantile custom as a source of marine insurance 
law. 
However, it is ln two compilations of the 
mercantile customs and usages relating to marine 
insurance that the bulk of marine insurance law of 
the sixteenth century is to be found. These were 
the Guidon de la Mer and the 1582 version of the 
Coutumes d'Anvers, the Customs and Usages of the 
Antwerp Insurance Exchange. While both were 
written documents, neither was a statutory 
enactment. Nevertheless, both the Guidon de la Mer 
and the Customs and Usages of the Antwerp Exchange 
exercised great influence on insurance practice 
and subsequent legislation14 . 
THE GUIDON DE LA MER 
The Guidon de la Mer emanated from Rouen in 
northern France15 • It was probably compiled by a 
committee of merchants setting out to record the 
That influence was also felt in jurisdictions far beyond northern France 
and Antwerp so that the customary law contained in these two documents 
acquired a life i ndependent of their wri tten components . 
While the written document later surfaced in the seventeenth century 
the Guid~n dates back to between 1556 and 1584. Van Niekerk: 
Introduct~on , 60 fn 146; Pardessus, Collection de Lois Maritimes 
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applicable principles of their customary law in 
writing. It is most unlikely that these customs 
were of local application only. Indeed, having 
regard to the close proximity of the other 
northern European trading centres
16 and the 
subsequent acceptance elsewhere17 of the Guidon 
as a source of the common law of merchants, it can 
safely be accepted that the Guidon faithfully 
recorded the customary law of marine insurance 
applying in northern Europe at that time, namely 
the second half of the sixteenth century. 
The Gui don deal t with marine insurance in fine 
detail. The chapter18 on abandonment alone 
contained twelve sections, the first of which not 
only defined abandonment 19 but also enumerated 
the cases in which it was available to an 
assured20 • The Guidon contained several 
Like Bruges, Antwerp, Amsterdam and even London and Hamburg. 
In England and America, for instance . 
Chapter VII. See Pardessus, op cit, Vol II, 400 et seq. 
' ... quitter et delaisser ses droits, noms, raisons et actions de la 
propriete qu' il a en la merchandise chargee, dont il est asseure 
... ' (' ... to quit and abandon the rights, titles, claims and actions of 
ownership which he has in the cargo laden on board and insured.') 
, ... naufrage du toute ou de partie, ou bien avarie qui excede ou 
endommage la ~oitie de la merchandise, quand il y a prise ou d'ennemis, 
arr~st de pr~nce, ou tel autre destourbier en la navigation, ou teIIe 
~~rence e~ la merchandise, qu'il n'y ait moyen l'avoir fait naviger 
a son dern~er reste, ou qu'eIIe ne valust Ie fret ou peu de chose 
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substanti ve abandonment provisions. The Guidon 
made it clear from the outset that the assured had 
the right to abandon, not an obligation to do 
S021. The Guidon also contained a missing ship 
provision. If a year and a day elapsed from the 
date of departure with no news being received of 
the ship, the ship was taken to have been lost at 
sea, and the custom was that the assured could 
abandon22. In respect of certain long voyages the 
period was increased by six months23 . 
The Guidon specifically provided that, if the 
missing ship should re-appear, the insurer would 
be entitled to every part saved, including the 
profits of the voyage, and the assured was 
expressly excluded from claiming any portion24. 
This provision arguably meant that the abandonment 
transferred ownership of the abandoned merchandize 
exceeds half the value of the merchandize, when there is a capture by 
enemies, an arrest by a prince, or such other disturbance of the voyage 
or such deterioration of (damage to) the goods (cargo) that it is not 
possible to forward them to their destination or not worth the freight 
or of little advantage . ') 
Article 1 . 
It is significant that the missing ship was treated as a case of a 
presumed loss, as that is the way the missing ship was dealt with in 
Roman-Dutch law and is still dealt with in English law. 
Article 12; see Pardessus, op cit, Vol I, 404. 
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to the insurer25 . However, the Guidon went on to 
record that there was a difference of opinion 
about the question whether the abandonment alone 
was sufficient to enable the insurer to pursue the 
, d h' 26 sh1P or goo s as 1S own . 
The formal requirements for an abandonment were 
set out in the Guidon in some detail. (a) In the 
first place, the assured was required to make his 
decision without delay once he had received 
reliable news of the casualty. He also had to 
furnish the insurer with information about the 
cargo and the bills of lading, and had to give 
proof of the arrest or loss. This notice had to be 
given through the registrar of insurance27 • (b) 
The notice of abandonment had to be served by a 
royal sergeant, the registrar of insurance or a 
notary, and had to be served at the domicile of 
According to Pardessus , op cit , Vol IV, 378 fn 3 this prov~s~on of the 
Guidon was the forerunner of article 60 of the ordonnance de la Marine 
of 1681, which provided that the goods 'belonged' to the insurer after 
the notification of the abandonment. 
Article 2. Pardessus, op cit, Vol I, 401 fn 2 ascribes this difference 
of opinion to a lack of understanding of the theory of abandonment . He 
pointed out that one had to look at the common law for an explanation 
of the advantages of the transfer which occurs by way of the 
abandonment. The theory was that the contract of insurance did not 
result in the sale of the goods insured to the insurer . However, one 
could not transfer ownership of the goods except by an act of transfer; 
so the insurer had to have a mandate ('procuration') from the assured 
to be able to dispose of the thing insured after the abandonment . 
Eventually, Pardessus pointed out, custom simplified this process with 
the result that the declaration of abandonment was now taken to vest 
ownership of the abandoned things in the insurer . 
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the insurers28 . It is clear that the Guidon 
envisaged that the assured had to give two 
different kinds of notices to the insurer . The 
first was a notification of the casualty while the 
second was the abandonment itself29. 
THE CUSTOMS AND USAGES OF THE ANTWERP EXCHANGE 
The other collection of customs and usages which 
existed in northern Europe in the second half of 
the sixteenth century was that of the Antwerp 
Insurance Exchange. Although it is certain that 
these customs and usages were being observed 
already in 1563 30 , they have been preserved in 
writing only in a 1582 compilation. This 
collection was not as detailed as the Guidon de la 
Mer and appears to have dealt only with specific 
matters in order to record peculiar rules of the 
Antwerp Exchange. 
Article 3. 
The distinction has been maintained in virtually all subsequent marine 
insurance legis l ation. 
It is known that these customs and usages of the Antwerp Exchange must 
have been fi.rm,ly entrench:d in Antwerp before 1563 already because in 
~hat year Ph~l~p II of Spa~n promulgated an ordonnance which dealt with 
~nsurance (~n Chapter VII) and provided (in article 2) that all 
~nsurances on goods and merchant ships had to be done in accordance with 
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Article 14 of the 1582 compilation provided that 
the assured was entitled to abandon the ship or 
goods insured to the insurer in the event that the 
insured ship had become innavigable, or that the 
ship or goods had been captured or taken by 
enemies, and in similar cases31 • In such a case 
the insurer was obI iged to pay the sum insured 
within three months from the notice of 
abandonment32 • Article 7 provided that, if the 
insured ship or goods were missing for a period of 
a year and a day without news, (if the ship was 
engaged on a voyage in the waters of Europe or 
Barbary (Turkey) or on a voyage of similar 
distance), the ship and goods would be presumed to 
be lost. For longer voyages the period was two 
years. The assured would then be entitled to claim 
the sum insured by giving notice to the 
insurers33 • The customs of the Antwerp Exchange 
did not elaborate on the formalities for the 
abandonment, nor what the proprietary consequences 
'in deBe ende ghelycke ghevallen' , which suggests that abandonment was 
allo~ed in cases which had the same effect, notwithstanding that the 
prec~se cause was not defined, so long as the cause fell within the 
risks insured against. 
'na d'intimatie'. What precisely was meant by 'intimatie' is not 
cert~in, but it would appear that more than mere notification was 
requ~red , probably a formal notice of demand coupled with an offer by 
the assured to relinquish his rights in and to the insured ship or 
goods . 
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of a proper abandonment were . It is more likely 
than not that these aspects did not require 
regulation and were therefore were left to the 
underlying mercantile custom . 
The status and importance of the customs and 
usages of the Antwerp Exchange are evident from 
their subsequent incorporation in legislation on 
insurance34 • The 1563 Ordonnance of Philip II of 
Spain referred to them. His 1570 Ordonnance 
expressly required the insurance to be in 
accordance with the customs and usages of the 
Antwerp Exchange35 . 
It is thus apparent that there was a strong body 
of customary law applicable not only in the 
Netherlands but in northern Europe in the second 
half of the sixteenth century . In the Netherlands 
this customary law formed the basis of the 
statutory law which was introduced by the Spain at 
that time. 
'The unwritten Antwerp customary law still formed the more important 
part and underlying basis of the insurance law' at the time of the 1563 
Ordonnance of Philip II; Van Niekerk, Introduction , 43 . 
The 1570 Ordonnance ' contained a detailed treatment of insurance law in 
36 sections as well as a model policy form in which reference was made 
t~ the underlying' . usages and customs of the Antwerp Exchange; Van 
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THE SPANISH ORDONNANCES 
The common law or law merchant of marine insurance 
was built upon by a number of statutory enactments 
spanning the period from 1850 to the eventual 
codification of the marine insurance law of the 
Netherlands in the Wetboek van Koophandel (' the 
WvK') of 1838. Initially the statutes dealing with 
marine insurance were not intended to, nor did 
they, regulate marine insurance comprehensively. 
They also did not replace the underlying customary 
law36 • The Spanish legislation37 was drafted by 
Spanish lawyers operating under the influence of 
the Barcelona ordonnances and other Spanish 
ordonnances38 • These draftsmen must have been 
familiar with the concept of abandonment and the 
problem of the ship which disappeared without 
news, as these subjects were dealt with in some 
detail in the ordonnances which had previously 
been passed in the Spanish towns. They must also 
aware of the customary law already in place, 
especially that of the Antwerp Exchange. It is 
Van Niekerk, Introduction, 36. 
All statutes will be referred to as 'ordonnances', notwithstanding the 
logic of Van Niekerk's scheme of referring to the Spanish statutes as 
'placcaaten' and the Dutch municipal statutes as 'keuren' . 
These were reviewed in relation to the history and development of 
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clear from the manner with which they dealt with 
the subject of abandonment that they were content 
to leave it to be determined by customary law. 
THE 1563 ORDONNANCE OF PHILIP II 
On the 31st October 1563 Philip II of Spain 
promulgated an ordonnance which applied to all the 
Spanish possessions in the Low Countries39 . This 
ordonnance was still not a complete regulation of 
marine insurance law, but was aimed at specific 
malpractices40 . Whilst the ordonnance contained 
no direct abandonment provisions, it made the 
customs of the Antwerp Exchange and the model 
policy conditions contained in the ordonnance 
itself compulsory41. The ordonnance also 
contained a missing ship provision to the effect 
that any assured who wished to rely on the 
particular custom of the Antwerp Exchange relating 
to the missing ship42, had to prove that the ship 
It was not the first Spanish Ordonnance to apply to the Low Countries. 
Earlier ordonnances dated back to 1458, 1537, 1549 and 1551 
respectively. See Van Niekerk, Introduction, 36-41. 
Van Niekerk, Introduction, 42-43 . 
Title VII, article 2. 
~ich wa~ to the effect that the insurer was obliged to pay the sum 
~nsured ~f no news was received of the ship and goods for a period of 
a year and a day from the date of the policy. 
652 
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and goods still existed at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract43 • 
The provisions of the 1563 ordonnance are 
important for a number of reasons . Firstly, it 
would appear from the absence of detailed 
provisions on the subj ect of insurance in the 
ordonnance that the bulk of the law was still to 
be found in custom whilst the ordonnance itself 
was designed only to deal with the few matters in 
respect of which the legislator wished to make 
specific provision . Secondly, it is thus apparent 
that the Antwerp Exchange already had a we~l known 
set of customs in place in 1563. Therefore, whilst 
the ordonnance of 1563 did not contain any 
specific abandonment provisions, one would have to 
revert to the underlying customary law to 
ascertain what principles applied at the time. 
Ar ticle 5 . This provi sion was necessary to deal with the malpractice of 
insuring ships or goods on a ' lost or not lost' basis when by reason of 
an event preceding the conclusion of the contract the assured no longer 
ha~ an interest in the ship or goods when the contract was concluded . 
Th~s clearly offended the indemnity p r inciple and reduced the insurance 
to a mere wager . Bynkershoek referred to article 5 of the ordonnance in 
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THE 1570 ORDONNANCE OF PHILIP II 
In 1569 the Duke of Alva placed a complete 
insurance prohibition on the conclusion of 
contracts44 • This placed insurance business at 
Antwerp at risk, and eventually the Duke relented 
and repealed the prohibition in an ordonnance 
which was not acceptable to the Antwerp merchants. 
On the 20th January, 1571 the Duke published the 
reworded ordonnance which is known as the 
Ordonnance of Philip II of Spain of 157045 • The 
1570 ordonnance applied to all the provinces of 
the Netherlands which were then possessions of 
Spain. 
The 1570 ordonnance dealt with insurance in thirty 
six sections, but was still not a comprehensive 
ordonnance on the topic. Article 34 of the 
ordonnance made a prescribed form of policy 
compulsory. This policy provided that the 
insurance was subject to the provisions of the 
ordonnance itself and to the usages and customs of 
the Antwerp Exchange which were not contrary to 
Van Niekerk, Introduction, 44. 
Although published on 20 January 1571 it was known as the 1570 
ordonnance because the new year was then taken to commence at Easter; 
Van Niekerk, Introduction, 37 fn 84 . 
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the ordonnance itself. Thus, as was the case with 
the ordonnance of 1563, the underlying customs and 
usage of the Antwerp Exchange were recognized and 
made applicable. 
Article 15 of the ordonnance provided that if a 
foreign king, prince or potentate confiscated the 
ship or if the ship became innavigable and 
incapable of completing its voyage, then the 
assured was obliged to wait for six months before 
he could pursue payment under the policy. During 
that period the assured was also obliged to 
transfer the goods onto another ship to carry them 
to their destination. If the assured did not 
tranship the goods, the insurer would be entitled 
to do so. In all these cases the insurer had to 
bear the cost of the transhipment as well as any 
damages resulting from the arrest46 • 
Article 16 provided that the assured was not 
obliged to wait for the effluxion of the period of 
six months if the goods insured were perishables 
such as wine, fruit, grain and other specified 
It,will b~c~me apparent in the discussion of subsequent legislation that 
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goods. In such a case the assured could pursue his 
action forthwith as he deemed advisable47 . 
Article 23 of the ordonnance provided that when 
the ship had been arrested, taken or laid under 
embargo by kings, princes or potentates, and there 
remained hope to recover the same, the assured had 
to wait six months from the date of the taking or 
embargo before he could recover payment48 if the 
port of destination was in Europe or Barbary, 
(Turkey) but if the ship was destined for the 
Indies or to a port outside the limits of Europe 
or Barbary, the term was extended to one year. In 
the meantime the insurers had to provide security 
by way of bailor pledge for payment of the 
insured sum. If the goods were lost or damaged for 
certain, or without hope of recovery, the insurers 
had three months in which to pay the insured sum, 
calculated from the date of a properly executed 
notification of the loss or damages49 • 
This principle was maintained in subsequent legislation . 
A distinction was thus drawn by implication between arrests by a power 
who could ~e persuade~ to release the ship and a power who was unlikely 
to enterta~n such an ~dea, basically between friendly and enemy states. 
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Article 23 of the 1570 ordonnance referred to an 
'inthimatie, notificatie oft certificatie vande 
schade oft verlies, hen behoorlicken gedaen sal 
wesen'. It appears that formal notification of 
some sort was required before the assured could 
recover the loss . Not only is it clear that the 
underlying requirements for the notice to be given 
by the assured before he could claim under the 
policy were contained in the customs of the 
Antwerp Exchange and even the underlying customary 
law, but the words used, namely 'inthimatie, 
notificatie oft certificatie' in general meaning 
echo the words 'intimare, notificare et 
denuntiare' of the Savona Ordonnance of 1503 5°. 
These articles of the 1570 ordonnance do not refer 
to abandonment directly, nor to the case of the 
missing ship. One must therefore assume that the 
underlying customary law still regulated 
abandonment, as it did many other insurance 
matters. The provisions of articles 15, 16 and 23 
do, however, give some indication of some general 
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principles which applied to abandonment cases at 
that time51 • 
There used to be some· dispute as to whether these 
two Spanish ordonnances continued to be applicable 
in the Roman-Dutch law of the province of 
Holland52 • Bynkershoek53 laid this dispute to 
rest, however, answering the question in the 
affirmative54 . The 1563 and 1570 ordonnances of 
Philip II of Spain must therefore be considered as 
the basic statutory instruments from which the 
South African principles of marine insurance and 
of abandonment are to be established. 
THE FIRST ROUND OF DUTCH ORDONNANCES 
When Spain lost its grip on the northern provinces 
of the Netherlands, the towns involved in trading 
regained their independence in mercantile matters 
and commenced to regulate commercial activities 
within their jurisdictions in accordance with 
Articles 15, 16 and 23 of the 1570 ordonnance were referred to by Van 
der Keessel, Praelectiones 3.24.12 at 1~66-1467 and Van Zurek, Codex 
Batavus, 2nd ed, (1727), paragraphs 17 and 20. 
See Van Niekerk, Introduction, 54 and the authorities there referred to. 
Quaestiones Juris Privati 4.1. 
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their ancient legislative privileges55 . There was 
immediately a movement away from the strict 
regulatory approach of the Spanish lawmakers to a 
more liberal one. Mercantile customs and usages 
were left undisturbed, and in many cases they were 
given additional force by being taken up in the 
local ordonnances. However, until the advent of 
the WvK in 1838, the local insurance ordonnances 
of the Dutch towns were still aimed, generally, at 
particular malpractices56 . 
When the towns started legislating for themselves, 
small differences became apparent, but the main 
principles remained the same nevertheless. The 
legislative process of the towns built upon the 
existing Spanish legislation and customary law 
which applied throughout Holland to become the 
common law of the whole province57 • Thus the 
Roman-Dutch law of marine insurance was created 
out of these three main components, the underlying 
mercantile customs and usages, the Spanish 
legislation and the local ordonnances of the Dutch 
towns. 
Van Niekerk, Introduction, 52 . 
Van Niekerk, Introduction, 52 . 
Van Niekerk, Introduction, 56 - 57. 
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THE AMSTERDAM ORDONNANCE OF 1598 
On 31 January 1598 the town fathers of the port of 
Amsterdam broke away from the Spanish mould and 
promulgated their own ordonnance 'gemaeckt op't 
stuck vande Asseurantie' . The ordonnance contained 
two model policies, a cargo policy and a hull 
policy. The customs of the Antwerp Exchange were 
no longer referred to in the ordonnance nor in the 
draft policies, probably because Amsterdam had by 
then taken over the insurance business which had 
previously been conducted at Antwerp and in the 
process also the customs and usages of the Antwerp 
Exchange. 
Article 8 of the ordonnance provided for the 
abandonment of the ship or goods. If any foreign 
king, prince, potentate or ruler captured, 
detained or arrested the insured ship or goods, 
whether there was hope of recovering them or not, 
the assured was entitled to abandon the ship or 
goods to the insurer. Likewise, he was entitled to 
abandon the ship or goods in so far as the ship 
became unfit and incapable of completing the 
voyage. However, in such cases the abandonment 
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had elapsed from the date when notice had been 
given by the assured through his broker or some 
other public person to the insurers at the place 
where the majority of them were domiciled. If the 
capture, detention or arrest occurred outside the 
waters of Europe or Barbary, the period was 
extended to one year. The assured was entitled to 
require security from the insurer . Article 9 
provided that the periods of six months or one 
year would not apply if the goods insured were 
perishable. 
Article 25 provided that the assured could abandon 
the ship or goods forthwith if the ship became 
innavigable or if the ship or goods were captured 
or taken by enemies or were otherwise damaged or 
lost for certain without hope of recovery. In such 
a case the insurers had to pay the sum insured 
within three months after 'de inthimatie van 
dien' . 
Article 5 of the 1598 ordonnance specifically 
enacted the principle of the custom of the Antwerp 
Exchange which was mentioned in Article 5 of the 
1563 Ordonnance of Phillip II. It provided that 
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for a period of a year and a day (in European and 
Turkish waters or thereabouts) would be presumed 
to be lost. In respect of more distant sailings 
the period was to be two years . Article 5 further 
provided that the assured was entitled to claim 
payment of the sum insured three months after 
giving notice to the insurer (' doen 
inthimatien') 58. 
Article 28 of the ordonnance required the assured 
to give notice to the majority of the insurers at 
the place where the contract was concluded of any 
intelligence he received of any casualty, arrest 
or loss affecting the insured ship or goods. This 
information had to be provided through brokers or 
other public persons who had to keep a note of the 
notice. It is clear that the ordonnance provided 
for two kinds of notices. The first was a notice 
of all intelligence pertaining to the insured ship 
or goods which related to the possibility of a 
claim . The second kind of notice was the actual 
notice of a claim arising from an event insured 
against. In the latter case the notice naturally 
had to be in the form of an abandonment as the 
Pardessus , op cit , Vol IV, 124 translated , intbimati en , as ']a 
denonc~ati~n', ~hi~h conveys the impression of an offer by the assured 






Part v: Chapter 16 : Roman-Dutch law : custom & Legislation 
assured could only claim the full sum insured 
against an abandonment of his rights in the 
subject matter of the insurance. 
The Amsterdam Ordonnance of 1598 therefore 
provided for three separate cases . In the first 
place the assured could abandon immediately in the 
case of perishables and in the case of certain 
losses where the loss was final and certain. In 
the second category of cases where there was some 
possibility of recovery, the assured had to wait 
six months or two years, depending on the 
destination, before he was entitled to abandon. In 
the third instance, the missing ship was deemed to 
be lost and the assured allowed to recover the sum 
insured after six months or two years, again 
depending on the destination . 
THE MIDDELBURG ORDONNANCE OF 1600 
The provisions of the Amsterdam Ordonnance of 1598 
were copied by Middelburg in 1600 with effect from 
30 September 1600. The articles were numbered 
differently but the substance was the same59 . 
Articles 5, 8, 9, 25 and 28 of the Amsterdam Ordonnance of 1598 became 
articles 12, 15, 16, 26 and 21 respectively of the Middelburg Ordonnance 
of 1600 . 
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Flessingen copied the Middelburg Ordonnance 
16616 0 • 
THE ROTTERDAM ORDONNANCE OF 1604 
in 
On 12 March 1604 Rotterdam promulgated its own 
insurance ordonnance. It dealt with the subject of 
abandonment logically, concisely and 
comprehensively . 
Article 12 gave the assured the right to abandon 
the ship or goods forthwith in the case of 
innavigability of the ship, or if the ship or 
goods were taken by enemies or pirates, were laid 
under arrest or were otherwise damaged or lost 
beyond hope of recovery. However, if the ship or 
goods were laid under arrest or detained by any 
kings, princes or rulers of Europe, Barbary or the 
Canary Islands, or at any nearer place, where 
there was hope of recovery, the assured had to 
wait six months before he could abandon after 
giving notice through a public person to the 
majority of insurers . And if the event occurred 
outside Europe, Barbary or the Canary Islands, the 
assured had to wait for a year before he could 
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claim the sum insured. Nevertheless, if the goods 
were perishable, the assured did not have to wait 
for the effluxion of the prescribed period but 
could claim the sum insured immediately. 
Article 14 provided for the case of the missing 
ship which could be abandoned if no news were 
received of her for a year and a day after 
sailing, if the destiny was in European, Turkish 
or Canary Island waters and two years if the 
sailing was to a more distant place. Whereas 
neither the Amsterdam of 1598 nor the Middelburg 
Ordonnance of 1600 provided expressly for the 
abandonment of the missing ship or the goods on 
her, the Rotterdam Ordonnance made it clear in its 
article 14 that the missing ship or the cargo on 
her had to be abandoned to the insurer when the 
sum insured was claimed. 
If the ship became innavigable or was arrested 
prior to completion of the voyage, and the goods 
on board were not arrested or lost together with 
the ship, the assured was obliged to tranship the 
cargo onto another ship and the risk continued 
whilst the goods were being carried on such ship. 
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transhipment and any damage to the goods, 
including additional freight. 
Article 15 provided that the abandonment had to be 
made in writing and through a public person . The 
sum insured could only be claimed three months 
after such abandonment . 
THE BASIC RULES OF ABANDONMENT 
5.1. At this stage in the development of the Roman-
Dutch law of marine insurance, that is after the 
first round of ordonnances was promulgated in the 
most important port towns of Holland, some 
important aspects or principles of abandonment are 
already identifiable. However, it is important for 
a proper understanding of the content of the right 
to abandon in Roman-Dutch law, and consequently 
South African law, to keep two facts clearly in 
mind. 
5.1.1. The first is that the customs and usages of the 
Antwerp Exchange allowed the assured to abandon in 
the specific cases mentioned as well as 'ghelycke 
ghevallen' . This means that the causes giving rise 
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customary law were not regarded as a numerus 
clausus. Understanding this fact allows one to 
understand that the specific cases referred to in 
the customs of the Antwerp Exchange and also in 
the subsequent local ordonnances of the towns were 
not intended to be a complete and exclusive list 
of such causes. They served rather as examples in 
respect of which particular provisions were 
thought necessary by the legislature61 . 
The second important fact is that the local 
legislatures of the towns did not intend to deal 
with all the substantive aspects of abandonment. 
Some of these the legislatures were content to 
leave to the underlying customary law and to the 
parties to the contract. The proprietary 
consequences of an abandonment is one of the cases 
where the local ordonnances did not make any 
provisions at all . This does not mean that 
abandonment in the Netherlands did not have the 
same proprietary consequences as elsewhere. It 
A proper understanding of this fact allows one also to recognize the 
clo~e links be.tween South African law and English law on this particular 
subJect . Eng11sh law also does not require the loss giving rise to the 
abandonment to have been caused by one of a narrowly defined set of 
events. In this respect the Roman-Dutch law of the time, that is the 
seventeenth century, appears to be more closely related to English law 
than to French or German law . This was probably the result of the 
influence which the Antwerp Insurance Exchange had on practice at both 
Amsterdam and London. For an historical review of the relationship 
between Antwerp and London in early insurance practice see Holdsworth 
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merely means that one has to go into the 
underlying customary law to ascertain what those 
consequences were. 
The basic principles or rules of abandonment may 
now be extracted from the recorded customary law 
as contained in the Guidon de la Mer, the 1582 
version of the customs and usages of the Antwerp 
Exchange, the Spanish ordonnances of 1563 and 
1570, and the first round of local ordonnances of 
Amsterdam, Middelburg and Rot terdam62 • These 
rules constitute the general principles of 
abandonment which were applicable in the province 
of Holland in the middle of the seventeenth 
century and would thus constitute the basic 
principles of abandonment inherited by South 
African law from the province of Holland. These 
rules are arranged in what follows in the same 
pattern as that adopted in respect of the 
discussion of Dutch, German, French and English 
and American law in Chapters 6 to 10. 
In the process of distilling the abandonment principles from these 
sources the Guidon de la Mer will be relied upon as the residual source 
or backup only if the Customs of the Antwerp Exchange, the Spanish 
ordonn~ces and Dutch ordonnances are silent on a particular point, as 
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THE CIRCUMSTANCES GIVING RISE TO THE RIGHT TO 
ABANDON 
RULE 1: The assured was entitled but not obliged 
to abandon when the circumstances penni tted an 
abandonmen t . 
This rule follows the principle enunciated 
expressly in article 1 of Chapter VII of the 
Guidon de la Mer, where it was put as follows: 'Le 
delais n' est de necessi te, mais depend de la 
volonte du marchand chargeur ... ,63. According to 
article 14 of the customs of the Antwerp Exchange 
'vennach de gheassureerde het gheassureert schip 
oft goed t'abandoneren . .. , which indicates 
equally that abandonment was a right vesting in 
the assured and not an obligation . 
RULE 2: If the assured elected to abandon, he was 
allowed to recover the full amount of the 
insurance provided he first made a proper 
abandonment of the ship or goods, as the case may 
be, to the insurer64 • 
('The abandonment is not compulsory but depends on the wish of the cargo 
owner . .. ' ) 
Antwerp customs, articles 14 and 15; 1570 Ordonnance , article 23; 
Amsterdam, art~cles 5, 8 and 25; Middelburg, articles 12, 15 and 26; 
Rotterdam, art1cle 15. 
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Two aspects of the rule require to be mentioned. 
Firstly, it is apparent from the customs of the 
Antwerp Exchange and all the relevant ordonnances 
that only the ship or cargo insured could be 
abandoned. Secondly, the purpose of the rule was 
to prevent a double- or over-recovery on the part 
of the assured. The rule therefore protected the 
indemnity principle. 
RULE 3(a): In the case of capture of the ship or 
goods insured by the enemy or by pirates, in the 
case of innavigabili tyE5 (' onseylbaarheid' ), and 
in any other case where the ship or goods were 
lost for certain wi thout hope of recovery, the 
assured was entitled to make an immediate 
abandonmen t 66 • 
Unlike a detention by a foreign ruler who was not 
an enemy, an enemy or pirates would not be likely 
to give up the captured ship or goods. In 
international law the enemy may even acquired 
ownership of the ship or goods by the capture67 • 
Innavigability in the context of marine insurance means that the ship 
is absolutely irreparable or cannot be repaired where she is for want 
of money or material . The latter is known as relative innavigability. 
Antwerp customs , article 14 ; Amsterdam, article 25; Middelburg , article 
26; Rotterdam, article 15. 
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The loss was therefore regarded as certain and 
final as soon as the capture had occurred. In the 
case of innavigability a similar situation arose 
by virtue of the fact that the ship was incapable 
of being made seaworthy again, and the loss was 
therefore again certain and final. There was thus 
no purpose in delaying the exercise of the right 
to abandon in these and any other case where the 
loss was certain and final . 
RULE 3 {b}: If the goods insured were of such a 
nature that they would be likely to perish with 
the mere effluxion of time, detention by a foreign 
ruler (not an enemy) and unfitness of the ship to 
continue on the contemplated voyage gave rise to 
an immediate right to abandon in respect of such 
goods68 • 
There was no purpose in delaying the exercise of 
the right to abandon in such cases because the 
delay brought about by the detention or the 
repairs would result in a certain and final loss 
in any event69 • 
1570 Ordonnance , article 16; Amsterdam, article 9 ; Middelburg , article 
16; Rotterdam, article 12 . 
Unfitness apparently differed from innavigability in that the ship was 
del~yed but cou:d still be repaired . Delay was, of course, fatal to 
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RULE 4 (a): In the case of detention by foreign 
rulers who were not enemies and in the case of 
supervening unfitness or inability of the ship to 
complete the contemplated voyage, the assured was 
entitled to abandon the insured ship or goods, as 
the case may be, after the expiry of a prescribed 
period, which ran from the date of the 
notification referred to in Rule 670 • 
The reason for the delay of the right to abandon 
until the prescribed period had elapsed is 
immediately apparent. So far as the detained ship 
or goods were concerned, there was always a 
possibility that the foreign ruler would relent 
and release the ship or goods. So far as the unfit 
or damaged ship was concerned, she could be 
perhaps be repaired to complete the voyage, albeit 
after some delay. When the prescribed period had 
elapsed without recovery or such repairs as to 
make the ship seaworthy again, the loss became 
definite and certain and the assured obtained the 
right to abandon. As in the case of the missing 
ship, the purpose of the prescribed period was 
The . requirement of notice was dealt with separately; 1570 Ordonnance, 
art7cle 23 ; Amsterdam, article 8 ; Middelburg, article 15 · Rotterdam art~cles 12 and 13. ' , 
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thus to obtain a measure of certainty of the fact 
of an indemnifiable loss. 
RULE 4(b) : During the relevant waiting period the 
assured was entitled to tranship the goods at the 
expense and risk of the insurer. The insurer was 
entitled to tranship himself, if the assured did 
not do so, in which event the insurer was liable 
only for the costs of transhipment and the actual 
damage suffered in respect of the cargo as a 
result of the arrest or unfitness71 • 
The assured's right to tranship together with the 
insurers' right to do so if he did not ensured 
that appropriate action was taken to minimise the 
loss. 
RULE 4(c): During the relevant period the assured 
was enti tled to demand securi ty for payment of the 
insured amount from the insurer72 • 
Since insurers in those days were often individual 
merchants and not necessarily financially strong, 
the assured was allowed to safeguard his own 
Amsterdam, article 8; Middelburg, article 15 ; Rotterdam, article 13. 
Amsterdam, article 8; Middelburg , article 15; Rotterdam, article 12 . 
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position during the period of delay between making 
his claim and the date for payment by obtaining 
security. 
RULE 5: The ship of which no news was received for 
a specified period was presumed to be lost after 
the expiry of the prescribed period and the 
assured was thereupon allowed to claim the full 
amount of the insurance in respect of the ship 
(and the goods carr i ed on her73 ) upon making an 
abandonment14 • 
The purpose of the prescribed period was to obtain 
certainty, by way of presumption, of the fact of 
an indemnifiable loss . The requirement of an 
abandonment in such a case was to protect the 
indemnity principle. 
THE SUBSIDIARY RULES OF ABANDONMENT 
RULE 6: The assured was obliged to notify the 
majority of the insurers who were domiciled at the 
The ord~nnances did not specifically state what was to happen in respect 
of the ~nsured goods on board the missing ship . Scheltinga later pointed 
o~t that the presumption also operated in respect of such goods. See the 
d~scussion of Scheltinga's contribution in the text in the next chapter . 
Antwerp customs, article 7; Amsterdam, article 5; Middelburg, article 
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place where the contract was concluded of any 
casual ty, arrest or loss affecting the insured 
ship or goods. The notification had to be made 
through a broker or public person who had to keep 
a record of the notification given. Where the 
abandonment could not be made forthwith, time did 
not begin to run until this notification had been 
served75 • 
The purpose of this rule was to enable the 
insurers to assess their position and to take such 
steps as were available to safeguard their own 
interests. The notice was regarded as serious 
enough to warrant formal service through a public 
official and the maintenance of a public record of 
the information given to the insurers regarding 
the casualty. 
RULE 7: The abandonment had to be made in writing 
and had to be served formally through a public 
official whose duties included the service of such 
formal documents and processes76 • 
Amsterdam, article 28 read with article 8; Middelburg, article 21 read 
with article 15; Rotterdam, article 16. The officer entrusted with this 
task differed from town to town , but was a public official. 
Amsterdam, article 8; Middelburg, article 15; Rotterdam, article 15 . Who 
this official was differed from town to town. 
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When the importance of the consequences of the 
abandonment is considered, there was clearly a 
need for formality and certainty in the 
abandonment process. (The time for payment began 
to run with the service of the notice of 
abandonment and the abandonment also had the 
effect that certain rights vested in the insurer.) 
This rule thus served the purpose of making the 
abandonment part of the public and recorded 
procedure. 
5.5. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ABANDONMENT 
5 . 5.1. 
77 
RULE 8: The insurer was obliged to pay the sum 
insured after the expiry of a prescribed 
period77 • 
This was probably not merely a formal recording of 
the insurer's obligation to pay. The delay for the 
obligation to pay to mature may well have been 
designed to give the insurer an opportunity to 
obtain the release of sufficient funds from his 
other ventures to enable him to pay the sum 
insured . 
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RULE 9: The effect of the abandonment was that the 
assured relinquished his rights in relation to the 
ship or goods insured in favour of the insurer, 
who acquired ownership by operation of law.
78 
It was pointed out in Chapter 14 supra that the 
process of transferring ownership to the insurer 
required two separate legal acts. The first was 
the abandonment in favour of the insurer by means 
of which the assured offered to relinquish 
ownership, not against the world at large, but 
vis-a-vis the insurer. The second was the vesting 
of ownership in the insurer, which occurred ex 
lege and did not require any act on the part of 
the insurer to bring or take the ship or goods 
abandoned to him under his physical control. 
This rule is therefore based on the principles of 
the underlying common law as it is clear that 
there was no specific reference in the customs of 
the Antwerp Exchange or in the local ordonnances 
to that the abandonment had the effect that the 
. Article 14 of the customs of the Antwerp Exchange provided that the 
assured 'vermacb ... de gbeassureert scbip oft goed t'abandonneren tot 
beboef van den versekerer ... ' While this provision did not under the 
Roman law which applied to commercial transactions have th~ effect of 
~esting ownership of the abandoned ship or goods ~utomatically in the 
7nsurer, that result was achieved by a provision of the jus commune of 
~nsurance and was eventually specifically enacted in article 678 of the 
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insurer became the owner of the abandoned ship or 
goods as a result of the mere fact of the 
abandonment 79. However, the finding of unowned 
goods, or of goods the property in which had been 
abandoned by the owner constituted a recognized 
manner of acquiring ownership 80. It therefore 
appears that the insurer could become the owner of 
the abandoned ship or goods in accordance with the 
common law by occupatio81 • This existence of the 
principles of this rule is also justified by 
article 2 of the Guidon de la MerB2. 
At this stage of the Roman-Dutch law of marine 
insurance of the province of Holland was 
transplanted to the Cape of Good Hope. De Groot 
and Groenewegen had by the relevant date, 6 April 
1652, published their comments on the insurance 
The Roman-Dutch common law required an occupatio for the acquisition of 
ownership. See in this regard De Groot, Inleidinge tot de Hollandscbe 
Recbtsgele~rdbeid, ('Inleidinge') , (1631) , 2.4.1-38, especially 36 - 37; 
Van der L~nden, Recbtsgeleerd, Practicaal, en Koopmans Handboek, 
('Koopmans Handboek') , (1806), 1.2 . 1. 
Van der Linden, Koopmans Handboek, 1.2 . 4. 
As was pointed out in Chapter 14 supra, this was not a satisfactory 
~rrangement as the .insurer ~oul~ be unable to pursue the ship or goods 
~n t~e hands of th~rd part~es w~thout the co-operation of the assured 
and.~t appears that a principle developed in the European jus commune 
of ~nsurance that ownership vested in the insurer automatically upon 
service of the notice of abandonment . 
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law applicable in Holland during their time
83
. 
The Roman-Dutch law was not static, however, and 
new ordonnances continued to be promulgated and 
more authors commented on the subject. Eventually 
the law was codified in the WvK of 1838. It was 
pointed out in the preceding chapter that not all 
the developments which took place in Holland after 
1652 applied automatically at the Cape of Good 
Hope. However, so far as the provisions of later 
ordonnances were incorporated in the works of the 
institutional writers on Roman-Dutch law, such 
provisions became part of the Roman-Dutch law of 
the Cape, with the exception of provisions of 
purely local application84 . This makes it 
necessary to review the insurance legislation 
passed in Holland after 1652 and also to consider 
the works of the institutional writers. The first 
of these tasks belongs in this chapter but the 
second is the subject of the next. The review of 
the second round of ordonnances which follows 
therefore does not take account of the extent to 
which their principles were adopted by the 
institutional writers. 
The first half of the seventeenth century . The works of these authors 
are dealt with in the next chapter. 
See Shooter t/a Shooter's Fisheries v Incorporated General Insurances 
Ltd 1984 4 SA 269 (D) at 286; R v Harrison and Dryburgh 1922 AD 320 at 
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THE SECOND ROUND OF DUTCH ORDONNANCES 
THE ROTTERDAM ORDONNANCE OF 1721 
On 27 January 1721 Rotterdam promulgated a new 
ordonnance on insurance, average and maritime 
matters which maintained the logic, structure and 
technical excellence of the earlier Rotterdam 
ordonnance85 • 
Section 60 required the assured to abandon the 
ship or goods insured to the insurer before he 
could claim the sum insured if the insured ship or 
goods were lost, taken, damaged or arrested86 • If 
the ship had perished or had become innavigable or 
if the insured goods had perished or been damaged 
or had been taken or were otherwise lost for 
certain, without hope of recovery, the abandonment 
could be made immediately ('aanstonds') in terms 
of section 62 87 . In terms of section 63 the 
assured was also entitled to abandon immediately 
The Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1721 was also adopted by the town of 
Dordrecht in 1775, without substantial amendment · Van Niekerk 
Introduction, 60 . " 
This provision confirmed Rule 2 enunciated above. 
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if the goods were perishable and were detained by 
a governmental power88 . 
Otherwise, in terms of section 64, if there was 
still hope that the arrested ship or goods could 
be recovered, the assured had to wait with his 
abandonment for a prescribed period after he had 
given notice through a public person of the 
incident to the insurers. If the incident occurred 
within European waters as far as Barbary on the 
one side and the Canary Islands on the other, the 
period was six months and if the incident occurred 
in more distant waters, one year89. In terms of 
article 65 the insurer was obliged to provide 
sufficient security for the claim of the assured 
pending the expiration of the prescribed 
period90 . 
The missing ship was provided for separately in 
section 67, which provided that if no news was 
received of the insured ship or goods for a period 
of a year and six weeks from the departure of the 
The phrase used was ' van hooger hand zullen zijn gearreBteert'. This 
provision conf i rmed Rule 3(b). 
This provision confirmed Rule 4(a) . 
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ship, the ship and goods were presumed to be lost 
and the assured was to be entitled to abandon the 
ship or goods to the insurers. If the destination 
was beyond the waters of Europe, from Barbary to 
the Canary Islands, the prescribed period was two 
years 91 • 
In terms of section 61 the abandonment had to be 
made through the 'bode van het Zee-Regt' by way of 
a written notice, failing which the abandonment 
would be invalid92 . Article 68 provided that 
payment could not be claimed from the insurer 
before one month had elapsed from the notice of 
abandonment 93 • The standard policy conditions of 
the Rotterdam Chamber of Insurance94 obliged the 
insurers to pay the sum insured within a month of 
proper notice of the loss or damage95 • 
This provision confirmed Rule 5. 
This provision confirmed Rule 7. 
'de Insinuatie van het Abandonnement' . This provis i on confirmed Rule 8. 
see . v~ Niekerk, Introduction, 240-245 for the text of the standard 
pol~c~es. 
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THE AMSTERDAM ORDONNANCE OF 1744 
Amsterdam followed with its own ordonnance on the 
10th March, 1744 . It dealt with abandonment 
equally succinctly as follows: 
Article 26 contained a number of provisions 
including the following: In the case of an arrest, 
capture or taking of the ship by a foreign king, 
prince, potentate or ruler, where recovery was 
uncertain, and also in the case where the ship 
became incapable of completing the planned voyage, 
the assured had to wait six months or twelve 
months depending on the destination before he 
could abandon her to the insurers96 • The relevant 
period ran from the time the assured gave notice 
of the condition of the ship or goods to the 
insurers97 • This notification had to be given by 
way of an exploit served by the 'Bode van de 
Assurantie Kamer' at the place where the majority 
of the insurers were98 • The assured was entitled 
to claim security or pledges from the insurers 
This part of art i cle 26 confirmed Rule 4 . 
This provision confirmed Rule 4(a). 
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pending payment in the latter case99 . The assured 
was further entitled to tranship the goods at the 
expense of the insurers who also had to pay any 
additional freight and the damages arising from 
the event 100 . 
If the ship became innavigable or if the insured 
ship or goods were taken or captured by enemies or 
were otherwise certainly lost or damaged without 
hope of recovery, the assured could abandon such 
ship or goods straight away101 and the insurers 
became obliged to pay the sum insured three months 
after service of the notice of abandonment102 . If 
the goods were perishable, the assured also did 
not have to wait for the expiry of the relevant 
period but could make the abandonment 
forthwith103 . 
The missing ship was provided for on the same 
basis as before, namely that if no news was 
This provision confirmed Rule 4(c). 
Article 26, which confirmed Rule 4(b). 
Article 28 , which thus confirmed Rule 3(a) . 
This part of article 28 confirms Rule 8. 





Par t V: Chapter 16 : Roman - Dutch law : Custom & Legislat i on 
received of the ship or goods insured for a year 
and a day from the date of sailing, she would be 
taken to be lost and the insured became entitled 
to give notice to the insurers and to claim 
payment of the insured amount three months later. 
If the ship's destination was beyond the waters of 
Europe, Barbary, the Canary Islands, the 
Mediterranean, the Levant and the Archipel, the 
period was two years104. 
The concept of subrogation is not mentioned in any 
of the abovementioned ordonnances at all. It is, 
however, such an essential component of indemnity 
insurance that one must assume that subrogation 
was regulated satisfactorily by the underlying 
customs so that the legislature at no stage felt 
obliged to intervene . Neither did these 
ordonnances mention that one of the consequences 
of a proper abandonment was that the abandoned 
ship or goods were to vest in ownership in the 
insurer. 
In summary, it appears that the new ordonnances of 
Rotterdam and Amsterdam (as well as Flessingen and 
Article 29, which confirmed Rule 5. It is interesting to note that the 
Amsterdam Ordonnance still did not mention abandonment expressly in 
relation to the missing ship. 
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Dordrecht) confirmed the provisions which already 
applied under the earlier ordonnances. 
7. CONCLUSION 
7.1. It remains to determine to what extent the rules 
so far extracted from these customs and statutory 
provisions were incorporated in the works of the 
recognized Roman-Dutch authors and to what extent, 
if any, those principles have been modified by 
them. By recounting the historical events in the 
development of the concept of abandonment, as has 
been done in this chapter, it has been possible to 
distil the basic rules and principles of 
abandonment from the first customs and legislation 
which applied to the subject in the province of 
Holland. It is clear that abandonment was a 
feature of the marine insurance customs, practice 
and legislation which were applied in the port 
towns of Holland from the earliest time, after the 
practice of insurance had spread to those parts of 
northern Europe. It is also clear that the 
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very similar to those applying in France105 , and 
to a lesser extent, in England106 . 
However, the Roman-Dutch law was not merely a 
collection of old customs and ordonnances. It was 
a living and developing body of law which was 
subjected to intense scrutiny by some of the great 
Roman-Dutch jurists of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. In order to determine how 
the relevant customs and the provisions of the 
ordonnances were interpreted and applied, one has 
to turn to the treatises and opinions of these 
jurists. One may then determine to what extent 
more light can be shed on abandonment as a 
component of the Roman-Dutch law which came to 
South Africa in 1652 . These tasks are undertaken 
in the next chapter . 
See Chapter 5 supra for a discussion of the abandonment provisions of 
the French Ordonnance de la Marine of 1681, for example, and compare 
those to the rules stated in this chapter . 
See Chapter 5 supra . 
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CHAPTER SEVENTEEN 
ROMAN-DUTCH LAW: TREATISES AND OPINIONS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. The principles of abandonment as laid down in the 
Spanish and local Dutch ordonnances were the 
subject of discussion in the treatises and 
opinions of the Roman-Dutch lawyers of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries . The rules of 
abandonment extracted from the ordonnances were 
confirmed and in some cases elaborated upon by 
these authors. Since the treatises and opinions of 
these authors are important sources of the law 
inherited from the province of Holland, their 
comments will naturally have to be considered in 
any endeavour to establ i sh the principles of 
abandonment which became part of South African 
law. 
1.2 . The relevant Roman-Dutch authors can be divided 
into two main categories, namely those who 
commented on the first round or phase of insurance 
ordonnances and those who commented after the 
second round or phase of insurance ordonnances had 
been promulgated . De Groot and Groenewegen fall 
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written early in this phase by Jacob de la Mine1 
and some important opinions were later furnished 
by Van den Ende 2 shortly before the Rotterdam 
Ordonnance of 1721 was promulgated. Bynkershoek 
completed his work after the Rotterdam Ordonnance 
of 1721 but before the Amsterdam Ordonnance of 
1744 was passed. Van der Keessel and Van der 
Linden are the most important writers on the 
Roman-Dutch law of the second phase. However, 
having regard to the fact that the later 
ordonnances mostly confirmed the provisions of the 
earlier ones so far as abandonment is concerned3 , 
it does not appear to matter much whether an 
author cormnented on the former rather than the 
latter. It remains important, nevertheless, to 
determine to what extent the principles laid down 
in the Spanish and local ordonnances were 
confirmed or altered by these authors. 
None of the authors referred to discussed the 
customary law underlyi ng the applicable 
ordonnances. Nor did they, with the exception of 
Van den Ende and Van der Linden, refer to the law 
Consultatie 52 dated 10 March 1676 in Van den Berg, Nederlands 
. Advysboek, (1693-1698) . 
The first opinion (Advys 14, infra) was a joint opinion by Abraham van 
den Ende and two of his colleagues . 
As was demonstrated in Chapter 16 supra. 
689 
2. 





Part v: Chapter 17 : Roman - Dutch law : Treatises and Opinions 
applying in the neighbouring countries. On the 
effect of the abandonment on the question of 
ownership of the abandoned ship or goods none of 
the abovementioned authors made any contribution 
at all. That was left to a practising advocate, 
Abraham van den Ende, who did so by way of 
opinions later taken up by BareIs in his 
collection of opinions on mercantile and shipping 
matters4 • 
HUGO DE GROOT 
De Groot wrote his main works in 1631. It was 
written in form and substance as a commentary on 
the complete range of the laws applicable in the 
Province of Holland, without any substantial 
reference to authori ty6. Abandonment was dealt 
with by De Groot in four paragraphs in his chapter 
on insurance7 • De Groot did not disclose any 
principles which are not already apparent from the 
provisions of the underlying Spanish and local 
ordonnances. However, the value of De Groot's 
contribution lies therein that he stated the law 
Advysen over den Koophandel en Zeevaert, (1780-1781) . 
Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleerdheid, ('Inleidinge'). 
These were later inserted by Groenewegen. 
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as that applicable in the whole province of 
Holland rather than merely the law of an 
individual town. The rules of abandonment 
identified in the previous chapter could 
therefore, so far as they are confirmed by De 
Groot's Inleidinge, be regarded as the seventeenth 
century law of the province of Holland and 
consequently of South Africa. 
Inleidinge 3.24.10 De Groot confirmed that the 
ship and cargo of which no news was received for 
a year and some days8 while on a voyage in 
European and Turkish waters and for two years in 
respect of more distant sailings was presumed to 
be lost 9 • 
Inleidinge 3.24.12 De Groot then confirmed the 
principle that, if the ship was detained in a 
foreign port by restraint of princes and rulers, 
or became otherwise incapable to prosecute the 
voyage, the assured had to wait six months or one 
year, depending on the destination, after having 
given notice of the event to the insurer before he 
This is clearly a mistake because the local ordonnances all specified 
a year and a day. 
This paragraph merely echoes the existing provisions of the ordonnances 
in force at the time and confirms Rule 5. See the Amsterdam Ordonnance 
of 1598, article 5; the Middelburg Ordonnance of 1600, article 12; the 
Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1604, article 14; and article 7 of the customs 
of the Antwerp Exchange. 
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could abandon10 . The assured was entitled to 
tranship the cargo in such a case and if he failed 
to do so the insurer could . In the latter event 
the insurer was liable for the cost of 
transhipment, the additional freight and the 
damage suffered in respect of the cargo itself as 
a result of the detention or restraint11 . In the 
interim the assured was entitled to demand 
security for payment of the amount of the 
insurance12 . The six month or one year period did 
not apply in the case of perishables13 . 
Inleidinge 3.24.13 If the ship became innavigable 
or if the ship or cargo was taken by enemies or 
pirates, the assured was allowed to abandon them 
forthwith14 and the insurers then became obliged 
to pay the sum insured within three months15 . 
Inleidinge 3.24 . 14 The assured had to communicate 
all intelligence of restraint or loss to the 
This statement confirmed Rule 4(a) . 
This statement confirmed Rule 4(b) . In this regard De Groot pointed out 
that the s~andard clause in policies at that time cast upon the insurer 
also the r1sks of transshipment, in which event the assured's claim for 
the sum insured would not be abated by the insurer's efforts. 
This statement confirmed Rule 4(c) . 
This statement confirmed Rule 3(b) . 
The statement confirmed Rule 3(a) . 
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insurer16 • 
SIMON GROENEWEGEN VAN DER MADE 
Groenewegen published an edition of De Groot's 
Inleidinge in 1644 to which he had added footnotes 
containing his own comments and references to 
authori ty17. He referred to a wide range of 
authorities for De Groot's statements on insurance 
generally, including Santerna
18
, the Spanish 
Ordonnances of 1563 and 1570, the customs of the 
Antwerp Exchange, the Amsterdam Ordonnance of 
1598, the Middelburg Ordonnance of 1600, the 
Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1604, as well as the 
opinions of Dutch lawyers19 • In the footnotes on 
the abandonment paragraphs in Inleidinge 
Groenwegen mentioned no authorities outside the 
customs of the Antwerp Exchange and the local 
ordonnances of Amsterdam, Middelburg and 
Rotterdam. The value of Groenewegen' s contribution 
lies in his confirmation, by omission rather than 
by express statement, that the principles set out 
This statement reflected the provisions of the existing ordonnances and 
confirmed Rule 6 . 
See De Wet, Ons Ou Skrywers in Perspektief, (1988), 135. 
Tractatus de Assecurationibus et Sponsionibus Mercatorum, (1552). 
See Inleidinge 24 . 1 . 1, 2 and 3, the footnotes thereto and 3.24 . 6, 
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in De Groot's Inleidinge constituted the law of 
the whole of the province of Holland and not 
merely of the towns in respect of which the 
individual ordonnances had been made. 
JACOB DE LA MINE 
In Consul tatie 5220 of 10 February 1676 De la 
Mine expressed the opinion that the effect of a 
capture by an enemy was that an original title (of 
ownership) was acquired by the enemy21 and that 
the assured could not re-acquire ownership in a 
subsequent re - capture once the insurer had been 
condemned to pay the sum insured22 . While De la 
Mine did not say so expressly, the reason for the 
latter statement was that the ship had been 
abandoned to the insurer when the assured claimed 
the sum insured, with the consequence that the 
insurer had thereby been vested with the assured's 
rights in and to the ship 23. 
Van den Berg, op cit, 112. 
'een primitive tijtul van eijgendom werd bekomen 
, ... dat het Schip eens genomen en daar door den eijgendom verlooren 
zijnde geworden Debora van Foreest daar mede haar regt ende Actie 
soodanig heeft verlooren gehad dat sij de selve niet weder heeft kunnen 
bekomen, gelijk als Rota Genuens seer wei ten regarde van de Assuradeurs 
heeft gedecideert wanneer deselve Assuradeurs zijn gecondemneert 
geworden te betalen omdat het Schip was genomen geweest ... ' 
It is stated in the opinion that the ship had been' geabbandonneert' and 
the conclusion is therefore inevitable that the assured did so and 
claimed the full amount of the insurance . The opinion therefore confirms 
the validity of Rule 9. 
694 
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4 . 2. De la Mine relied in respect of the effect of the 
capture on the authority of De Groot24 , and in 
respect of the inability of the assured to re-
acquire ownership after the abandonment and 
payment by the insurer on Decisio 101 of the Rotae 
Genoa. Dutch practice thus recognized that the 
abandoned ship accrued to the insurer after an 
abandonment. A significant feature of the opinion 
is that De la Mine relied unashamedly on authority 
emanating from outside Holland, which suggests 
that the insurance principles of the Roman-Dutch 
law were based on the European j us commune of 
insurance. 
5 . ABRAHAM VAN DEN ENDE 
5.1. Three important opinions dealing with the general 
principles of abandonment and its operation as a 
means of transferring ownership of the abandoned 
ship or goods were taken up in BareIs' collection 
of opinions25 . The first was dated 6 May 1706 and 
signed by Verryn, Van den Ende and Schrik26. It 
was later amplified by a second opinion dated 18 
24 
De Jure Belli ac Pacia, (1625), 6.3 in fine . 
25 
Op cit . 
26 
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May 1915 and signed by Van den Ende alone
27
• The 
third was dated 10 April 1715 and was signed by 
Van den Ende28 • 
ADVYSEN 14 and 23 
The ship and its cargo of wine were insured at 
Middelburg on standard Middelburg conditions for 
a voyage from Bourdeaux to Middelburg. A capture 
by the English was a special risk justifying a 
higher than usual premium. The ship was detained 
at Guernsey after her departure by a Guernsian 
(English) ship29. The assured thereupon gave 
notice to the insurers through a notary that the 
detention was likely to cause a loss and damage 
through deterioration and leakage of the wine, and 
further that the assured intended to sell the ship 
and wine by auction. The assured intimated also 
that he would claim the difference between the 
insured value of the ship and wine and the price 
realized at auction minus the expenses incurred in 
the sale from the insurers. Three months later the 
ship arrived safely at Middelburg, but the assured 
Advys 23; BareIs, op cit, 128. 
Advys 16; BareIs, op cit, 85 . 
While the opinion does not state this fact, the Dutch and the English 
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sold her and the wine at auction after giving the 
insurers notice that he intended to do so and 
invited them to be present at the sale. The ship 
and wine realized only fifty percent of their 
insured value. 
Although the facts recited does not make it clear, 
there must have been an abandonment to the 
insurers at the time the assured gave the notarial 
notification to the insurers3o • The issue was 
whether the assured was entitled to recover the 
loss from the insure,rs. Van den Ende' s opinion was 
in favour of the assured. One of the reasons he 
advanced was that the assured was entitled to 
institute action forthwith upon the detention at 
Guernsey, without having to wait to ascertain what 
the final outcome of the event was going to be31 • 
He further pointed out that once the ship and the 
wine had been abandoned to the insurers it 
zouden zyn en blyven in effecte geabandonneerd 
, and that the subsequent recovery of the ship 
A notarial notification has the hallmarks of an 'inthimatie door een 
publijk perzoon' , that is to sayan abandonment . 
, . .. de Geassureerde aenstonds op en met het neemen, opbrenging en 
aenhouden .. . bevoegd is geweest zyne actie te insti tueeren en te 
vervolgen , zonderna den uitval der zaeke te wagten, en zulks ook zonder 
onde~scheid zelfs of 'er hoope ware geweest om het goed weder te krygen 
of n~et.' See Barels, op cit, 70 . As authority for this proposition the 
authors of the opinion referred to the respective ordonnances and a rule 
of the Chamber of Middelburg. So far as the ship and the wine were 
concerned, the ordonnances allowed an immediate abandonment in the case 
of capture by an enemy. In respect of the wine the ordonnances allowed 
~ immediate abandonment also on the ground that wine is a perishable 
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and wine therefore made no difference to the 
assured's right to claim32 . 
This opinion establishes a further rule namely: 
The assured's right to abandon and the 
consequences of an abandonment properly made are 
not affected by any subsequent recovery of the 
abandoned ship or goods. 
The opinion was clarified in certain respects by 
Advys 23. It was pointed out there that the 
abandonment may be made' ... met volkoomen effect 
van rechte zo als daer te vooren by het 43 artikel 
was gepermitteerd en vasgesteld.,33 
The effect of the opinion was not just that the 
assured had the right to make an immediate 
abandonment on the facts of the case, but also 
that one of the consequences of a proper 
abandonment was that ownership of the abandoned 
goods vested in the insurer34 . Apart from this 
At 71. 
At 130 . The article 43 referred to is that of the French Ordonnance de 
la Marine of 1681. 
Schlemmer, Verkryging van Eiendomsreg deur 'n Versekeraar in geval van 
Diefstal van 'n Versekerde Saak, LLM thesis, RAU, (1991), 51 expressed 
doubt as to whether this opinion goes as far as to suggest that the 
abandonment referred to in marine insurance has the effect of 
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opinion and Advys 16 there is no direct authority 
in Roman-Dutch law directly to that effect . 
It is significant that Van den Ende, who wrote the 
clarifying Advys 23, relied on article 43 of the 
Ordonnance de la Marine of 1681 and Decisio 101 of 
the Rotae Genoa35 as authority for this view. 
This confirms the conclusion arrived at earlier 
that the Roman-Dutch insurance principles were 
based on the European jus commune of insurance. 
ADVYS 16 
The facts of the case were not stated in the 
published opinion. The issues are capable of being 
identified in a broad sense only by the opinions 
which were expressed. 
It appears that the ship had been detained and 
prevented from completing the voyage36 by the 
government at Stockholm. The assured then incurred 
expenses in an endeavour to have the ship and 
cargo released. According to Van den Ende the 
assured was entitled to recover not only the sum 
The commercial court of the merchants of Genoa . 
, . .. in bet vervolgen bunner voijagen aengebouden en belet derzelve 
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insured37 but also those expenses38 , but he was 
obliged to abandon the insured ship, with all 
rights and everything attaching to it, the goods 
insured together as well as their proceeds to the 
insurers39 • 
The abandonment, in respect of ship and cargo was 
proportional to the extent of the insurance if the 
insurance was partial40 • This statement qualified 
the principle that the abandonment vested 
ownership in the insurer by providing that the 
transfer operated only to the extent that the ship 
or goods were covered by the insurance41 • 
Van den Ende then went on to point out that 
mercantile custom was uniformly to the effect that 
the assured was entitled to abandon the insured 
ship or goods for the benefit of the insurers if 
the ship or goods were detained during the voyage 
and prevented from completing it. However, before 
' zyne volle getekende of geassureerde somme' ; BareIs, op cit, 85 . 
However, the expenses were recover able under the principles of 
negotiorum gesti o ; BareIs , op cit, 86 - 87. 
' bet zuivere proven ue' . 
'proportionelijk na maete van de gedaen e of gepennitteerde Assurantie' ; 
BareIs, op c i t, 86. 
One can therefore formulate a qualification to two of the principles 
already enunciated. The first is that the assured had to abandon the 
whole of the insured interest . The second is that the abandonment 
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the insurers became obl iged to pay the insured 
amount the assured had to give proper notice and 
make an abandonment42 . The notice referred to 
must have been the notification the assured was 
required to give the insurers of all events 
affecting the insured ship or goods . The 
abandonment was a separate event. 
Van den Ende then repeated the opinion expressed 
in Advys 14 to the effect that the recovery of the 
ship or goods after the abandonment had no effect 
on the abandonment43 a nd that the insurer 
acquired an indisputable right of ownership 
through the abandonment44 . 
The importance of these opinions and particularly 
Van den Ende's contributions cannot be 
underestimated. In the first place, these opinions 
were written by practising lawyers who dealt with 
the law as it was applied in practice. In this 
He relied on article 8 of the Amsterdam Ordonnance of 1598, article 15 
of the Middelburg Ordonnance of 1600, articles 12 and 13 of the 
Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1604, articles 42 - 44 of the Ordonnance de la 
Marine of 1681, De Groot's Inleidinge , 'en andere meer'. 
' .. . dat de vrygeevinge van scbip en goed ganscb geene veranderinge kan 
maKen in bet Abandonnement en den afs t and ' ; Barels, op cit, 88. 
, . .. overmits door middel van dat Abandonnement en van dien afstand B. 
als Assuradeur en (sic) ontwyffelbaer regt van eigendom beeft 
verkregen'; BareIs, op cit , 88 . As authority for the statement Van den 
Ende referred to article 60 of the Ordonnance de la Marine of 1681 
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light their reliance on mercantile custom and on 
foreign authorities demonstrates that the rules of 
insurance law of the time were not peculiar to any 
particular country or town. They were generally 
the same everywhere and therefore authorities were 
applied across national and town boundaries45 . 
Van den Ende also gave positive proof of the 
existence of Rule 9, namely that the effect of the 
abandonment in Roman-Dutch law was that ownership 
of the abandoned ship or goods was acquired by the 
insurer. Until the three advysen referred to there 
was no direct evidence of the existence of this 
principle in the Roman-Dutch customary law, nor in 
any of the Dutch insurance ordonnances passed from 
1563 to 1744, nor in De Groot and Groenewegen's 
works. 
However, that this rule had been part of the 
Roman-Dutch law of marine insurance was ultimately 
acknowledged by its incorporation in the 
codification of Dutch marine insurance law in the 
Wetboek van Koophandel of 1838 (' the WvK') 46 • 
The reliance on the Ordonnance de la Marine and the decisions of the 
Rotae Genoa give an idea of the extent to which this was done . See also 
the reference to Straccha in Advys 13 at 66 . 
Artic~e 678 of the Wetboek van Koophandel of 1838, ('the WvK'l. See also 
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GERLACH SCHELTINGA 
Notes taken by Scheltinga's students in 1755 and 
1756 during his lectures on De Groot's Inleidinge 
were recently published in South Africa
47
. 
Scheltinga offered the following comments: 
The reference in Inleidinge 3.24.10 to Europe or 
Turkey was not to be taken literally, but meant 
'1' , h t 1 48 sal lngs ln t a genera area . The presumption 
of loss in respect of the missing ship, Scheltinga 
pointed out, operated in relation to the ship as 
well as the goods carried on her at the time 
although the ordonnances' only mentioned the 
ship49. This clarification is important because 
there might otherwise have been a lacuna in our 
understanding of the law. 
With regard to Inleidinge 3.24.13 Scheltinga 
pointed out that it was uncertain exactly what was 
meant by innavigable because the assured was also 
Scheltinga se 'Dictata' oor Hugo de Groot se Inleidinge tot de 
Hollandsche Rechtsgeleerdheid, published by De Vos and Visagie, (1986). 
The Middelburg Ordonnance of 1600 added the words 'of daaromtrent' and 
the Rotterdam Ordonnance even added ' of die eylanden van Canari~n en 
andere daaromtrent'. He also referred to article 29 of the Amsterdam 
Ordonnance of 1744 in this regard . He further mentioned that the news 
had to be received at the place of sailing and not elsewhere again 
relying on the same article. ' 
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allowed to abandon if the ship became unfit to 
complete the voyage. He left this question 
unresol vedso • 
WILLEM SCHORER 
Schorer's 1767 contributions1 on the relevant 
sections of De Groot's Inleidinge consisted of two 
itemss2 . He pointed out in relation to a footnote 
added by Groenewegen to Inleidinge 3.24.10 that 
Groenewegen had mistakenly referred to article 15 
of the Amsterdam Ordonnance instead of article 
553 • He also pointed out with reference to 
Inleidinge 3.24.12 that the assured could claim 
security from the insurer not only in the case 
mentioned by De Groot, but also in the event of 
one of the insurers being suspected of being 
insol vent54 • 
See in this regard the discussion of Van der Keessel's contribution 
intra . 
Inleiding tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleerdheid beschreven By Hugo de 
Groot, bevestigd met Plakaten, ens, door Mr Simon van Groenewegen van 
der Made, nu met Latynsche aanteekeningen uitgebreidt door Mr Willem 
Schorer, (1767) . 
By the time of Schorer's comments the 1721 and 1744 ordonnances had been 
passed in Rotterdam and Amsterdam respectively, but Schorer did not 
refer to them . 
Schorer's note on Inleidinge 3.24.10. 
As authority for this last statement he relied on Heineccius; Elementa 
Juris Germanici tum veteris, tum hodierni, (1736 - 37), Vol II, Title 
15, para 440 . However: this principle seems to derive from insolvency 
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JOHANNES VOET 
Voet dealt with neither the principles of 
insurance nor with those of abandonment in his 
work, but mentioned some sources on the subject 
which makes it clear that sources from the 
European jus commune of marine insurance as well 
as the Ordonnance de la Marine of 1681 were 
regarded as sources of the law of Holland
55
• 
Voet's contribution lies therein that he confirmed 
the val idi ty of the method adopted by Van den 
Ende, namely to apply the principles enunciated by 
the Ordonnance de la Marine of 1681 and the 
ancient writers Santerna and Straccha. 
CORNELIS VAN BYNKERSHOEK 
Bynkershoek's Quaestiones Juris Privati56 has 
been described as the most important of all the 
contributions made by the Dutch writers on the 
Roman-Dutch law of insurance57 • The main sources 
relied upon by him were the Spanish and local 
Commentarius ad Pandectas, (1698-1704), 22.2.3 . This work was' 'n in 
besonderhede uitgewer~te kommentaar', according to De Wet , op cit, 154 . 
Apart from the Span~sh and local ordonnances Voet mentioned the 
Ordonnance de la Marine of 1681 and Santerna and Straccha. 
(1744) . 
Van Niekerk, 'Enkele bibliografiese gegewens oor Comelis van 
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ordonnances and the collections of opinions and 
decisions which existed at that time. Abandonment 
is dealt with in only one of the chapters of 
Quaestiones Juris Privati, but the legal 
principles were not discussed there as the case 
referred to by him turned on the facts 58 . The 
ship had been driven onto the beach by strong 
winds. equipment 
furniture 59 at the place where she had been 
The master sold her and 
shipwrecked60 and abandoned the ship itself61 . 
The insurer argued that she could have been freed, 
but the court found that there was sufficient 
evidence to the contrary62 . 
DIONYSIUS VAN DER KEESSEL63 
Van der Keessel's Theses Selectae64 was published 
in 1800, shortly before the Cape of Good Hope was 
Quaestiones Juris Privati , (1744), 4.14. 
'instrurnentibus' . 
'in loco nautragii '. 
'navern ipsam derelinquit'. The abandonment referred to in this passage 
~oes not refer to t~e abandonment of the ship by the assured to the 
1nsurer but the phys1cal abandonment of the ship by the master and crew 
who gave the ship up as beyond saving. ' 
This case was subsequently referred to in De Pass v Commercial Marine 
Insurance Co (1857) 3 Searle 46 . See Chapter 18 intra . 
Van der Keessel was a student of Scheltinga's; De Wet, op cit, 172 . 
Theses Selectae Juris Hollandici et Zelandici, (1800) . 
706 
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to become a British possession and the law in the 
Netherlands was to be codified. It took the form 
of a commentary on De Groot's Inleidinge, with 
reference to the law which was current at the end 
of the nineteenth century . Van der Keessel's 
lectures to students also survived, but were only 
published recently. His Praelectiones65 was also 
in the form of a commentary on De Groot's 
Inleidinge, but he also referred to his own Theses 
Selectae. The method adopted by Van der Keessel 
made it inevitable that his works confirmed the 
rules of abandonment identified earlier and 
confirmed by De Groot. Nevertheless, by the time 
of Van der Keessel' s wri ting and lectures the 
Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1721 and the Amsterdam 
Ordonnance of 1744 as amended had also been in 
force for a considerable period. Apart from his 
useful elucidation of many of the details of the 
old ordonnances, Van der Keessel's contribution 
allows one to determine to what extent the law 
expounded by De Groot had changed . 
With regard to Inleidinge 3.24 . 10 and the case of 
the missing ship, Van der Keessel offered a number 
Praelectiones Juris Hodier.oi ad Hugonis Grotii Introductionem ad 
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of comrnents 66 : 
He argued in the first place that the period of a 
year and a day actually meant a year and six 
weeks, by virtue of the provisions of article 67 
of the Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1721 and article 69 
of the Dordrecht Ordonnance of 1775. 
Van der Keessel added that no news must have been 
received at the port from where the ship sailed as 
well as at the port of destination . 
He confirmed that in such an event there was a 
presumption that the ship was lost with the cargo 
and that the assured was entitled, after proper 
notification to the insurer, to relinquish the 
ship and goods to the insurer and to claim the sum 
insured after three months 67 • 
Van der Keessel thereupon pointed out that the 
Amsterdam Ordonnance of 1744 had extended the area 
to include the Levant and the Archipel 'of 
daaromtrend' and that by way of an amendment 
Praelectiones 1461 . 
The effect of the presumption is thus twofold : Firstly, it is presumed 
that the ship has been lost. Secondly, it is presumed that the cause of 
the loss was an insured peril . While this is nowhere expressly stated 
this conclusion is the inevitable result of the fact that the insure~ 
became ~iable to pay the sum insured when a proper abandonment followed 
the exp1ry of the relevant waiting period . 
708 
10.2 . 5. 
10.3. 
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imported in 1756 Greenland and the Strait of Davis 
were included. 
He pointed out that the amendment further provided 
that the assured could require the insurer to 
secure the sum insured by paying it to him or by 
paying it into court, but in such a case the 
assured was obliged to pay a ~% interest. If the 
ship should subsequently turn up unscathed in some 
or other port, the amount paid in by the insurer 
had to be repaid to him, together with 4% interest 
from the date of his initial payment to the date 
of repayment . If the ship should arrive safely 
after the prescribed period, the running of 
interest would be hal ted on the expiry of the 
relevant term, to which had to be added an 
additional three months, being the time the 
insurer in any event has within which to pay . 
Van der Keessel mentioned the provision that the 
assured was entitled to tranship the goods at the 
risk of the insurer in the case of detention by a 
foreign people or unfitness of the ship for the 
voyage as a resul t of some serious inj ury68. He 
added that if the injury to the ship was of a less 
serious nature the assured ought to allow a short 
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time for the repair of the vesse169 . 
He also confirmed that the ship which had been 
insured and had been rendered totally unfit for 
navigation by some serious injury could at once be 
relinquished to the insurer7o , but if the injury 
was not quite as serious, and the ship was capable 
of being repaired at a small cost, the assured was 
obliged to perform the repairs in accordance with 
the standard conditions of the policy of 
insurance 71 • However, if the ship was detained 
under an arrest, a period of six months or a year 
had to elapse before it could be relinquished to 
the insurer, who in the meantime was obliged give 
pledges or security for the 10ss72. 
with reference to Inleidinge 3.24.13 Van der 
Keessel pointed out that the assured was entitled 
to abandon immediately where the insured ship 
He relied for these statements on article 8 of the Amsterdam Ordonnance 
of 1598, article 26 of the Amsterdam Ordonnance of 1744, article 15 of 
the Middelburg Ordonnance of 1600, article 13 of the Rotterdam 
Ordonnance of 1604, articles 53 and 54 of the Rotterdam Ordonnance of 
1721 and article 55 of the Dordrecht Ordonnance of 1775. 
Theses Selectae 755; He relied on article 12 of the Rotterdam Ordonnance 
of 1604, article 62 of the Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1721 and article 64 
of the Dordrecht Ordonnance of 1775. 
Theses Selectae 755 . In this regard Van der Keessel relied on page 92 
of the Handvesten van Amsterdam, Tweede Vervolg. 
Theses Selectae 755. This principle was established by article 26 of the 
Amsterdam Ordonnance of 1744, articles 65 and 66 of the Rotterdam 
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became totally unfit prior to completion of the 
voyage or if the ship or goods were captured by 
the enemy or pirates, and all hope to recover them 
consequentlyevaporated73 . 
In his Praelectiones74 Van der Keessel explained 
Inleidinge 3.24.12 and 13 in more detail. 
He pointed out that De Groot's paragraph 12 dealt 
with the case where the insured ship had landed in 
such danger that there was still a degree of hope 
that it could be saved. In such a case the insured 
was not entitled to abandon the ship or insured 
goods immediately, but was obliged to wait the 
prescribed period and had to gi ve the insured 
notice of the incident75 • 
Further, the detention referred to was a detention 
by kings, princes and other lawful rulers and not 
those who were enemies of the state, because in 
the case of the former one would retain some hope 
that the ship may be recovered. He added that the 
Theses Selectae 755 . 
1465-1468. 
He relied for this statement on articles 15 and 16, read with article 
23 of the 1570 Ordonnance, the provisions of the first round of Dutch 
Ordonnances, as well as articles 26 and 27 of the Amsterdam Ordonnance 
of 1744~ articles 53, 54, 64 to 66 of the Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1721 
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position was the same for the ship which was 
detained prior to completion of the voyage and the 
one which was laid under detention after arrival 
at the port of destination, provided that the 
insurers were still at risk76 . 
Van der Keessel then explained the difference 
between unfitness to complete the voyage and 
innavigability in some detail. In the former case, 
he pointed out, the ship could not be abandoned 
forthwith because there was some hope that it 
could be repaired. In short, the damage to it was 
relatively minor. On the other hand, the ship was 
regarded as innavigable or 'onzeijlbaar' or 'onnut 
ende onbekwaam om de gedestineerde reyse te doen' 
or ' bui ten staat om de gedestineerde reise te 
doen', or ' innavigabel' 77 when the defect of the 
ship was so serious that it was totally unable to 
sail at all, or at least unfit for the completion 
of the voyage for which it was destined78 • 
He then proceeded to explain that notice of the 
casualty had to be given to the insurer through a 
Van der Keessel relied in this regard on a distinction between the 
provisions of articles 12 and 13 of the Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1604 and 
article 14 thereof, and similarly between articles 53 and 64 of the 
Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1721 . 
Using the language of the various ordonnances . 
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public person, the messenger of the Chamber of 
Insurance or a notary or similar public person, 
failing which the assured was obliged to 
compensate the insurer for the damage arising from 
his failure 79 • At Amsterdam this notice had to be 
given through the secretary or marshall of the 
Chamber of Insurance8o • Van der Keessel 
explained81 that this notification was required 
because the insurers had an interest in the news 
of loss or damage by virtue of the risk they bore. 
The notification had to be given to the majority 
of the insurers domiciled at the place where the 
contract was concluded, and had to be made through 
a public person who had to record the notice of 
what had occurred. Amsterdam had specific 
provisions with regard to this procedure, 
requiring the assured to advise the insurer of all 
tidings the assured has received with regard to 
any casualty, capture or arrest, and the assured 
had to provide copies of the letters bearing such 
tidings to him82 • He added that this notice had 
Theses Selectae 758. This provision was provided by article 54 of the 
Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1721 . 
Article 36 of the Amsterdam Ordonnance of 1744 as amended by article 36 
of the amending ordonnance of 1756. 
Praelectiones 1472. 
The 1756 amendments to the Amsterdam Ordonnance of 1744 provided that 
the notification and abandonment could no longer be served by notaries 
or brokers, but ~n~y thr~ugh the secretary or messenger of the Chamber 
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to be given before the assured could abandon and 
claim compensation under the policy83. 
Van der Keessel pointed out that the insurer had 
to pay the sum insured in three months in most 
places, but at Rotterdam and Dordrecht within a 
month84 • The amount payable was that which was 
contracted for at the conclusion of the 
contract 85. The amount to be paid was the total 
estimated value of the ship at the commencement of 
the insurance, in respect of which rule there 
existed an exception at Amsterdam86 in terms of 
which the insured value of the ship was abated for 
depreciation as a result of a long and successful 
voyage87 • 
JOHANNES VAN DER LINDEN 
The wide range of sources Van der Linden referred 
and a fine of 25 Guilders would be payable. 
Praelectiones, 1468 . 
Theses Selectae 757. 
Praelectiones 1471 . 
Article 33 of the Amsterdam Ordonnance of 1744 . 
The.Amsterd~m p~ovision appears to be more easily reconcilable with the 
str~ct appl~cat~on of the indemnity principle than the rule that the 
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to in his Koopmans Handboek88 include the 1563 
and 1570 Ordonnances of Philip II of Spain, the 
1744 Amsterdam Ordonnance (with its amendments), 
the 1721 Rotterdam Ordonnance, the 1775 Dordrecht 
Ordonnance, the 1600 Middelburg Ordonnance (with 
its 1719 amendments), the works of pothier89, 
Emerigon90 , Weskett91 , Park
92 
I Baldasseroni 93 
I en andern meer' 94. He dealt with the main 
principles of abandonment as follows: 
Van der Linden made it clear that the insurer's 
obligation to pay the sum insured was dependent 
upon the assured making an abandonment 95 • 
Regtsgeleerd, Practicaal, en Koopmans Handboek, (1806), (' Koopmans 
Handboek') , 4 . 6.1. 
Traite du Contrat d'Assurance, (1768-1778) . 
Traite des Assurances et des Contrats a la Grosse, (1783) . 
Complete Digest of tbe Tbeorie and Practice of Insurance, (1781) . 
System of tbe Law of Marine Insurances, (1800 edition) . 
Delle Assicurazioni Marittime Trattato, (1786). The fact that Van der 
Linden regarded Baldasseroni as a source of the law on the subj ect tends 
to suggest that there wil be no material differences between the Roman-
Dutch law as explained by Van der Linden and Italian law. Baldasseroni' s 
own work appears to be a comparative study. In the section dealing with 
abandonment (Vol II Part 6) he referred extensively to ordonnances, 
writers and cases emanating from England, France, Holland and Germany . 
Like many others of his time, including Park and Van der Linden, 
Baldasseroni appears to have regarded marine insurance principles as 
transcending national borders and legal systems. 
De Wet, op cit, 88 said that Van der Linden had been influenced by 
Pothier and added that ' (o)ns ou skrywers bet nie geskroom om van die 
werke van die Franse praktykskrywers gebruik te maak nie.' 
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If the ship perished completely ( 'geheel en al 
vergaan') , or was damaged to such an extent that 
the assured could claim the full amount of the 
insurance, then the assured was obliged, before he 
could claim payment, to abandon the ship or goods 
and to relinquish them in favour of the 
insurer96 • If the loss was certain and final, 
there was an immediate right to abandon
97
• 
However, if there was still hope to recover the 
ship or goods the assured was obliged to wait for 
a period of six months or a year, (depending on 
the destination), after notice of the casualty had 
been given to the insurers before he could abandon 
and claim payment. In the meantime he was entitled 
to require security from the insurer98 • In the 
case of detention in a foreign country or 
innavigability of the ship, the assured was 
allowed to tranship the cargo at the insurer's 
expense. If, however, the damage was small, he 
could not do so but had to take the necessary time 
Koopmans Handboek 4 . 6 . 8.2 ; Van der Linden relied here on Pothier, op 
cit , 3.1 . 1.3 and a r ticle 60 of the Rot ter dam Ordonnance of 1721. 
Koopmans Handboek 4.6.8.2. For this statement Van der Linden relied on 
De Groot, Inleidinge 3.24.13, article 62 of the Rotterdam Ordonnance of 
1721 and the equivalent a r ticle in the Dordrecht Ordonnance of 1775 . 
Koopmans Handboek 4 . 6.8.2 . As authority Van der Linden relied on De 
Groot, Inleidinge 3.24.12 , article 26 of the Amsterdam Ordonnance of 
1744, articles 64 to 66 of the Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1721 , art i cles 
67 and 68 of the Dordrecht Ordonnance of 1775 , as well as Van der 









Part v: Chapter 17: Roman-Dutch law : Treatises and Opinions 
to repair the ship99. 
If no news were received of the ship or goods they 
were considered totally lost and the assured 
became entitled to abandon them after a year and 
six weeks if the destination was not beyond Europe 
or Turkey, and after two years in more distant 
sailings10o • 
The method by which the abandonment was made was 
through written notice served by the ' Bode van 
Zeezaaken' on the insurer101 • 
The assured was obliged to advise the insurer 
forthwith, , dadelijk en zonder verwijl', of all 
tidings with regard to the ship and goods and on 
breach was liable to pay such damages as the 
insurer suffered102 • 
Koopmane Handboek 4 . 6 . 8.2 . Van der Linden again relied on the new 
ordonnances, (article 26 of the Amsterdam Ordonnance of 1744, articles 
53 and 54 of the Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1721 and article 55 of the 
Dordrecht Ordonnance of 1775), for this statement, but added article 15 
of the Middelburg Ordonnance of 1600 as a reference. 
Koopmane Handboek 4 . 6.9 . 1. The period of a year and six weeks was 
peculiar to Rotterdam and Van der Linden relied on article 67 of the 
Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1721 for this statement . 
For this proposition Van der Linden relied on article 60 of the 
Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1721. 
Koopmane Handboek 4.6.8.1. As authority for this statement Van der 
Linden relied on De Groot, Inleidinge 3.24.14 and article 36 of the 






Part v: Chapter 1 7 : Roman-Dutch law : Treatises and Opini ons 
The assured who made an abandonment had to declare 
to the insurer all other insurances he had taken 
on the ship or goods and also any loans he had 
taken on bottomry. This requirement must have been 
part of the European jus commune which still 
applied in Holland as the sources Van der Linden 
relied on were not strictly Roman-Dutch103 . 
THE PRINCIPLES OF ABANDONMENT IN THE ROMAN-DUTCH 
LAW OF THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 
The basic principles of abandonment which were 
identified in the previous chapter with reference 
to mercantile custom, the Spanish ordonnances of 
1563 and 1570 and the Dutch ordonnances may now be 
re-examined in order to ascertain to what extent 
they have been confirmed or qualified by the 
institutional writers discussed in this chapter . 
This exercise ought to produce the principles of 
abandonment in the Roman-Dutch law of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries which became 
the law of South Africa. At the same time it will 
be indicated whether the same principles applied 
in Germany, France and England at that time and to 
what extent the relevant principles were taken up 
Koopmane Hanciboek 4.6.8.3 . This provision is not contained in any of the 
Dutc~ ordonnances but in this regard Van der Linden relied on Pothier, 
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in the WvK in 1838. This process ought to allow 
one to determine to what extent the Roman-Dutch 
principles of abandonment were the same as those 
of neighbouring maritime countries. 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES GIVING RISE TO THE RIGHT TO 
ABANDON 
RULE 1: The assured was entitled but not obliged 
to abandon when the circumstances penni tted an 
abandonmen t . 
De Groot, Van der Keessel and Van der Linden did 
not expressly state that abandonment was a right 
of the assured rather than an obligation but 
treated it as a right. This approach was in 
consonance with the Guidon de la Mer04 , the 
customs of the Antwerp Exchange105 , the 
Ordonnance de la Marine of 1681106 , the 
Article 1 of Chapter VII where it was put as follows: 'Le delais n'est 
de necessi te, mais depend de la volonte du marchand chargeur ... '. 
('The abandonment is not compulsory but depends on the wish of the cargo 
owner . . . ' ) 
Article 14, which indicates equally that abandonment was a right, not 
a duty: 'de gheassureerde (vennach) het gheassureert schip oft goed 
t'abandoneren ... '. See also article 17 of the Genoa Ordonnance of 1610 
!Magens, An Essay on Insurances , (1755), Vol II, 66), where it was put 
. 1n clear terms that the assured had an election between an average claim 
and an abandonment claim: 'The assured may • . . according to his own 
choice, ei ther demand the full assurance, and abandon ..• or else he may 
make up an account of the damage ... ' (My underlining.) 
Article 46: 'Abandonment may be made . .. '; See also Emerigon, op cit, 
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d f 1730107, Konigsberg Or onnance 0 and English 
common law108 and was taken up in the WvK109 • 
RULE 2(a): If the assured elected to abandon, he 
was allowed to recover the full amount of the 
insurance provided he 'first made a proper 
abandonment of the insured ship or goods, as the 
case may be, to the insurer. 11o 
In most instances this rule is merely implied, for 
example by De Groot111 , but Van der Linden112 
and Van den Endel13 expressly referred to it as 
a requirement for a claim for the full amount of 
the insurance. The requirement of an abandonment 
is so obvious in all the relevant statutory 
Article 22 of the ordonnance used the phrase' ... is authorised to give 
up the said Ship or Goods, and to abandon it . .. ', (Magens' translation.) 
See Magens, An Essay on Insurances, 1755, Vol II, 192. 
Malynes, Consuetudo, vel, Lex Mercatoria, (1685), Chapter XXV, 115; Goss 
v Withers 2 Burr 683; Marshall, A Trea t ise on the Law of Insurances, 5th 
ed, (1865), Bk I, 478 . 
Article 663 expressed it permissively , namely that the assured ship or 
goods 'kunnen geabandonneerd worden 
Articles 14 and 15 of the Antwerp customs; article 23 of the 1570 
Ordonnance of Philip II; articles 5,8 and 23 of the Amsterdam Ordonnance 
of 1598; articles 5, 8 and 26 of the Middelburg Ordonnance of 1600· 
article 15 of the Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1604; article 60 of th~ 
Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1721. 
Inleidinge 3.24 . 12 and 13. 
Koopmans Handboek 4.6.8.2. 
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provisions114 and in the English common law11S 
that it is seldom expressly referred to. The 
effect of articles 679 and 690 of the WvK was that 
the assured had to make an abandonment before the 
insurer became obliged to pay the full amount of 
the insurance. That only the insured ship or cargo 
could be abandoned is also confirmed by the 
subsequent provisions article 663(1) of the 
This rule has to be qualified as a result of the 
effect of the abandonment as set out in Rule 9. 
The abandonment divests the assured of his 
ownership of the ship or goods and vests it in the 
insurer. Such a divestment can clearly not be made 
effectively by any person other than the assured 
or his authorised agent. By the same token, the 
insurer must at least know that ownership is being 
vested in him when it occurs, and the abandonment 
therefore has to be to the insurer or his 
authorised agent. The following subrule must 
therefore be added: 
See for example article 46 of the Ordonnance de la Marine of 1681 and 
articles 22, 25 and 27 of the Konigsberg Ordonnance of 1730. 
Magens, op cit, Vol II, 174; Marshall, op cit, (1865), Bk I, 443. 
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RULE 2(b): The abandonment had to be made by the 
assured or his duly authorised agent to the 
insurer or his duly authorised agent. 
There is also authority for this principle in the 
English common law117 and Dutch case law118 . 
RULE 3(a): In the case of capture of the ship or 
goods insured by the enemy or by pirates, in the 
case of innavigability ('onseylbaarheid'), and in 
any other case where the ship or goods were lost 
for certain without hope of recovery, the assured 
was entitled to make an immediate abandonment. 119 
This rule was confirmed by De Groot120 , 
Groenewegen121, Van den Ende122 , Van der 
Keessel123, who explained it in detail124 , and 
Marshall , op cit, (1865) , Bk I, 486; Rankin v Potter (1873) 6 AC 83 
(HL) . 
De Allgemei ne Versicberungs Aktien Gesellscbaft 'Hansa' v De 
Vennootscbap van Koopbandel, onder de firma P Onnes en Zoon 1924 NJ 824 
(Hoge Raad) . 
Antwerp customs , article 14 ; article 25 of the Amsterdam Ordonnance of 
1598; article 36 of the Middelburg Ordonnance of 1600; article 15 of the 
Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1604 ; article 63 of the Rotterdam Ordonnance of 
1721; article 28 of the Amsterdam Ordonnance of 1744. 
Inleidi nge 3 . 24.13 . 
By his footnotes to Inleidinge 3.24. 13 . 
Advys 14 in BareIs , op c i t, 70 . 
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Van der Linden125 . The principle of an immediate 
abandonment was also present in the Ordonnance de 
la Marine126 , the Konigsberg Ordonnance of 
1730127 and the English common law128, and was 
further taken up in article 663 read with article 
668 of the WvK. 
RULE 3 (b): If the goods insured were of such a 
nature that they would be likely to perish with 
the mere effluxion of time , detention by a foreign 
ruler (not an enemy) and unfitness of the ship to 
continue on the contemplated voyage gave rise to 
an immediate right to abandon. 129 
Praelectiones, 1466 et seq. 
Koopmans Handboek 4 . 6 . 8 . 2. 
Article 43. 
Article 22 was reminiscent of the Dutch ordonnances where it provided 
that : 'The Ship or Goods insured being entirely lost, without any Hopes 
of recovering them, or the Ship proving unfit for farther service, and 
proper Notice having been given of this to the Insurer, the Person 
insured is authorised to give up the said Ship or Goods, and to abandon 
it ... ' One can only speculate to what extent Magens compilation of the 
Dutch o r donnances together with the Konigsberg Ordonnance influenced the 
development of the English approach, which allows an abandonment without 
strict reference to the exact nature of the event. It would appear at 
any rate that English, Roman-Dutch and German law (as expounded by the 
Konigsberg Ordonnance ) were all to the effect that the effect of the 
event was all important, rather than the precise cause, and in that 
respect differed from French law . The French approach was to prevail, 
however, in the subsequent codification process on the continent so that 
Dutch and German law parted from English law and became similar to 
French law in this respect. This development occurred, however, after 
the Roman - Dutch law had been transplanted to the Cape of Good Hope. 
Magens, op c i t, Vol II, 174 . 
Article 16 of the 1570 Ordonnance of Phil i p II of Spain; article 9 of 
the Amsterdam Ordonnance of 1598; article 16 of the Middelburg 
Ordonnance of 1600; article 12 of the Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1604 · 
article 63 of the Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1721; article 27 of th~ 
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The rule was confirmed by De Groot
130
, 
Groenewegen131 , but Van der Keessel and Van der 
Linden were silent on the subject, probably 
because they regarded it as obvious that the goods 
were 'lost for certain and without hope of 
recovery' in such a case and therefore fell within 
the general rule. Similar principles applied under 
the Konigsberg Ordonnance of 1730132 and in 
English conunon lawl33 . 
RULE 4 (a): In the case of detention by foreign 
rulers who were not enemies and in the case of 
supervening unfitness or inability of the ship to 
complete the contemplated voyage, the assured was 
entitled to abandon the insured ship or goods, as 
the case may be, after the expiry of a prescribed 
period, which ran from the date of the 
notification referred to in Rule 6. 134 
Inleidinge 3.24.13 . 
By his footnotes to Inleidinge 3.24 . 12. 
Article 26. 
Under the early common law the period within which the assured could 
abandon was shortened in respect of perishables; see Magens, op cit, Vol 
II, 176. 
The requirement of notice was dealt wi th separately; article 23 of the 
1570 Ordonnance of Philip II of Spain; article 8 of the Amsterdam 
Ordonnance of 1598; article 15 of the Middelburg Ordonnance of 1600 ' 
articles 12 and 13 of the Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1604; article 64 of 
the Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1721 ; article 26 of the Amsterdam Ordonnance 
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The rule was confirmed by De Groot 135 , 
Groenewegen136 , Van der Keessel 137 and Van der 
Linden138 • Van der Keessel pointed out that the 
reference to foreign rulers was to lawful 
rulers139 and that the right to abandon arising 
from an arrest or detention continued to exist if 
the ship was arrested or detained at the port of 
destination while the insurance was still in 
effect140 • These qualifications do not appear to 
require an amendment of the rule as phrased, 
however. The Ordonnance de la Marine141 , the 
Konigsberg Ordonnance of 1730 142 and the English 
common law143 recognized that there were cases 
where the loss was not as yet certain and likewise 
required the assured to wait for a prescribed 
period before he could abandon. This principle was 
Inleidinge 3 . 24.12 . 
By his footnotes to Inleidinge 3 . 24 . 12. 
Theses Selectae 755 and Praelectiones , 14 65 et seq . 
Koopmans Handboek 4 . 6.8.2 . 
Praelectiones, 1466 . 
Loc cit. 
Articles 49 and 50. 
Article 25. 
Magens, op cit, Vol II, 175, where the early common law was dealt with . 
On general pri~ciple , the English common law did not allow the assured 
to ab~don unt~l there was constructive total loss, which implies that 
the sh~p or goods could not be recover ed within a reasonable time . 
725 
12.4. 
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also taken up in the WVK144. 
RULE 4(b): During the relevant waiting period the 
assured was entitled to tranship the goods at the 
expense and risk of the insurer. The insurer was 
entitled to tranship himself, if the assured did 
not do so, in which event the insurer was liable 
only for the costs of transhipment and the actual 
damage suffered in respect of the cargo as a 
resul t of the arrest or unfi tness145 . 
The rule was confirmed by De Groot146 , 
Groenewegen147 , Van der Keessel 148 and Van der 
Linden149 and also applied in the early English 
conunon law150 . 
RULE 4(c): During the relevant period the assured 
was enti tIed to demand securi ty for payment of the 
Article 668 . 
Article 8 of the Amster dam Ordonnance of 1598; article 15 of the 
Middelburg ordonnance of 1600; article 13 of the Rotterdam Ordonnance 
of 1604. 
Inleidinge 3 . 24 . 12 . 
By his footnotes to Inleidinge 3.24 . 12. 
Theses Selectae 754 , where he further pointed out that the assured was 
obliged to delay , the voyage for a short while rather than tranship if 
the damage was m~nor and could be repaired expeditiously . 
Koopmans Handboek 4 . 6 . 8 . 2 . 
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insured amount from the insurer. 151 
The rule was confirmed by De Groot
152
, 
Groenewegen153 , SChorer154 , Van der Keessel
155 
and Van der Linden156 , but was not taken up in 
the WvK. While the Konigsberg Ordonnance contained 
a similar provision157 , the requirement that the 
insurer should provide security for the claim 
appears to have fallen into desuetude by the end 
of the eighteenth century. 
RULE 5: The ship of which no news was received at 
both the port of sailing and of destination was 
presumed to be lost after the expiry of a 
prescribed period, which depended on the ship's 
destination, and the assured was allowed to claim 
the full amount of the insurance in respect of the 
Article 8 of the Amsterdam Ordonnance of , 1598; article 15 of the 
Middelburg Ordonnance of 1600; article 12 of the Rotterdam Ordonnance 
of 1604; article 65 of the Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1721. 
Inleidinge 3.24.12. 
By his footnotes to Inleidinge 3.24 . 12 . 
In his notes on Inleidinge 3.24.12, where he added that security could 
also be had if it was suspected that one of the insurers was insolvent . 
This provision more properly falls within the ambit of the law of 
insolvency . In any event, none of the subsequent writers incorporated 
this provision in their work . 
Tbeses Selectae 755. 
Koopmans Handboek 4. 6 . 8 . 2 . 
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ship upon making an abandonment. 158 
The rule was confirmed by De Groot159, 
Groenewegen160 , Scheltinga161 , Schorer
162, Van 
der Keessel163 and Van der Linden164 . The time 
limits were dependant upon the state of navigation 
and the means of communication of the time. There 
were therefore amendments to the existing 
legislation from time to time which took account 
of new destinations and circumstances. The 
underlying ordonnances were also worded in such a 
fashion that the destinations were not 
circumscribed precisely. There appeared to be a 
distinction only between intermediate voyages on 
the one hand and long voyages on the other. The 
time which had to elapse before the presumption 
would operate logically depended on the length of 
the voyage . 
Article 7 of the Antwerp customs; article 5 of the Amsterdam Ordonnance 
of 1598; article 12 of the Middelburg Ordonnance of 1600; article 14 of 
the Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1604 : arti c le 67 of the Rotterdam Ordonnance 
of 1721; article 29 of the Amsterdam Ordonnance of 1744. 
Inleidinge 3 . 24.10 . 
In h i s footnotes to Inleidinge 3 . 24 . 10. 
Dictata, ad Inleidinge 3 . 24.10. 
In his notes on Inleidinge 3.24.10 . 
Praelectiones 1461. 
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The amended provision that no news should have 
been received at the port of destination either 
took account of the fact that there were more 
voyages than earlier with an increasing prospect 
of news being brought back from the port of 
destination by other ships . The rule that the 
assured could require security for his claim from 
the insurer after half the period had elapsed 
appears to have been peculiar to Amsterdam. 165. 
The missing ship provision is ancient in 
heritage166 and applied under the Guidon de la 
Mer67 , the Ordonnance de la Marine of 1681168 , 
the Konigsberg Ordonnance of 1730 169 , and in 
English common law170 • The missing ship 
provisions of the various Dutch local ordonnances 
were consolidated in article 667 of the WvK, where 
periods of six, twelve and eighteen months 
respectively were introduced for sailings to and 
from European ports, those in the Atlantic and 
Van der Keessel , Praelectiones, 1461 . 
Dating back to article 15 of the Barcelona Ordonnance of 1435. 
Article 12 . 
Article 48 . 
Article 27. See Magens, op cit, Vol II, 193 . 
Magens, op cit, Vol II, 177; Park, op cit, 71-72; Marshall, op cit, 
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those further awayl71. 
THE SUBSIDIARY RULES OF ABANDONMENT 
RULE 6(a): The assured was obliged to notify the 
majority of the insurers who were domiciled at the 
place where the contract was concluded of any 
casual ty, arrest or loss affecting the insured 
ship or goods. The notification had to be made 
through a broker or public person who had to keep 
a record of the notification given. Where the 
abandonment could not be made forthwith, time did 
not begin to run until this notification had been 
served. 172 
The principles of this rule were confirmed by De 
Groot173 , Groenewegen174, Van der Keessel 175 
and Van der Linden176 • They also applied under 
See Chapter 6 para 2 . 5 . 9 supra . These periods were later reduced by the 
standard pol i cy of the Amsterdam Exchange. 
Article 28 read with article 8 of the Amsterdam Ordonnance of 1598; 
article 21 read with article 15 of the Middelburg Ordonnance of 1600 · 
article 16 of the Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1604· article 26 read with 
article 36 (as amended) of the Amsterdam Ordonn~ce of 1744. The officer 
entrusted with this task differed from town to town but was a public 
official . ' 
Inleidinge 3.24.14. 
His footnotes to Inleidinge 3 . 24.14 . 
Theses Selectae 758 and Praelectiones, 1472. 
Koopmans Handboek 4 . 6 . 8 . 1 . 
730 
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the Konigsberg Ordonnance of 1730177 and even in 
the early English common law178 , but do not 
appear to have survived in English law. The 
principle was slightly different under the 
Ordonnance de la Marine of 1681179 • The rule was 
also taken up in article 673 of the WvK which made 
it clear that the duty existed only in respect of 
abandonment cases and not to other losses. 
It was later provided expressly that the assured 
who failed to give such notice would be liable for 
such damages as may be suffered by the insurer as 
a result of the breach18o • Van der Keessel 181 
and Van der Linden182 confirmed the stipulation 
with regard to damages . On the general principles 
of the law of contract the breach of the 
obligation to disclose news of a casualty or a 
threat to the insurer at the earliest opportunity 
should give rise to a liability for damages . The 
rule may therefore be qualified by the statement: 
Article 21. See Magens , op cit, Vol II, 191. 
Magens, op cit, Vol II, 174. 
Article 42 provided no penalty for a fai l ure to give the notification 
or a late notification ; see Emerigon , op cit, (Meredith edition), 679 . 
The provision for damages emanated from article 54 of the Rotterdam 
. Ordonnance of 1721 , was repeated in article 36 of the Amsterdam 
Ordonnance of 1744 as amended in 1756 . 
Theses Selectae 758 and Praelectiones , 1472 . 
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RULE 6 (b): The assured was held liable for any 
damages suffered by the insurer as a resul t of his 
failure to give such notice. 
The liability for damages was also provided for in 
~rticle 673 of the WvK. 
RULE 7 (a): The abandonment had to be made in 
writing and had to be served formally through a 
public official whose duties included the service 
of such formal documents and processes. 183 
French law did not have such a requirement, but 
the practice at Marseilles was for an entry to be 
made in a special register184 . In the English 
common law no formality was required and the 
abandonment could be made orally or in 
writing185. Articles 678 and 680 (1) of the WvK 
also obliged the assured to give formal notice of 
abandonment through service by 'exploi t' served by 
a 'deurwaarder' 186 . 
Article 8 of the Ameterdam Ordonnance of 1598: article 15 of the 
Middelburg ordonnance of 1600; article 15 of the Rotterdam Ordonnance 
of 1604; article 61 of the Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1721; Article 36 of 
the Ameterdam Ordonnance of 1744 as amended in 1756. Who this official 
was differed from town to town. 
Emerigon, op cit, (Meredith edition), 679 . 
Parmeter v Todhunter (1808) 1 Camp 541 ; Marshall, op cit, (1865), Bk I, 
485. 
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Van den Ende expressed the opinion that a 
subsequent recovery of the ship or goods had no 
effect on the assured's right to claim the insured 
amount, nor on the transfer of ownership 18 7 . The 
abandonment fixed the parties' 
obligations with final effect, 
therefore has to be amplified by: 
rights and 
and the rule 
RULE 7 (b): The parties I rights and obligations 
were determined on the facts as they were on the 
date when the abandonment was made. 
This principle was established on the authority of 
Van den Ende's opinion188 and accorded with 
French law189 • Article 679 of the WvK preserved 
this principle. English law differed in that the 
circumstances as at the date when suit was brought 
determined whether there was a right to abandon or 
not190 • 
According to Van den Ende the abandonment was 
AdvyB 24 , at 71, read with AdVYB 23, at 130 and AdvyB 16, at 88 in 
BareIs, op ci t. 
Supra. 
Article 45 of the Ordonnance de la Marine entitled the assured to work 
for the recovery of the ship or goods without prejudice to his right to 
abandon. 
Hamilton v MendeB 2 Burr 1210 ; Naylor v Taylor 9 B & C 718; Park, op 
cit, 165, 181-183 ; Marshall, op cit, (1865), Bk I, 454-455 . 
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proportional to the extent of the insurance . The 
abandonment therefore had to extend to the whole 
interest which was subj ect to the insurance191 . 
The rule is therefore qualified by the principle 
that: 
RULE 7 (c) The abandonment could not be partial. 
This principle applied under the Ordonnance de la 
Marine of 1681192 , the Konigsberg Ordonnance193 , 
in the English common law194 , and was taken up in 
article 677 (1) of the WVK195. 
Since the abandonment had the effect of divesting 
the assured so effectively of ownership that it 
could transfer to the insurer without further ado, 
the abandonment could not be made conditionally. 
This principle imposed a further rule namely: 







Advys 16 . 
Article 47. 
Article 24. See Magens, op cit, Vol II , 192. 
Magens, op cit, Vol II, 175; Park, op cit, 162; Marshall, op cit, 
(1865), Bk I, 486-487 . 
See Chapter 6 para 3.7 supra. 
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The rule applied in French law196 as well as the 
English common law197 and was taken up in article 
677(1) of the WvK. 
12.5.11. Van der Linden mentioned another principle, namely 
that the assured, when making the abandonment, had 
to declare all other insurances he had taken on 
the insured ship or goods as well as any loans on 
bottomry that he had taken on them198 . This 
principle is not referred to by any of the other 
Roman-Dutch authors, but appears to have been part 
of the underlying common law. It was contained in 
the Ordonnance de la Marine of 1681199 and the 
English common law2oo • The rule can be stated as 
follows: 
12.5.12. RULE 7{e): When making the abandonment the assured 
had to declare to the insurer all other insurances 
taken by him on the ship or goods, as well as any 
loans on bottomry he had taken on the security of 
the ship or goods insured. 
196 
Emerigon, op cit, (Meredith edition), 684. 
197 
Marshall, op cit, (1865), Bk I, 487. 
198 
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The purpose of the rule was to enable the insurer 
to determine the exact extent of his own rights 
after the abandonment, to pursue those rights in 
relation to the abandoned effects as well as 
determine his position in relation to third 
parties such as possible co-insurers and 
mortgagees. The principles of this rule were taken 
up in article 675 of the WvK201 • 
THE CONSEOUENCES OF THE ABANDONMENT 
RULE 8: The insurer was obliged to pay the sum 
insured after the expiry of a prescribed 
period. 202 
The rule was confirmed by De Groot203 , 
Groenewegen204 , Van der Keesse1 205 and Van der 
Linden206 • This principle applied under the 
Guidon de la Mey207 , in French law 
See Chapter 6 para 3 . 5 supra . 
Article 5 of the Amsterdam Ordonnance of 1598; article 12 of the 
Middelburg Ordonnance of 1600 ; article 15 of the Rotterdam Ordonnance 
of 1604 ; article 68 of the Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1721. 
Inleidi nge 3 . 24.13 . 
By his footnotes to Inleidinge 3.24.13. 
Theses Selectae 757 . 
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thereafter208 , under the Konigsberg Ordonnance of 
1730209 and in English law210 . Articles 679 and 
690 of the WvK confirmed the principle and, in 
terms of article 680(2) of the WvK, interest ran 
in favour of the assured from the date upon which 
the insurer became obliged to make payment 211 • 
The amount recoverable upon an abandonment was 
abated, at Amsterdam, by any depreciation in the 
value during the voyage212 • 
RULE 9(a): The effect of the abandonment was that 
the assured relinquished his rights in relation to 
the ship or goods insured in favour of the 
insurer, who acquired ownership of them by 
opera tion of law213 • 
This rule was born out of the mercantile customs 
which applied throughout western Europe and in 
England during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
Emerigon , op cit , (Meredith edition), 685. 
Articles 22 , 25 and 27 . See Magens, op c i t, Vol II, 192-193 . 
Magens, op cit, Vol II , 175 . 
This principle, that interest runs in favour of the creditor from the 
date of mora, appears to be a general principle of the Roman - Dutch law 
rather than a peculiar principle of marine insurance law . See Chapter 
6 para 4.6. supra . 
Van der Keessel, Praelectiones , 1471. 
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centuries214 • It was confirmed as being in force 
in Holland by being applied by De la Mine
215 
and 
Van den Ende216 and was taken up in article 678 
of the WvK. It was expressly provided for in the 
Ordonnance de la Marine of 1681217 and was part 
of the English common l aw2l8. Under the 
Konigsberg Ordonnance the requirement was to the 
same effect, namely that the assured was 'obliged 
wholly to transfer the lost Ship or Goods to the 
Insurer. ,219 
Van den Ende mentioned a further aspect of the 
abandonment which elaborates on the principle 
postulated namely that the abandonment operated as 
a transfer only to the extent of the insurance220 
so that in the case of under-insurance the assured 
retained ownership of that portion in respect of 
which he was regarded as self-insurer. The rule 
must therefore be extended to add: 
See Chapter 14 supra . 
Consultatie 52 ; Van den Berg, Nederlands Advysboek, (1693-1698), 112. 
Advysen 14 , 23 & 16 in BareIs, op cit. 
Article 60 . 
Magens, op cit, Vol II, 177. In English law the transfer was retro-
active to the date of the loss; Cammell v Sewell 3 H & N 617 ; S . C. in 
Cam. Scacc. 5 H & N 728 . 
Article 27 . See Magens, op cit , Vol II, 193 . 
Advys 16 in BareIs, op cit, 86. 
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RULE 9(b): The insurer acquired only that part or 
proportion of the insured ship or goods which were 
covered by the insurance. 
This principle was part of the Guidon de la 
Mer221 and subsequent French law222 as well as 
the Konigsberg Ordonnance223 and the English 
common law224 . The rule was also taken up in 
article 677(2) of the WvK. 
CONCLUSION 
The rules enunciated thus far are the basic 
principles of abandonment which were transplanted 
to South Africa by the Dutch settlers in 1652 
Those rules developed during the next hundred and 
fifty years. There was still direct contact with 
the Roman-Dutch law until 1806 when the Cape of 
Good Hope became a British possession. The 
principles which were transplanted to the Cape 
thus included the underlying common law as 
contained in the European j us commune of 
insurance, the statutory provisions which applied 
Article 7 . 
Emerigon, op cit, (Meredith edition), 702. 
Article 24. See Magens, op cit, Vol II , 192 . 
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in the Province of Holland and in the writings of 
the acknowledged authors on Roman-Dutch law up to 
1806. 
As was demonstrated, these principles were not 
only the same or similar to those applying in 
France, Germany and England at the time, but they 
were also later taken up in the WvK in the 
Netherlands. The result was that these inherited 
principles of abandonment were in consonance with 
the law applying in other countries and were given 
a new lease of life in the Netherlands in. the WvK 
of 1838. 
The codification process in the Netherlands 
started in the first decade of the nineteenth 
century and the further development of the Roman-
Dutch law in Holland was halted. Since the British 
rulers of the Cape of Good Hope did not replace 
the Roman-Dutch law applying at the Cape with 
their own, any further development of the 
inherited abandonment principles could only occur 
by means of local legislation and judicial 
decisions. While there has been an opportunity 
between 1806 and the present for English law and 
practice to influence the inherited principles of 
abandonment, the extent, if any, to which that has 
740 
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occurred can only be determined by reference to 
local legislation and case law. 
The extent to which English law and practice and 
South African legislation and case law constituted 
new developments in the last two centuries will 
therefore be considered in the next chapter before 
the exposition of the principles of abandonment 
which apply in South African law is finalised. It 
should be recorded, however, that in the absence 
of new developments emanating from these sources, 
the basic rules and principles of abandonment 
which applied in the Roman-Dutch law constitute 
the common law principles of abandonment in South 
African marine insurance law. 
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CHAPTER EIGHTEEN 
SOUTH AFRICAN LAW: LEGISLATION AND CASE LAW 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. In 1806 the Cape of Good Hope was finally 
conquered by the British and the opportunity arose 
for the Roman-Dutch law applying at the Cape to be 
influenced by English law. Within forty years 
thereafter Natal became a British possession and 
the same opportunity arose there. On the other 
hand, during the same period of forty years the 
two Boer Republics of Transvaal and the Orange 
Free State were established. Initially the Roman-
Dutch law remained the law applying to marine 
insurance in the two British Colonies, the Cape of 
Good Hope and Natal, and also in the two the Boer 
Republics, Transvaal and the Orange Free State. 
1.2. The two British Colonies and the two Boer 
Republics each had its own Parliament and Supreme 
Court. Each therefore had the opportunity to 
change the old Roman-Dutch law by means of 
legislation or by way of judicial interpretation. 
As will be seen below, there was no predictable 
pattern so far as the importation of English law 
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passed legislation affecting marine insurance in 
1879. The Orange Free State did so in 1902 after 
it had become a British possession. Natal and 
Transvaal passed no legislation of their own. So 
far as decided cases are concerned, four cases 
were reported in the Supreme Court of the Cape of 
Good Hope and one in the Durban and Coast Local 
Division of the Supreme Court1 • Only one case 
reached the Appellate Division. It remains to 
determine to what extent, if any, the local 
legislation and decided cases influenced the law 
so far as abandonment is concerned. 
LEGISLATION 
In the Cape of Good Hope, where the British forms 
of government, English institutions and mercantile 
custom were introduced, it was probably inevitable 
that the importation of English commercial law was 
eventually to be advocated by the Chief Justice 
(1873 to 1910), Lord John Henry de Villiers2. De 
Villiers CJ drafted a Bill which became the 
General Law Amendment Act 8 of 1879 and came into 
. This division of the South African Supreme Court is the successor to the 
~ri~in~l ~upr~me Court of Natal, and is by far the busiest maritime 
)ur1sd1ct10n 1n the country . 
Van Niekerk, The Decline, Revival and Future of the Roman-Dutch Law of 
Insurance in South Africa, ('Decline'), Monogram 3, (1986) Unisa, 15. 
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operation on the 11th September, 18793 . 
2.2. Section 2 of Act 8 of 1879 provided as follows: 
'In every suit, action, and cause having reference 
to questions of fire, life and marine insurance, 
stoppage in transitu, and bills of lading, which 
shall henceforth be brought in the Supreme Court, 
or in any other competent Court of this Colony, 
the law administered by the High Court of Justice 
in England for the time being, so far as the same 
shall not be repugnant to, or in conflict with, 
any Ordonnance, Act of Parliament or other statute 
having the force of law in the Colony, shall be 
the law to be administered by the said Supreme 
Court or other competent Court.' 
2.3. Section 3 of the act provided that no 'statutory 
enactment made and passed by the Imperial 
Parliament after the taking effect of this Act' 
was to have any effect in the Cape of Good Hope 
unless such statutory enactment was re-enacted by 
the parliament of the Cape of Good Hope4 . Only one 
case touching upon abandonment was decided by the 
Supreme Court of the Cape of Good Hope after the 
3 
Van Niekerk, Decline, 18. 
4 
Van Niekerk, Decline, 20 . 
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enactment of Act 8 of 1879. That occurred in 1917. 
In the meantime the Marine Insurance Act 1906 
('the MIA'), had come into operation in England 
but was not re-enacted at the Cape. 
2.4. In May, 1902 the Republic of the Orange Free State 
became a British colony. In 1902 the Free State 
legislature passed the General Law Amendment 
Ordonnance 5 of 1902 which provided that in every 
action having reference to questions of fire, life 
and marine insurance brought in an Orange Free 
State court after the taking effect of the 
ordonnance on 1st August, 1902 the law 
administered by the Cape of Good Hope Supreme 
Court for the time being was to be the law to be 
administered by the Orange Free State courts. The 
MIA was not imported into the law of the Orange 
Free State either. 
2.5. Whilst there may be considerable argument as to 
what questions precisely are covered by the 
reference to 'marine insurance' 6, there can be no 
doubt that abandonment falls squarely within the 
ambit of the term. In fact, as was demonstrated in 
Chapter 13, abandonment is unique to marine 
S Section 1 . See Van Niekerk, Decline, 21. 
6 







Part V: Chapter 18 : South African law: Legislation and case law 
insurance . English law was therefore to apply in 
the Cape of Good Hope from 1879 and in the Orange 
Free State from 1902 in respect of abandonment. In 
the case of the Orange Free State, the question is 
entirely academic since its courts were never 
called upon to decide any cases involving 
abandonment 7 • As for the Cape of Good Hope, only 
one case involving abandonment in marine insurance 
was decided by the Supreme Court of the Cape of 
Good Hope during the life of Act 8 of 18798 . 
The effect of Act 8 of 1879 (Cape of Good Hope) 
and Ordonnance 5 of 1902 (Orange Free State) was 
that the English marine insurance concepts of an 
actual total loss and a constructive total loss 
were imported into the marine insurance law 
applying at the Cape of Good Hope and Orange Free 
State. The principles of the English common law9 
as set out in the judgments of the English courts 
therefore determined all questions relating to 
abandonment in these two colonies. 
This resulted in the paradoxical position after 
There are no reported cases emanating from this jurisdiction on the 
question of abandonment in marine insurance. 
South African Railways & Harbours v w.m. Anderson & Co. 1917 CPD 121 . 
The principles of abandonment in the English common law were discussed 
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191010 that in two of the provinces of the Union 
of South Africa English law applied to marine 
insurance contracts whilst the Roman-Dutch law 
applied to the other two . Two of the provinces 
were landlocked, yet English law applied in the 
one but not the other. Two of the provinces were 
British colonies before 1902, but only one of them 
adopted English law. The paradox was completed by 
the fact that one of the former Boer republics and 
one of the British colonies adopted English law11 
while the other former Boer republic and the other 
British colony retained the Roman-Dutch law12 • 
There was simply no consistency in the situation. 
In 1965 an eminent academic called for the Cape of 
Good Hope and Orange Free State legislation 
importing English law to be repealed13 • So did 
the author of the most important textbook on 
shipping and carriage14 • The Pre-Union Statute 
Law Revision Act 43 of 1977 which came into 
operation on 13 April 1977 thereupon repealed the 
The four colonies united in the Union of South Africa with effect from 
1910 . 
The Orange Free State and Cape of Good Hope . 
Transvaal and Natal . 
Professor Ellison Kahn , 'Have certain English precedents binding force 
in South Africa?' (1965) 82 SALJ 526 at 527. 
Bamford, The Law of Shipping and Carriage in South Africa , 2nd ed, 
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General Law Amendment Act 8 of 1879 (Cape of Good 
Hope) and the General Law Amendment Ordonnance 5 
of 1902 (Orange Free State) 15. It remains to be 
seen whether, during the lives of Act 8 of 1879 
and Ordonnance 5 of 1902, any of the English law 
principles relating to abandonment in marine 
insurance were introduced into South African law. 
This naturally has to be done by reference to 
reported cases. As was pointed out in Chapter 15, 
the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 of 
1983 preserved the 'Roman-Dutch law,16 applicable 
in the Republic as the legal regime regulating 
marine insurance17 . 
DECIDED CASES 
Only five cases involving questions relating to 
abandonment in marine insurance have been reported 
in the official law reports of the Supreme Court 
of South Africa and its forerunners in the Cape of 
Good Hope and Natal. None emanated from the Orange 
Free State and Transvaal. These five cases span a 
period of almost exactly one hundred and fifty 
Section 1 read with the Schedule to the Act . 
This is regarded as a misnomer as the inherited Roman-Dutch law has 
s~nce ~ecome known simply as South African law. However, in the 
d~scuss~on of the cases referred to below the language of the court will 
be retained so far as possible. 
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years. English law was applied in only one of 
them18 . In the intervening period the means of 
navigation, communication and travel improved 
dramatically, not only on land but also at sea and 
in the air. 
CHIAPPINI & Co v JONES19 
THE FACTS: The ship Hall was repaired in Simon's 
Bay at a cost of £1,022 18s 4d, which amount was 
lent and advanced by the plaintiffs to the owner 
of the ship against the security of a bill drawn 
by the master on the owners of the ship. The 
plaintiffs then purported to insure the ship for 
£1 000, being her agreed value. The policy of 
insurance contemplated that if the bill drawn by 
the master on the owners were to be met after the 
ship might be lost, the insurers would not be 
liable. The insurance was free of average, whether 
general or particular20 . The ship thereafter 
sprang a leak en route to Liverpool and put in at 
the nearest port at Ascension, where she could not 
be made seaworthy for a passage to England again, 
there being no means for effecting the necessary 
South African Railways & Harbours v Wom. Anderson, supra. 
(1837) 3 Menzies 181. 
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repairs. The ship was condemned as unseaworthy, 
was unable to sail to Liverpool and was thus 
wholly lost to her owners. The bill was presented 
for payment to her owners but payment refused and 
the plaintiffs thereupon sued the insurer on the 
policy. Evidence was given by the plaintiffs' 
attorney John Barker, who testified that he had 
'applied to the defendant for the amount he had 
underwritten on the Hall, and told him that the 
plaintiffs were ready to assign to him all their 
interest in the bill or to lend their names, 
or to give him any other facility he might 
suggest, to enable him to receive the money from 
the owners.' 
THE ISSUES: The defendant raised two matters 
relevant to the question of abandonment. The first 
contention was that the ship had already been 
unseaworthy when she sailed from Simon's Bay2l. 
The second contention was that a formal 
abandonment was necessary to entitle the 
plaintiffs to sue and that no such abandonment had 
taken place22 • The argument continued that the 
At 187. 
At 188. This argument was based on Van der Linden Recbtsgeleerd 
Practicaal en Koopman8 Handboek, ('Koopmans Handboek') , (1806) 482 
(the English translation by Henry (1828)). The origin~l Dutch'editio~ 
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plaintiffs were bound to abandon the ship to the 
underwriters and had not done S023. 
THE DECISION: Menzies J , who presided at the 
trial, held against the defendant on the first 
point, finding that there was sufficient proof 
that the ship had sprung a leak at sea24 • He then 
held that the plaintiffs had no right in the ship 
which they could abandon as what was insured under 
the policy was their interest in the bill drawn in 
their favour to the value of £1 000,00, not the 
ship 25. He further held, without reference to 
authority, that the plaintiffs' offer to cede to 
the defendant all their interest in the bill and 
to do everything which could facilitate payment of 
the bill was a sufficient abandonrnent26 • Judgment 
was therefore granted for the plaintiffs with 
interest and costs. 
abandonnement wordt gedaan hij eene scbriftelijke insinuatie, door den 
Bode van Zeezaaken . ' 
At 188 . 
This finding is of importance in that it should always be kept in mind 
that the right to abandon in the case of innavigability only arises if 
the loss is caused by a peril of the sea, or, as it has been put, by the 
action of the sea . 
The ship was apparently not given as security for the advance. She could 
hardly have ~een, as a pledg~ w~uld have been required , placing her in 
the possess~on of the pla~nt~ffs. The sum insured determined by 
r 7ference to. the valu~ of the ship, a result of the parties ' 
m~sunderstand~ng of prec~sely what the insured interest was. 
At 188. 
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4.4. COMMENT : Both the main points argued by the 





In the first instance , the factual issue 
concerning the seaworthiness of the ship at the 
commencement of the voyage was a relevant 
consideration in determining whether the ship had 
become innavigable as a result of a sea peri1
27
, 
as the right to abandon the ship would not arise 
otherwise. However, it was not the ship which had 
been insured, only the liability of her owners on 
the bill . It therefore appears that the assured, 
being the drawee of the bill, had no insurable 
interest in the ship in any event, but might have 
had such an interest if the ship or some right in 
it had been given as security for the advance. 
On the question whether the ship ought to have 
been abandoned the court was clearly correct in 
pointing out that the insured interest was the 
plaintiffs' interest in the bill, and that they 
had no interest in the ship which they could 
abandon to the defendant. While this reasoning 
cannot be faulted, the fact is that only the ship 
and the goods carried on her could be abandoned 
'onbruikbaarheid door zeeschade'. 
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under the Roman-Dutch law28 , a principle which 
was also taken up in the Wetboek van Koophandel of 
1838 (' the WvK' ) in the Netherlands
29
• The 
plaintiffs' offer to cede their interest in the 
bill should rather be seen as an unnecessary offer 
to transfer their rights against the drawer of the 
bill. This offer to cede was unnecessary as the 
insurer would have been subrogated to those rights 
upon indemnification of their assured in any 
event30 • 
As to the form and service of the notice of 
abandonment, the court did not discuss either. It 
is clear, nonetheless, that the ' offer of the 
plaintiffs to cede' 31 their rights in the bill 
was regarded as sufficient, not only by the court 
but also by the defendant's counsel. However, 
since this could not be an abandonment case as the 
insured interest was not the ship or her cargo, 
Only the ship and cargo insured were mentioned in the customs of the 
Az.1twerp Exchange , the local ordonnances (Amsterdam, 1598 and 1744, 
M1ddelburg, 1600, and Rotterdam, 1604 and 1721) , and the works of the 
Roman-Dutch writers discussed in Chapters 16 and 17 supra . There was no 
mention of any other thing or right being able to be abandoned and the 
conclusion is inescapable that it was not contemplated that anything 
other than the ship and her cargo coul d be abandoned . 
Article 663 . As in the underlying Roman-Dutch law, there was no mention 
in the WvK of anything other than the ship and the goods carried on a 
shi p which could be abandoned. 
This should not be seen as any serious criticism of the plaintiffs' 
attorney ' s conduct as the concept of subrogation was only beginning to 
emerge as a separate concept from within the wider concept of 
abandonment at that time. This matter i s discussed in Chapter 12 supra . 
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the court's remarks on the requirements of the 
Roman-Dutch law for a proper abandonment were 
obiter dicta. 
Nevertheless, the court's approach to the 
formalities of the notice of abandonment raises 
the inference that the requirements of the 
Amsterdam and Rotterdam ordonnances regarding 
formal service of the notice of abandonment were 
not applied at the Cape . The judgment cannot be 
said to go as far as stating that notice of 
abandonment was unnecessary as there had been a 
notification which could have been either oral or 
written32 • 
The court's judgment is reconcilable with Van der 
Linden's observations that the assured was 
required to effect an abandonment, , alvoorens 
vergoeding te kunnen eischen', but not with the 
two requirements he mentioned in respect of the 
notice of abandonment itself, namely that the 
notice to be in writing and that it to be served 
The plaintiffs' attorney's evidence (at 186) was that he 'applied' for 
the sum insure~ and ' told' the defendant that the plaintiffs were 
prepared to ass~~ their rights in the bill . It is not clear from the 
report whet~er t~~s. occurred orally or in writing, or even partly orally 
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by the 'Bode van Zeezaaken,33. So far as written 
notice is concerned, the report of the case is not 
sufficiently clear for a conclusion to be drawn 
that written notice was no longer required at the 
Cape of Good Hope. But so far as service by the 
'Bode Van Zeezaaken' was concerned, that could 
clearly no longer apply at the Cape as the 'Bode' 
was an official appointed in respect of a 
particular town or area and apparently never had 
any equivalent at the Cape34 • 
In summary, Chiappini &. Co v Jones was not an 
abandonment case because the insured interest was 
not a ship or her cargo. At most it was a 
subrogation case. The distinction between 
abandonment and subrogation was not yet clear at 
the time, and the court and the parties, probably 
for that reason, failed to see the case in the 
clear light now available. 
DE PASS v COMMERCIAL MARINE INSURANCE CO. 35 
THE FACTS: The bark 'Dido' and her cargo of copper 
Koopmans Handboek 4.8.2. As authority for this requirement Van der 
. Linden relied on article 61 of the Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1721 and on 
Pothier, Traite du Contrat d'Assurance, (1768 - 1778), 3 . 1.1.3 . 
Nor anywhere else in South Africa. 
(1857) 3 Searle 46 . 
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ore were insured on a voyage from Hondeklip Bay to 
Swansea on two separate policies, a hull policy 
and a cargo policy, in an aggregate amount of 
£797 9s. She was damaged in heavy weather off 
Madeira as a result of which she was forced to 
make for Funchal. The plaintiff's case was that 
she could not be made seaworthy again without 
'great and expensive repairs effected upon 
her,36, and that he was unable to raise the money 
at Funchal. The master therefore transhipped the 
cargo, abandoned the Dido to the underwriters, and 
after the abandonment sold her in the interests of 
underwriters for £800. The plaintiff, relying on 
the abandonment, claimed £650 lOs 10d on the hull 
policy and £146 18s 2d on the cargo policy, in 
each case after deduction of various expenses. 
5.2. THE ISSUES: The defendant denied any need for the 
abandonment of the 'Dido' and the transhipment of 
the cargo . Counsel for the defendant argued that 
there was no evidence of an attempt to raise funds 
to pay for the repairs and further that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the allegation 












Part v: Chapter 18 : South African law : Legislation and case law 
Funchal. He referred to two English authorities
37 
and also to an American authori ty38 in support 
his contentions. The plaintiff's counsel had 
referred to the same English authorities in 
support of his submission on the master's 
authority to sell the ship. 
THE DECISION: Each of the three judges gave a 
separate judgment. 
Bell J recited the facts and identified the issue 
as whether the plaintiff was entitled to abandon 
the ship. He pointed out that none of the 
authorities cited 'was from the Roman-Dutch law, 
which is the law of this court,39. He then 
examined the Roman-Dutch authorities and referred 
to Voet40 , De Groot41 and Van Der Keesse142 as 
well as the Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Middelburg 
Ordonnances and came to the conclusion that 'if a 
Abbott on Shipping, 8th ed; Arnould on Mari ne Insurance, (probably the 
first or second edition ) . 
Kent, Commentaries on American Law, (edition not stated) . 
At 49 . 
Commentarius ad Pandectas , (1698-1704) , 14 . 1 . 3. 
Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Regtsgeleerdheid, (1631), (' Inleidinge') , 
3.24 . 12 and 13 . 
Thes~~ Selectae ~uris Hollandici et Zelandici , ad supplendam Hugonis 
Grot~~ Introduct~onem ad Jurisprudentiam Hollandicam, (1800) ('Theses 
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vessel is wholly unnavigable the master may 
immediately abandon her' 43 . 
Bell J further held that if the vessel could not 
be repaired for want of money or credit, or 
without a ruinous expense, she could be abandoned 
provided there was proper proof that repairs could 
not be effected44 • He reviewed English law 
through a variety of authorities45 and cases46 
as well as an American authori ty47 and found that 
there was 
'no proof of urgent necessity, which is what all 
the English cases dwell upon nor of 
irreparability which the Dutch law requires, 
allowing that expression to include impossibility 
of repairing from the ruinous heaviness of the 
This conclusion is in accordance with Van der Keessel's statement in 
Theses Selectae, 755, as also with Van der Linden's Koopmans Handboek 
4. 6. 8 . where he said that the abandonment could be made 'aanstonds' 
(forthwith) if the ship had perished or had become innavigable or the 
goods had been lost ' met zekerheid'. This part of the judgment confirms 
Rule 3(a) established in the previous chapter. 
At 51 . This statement is not justified by any of the authorities cited 
by Bell J, but appears to be the rule in English law. 
Abbott on Shipping, 8th ed, and Arnould on Marine Insurance, (probably 
the first or second edition) . 
Tremenhere v Tresilian 1 Sid 452; Johnson v Shippen 2 Raym 984; The 
Fanny and Elmira Edwards Adm Rep 117; Royal Exchange Assurance Co v Idle 
3 Brod & Bing 151 ; Robertson v Clarke 1 Bing 445; Somes v Sugrue 4 Car 
& Payne 276; Hayman and Others v Moulton 5 Esp 65 and Hunter v Parker 
7 M & W 342. 
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expense' 48. 
Bell J was therefore in favour of absolving the 
defendant from the instance. 
Cloete J concurred in the judgment of Bell J. He 
pointed out that the policy of insurance was 
effected at the Cape of Good Hope, by a plaintiff 
who had a house of trade there and with defendants 
who had set up a marine assurance company in Cape 
Town. He therefore was of the opinion that the 
case had to be decided according to the lex loci 
contractus49 • He also identified the issue as 
whether the master ' under the Roman-Dutch law, was 
justified in proceeding to the act of 
abandonment' 50. Cloete J referred to the old 
ordonnances of the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries and stated that they never authorised 
the inunediate abandonment of a but 
required a long period of time within which the 
At 56 . 
At 57. 
At 58. 
This statement appears to be incorrect as it conflicts with the express 
authority of the Dutch ordonnances dating back to the Amsterdam 
Ordonnance of 1598 as well as the writings of De Groot, Inleidinge 
3 . 24.13; Van der Keessel, Praelectiones 1466 et seq and Theses Selectae 
755; Van der Linden, Koopmans Handboek 4.6.8.2. and others. Van der 
Keessel's Pra~lectioneB was, of course, not available to the court as 
that was publ~shed only recently. 
759 
5 . 3 . 3. 
52 
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owner was bound to keep possession of the ship and 
to expend as much as possible for the purposes of 
repairing the ship, if that could be done, before 
he could claim the insurance52 • 
Cloete J also referred to a case reported by 
Bynkershoek53 in which the mercantile tribunal at 
Amsterdam and the Court of Holland had found in 
favour of the assured where a vessel had been 
grounded and was abandoned. There was then an 
appeal to the Supreme Court . On appeal the 
insurers insisted that the ship might have been 
refloated and repaired . The court held, firstly, 
that it had been proved that the expense which 
would have been incurred i n repairing the vessel 
would have exceeded her value by far and, 
secondly, that the master had informed the 
insurers of what had happened, but they gave him 
no instructions on how to act. Cloete J was of the 
opinion that this authority was apposite and bore 
strongly upon the case under consideration. He 
thus found in favour of the defendants because of 
lack of proof that the funds to repair the ship 
Cloete J did not distinguish clearly between the cases of unfitness 
which was repai rable and innavigability which meant the ship could not 
be made seaworthy again . It i s clear though that the case befor e the 
court concerned the former . 
Quaestiones Juris Privati, (1744), 4 . 14 (at 634 of the particular 
edition) . 
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were not to be found at Funcha1 54 • 
Watermeyer J agreed that there should be 
absolution from the instance because there had 
been 'a failure of proof as regards the 
innavigability or constructive innavigability. 55, 
He also reviewed the old ordonnances56 , referred 
to Voet, Van Der Keessel and the case quoted by 
Cloete J, and further to the Hamburg Ordonnance57 
attached to the Dutch edition of ROCCUS
58
• 
According to Cloete J abandonment was allowed only 
where there was no hope whatever of the recovery 
of the ship 59. He relied upon Van der Keessel for 
the statement that the ship could be abandoned 
immediately if the damage caused by the perils of 
the sea was major and irreparable but that if the 
This is a significant development because Roman - Dutch case law was 
accepted by Cloete J as authority for a point which had not been put 
forward by De Groot, Van der Keessel and Van der Linden on the point . 
The principle to be derived from this approach is that the court is at 
liberty to examine case law to determine the fine issues which may arise 
on the general principles stated in the various ordonnances and Roman-
Dutch authorities. 
At 59-60. He was of the op1n10n that in the case of the Dido the ship 
was not alleged to have been beyond repair but it was alleged that the 
funds to do so at Funchal were lacking. It was for the plaintiff to 
prove this fact , which was not proved properly . 
The ordonnances of Philip II of 1563 and 1570, as well as the Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam and Middelburg ordonnances , in this instance those of 1598, 
1604 and 1600 respectively. 
1731. 
Feitama, Merkwaardige aanmerkingen vervat in twee tractaaten, waarvan 
bet eene is bandelende over scbepen en vragtgelderen, bet anderen over 
assurantien oite verzekeringen, mitsgaders eenige uytgesogten 
gewijsdens, (1737). 
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injury should be levius and could be repaired at 
a moderate expenditure, the assured was obliged to 
have her repaired60 • 
The defendants were therefore absolved from the 
instance in respect of the claim on the hull 
policy but judgment was granted in favour of the 
plaintiff for the amount claimed in respect of the 
cargo policy because the plaintiff was found to 
have been entitled to tranship the cargo onto 
another ship under the circumstances61 • 
COMMENT: A number of important principles were 
established or confirmed in this decision. 
In the first place, all three judges held that 
Roman-Dutch law applied rather than English law, 
notwithstanding that counsel had argued the matter 
on the basis of English law. 
In the second place, important Roman-Dutch 
Theses Selectae 755 . Watermeyer J thus confirmed the applicability of 
Rules 3(a) and 4(a) enunciated in the previous chapter. 
The court therefore confirmed the principle of Rule 4 (b) that the 
assured is entitled to tranship the cargo insured at the cost of the 
insurers during the period when the final fate of the ship which is 
unfit or under detention is awaited . It is also apparent from the 
cc;>urt's finding in respect of the cargo policy that there may be 
c~rcumstances where the cargo may be abandoned without there being a 
right to abandon the ship carrying them. In each case the question would 
be whether the particular insured interest (the ship or cargo) was lost 
for certain . This principle is recognized by the WvK, (see Chapter 6 
para 2.5 supra) which specified separate requirements for the right of 
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authorities were identified. These include De 
Groot, Van der Keessel, Voet and Bynkershoek. Over 
and above that the old ordonnances of Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam and Middelburg were expressly relied 
upon (and thus given a new life at the Cape of 
Good Hope) . 
In the third place the court consulted Roccus, an 
Italian authority on the civil law of the 
seventeenth century covering maritime and 
insurance matters, who, in turn, frequently relied 
on other authors like Santerna and Straccha. This 
approach allows an examination of the works of 
these authors in the pursuit of the roots and 
principles of the Roman-Dutch law of marine 
insurance applicable at the Cape of Good Hope. 
Further, one of the judges (Bell J) did a 
comparative evaluation of English law and Roman-
Dutch law on the issues before the court. It is 
clear from his findings that the result and much 
of the reasoning would have been the same even if 
English law had to be applied. 
The distinction between absolute and relative 
innavigability also came to the fore. In the case 
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incapable of being repaired. In the case of 
relative innavigability, the ship is physically 
capable of being repaired, but the means of 
repairing her are unavailable at the place where 
she is, or she cannot be repaired for an amount 
less than her repaired value. It is apparent from 
the judgments that all three judges would have 
granted judgment in favour of the assured if there 
had been proper proof that the ship could not be 
repaired for less than her value62 • This 
highlights the importance of an abandonment loss 
as an economic loss. The principle that the 
economic type of suffered in the case of relative 
innavigability gives rise to a claim for the full 
amount of the insurance was therefore reinforced 
and given effect to in the case of the 'Dido'. 
THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE MARINE INSURANCE Co. v 
BERG63 
THE FACTS: The 'Galatea' carried an insured cargo 
of wood from Knysna to Table Bay. Before the cargo 
could be delivered in Table Bay, the ship was 
The idea of a constructive total loss as known in English law therefore 
appears to have had some appeal to the judges presiding . Indeed, 
Watermeyer J even used the appropriate terminology when he referred to 
'constructive innavigability'. This idea will be further developed in 
the next chapter before a recommendation is made on the adoption of the 
concept of a constructive total loss. 
(1865) 1 Roscoe 289 . 
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driven by the force of the winds and waves upon 
the beach at Table Bay where she was wrecked. The 
defendant, who was the ship's agent, gave notice 
to owners of the cargo (who were also the 
charterers of the ship) to remove the cargo on 
payment of the freight, failing which the cargo 
would be sold for the benefit of whomsoever was 
entitled to it. The owners of the cargo declined 
to remove the cargo from the ship as she lay 
amidst the surf and abandoned the cargo in favour 
of the plaintiffs, their insurers. Thereafter the 
defendant caused the cargo to be sold for a net 
price of £515. The insurers then instituted action 
against the defendant for payment of the sum of 
£515 but the defendant tendered that amount minus 
the freight. The insurers claimed the full amount 
of the net proceeds of the sale, £515, but the 
defendant resisted that claim, again tendering the 
balance after deduction by the amount of the 
freight 64 • 
6.2. THE ISSUES: The issue before the court was 
whether the freight was earned and recoverable 
under the circumstances. There was therefore no 
true abandonment question before the court. 
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oblique fashion in that the plaintiffs as 
insurers, having accepted the abandonment, 
instituted the action for the proceeds of the sale 
which represented the goods. 
THE DECISION: Three separate judgments were given 
by the members of the court in granting judgment 
in favour of the defendant. 
The Chief Justice, Sir William Hodges, stated that 
he entertained considerable doubt whether any 
right of abandonment existed65 • Nevertheless, on 
the issue before the court as to whether the 
freight had been earned, he found in favour of the 
defendant, after referring to various Roman-Dutch 
authorities including Roccus66 , Corin67 (Coren) 
and a case referred to by the latter. 
Bell J was also of the view that the owners of the 
cargo were not entitled to abandon it, 
'considering that the cargo was in the port of 
At 291. 
Op cit, (Feitama's translation) . The reference must have been to the 
first part of Roccus' work where he deals with ships and freight 
article 81 at 106 of Feitama's edition . ' 
The work referred to must have been Observationes XLI rerum in Senatu 
Hollandiae~ Zelandiae, Frisiae judicatarum' item consilia XXX quaedam 
(1633) , wh~ch was available in the library of the court· see Roberts' 
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delivery wholly uninjured' 68 . He stressed that in 
all prior cases of abandonment there was always a 
failure of performance in the sense that the cargo 
has not reached the agreed port of delivery69. 
'The peculiarity in the present case is that the 
abandonmen t took place in the actual port of 
delivery, and after an offer by the shipowner to 
deliver the goods uninjured by seawater.,70 
Bell J was also of the view that the plaintiffs, 
by assenting to the sale of the cargo and 
demanding by this very action the proceeds of the 
sale, had in fact received delivery of the cargo 
and that the freight was accordingly payable71 • 
Watermeyer J mentioned that he had considered case 
law in England, Holland, France and America and 
found that no similar case had occurred in any of 
those jurisdictions72 • He thought Lord 
Mansfield's words in Luke v Lyde73 were apposite, 
At 294-295 . 
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namely that 'the maritime law is not the law of a 
particular country, but the general law of 
nations' 74. He found one helpful case in Barels' 
collection75 and pointed out that in that case it 
was not contended in any of the courts that the 
freight had not been earned at al1 76 • He 
therefore found that the freight had been earned. 
He concluded by saying that he did not consider it 
necessary to enquire into the abandonment to 
underwri ters 77 • 
COMMENT: This was not a true abandonment case. 
Although an abandonment had occurred and had been 
accepted by the underwriters, the assured never 
had the right to abandon because the cargo had 
been saved and had arrived undamaged at the port 
of destination. Indeed, the facts found proved in 
respect of the freight claim established the 
absence of the right to abandon. Nevertheless, 
because the underwriters had obviously accepted 
the abandonment, as between them and the assured 
they were bound by their accept~nce. 
At 297. 
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6.5. The cases of the ' Hall', the ' Dido' and the 
'Galatea' were all decided by the Supreme Court of 
the Cape of Good Hope which was under British rule 
at the time but applied the inherited Roman-Dutch 
law. The judges also showed themselves quite ready 
to consult comparative materials in English and 
American law. However, by the time the next case 
was to be decided by that court, English law had 
been substituted in 'every suit, action, and cause 
7 . 
having reference to questions of 
insurance' 78 • 
marine 
SOUTH AFRICAN RAILWAYS & HARBOURS v Wm. ANDERSON 
& Co. 79 
7.1. THE FACTS: The defendant hired a salvage pump and 
gear valued £1 200 at a rental of £20 per day from 
the plaintiff for the purpose of pumping water out 
of the holds of the 'Rangatira' which was ashore 
at Robben Island. In terms of the contract the 
defendant had to return the pump and gear in good 
order and condition. The plaintiff on the other 
hand had to insure the p l ant with an insurance 
company or in its own fund at the defendant's 
expense. The defendant gave two notices of 
78 
By section 2 of Act 8 of 1879. 
79 
1917 CPD 121. 
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abandonment, one on the 28th April, 1916 and the 
other on the 1st May, 1916 . In terms of the first 
notice it also cancelled the contract of hire. 
This it did because it contended that the sea had 
become so bad that it was impossible to approach 
the 'Rangatira'. The defendant also contended that 
at no time subsequently was it possible to recover 
the pump and gear, which became a total loss. It 
was therefore impossible for the defendant to 
return the plant to the plaintiff. However, during 
May, 1916 some salvors worked on the 'Rangatira' 
and a number of items forming part of the hired 
plant and fear were safely removed, leaving a 
balance on the ship which was lost, the value of 
the balance being £300. The plaintiff then sued 
for the sum of £1 200 and hire at £20 per day for 
the duration. 
7.2. THE ISSUES: A number of issues were raised in the 
case. The first was whether the insurance was for 
the benefit of the plaintiff or for the benefit of 
the defendant. Arising from that issue, the 
question arose whether the defendant, if the 
insurance was for its benefit, was entitled to 
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The defendant's counsel submitted that any movable 
could be the subject of marine insurance as long 
as it is subjected to a maritime risk80 . He 
therefore contended that the principles of marine 
insurance applied to the case, and that English 
law applied by virtue of the General Law Amendment 
Act 8 of 187981 . 
The plaintiff's counsel contended that the 
insurance was for the plaintiff's benefit and that 
the defendant therefore had no right to abandon. 
He further contended that only an owner could 
abandon and, in any event, that the right to 
recover for a total loss existed only if the 
danger continued to the time of the action. He 
added that it had to be proved that a prudent 
uninsured owner would not have spent any more 
money on the thing abandoned and that the thing 
continued in that condition82 . 
THE DECISION: The court, Juta JP, was of the 
opinion that the defence of abandonment was 
misconceived. 
This is so in English law but it should be remembered that in the Roman-
Dutch and Dutch law only a ship or her cargo could be abandoned . 
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He held that 
'(i)n order to justify abandonment as for 
constructive loss of things subject to marine 
insurance four requisites seem necessary: the 
person abandoning must be insured; he must have an 
absolute right of ownership in the goods, the 
thing insured must have been reduced to such a 
state or placed in such a position by the perils 
insured against as to make its total destruction 
or annihilation though not inevitable yet highly 
imminent, and lastly, that such a state or 
position did not change so before action brought 
that the insured might have taken possession of 
the thing insured, wholly uninj ured, and could 
thus have had restoration of it.' 83 
Juta JP further held, if it was necessary to 
decide the point, that the agreement was an 
insurance for the benefit of the plaintiff rather 
than the defendant 84 • He pointed out that the 
risk which was run by the defendant was different 
to that run by the plaintiff, who was the owner of 
the plant8s • Juta JP then pointed out that the 
At 127 . 
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defendant had nothing to abandon because the 
contract of hire had been terminated and it was 
not the owner of the plant86 • He felt that the 
third and fourth requisites for an abandonment 
were also absent because 'there were several 
occasions in May when the pump and gear which were 
then intact and uninjured could have been safely 
taken ashore' 87, and because 'the notice of 
abandonmen t, even if given at a time when 
destruction was imminent, was of no effect at the 
time of the action' 88 • After discussing the 
evidence on the question of hire, Juta JP held 
that the defendant was liable for the value of 
those items constituting part of the plant hired 
which was lost and not returned, namely £300, and 
granted judgment for the plaintiff. 
COMMENT: This case had to be decided according to 
English law and only English authorities were 
referred to by counsel in their argument and also 
At 127. This finding acknowledges the reason for the existence of Rule 
2 (b) enunciated in the previous chapter, namely that the abandonment has 
to be made by the assured as owner of the thing abandoned because the 
act of abandonment allowed ownership to vest in the insurer . For that 
reason English law was the same as Roman - Dutch law to the effect that 
no one other than the owner of the thing (or holder of an insured right) 
could abandon a thing to the insurer . 
At 128. 
At 128. In this respect the finding would have had to be different if 
R~man-Dutch law had to be applied, because the state of affairs at the 
t~me of abandonment determines the parties' rights in Roman-Dutch law 







Part V : Chapter 18 : South African law: Legislation and case law 
by Juta JP in his judgment . The court summarised 
the requirements for an abandonment under English 
marine insurance law without reference to the 
Marine Insurance Act, 1906 (' the MIA' ) 89 • The 
finding that the insurance had been for the 
benefit of the plaintiff made it strictly 
unnecessary to enter upon the question of 
abandonment at all because abandonment is a remedy 
applicable only in the case where there is a 
marine insurance contract in force between the 
parties. In the light of that finding it would not 
have made any difference whether the case was 
decided under English law or the Roman-Dutch law 
received at the Cape of Good Hope9o • 
SHOOTER t/a SHOOTER'S FISHERIES v INCORPORATED 
GENERAL INSURANCES LTD91 
THE FACTS: The 'Morning Star' was insured under 
two marine insurance policies, a hull and a war 
Section 3 of the General Law Amendment Act 8 of 1879 specifically 
provided that subsequent statutes of the Imperial Crown would not apply 
at the Cape of Good Hope unless specifically re-enacted , and the MIA was 
not so re - enacted at the Cape after i t became law in England . 
There is one important consequence , however, and that is that this 
decision demonstrated the ability of a South African court and South 
African lawyers to apply the English concept of a constructive total 
loss. That concept , it is submitted, was not entirely foreign to South 
African lawyers as it actually underlies all abandonment cases in Roman-
Dutch law, (and German, French and Dutch law) , as was demonstrated in 
Chapter 14 supra . Its presence in cases of relative innavigability in 
Roman - Dutch law was also hinted at in De Pass v Commercial Marine 
Insurance Co . I supra . 





Part V: Chapter 18 : South African law : Legislation and case law 
risks policy. The risks specified in the policies 
were in identical terms, following the standard 
Lloyd's wording. The 'Morning Star' was fishing 
13.5 nautical miles from the Mocambican coast on 
12 April 1983 when she was intercepted by two 
other trawlers and forced to Maputo, where she 
remained for the next twenty one days, during 
which the skipper and engineer were prosecuted for 
illegal fishing in Mocambican waters. They were' 
convicted and fined the equivalent of R167 000. 
They were further advised that the vessel would be 
confiscated by the Government of Mocambique unless 
the fine was paid within fifteen days . The 
plaintiff did not have the means to pay the fine. 
The defendant was invited to pay the fine 92 but 
it declined to do so, denying liability under the 
policies. The fine was thus not paid and the 
'Morning Star' was never released. The plaintiff 
as owner of the " Morning Star' and assured under 
both policies then claimed the full amount of the 
insurance, namely R300 000 93 • 
THE ISSUES: The plaintiff contended that the loss 
was covered by the phrase in the risk clause 
A~co~ding to the original case record this occurred on 4 May 1983, 
w~th~n ~ day or t~o of the master and engineer being convicted and the 
crew be~ng repatr~ated. 
These facts are recited at various places · th . d 
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'arrests, restraints and detainment of all kings, 
princes and people of what nation, condition or 
quality soever' in that the loss of the 'Morning 
Star' was the result of an arrest and detainment 
by the 'people' of Mocambique94 • The defendant 
repudiated liability on four grounds. The first 
ground was that the policy did not cover the 
arrest or restraint of the vessel pursuant to an 
order of court in the ordinary judicial 
process95 • Allied to the first point was the 
argument raised by the defendant's counsel 'that 
the proximate cause of the loss was not the arrest 
of the vessel but its confiscation by the 
Mocambican authorities consequent upon the failure 
by the plaintiff to pay the fine imposed upon the 
skipper and engineer' 96 . The second ground of 
repudiation was that the plaintiff had breached a 
clause of the war risks policy which warranted 
that the vessel would engage in 'legal fishing 
within Mocambique territorial waters' by illegally 
fishing within those waters 97 • The third ground 
was that the defendant had not undertaken to 
insure the plaintiff against losses resulting from 
At 274F . 
At 274H. 
At 277D-G . 
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his own illegal or unlawful activities98 . The 
fourth ground was that the plaintiff had failed to 
give notice of abandonment 99 • 
THE DECISION: The court, Friedman J, dealt with 
each of the grounds of repudiation in turn. 
As to the first ground , he found that the 
proceedings in question were criminal proceedings 
and that the order of the Mocambican court did not 
have the effect of placing the occurrence outside 
the risk clause in the policies10o • He found that 
the initial arrest and subsequent restraint and 
detainment constituted an act of 'kings, princes 
and people of what nature condi tion or quali ty 
soever' within the meaning of the risk clause and 
that it was a continuous process commencing with 
the initial arrest and resulting in its ultimate 
confiscation and loss. The interposition of the 
decision of the court between the arrest and the 
subsequent loss did not alter the position1 01 • 
As to the second ground, he found that the phrase 
At 282C - E. 
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'Mocambique territorial waters' in the policy was 
unambiguous and meant the waters extending twelve 
nautical miles off the Mocambican coast102 and, 
as the plaintiff had established that the 'Morning 
Star' was fishing more than twelve nautical miles 
offshore when she was intercepted, the defendant 
could not avoid liability on this ground103 • 
As to the third ground, he found that even though 
the 'Morning Star' had in fact been fishing 
illegally by fishing within the exclusive economic 
zone of Mocambique, the plaintiff had acted in 
ignorance and there was thus no wilful or 
intentional misconduct on his part. He therefore 
held that it would not be contrary to public 
policy to allow the plaintiff to recover104 • 
Friedman J then dealt with the fourth ground, 
namely that no notice of abandonment had been 
given. He pointed out that the loss appeared to be 
in the nature of a constructive total loss, 
although there was no distinction between an 
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law105 • He then reasoned as follows: 
(a) The law to be applied in the case according 
to section 6(1) (b) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction 
Regulation Act 105 of 1983 is 'the Roman-Dutch law 
applicable in the Republic' 106 • 
(b) The authors Gordon and Getz 107 rely upon 
passages in Van der Linden108 and Van der 
Keessel 109 for their statement that notice of 
abandonment was a requirement of Roman-Dutch 
law110 . 
( c) Van der Linden 111 , De Groot 112 and Van der 
Keessel 113 made it clear that there are two types 
of notice; the first is mere notice of the loss to 
the insurer and the second is the notice of 
At 285A-C. 
At 285C. 
The South African Law of Insurance, 3rd ed, (1983), fn 253 . 
Koopmans Handboek 4 . 6.8. 
Praelectiones Iuris Hodierni ad Hugonis Grotii Introductionem ad 
Iurisprudentiam Hollandicam, (published only in 1961-1967) , 
('Praelectiones') , 3 . 24.13 . (must be 3.24.14.) 
At 285C-D. 
Loc cit . 
Inleidinge 3.24.14. 
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abandonment. The authority relied upon by these 
authors for the first notice is 'an ordonnance of 
Amsterdam' and 'an ordonnance of Middelburif14· 
The authority for the second type of notice 
'appears to be an ordonnance of Rotterdam' l1S, 
Friedman J postulated. 
(d) Friedman J then stated that the question was 
whether 'these ordonnances can be said to be part 
of the "Roman-Dutch law applicable in the 
Republic'" 116 • 
(e) Statutory requirements in the various 
'provinces of Holland' of a fiscal or purely local 
nature, whether passed before or after 1652, are 
not part of the law of the Republic l17 . 
(f) The requirements of the various ordonnances 
of Amsterdam, Middelburg and Rotterdam referred to 
earlier are, by their very nature, of local 
application only and therefore not part of the 
At 286A. While Van der Linden referred to the Amsterdam Ordonnance of 
1744 in this regard (Koopmans Handboek 4 . 6.8 fn 1) De Groot and Van der 
Keessel referred to the earlier ordonnances. 
At 286B . The ordonnance referred to must have been the Rotterdam 
Ordonnance of 1721, relied upon by Van der Linden in Koopmans Handboek 
4.6 . 8 fn 3. 
At 286B . 
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, ' h bl' 118 Roman-Dutch law app11cable 1n t e Repu 1C , 
(g) It is in any event not clear what form the 
notice of loss or notice of abandonment should 
take as the formalities prescribed by Van der 
Linden and Van der Keessel by their very nature 
can no longer be operative119 , 
(h) The sanction for the failure to give the 
first type of notice was that the assured had to 
make good any loss caused to the insurer12o . He 
was not disqualified from claiming the indemnity. 
(i) 'It is not clear what, if any, sanction was 
attendant upon the failure to give the second type 
of notice. 1121 In any event, the defendant had 
repudiated liability and the giving of notice of 
At 286E - F, That these ordonnances might have set out the basic 
principles of the European jus commune of insurance which were also 
principles of the Roman-Dutch law of the time was not considered by the 
court . 
At 2861-287A . The court here clearly confused substance with procedure . 
The requirement of an abandonment was and is substantive . The 
requirement that the notice of abandonment be served by a particular 
official is merely procedural. The fact that the relevant procedure had 
no counterpart in South African law did not mean that the substantive 
provision had fallen away. 
This is made clear by Van der Linden Koopmans Handboek 4 . 6.8.1. Van der 
, Linden relied on article 36 of the 1744 Amsterdam Ordonnance. 
At 287B . Gordon & Getz, op cit, 3rd ed, (1983), 389 relied on Van der 
Linden, Koopmans Handboek 4 . 6 . 10 and Pothier, Traite du Contrat 
d'Assurance, ((1768-1778), 3.1.1 . 6 for the statement that the failure 
to give due notice of abandonment was to deprive the assured of the 
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122 
abandonment therefore became unnecessary . 
Friedman J therefore granted judgment for the 
plaintiff in the sum of R300 000,00, interest and 
costs. 
COMMENT: The case of the 'Morning Star' was the 
first and only case after the repeal of the 
General Law Amendment Act 8 of 1879 (Cape of Good 
Hope) and the General Law Amendment Ordonnance 5 
of 1902 (Orange Free State) in which the question 
of abandonment carne up pertinently for consider-
ation and decision123 • A number of important 
findings were made by Friedman J in the course of 
his judgment. 
In the first place, he found that 'the Roman-Dutch 
law applicable in the Republic' 124 was the law 
regulating marine insurance in the Supreme Court 
of South Africa exercising its admiralty juris-
diction, pursuant to section 6(1) (b) of the Act. 
That finding was not only endorsed by the 
At 287H . 
Whereas the Pre-Union Statute Law Revision Act 43 of 1977 merely 
repealed Act 8 of 1879 (Cape of Good Hope) and Ordonnance 5 of 1902 
(Orange Free ~tat~) without ~tating explicitly what legal system was to 
regulate mar~ne ~n~urance ~n. t~e ~uture, that question was finally 
resolved by the Adm~ralty Jur~sd~ct~on Regulation Act 105 of 1983. 
This is the phrase used in section 6 of the Admiralty Jurisdiction 
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Appellate Division in the subsequent appeal from 
his decision, but was also stated to be the case 
in respect of insurance generally by the Appellate 
Division in the case of Mutual & Federal Insurance 
Co Limited v Oudtshoorn Municipalit~25. 
Friedman J's finding (in relation to the defence 
that there had been no notice of an abandonment) 
that 'the requirements of the various ordonnances 
of Amsterdam etc. referred to above are, by their 
very nature, of local application only' and 
therefore are not applicable in the Republic is, 
however, plainly wrong. Whilst there may have been 
local requirements so far as the service of the 
notice of abandonment was concerned, the giving of 
notice was universally required. 
Further, although an abandonment generally may be 
a unilateral act, in marine insurance it is 
bilateral by its very nature. The insured ship or 
goods are abandoned to the insurer126 , not to the 
1985 1 SA 419 (A). 
This is ap~arent from the wording of, inter alia, article I, Chapter VII 
of the Gu~don de la Mer, ('faire delai8 a 8e8 a88eureur8'); article 14 
of the Customs and Usages of the Antwerp Exchange (, tot beboef van den 
ver8ekerer'); articles 14 and 15 of the Rotterd~m Ordonnance of 1604 
(' ten profijte van de Ver8eekeraer8' and ' ten beboeve van bunn~ 
Ver8eekeraer8') and article 28 of the Amsterdam Ordonnance of 1744 
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world at large127 . This emphasises the need for 
a notice of abandonment. Otherwise the insurer is 
not to know that he has become or may become the 
owner of the insured and abandoned ship or goods. 
The telex addressed by the plaintiff's attorneys 
to the defendant on the 4th May, 1983 was thought 
and apparently conceded not to constitute a notice 
of abandonment as required128 • Friedman J ought 
then to have considered the effect of the failure 
to give any notice of abandonment on the 
plaintiff's right to recover the full amount of 
the insurance. On this question there could not 
have been any doubt in Roman-Dutch law as Van der 
Linden had stated the position quite clearly where 
he wrote that the assured, 'before he claims for 
a total loss, is bound to abandon the ship or 
goods, and to renounce all his right or interest 
therein, in favour of the underwri ters. ,129 
Having regard to the apparent concession that 
English law has also come to this conclusion, after an initial moment 
of doubt. S7e the trilogy of cases on the point: Boston Corporation v 
France Fenw~ck & Co Ltd (1919) 15 LLR 85 (KB); Oceanic Steam Navigation 
Co Ltd v Evans (1934) 50 LLR 1 (CA); and Blane Steamships Ltd v Minister 
of Transport [1951] 2 LLR 155 (CA) . 
The plaintiff's counsel, Mr M J D Wallis SC, advised me that he had been 
compelled to argue that no notice of abandonment was necessary because 
the plaintiff's attorney had failed to give notice of abandonment. This 
aspect is discussed in more detail in the text below where the original 
case record is reviewed . 
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there had been no notice of abandonment the 
conclusion ought therefore to have been that the 
plaintiff could not claim for a total loss unless 
the loss was final and certain, or in the 
terminology of English law, an actual total loss . 
Whether there was such a loss is discussed below . 
INCORPORATED GENERAL INSURANCES LTD v SHOOTER t/a 
SHOOTER'S FISHERIES130 
THE SUBMISSIONS ON APPEAL: The defendant insurer 
took the judgment on appeal to the Appellate 
Division. Written heads of argument were filed by 
both parties131 • 
In its written heads of argument the defendant 
made the following submissions: 
(a) The court was required to apply the 'Roman 
Dutch law' to the dispute by virtue of section 
6(1) (b) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation 
Act 105 of 1983 132 . 
1 987 1 SA 842 (A) . 
In the case of the defendant insurer the heads of argument were prepared 
by counsel who had appeared at the t r ial before Friedman J. but the 
appeal was argued by Mr M Tselentis. 
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(b) Whilst English law had great persuasive 
authority with regard to the construction of the 
policy, in questions of law the Roman-Dutch law 
was applicable133 . 
(c) The proximate cause of the loss of the vessel 
was its confiscation due to the plaintiff's 
failure to pay the fine. In Roman-Dutch law the 
defendant as insurer is only liable for such 
losses as are proximately caused by a peril 
insured against 134 • 
(d) The defendant had succeeded in proving that 
the plaintiff had breached the warranty135. 
(e) In English law the assured claiming a 
constructive total loss has to give due notice of 
abandonment. Roman-Dutch law did not distinguish 
between an actual and constructive total loss but 
required the assured who claimed payment for a 
At 8431 . 
At 845D-E . This submiss i on appears to have lost sight of the fact that 
an abandonment loss, or a constructive total loss in English 
terminology, may arise from the underlyi ng arrest and detention. In such 
a case there is no duty on the assured to assume the insurer's 
obligation by paying the fine or ransom demanded. If this were not so 
the insurance against arrests and detentions would be of no use o r 
benefit to the assured as he would in practically all cases be able to 
obtain the release of the vessel by paying some fine, penalty or ransom . 
At 847A. This submission had been rejected on the facts, properly it is 
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total loss to abandon the subject matter of the 
insurer to the insurer in good time136. 
(f) Friedman J was incorrect in holding that 
notice of abandonment is not necessary under South 
African law. Van der Linden137 and Van der 
Keessel 138 both required such notice139 . While 
Van der Linden relied on article 61 of the 
Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1721 and Pothier, Van der 
Keessel did not rely on statute alone. In any 
event, the statute only regulated the procedure, 
'not the necessi ty for the notice' 140 . 
(g) The telex in question from the plaintiff's 
attorney to the defendant did not constitute any 
form of abandonment141 • 
On appeal the plaintiff's counsel took the same 
stance as before Friedman J on the issues. 
At 849I-850A . These submissions were patently correct, as the earlier 
review in this study of English and Roman - Dutch law amply demonstrates . 
Koopmans Handboek 4 . 5.8.10 . 
Praelectiones 3.24.13 . 
At 850B. 
It is submitted that these few words distilled the attitude of the 








Part V: Chapter 18 : South African law: Legislation and case law 
(a) He argued that the Roman-Dutch law had to be 
applied142 and that English authority is merely 
persuasi ve143 • 
(b) Counsel for the plaintiff further accepted 
that 'in order for the insured to recover under 
the policy the occurrence of the insured peril 
must be the proximate cause of the loss' 144. 
(c) He then contended that the plaintiff had been 
deprived of his vessel in consequence of an 
exercise of coercive authority by the Government 
of the State of Mocambique and that such a loss 
falls within the scope of the risk clause, 
notwithstanding the interposition of some form of 
judicial decision145 • 
(d) The plaintiff's counsel repeated his 
contention in the trial court that there was no 
requirement of a notice of abandonment under the 
Roman-Dutch law and in any event submitted that 
the failure to give notice of abandonment did not 
result in a forfeiture by the assured of his 
At 851B . 
At 851D . 
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claim. Counsel contended that the purpose of 
giving a notice of abandonment is to enable the 
insurer, 'by his acceptance thereof' to take such 
steps as are available to minimise the 10SS146. 
THE ISSUES: At the hearing of the appeal counsel 
for the defendant insurer abandoned the 
submissions in the heads of argument drawn by his 
predecessor so far as the warranty and the 
question of illegal fishing were concerned, but 
argued that the appeal should be allowed on either 
of the following grounds : 
(a) That the plaintiff had not discharged the 
onus of showing that the events which resulted in 
the loss of the trawler were covered by one of the 
risks enumerated in the 'risks clause' ; 
(b) The plaintiff's claim could not succeed 
because, despite the fact that there was no such 
requirement in the policy, no notice of 
abandonment had been given by plaintiff to 
defendants147. 
At 855:-J. This contention was clearly incorrect as it ignored the 
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9.3. THE DECISION: Galgut AJA gave the judgment of the 




Before dealing with the main contentions of the 
insurer, Galgut AJA made a number of points . 
(a) In the first place, he pointed out that the 
law to be applied by the court was the Roman-Dutch 
law applicable in the Republic, by virtue of 
Section 6(1) (b) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction 
Regulation Act 105 of 1983148 . 
(b) In the second place, he pointed out that in 
terms of Section 63(1) of the Insurance Act 27 of 
1943 any question of law arising from a domestic 
policy, which both policies under consideration 
were, had to be decided according to the law of 
the Republic but English decisions were of 
assistance and are persuasive authority on the 
meanings of clauses in the policies149 • 
(c) He then pointed out that the trawler was 
insured only , against the risk of actual total 
loss and or constructive total loss'. This meant 
that the plaintiff could not claim for any average 
At 857B - C. 
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or partial 10SS150. 
(d) Galgut AJA also pointed out that the policy 
contained a sue and labour clause151 . Whilst the 
court had not been referred to any statutory 
provision or a case in the Republic dealing with 
the effect of a sue and labour clause, he was of 
the opinion that 'an insured is under an implied 
duty to minimise his loss' 152. 
(e) After discussing the risk clause he came to 
the conclusion that the phrase 'detainments of all 
kings, princes and people' would, in the Republic, 
be interpreted to mean the ruling power of the 
country153 . 
(f) Galgut AJA then went on to mention that there 
was no statutory requirement in the Republic 
requiring notice of abandonment when the insured 
claims for a total loss while such a notice has to 
be given in England if the claim is for a 
At 857H. 
At 857!. 
At 859F. The subject is dealt with extensively with reference to Roman -
Dutch authorities by Van Niekerk in 'Suing, labouring and the insured's 
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. 1 1 154 constructlve tota oss 
Galgut AJA then found as follows: 
'I am, wi th respect, unable to agree wi th the 
finding of the Court a quo that the loss of the 
trawler was due to a continuous process. A 
Mocambican tribunal imposed a fine. Had that fine 
been paid the loss would not have resulted. In my 
view the confiscation did not resul t from the 
arrest of the trawler, it resulted from the 
failure to pay the fine. That failure was 
therefore the proximate cause of the confiscation 
of the trawler. The fact that the plaintiff was 
unable to pay the fine is irrelevant. The issue is 
not his ability to pay the fine. The issue is what 
caw~ed the confiscation. That, as we have seen, 
was the fact that the fine was not paid. That was 
not a peril covered by the risk clause. Because of 
the above finding it is not necessary to discuss 
the abandonment issue raised in B (the abandonment 
issue) above.' 155 
He thereupon allowed the appeal with costs. Rabie 
CJ, Jansen JA and Van Heerden JA concurred in his 
At 859B-C. 
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judgment. viljoen JA also concurred, save for 
stating that in his view the case had to be 
decided according to English law which, on the 
application of the principles relating to 
causation, would have given the same result
156
• 
Viljoen JA'S view was that the language of the 
policy was that of the standard Lloyd's policy and 
that the parties must have intended that 'their 
mutual rights and obligations should be 
determined in accordance with the English law of 
marine insurance' 157 • 
In the course of his judgment Viljoen JA also 
quoted from Lord Diplock's speech in Amien Rasheed 
Corpora tion v Kuwai t Insurance158 : 
'The contract of marine insurance is highly 
idiosyncratic; it involves concepts that are 
peculiar to itself such as sue and labour, 
subrogation, abandonment and constructive total 
loss, to give but a few examples.' 
,At 863D . 
At 865G. Viljoen JA relied upon and quoted the judgment of the House of 
Lords in ADden Rashid Corporation v Kuwait Insurance 1984 AC 50 (HL). 
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He then added: 
'Subrogation is a well known concept in South 
African insurance law but the others referred to 
are completely foreign to our law and peculiar to 
English marine insurance law.' 159 
COMMENT: 
The court and the parties appear to have been ad 
idem on two aspects of the case. The first was 
that the law to be appl ied by the court was 
determined by Section 6 (1) (b) of the Admiralty 
Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 of 1983, namely 
the Roman-Dutch law applicable in the 
Republic160 • The other was that the plaintiff 
could only recover for a loss proximately caused 
by a peril insured against161 • The appeal court 
applied the proximate cause test and found that 
the loss had not been caused by an insured peril 
but by the plaintiff's failure to pay the fine. 
At 864G-H. 
Having regard to the conclusions arri ved at in Chapter 15 supra, the 
approach of the parties and the court cannot be criticised except that 
this conclusion was drawn without any apparent depth of research and 
discussion. 
That this is so in respect of an ordi nary claim for a total loss, is 
clear, but in those cases where an abandonment is allowed a different 
situa~ion arises as the abandonment is allowed notwithstanding that the 
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The court expressly declined to deal with the 
abandonment point altogether and, on the facts of 
the case, the question of abandonment may not have 
been relevant at all since the parties approached 
the matter on the basis that there had not been 
any abandonment. It would only have been necessary 
to consider the consequences of an abandonment if 
the plaintiff had made an abandonment. Vilj oen 
JA's statement that abandonment was not part of 
South African law was thus obiter, and, in any 
event, incorrect . 
The court's attention was not drawn to some 
relevant English decisions, nor did the court 
consider English law notwithstanding the 
acceptance by the court and both parties that 
English decisions were helpful as persuasive 
authority. The most important of these decisions 
are Thornely and Another v Hebson162 and Stringer 
. and Others v The English and Scottish Marine 
Insurance CompanY63. 
In Thornely and Another v Hebson the 'William' was 
sold by order of the Admiralty Court in order to 
pay salvage earned by the rescue of the ship. The 
2 B & AId 512 . 
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owner did nothing to raise the funds to pay the 
salvage. The court unanimously held that the 
assured's inability to prevent the judicial sale 
of the vessel through impecuniosity would not have 
prevented the loss from being a total loss, but 
there had to be proof of such impecuniosity164. 
Since the assured had failed to produce such proof 
in the instant case the loss could only be treated 
as an average loss. 
The facts of Stringer and Others v The English and 
Scottish Marine Insurance Company were remarkably 
similar to those of the 'Morning Star'. The 
insurance was on the goods carried on the 'Dashing 
Wave' on a voyage from England to Matamores in 
America. The 'Dashing Wave' and her cargo were 
captured by an American warship and taken to New 
Orleans to have her and t he goods condemned as 
lawful prize. The assured did not abandon the 
goods at this stage, although the court was 
clearly of the opinion that they were entitled to 
do so. In other words, a constructive total loss 
was already present at this stage. The assured, 
however, did not abandon but sought to defend the 
claim for confiscation and were indeed successful 
It was put as follows by Holroyd J : 'I think, also, that the sale will 
not amount to a total loss, so as to entitle the assured to recover if 
it was in their power to have prevented it; and it lies upon th~ to 
shew that they could not do so.' 
796 
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in the trial court . However, the matter was taken 
on appeal and while the appeal was pending the 
Supreme Court in Washington ordered that the cargo 
be sold and the proceeds be held for disposal in 
terms of the law. Three questions arose, all 
directly relevant to the case of the ' Morning 
Star' . 
(a) The first question was whether the sale in 
terms of the court order resulted in a total loss 
of the goods . The court answered that it did, 
Martin B putting it as follows: 
'In my judgment, by the sale of these goods under 
the lawful order of the court of prize, the 
assured was deprived of all dominion and property 
in them. They were taken out of his possession. He 
was deprived of all property in and dominion over 
his goods; and therefore, in these circumstances, 
he is entitled to recover the full amount of his 
insurance, the underwriters, as I have said, being 
enti tied to the proceeds of the sale.' 165 
The effect of the judicial sale was therefore to 
divest the assured of his ownership of the goods, 
At 606 . The insurer would be entitled to such proceeds by virtue of the 
principles of subrogation. 
797 
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a circumstance which amounts in modern parlance to 
an actual total loss as opposed to a constructive 
total loss. 
(b) The second question was whether the assured 
were obliged to stave off the sale by putting up 
security for the prize claim, or, put conversely, 
whether the assured could be non-suited for their 
failure to prevent the sale by putting up the 
security. This question was answered in the 
negative. Kelly CB held that: 
, (I) f the single question were whether he (the 
assured) was possessed of the means to give that 
securi ty it might have been incumbent upon him to 
shew tha t he was unabl e to do so, and so to 
relieve himself of the duty thus sought to be 
imposed upon him.' 
He pointed out further that a prudent uninsured 
owner would not have put up security either. The 
mere failure to put up the security was therefore 
not regarded as sufficient to non-suit the 
assured; they must have had the ability to put up 
the security; and putting up the security must 
have been the prudent thing to do in the 
circumstances. 
798 
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(c) On the question of causation Kelly CB said: 
'This loss of the goods arose, though not 
directly, out of the original capture (which was 
of itself, if it had been so treated, a total 
loss), through a series of consequences, viz. the 
insti tution, the different steps, and the 
continuance of the sui t until the decree was 
pronounced; and the sale under the decree was - if 
I may use the expression - a completion of the 
total loss ... Under the circumstances, it appears 
to me, that all the requisi tes concurred necessary 
to establish a case of total loss, with or without 
abandonmen t ... ' 
Kelly CB thus saw the whole process which started 
with the capture of the ' Dashing Wave' and the 
goods and which ended in the sale of the goods as 
a continuous process resul t ing in a total loss by 
capture, an insured peril . 
(d) Martin B and Channell B concurred, the 
latter saying : 
, (M)y opinion is founded on the ground that the 
sale of the cargo by order of the prize court gave 
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. f t 1 1 ,166 the pol~cy or a to a oss. 
Four important points were made in the judgments, 
which would have equal force in American law as 
they deal with English law prior to the MIA167. 
Firstly, it is clear that the court viewed the 
initial capture as an event giving rise to the 
right to abandon and to claim for a constructive 
total 10SS168. Secondly, the assured would have 
been obliged to work for the release of the goods 
so far as a prudent uninsured owner would have 
done, but no further, and in particular no further 
than he could in fact afford. Thirdly, the sale 
deprived the assured of his ownership in the 
goodS 169 . Fourthly, notwithstanding the effluxion 
of a period of almost eighteen months from the 
capture to the sale and notwithstanding the 
assured's failure to obtain the release of the 
goods by putting up the security, the loss was 
regarded as having been caused by the initial 
At 608 . 
So far as English law under the MIA is concerned these judgments would 
retain their value as the underlyi ng common law is still used in the 
interpretation of the MIA. 
As Martin B put it at 605: 'The object ot the insurance being that the 
goods should arrive under the control and in possession ot the assured 
at t~e port ot discharge, when they were once captured by a person 
host~le to the owner, he would have a right to abandon them ... ' 
Martin B opined at 606 : 'In my judgment , by the sale ot these goods 
under the lawful order ot the court ot prize, the assured was deprived 
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capture. If this reasoning had been adopted in the 
'Morning Star' the court would have had to find 
that the plaintiff's loss had been proximately 
caused by the initial capture as the facts of the 
two cases are for practical purposes identical. 
The legal principle was also stated 
authoritatively in the consolidated appeals of 
Cosman v West; Cosman v British America Assurance 
Company' 70 concerning the barque 'L. E. Cann'. 
The Privy Council advised Her Majesty that there 
is as much a total loss under a marine insurance 
policy if the owner's right of property and 
possession are transferred to a purchaser in a 
sale in terms of a decree of a competent court as 
there would be if the property were totally 
annihilated by an insured peril171. The same 
principle manifestly applied to the 'Morning Star' 
as the plaintiff had been deprived of ownership by 
the order of a competent court. 
Some guidance on the point could also have been 
derived from the decision of the French Court of 
(1888) 13 LR (App Cas) 160 (PC) . 
This general principle applies as much after the MIA as it did at the 
time it was enunciated . 
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Appeal in the case of 'L'Arabie' 172. The 'Arabie' 
was damaged at sea and called at Port Louis in 
Mauritius, where she was repaired. The master 
found himself unable to raise the funds to pay for 
the repairs. The ship-repairer obtained an order 
for the seizure of the ship in order to enforce 
his claim. The court ordered the 'Arabie' to be 
sold and she was thereafter sold under the 
authority of the court's order. Her owner 
thereupon abandoned the ship under article 369(1) 
of the Code de Commerce of 1807 (' the CdeC') to 
his insurers and claimed the full amount of the 
insurance on the grounds of innavigability as a 
result of a sea peril. The Court of Appeal ruled 
that the seizure and subsequent sale of the ship 
in terms of the order of the court gave rise to 
the right to abandon where the inability of the 
master to procure the funds to pay for the repairs 
and thereby to obtain the release of the ship was 
not due to any fault on his part. Moreover, the 
Court stated explicitly that the order of the 
Mauritian judge who authori zed the seizure and the 
sale of the ship constituted 'une fortune de mer', 
a sea peril, as contemplated by article 369 (1) of 
the CdeC. Therefore, notwithstanding the 
apparently distant relationship between the damage 
Regis v Leray et Lafargue ('L'Arabie') 1880 (2) DJG 132 (Cour d'Appel) . 
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sustained at sea and the ultimate sale of the 
ship, the court accepted that there had been an 
unbroken chain of causation which resulted in the 
assured being totally dispossessed173 of his ship 
as a result of an insured peril. The reasoning 
adopted in this case is in consonance with that of 
the English decisions pertaining to the 'William', 
the 'Dashing Wave' and the 'L. E. Cann' and even 
implies that the type of dispossession which had 
occurred amounted to an actual total loss. 
The aid of Dutch law could also be invoked to make 
the same point, namely that the loss became a 
'feitelijk geheel verlies' (a factual total loss) 
entitling the assured to payment of the full 
indemnity upon the confiscation. Nolst Trenite 
wrote the following in his discussion of 
, Opbrenging en aanhouding door een vreemde 
mogendheid' 174: 
'Ret spreekt van zelf dat het enkele fei t dat 
schepen of goederen zijn opgebracht175 of 
aangehouden176, geen aanleiding tot abandonnement 
'totalement depOBBede'. 
Zeeverzekering, 2nd ed, (1930) , Vol II, 647. 
'arrested' . 
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behoort te geven. AIleen indien het beslag 
geruimen tijd duurt, kan men aannemen dat ze voor 
den eigenaar verloren zijn. Daarom worden in art. 
668 K. soortgelijke termijnen gesteld als bij art. 
667 K. voor vermissing zijn voorgeschreven, tenzij 
de opbrenging of aanhouding door verbeurd-
verklaring is gevolgd. In het laaste geval is er 
aanstonds zekerheid van het verlies verkregen, en 
kan dadelijk geabandonneerd worden.' 
It is thus clear that in Dutch law the 
confiscation of the ship or goods gave rise to a 
claim for the full amount of the insurance on the 
basis that the loss was certain and final 177 . At 
the time the 'Morning Star' was before the courts 
Dutch marine insurance law was very largely based 
on the provisions of the French CdeC of 1807. 
Dutch writers like Schook178 , Mens Fiers 
Smeding179 and Nolst Trenite180 also relied 
heavily on French authorities in their works. The 
decision of the French Court of Appeal in the case 
The fact that an abandonment was required is incidental as an 
abandonment was required in that sys t em in all cases where the full 
indemnity was claimed. 
Het Abandonnement , doctoral thesis , Utrecht, (1858) . 
Eenige opmerkingen over bet Recbt van Abandonnement, doctoral thesis, 
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of the ' Arabie' 181 therefore probably also 
reflects the way a Dutch court would have decided 
that case and more authority in favour of 
Shooter's claim could have been found in this way. 
In German law the confiscation would simply have 
created a 'Totalverlust' with the insurer obliged 
to pay the full indemnity whilst being entitled to 
deduct the value of any salvage, which there could 
not be unless the ship was restored to the 
assured182 • 
It is submitted that the Appellate Division ought 
to have adopted the reasoning in the English and 
French cases referred to earlier and could even 
have relied on the provisions of Dutch and German 
law as persuasive authority. The court should then 
have applied the strict or classical Roman-Dutch 
law principles as follows: 
(a) The questions before the court had to be 
determined according to t he principles of the 
'Roman-Dutch law applicable in the Republic' by 
virtue of section 6 of the Admiralty Jurisdiction 
Regulation Act 105 of 1983, which law should be 
Supra. 
See Chapter 7 supra. 
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'South Afr';can law' rather than referred to as ~ 
Roman-Dutch law183 . English decisions are helpful 
and of persuasive force in interpreting the 
clauses of the policy. 
(b) South African law recognizes the right of 
an assured to abandon the ship and insured cargo, 
as the case may be, and to claim the full amount 
of the insurance. 
(c) The right to abandon and to claim the full 
indemnity may already have arisen when the initial 
arrest and detention of the 'Morning Star' by the 
Government of the State of Mocambique took place, 
as the arrest and detention fell within the phrase 
'detainments of all kings princes and people' and 
within the reasoning of the 'Dashing Wave'. 
(d) If it had been proved that Mocambique was 
an enemy of the Republic of South Africa at the 
It can no longer be seriously denied that South African law is a 
synthesis of two great legal systems, namely English law and the 
inherited Roman-Dutch law. Insurance law is a good example of this 
synthesis. For example, the influence of English law and practice during 
the application of the General Law Amendment Act of 1879 (Cape of Good 
Hope) and the General Law Amendment Ordinannce of 1902 (Orange Free 
State) cannot be denied as English law then applied in those provinces 
to marine and fire insurance . (See Chapter 15 supra in this regard . ) As 
was pointed out in Chapter 12 supra, the principles of subrogation have 
been held to have been inherited from English law: see Ackennan v 
Loubser 1918 OPD 31. There are branches of the law where South African 
law is more Roman - Dutch than English, for example the law of succession, 
property and of persons . But other branches of the law are virtually 
identical to English law , especially commercial law and procedural law . 
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time of the arrest, then the plaintiff would have 
had the right to abandon the 'Morning Star' 
immediately when the initial arrest and detention 
occurred and to claim the sum insured. If 
Mocambique was not an enemy at the relevant time, 
the plaintiff would not have been entitled to 
abandon the 'Morning Star' forthwith, but he would 
have had to wait a reasonable time to ascertain 
whether there was any reasonable possibility of 
obtaining the release of the vessel. Whether the 
detaining power is a friend or an enemy is a 
question of fact, which is usually determined by 
evidence from officials of the Foreign Affairs or 
Defence Department. 
(e) Since no evidence had been adduced to show 
that the State of Mocambique was such an enemy 
state, the court had to proceed on the basis that 
there remained some possibility that the vessel 
may be released. 
(f) Since it had been proved that the assured 
did not have the means to pay the fine and thus to 
obtain the release of the vessel the loss was 
recoverable as a total loss of the factual kind . 
The cases of the 'William' the 'Dashing Wave', the 
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opinion are unimpeachable authority for this 
proposition184 . 
(g) The plaintiff had been obliged to notify 
the defendant of the fact of the arrest and 
detention as soon as possible after it occurred. 
This he had done185 . 
(h) In terms of the classic Roman-Dutch law, 
the plaintiff would have been obliged to make a 
valid abandonment to the defendant. In Van der 
Linden's words, he had to 'abandon the ship and 
renounce all his right or interest therein, in 
favour of the underwri ters. ,186 This is the 
position under the inherited Roman-Dutch law, but 
in English law no abandonment would be necessary 
when the loss is an actual total loss. 
(i) Since the confiscation had deprived the 
assured of ownership of the vessel no abandonment 
was necessary. The rule of the Roman-Dutch law 
which required an abandonment also in cases where 
the loss was an actual total loss rather than a 
Supra . 
This is the first kind of notice requi r ed, according to the authorities 
cited by Friedman J i n the trial court. 
Koopmane Hancllioek, 4.8 . 2 . 
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'wettelijk geheel verlies' can no longer be 
applied in South African law as the basis for that 
rule fell away when subrogation as a concept 
separate from abandonment came to the fore. There 
is no need for such a rule in cases of actual 
total loss or 'feitelijk geheel verlies' because 
there is nothing to abandon and nothing for the 
insurer to acquire. The insurer is adequately 
protected by the principles of subrogation which 
allow him to pursue the vessel in the hands of the 
Mocambican government after the indemnification 
and the indemnity principle is protected at the 
same time. In any event, South African law does 
not require meaningless formality in commercial 
contracts. 
(j) However, if the loss were to be regarded as 
a constructive total loss, to use English 
terminology, the plaintiff would not entitled to 
claim the full indemnity without a proper 
abandonment. Since the policies were against total 
loss only, there could be no claim for an average 
loss in such circumstances either. The court ought 
then to have considered whether the plaintiff had 
given a sufficient notice of abandonment. However, 
since the question of the adequacy of notice of 
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and in the appeal court's judgments, it becomes 
necessary to investigate this aspect further by 
having reference to the original case record. 
If the court had adopted this reasoning the result 
would have been in accordance with the Roman-Dutch 
law as adapted, pre- and post 1906 English law, 
American law, the then (1983) current Dutch law, 
current French and German law and justice. Having 
regard to the history of South African marine 
insurance law one could hardly hope for a better 
correspondence of South Af r ican law with the legal 
systems mentioned. 
THE 'MORNING STAR' : THE ORIGINAL CASE RECORD 
The original case record of the 'Morning Star' is 
still available in the archives of the Appellate 
Division in Bloemfontein . The record reveals a 
number of aspects of importance which are not 
apparent from the trial and appeal judgments as 
contained in the official law reports . 
The action was instituted on 1 November, 1983 by 
the issue of a Writ of Summons in Personam out of 
the Durban and Coast Local Division of the Supreme 
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institution of action thus coincided with the 
first day of operation of the 
Admiralty 
Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 of 1983, and 
Shooter was probably the first person in South 
Africa to institute action under the provisions of 
the Act. He was certainly the first to sue for 
payment under a marine insurance policy in South 
Africa in the admiralty jurisdiction of the 
court187 • At the time when action was thus 
instituted no special rules regulating admiralty 
proceedings had yet been promulgated and the old 
Rules of the Courts of Admiralty still in force in 
terms of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890 
were still applicable and were utilised. 
A Statement of Claim accompanied the Writ. It 
claimed payment in three paragraphs reading as 
follows: 
'3. The Plaintiff was the owner of the fishing 
vessel 'MORNING STAR'. 
'4. The Defendant was the insurer of the vessel 
under a Marine Hull Policy No. 37/MI/061107 and 
By virtue of section 1(1) (ii) (r) of the Act (prior to amendment now 
sectio~ 1(1) (iv) ~u)) a claim for marine insurance was defined as being 
an adm1ralty cla1m an~ thus fell within the admiralty jurisdiction of 
t~e Supreme Court. Pr10r to the Act marine insurance claims were dealt 
w1th under the parochial jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. See Chapter 
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under a Marine Hull (War Risks) Policy No. 
37/MI/061108. 
'5. Under the said policies the Plaintiff claims 
the sum of R300 000,00 from the Defendant arising 
from the actual total loss of the said vessel in 
Maputo on or after the 12th April, 1983; interest 
thereon according to law; costs of suit and other 
relief. ,188 
The claim was thus expressly for an 'actual total 
loss' . 
The defendant insurer requested particulars, 
including: the respective market values of the 
vessel when insured and when the loss was 
sustained189 i whether it was contended that the 
loss was an actual total loss or a constructive 
total 10ss190 i and whether notice of abandonment 
had been given and if so, when and in what 
terms 191 . 
Statement of Claim, 2. This and the following references are to the 
original and certified record of the case on appeal. 
Paragraph 2 of Exhibit A ('E'), 187 . 
Paragraph 3, Exhibit A ('E'), 187. 
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The plaintiff assured declined to answer the 
questions about the market value19 2 , and repeated 
that it was contended that the loss was an actual 
total 10SS193. The last question thus fell away. 
The Main Grounds of Defence included allegations 
that: the loss was a constructive total 10SS194; 
no notice of abandonment had been given195 ; the 
value of the ship was ' substantially less than 
R3 00 000, 00,196 ; and that the plaintiff had 
failed to 'sue, labour and travel' as a result of 
which the ship had been confiscated197 . 
Abandonment was alluded to in three clauses of 
each policy as follows : 
It was provided, under t he heading 'CONSTRUCTIVE 
TOTAL LOSS' that, for the purpose of determining 
whether the ship was a constructive total loss, 
the value was to be taken as repaired value 
Paragraph 2, Exhibit A ('F ' ) , 191. This refusal was justifiable because 
the policies were valued policies and it was for the insurer to prove 
that the agreed value was not the true value prior to the loss . 
Paragraph 3 , Exhibi t A ( ' F ' ), 191 - 192 . 
Paragraph 2.1 , Exhibit A ('G'), 195. 
Paragraph 2.2, Exhibit A ( ' G' ), 195 . 
Paragraph 3.3, Exhibit A ('G ' ), 196 . 
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without taking into account breaking up or wreck 
value198 • 
In case of an actual constructive total loss the 
underwriters for freight were to make no claim to 
the freight whether notice of abandonment had been 
given or not 199 • 
No acts of the insurer were to be considered 'a 
waiver or acceptance of abandonment' 200. 
The telex of 4 May 1983 from the plaintiff's 
attorney to the insurer reads as follows 201 : 
'We confirm that we act for Shooters Fisheries in 
respect of the arrest, restraint and detainment of 
the vessel 'Morning Star' in Maputo by the Peoples 
Republic of Mocambique and/or unidentified North 
Korean or East German fishing trawlers. 
'We are advised that the brokers Sancura have 
advised you of the circumstances of the matter 
Clause 14, Exhibit A ('G'), 219. 
Clause 15, Exhibit A ('G'), 219. 
Main clause, Exhibit A ('G'), 202. 
Exhibit D, 250. The telex was sent in capital case but for the sake of 
appearance it is reproduced here in lower case. 
814 
10.8. 
Part v: Chapter 18 : South African law : Legislat i on and case law 
which have also been widely reported in the press. 
'Our client has a claim in terms of the aforesaid 
policy (so called "War Risks") in respect of the 
constructive total loss of the vessel by the 
arrest restraint and detainment of the vessel as 
aforesaid for the full insured value thereof 
alternatively in terms of the suing and labouring 
clauses alternatively the common law, in respect 
of the cost charges and amounts payable to ob~ain 
the release of the vessel from detention, recrew 
her repair such damage as may have occurred and to 
return her to its operati ng port. 
'We confirm having telephoned Mr Lundin on the 
morning of 3.5.83 and having suggested we meet to 
discuss the matter to ascertain whether an 
amicable solution to the current impasse could be 
reached. Mr Lundin undertook to telephone the 
sender hereof but has not as yet done so. 
'It would be appreciated if the matter could be 
afforded your attention. 
'Regards. ' 
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raise the money to pay the fine was not 
disputed202 • 
COMMENT 
An outstanding feature of the of the policy, the 
pleadings and the telex quoted is that they used 
the language of English marine insurance law in 
the repeated references to 'actual' and 
, constructive total loss'. There was therefore 
support for Viljoen JA's approach that the parties 
probably intended English marine insurance law to 
apply. 
Whilst a claim for an actual total loss without 
the necessity of an abandonment could be 
substantiated if the effect of the confiscation 
was that, under Mocambican law203 , ownership 
transferred to the Mocambican Government, that 
point was not argued in the trial court nor in the 
Appellate Division. Such would have been the 
position if English law had to be applied204 • In 
The plaintiff did not have funds of his own, his bankers would not 
advance the money, and the defendant insurer refused to come to his 
assistance; Record: Vol I, 106. 
The lex loci. 
It will be recalled that Viljoen J A was of the opinion that the 
language of the policy was such that the parties must have intended that 
Bngl~sh law would apply to their contractual relationship. On this point 
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Wilson v Forstey2°5 the court held that the 
seizure and sale of a ship by a neutral state 
without the judgment or order of a competent court 
did not divest the owner of his property and that 
an abandonment would be necessary before the 
assured could recover for a total loss. In the 
case of the 'Morning Star' there was such a 
judgment, and the plaintiff's ownership of the 
vessel was therefore terminated by the 
confiscation order. This is also in accordance 
with the judgments in the cases of the 'William', 
the 'Dashing Wave', the 'L. E. Cann' and the 
'Arabie'. This means that, in English law, there 
was an actual total loss and no abandonment was 
then necessary206. 
However, if the strict Roman-Dutch principle were 
to apply to the matter, then an abandonment would 
still have had to be made as the Roman-Dutch law 
did not distinguish between an actual total loss 
conclusion whilst the underlying record justifies another . There is a 
lot to be said for Viljoen JA's approach in the light of the express 
reference to constructive total loss and actual total loss in the policy 
document itself. 
. 6 Taunt 25. 
See also Roux v Salvador 3 Bing (NC) 266 and Mullett v Sheddon 13 East 
304 where Lord Ellenborough said: ' (B)ut here the property itself was 
totally lost to the owner, and the necessity for any abandonment was 
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and a constructive total 10ss207. (For the 
reasons set out earlier it is contended that this 
can no longer be the position with regard to cases 
which amount to actual total loss.) On this 
construction an abandonment would still have been 
necessary even if the confiscation order had the 
effect of vesting ownership of the vessel in the 
Mocambican Government. 
(a) Whether the telex constituted a notice of 
abandonment is a moot question. It is at least 
arguable that it did constitute a notice of 
abandonment in so far as it read: 
'Our client has a claim in terms of the aforesaid 
policy (so called "War Risks") in respect of the 
constructive total loss of the vessel by the 
arrest restraint and detainment of the vessel as 
aforesaid for the full insured value thereof ... 
It would be appreciated if the matter could be 
afforded your attention. ,208 
(b) Whilst English law, that is as under the 
conunon law and the MIA, requires the notice of 
This fact was even recognized in Roux v Salvador, supra, at 284. 
The original case record does not have reference to any other document 
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abandonment to be unmistakable in its .terms, 
indicating the assured's intention to abandon 
unconditionally, 
prescribed209 • In 
no special form is 
Currie v Bombay Native 
Insurance C0210 the court accepted as a valid 
notice a similar one which read: 
'with regard to the Northland, we regret to say 
that she is a total wreck, and we have hereby to 
give you notice that we shall claim payment of the 
policies we hold against her cargo and 
disbursements. ' 
(c) It is submitted that the telex sent by the 
plaintiff's attorney to the insurer also passes 
the test enunciated by Roche J in George Cohen, 
Sons & Co v Standard Marine Insurance C0211 where 
the latter said: 
'On the whole, if necessary, I think I should 
decide that where a person claims a total loss and 
asks to be paid the full sum insured, he does 
sufficiently make it plain to an intelligent 
underwriter that he is abandoning his interest in 
Ivamy, Marine Insurance, 4th ed, (1985), 385 . 
(1869) LR 3 PC 72 . 
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the thing in respect of which he claims to be paid 
as for a total loss.' 
In Parmeter v Todhunter2 12 Lord Ellenborough 
said: 
'There is no implied abandonment by a demand of a 
total loss. It would be very well to prevent parol 
(oral) abandonment entirely; but if they are 
allowed, I must insist upon their being express. 
An implied parol abandonment is too uncertain and 
cannot be supported. The abandonment must be 
express and direct, and I think the word "abandon" 
should be used to render it effectual.' 
However, the statement that the word 'abandon' 
should be used was an obiter dictum and has not 
been followed in subsequent cases213 • There was 
thus no bar to finding that the telex constituted 
a notice of abandonment which was 'plain to an 
intelligent underwri ter' and was therefore 
sufficient. 
(1808) 1 Camp 541 . 
Ivamy, Marine Insurance, 4th ed, (1985), 385; Mustill and Gilman, 
Arn~uld's ~w of Marine Insurance. and A~erage, 16th ed, (1981), (cited 
as Arnauld) , para 1266; Panaman~an Or~ental SS Corporation v Wright 
[1970] 2 LLR 365 (QBD) . See also Singer Manufacturing Co v Western 
Assurance Co, supra , (Canada); Barrs v Merchants' Marine Insurance Co 
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(d) It further does not appear to matter 
whether this scenario is looked at through the 
eyes of English law or South African law. In both 
cases the same conclusion ought to be arrived at 
as neither legal system is interested in formality 
above substance. On this basis, therefore, there 
was a proper abandonment and a claim for the full 
indemnity ought to have been allowed. 
Since the claim was for payment of the agreed 
value, the onus of proof on the question of the 
quantum of claim was squarely on the defendant 
insurer. No evidence of value was given during the 
trial and, other aspects excepted, Friedman J was 
thus entitled to find a loss amounting to the 
agreed value of the vessel, namely R300 000,00. 
An important consideration became evident in the 
scenario thus posed. The ship could have been 
released upon payment of the fine of R167 000,00. 
If, therefore, an abandonment had been made before 
the actual confiscation by the Mocambican 
Government, the insurer as new owner of the 
'Morning Star' would have been able to acquire her 
release by payment of that fine. By these means 
the insurer would have achieved a saving or 
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difference between the value of the vessel and the 
fine. This clearly demonstrates the benefit of an 
abandonment to the insurer and the need that the 
abandonment be made at an early stage to allow the 
insurer to save or salvage as much as possible of 
the insured and abandoned ship or goods. It also 
demonstrates that there was probably a lack of 
understanding of the basic principles of 
abandonment in the insurer's office. 
The plaintiff ought therefore to have succeeded. 
CONCLUSION 
This survey of developments in the South African 
legislatures and the courts did not bring to light 
any new insights into the ancient institution of 
abandonment. It appears though that some courts 
applied, or endeavoured to apply, abandonment 
principles from time to time, but the 
opportunities to do so were limited. Further, when 
the opportunity did arise the facts were often 
such that the case could be and was decided on 
another point. In the few cases where abandonment 
legitimately came to the fore, the courts 
initially applied the Roman-Dutch law principles 
adequately, but the recent case of the 'Morning 
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Star' demonstrated a disturbing lack of 
understanding of abandonment, coupled with an 
equally disturbing lack of depth in the research 
into the subj ect. A grave injustice appears to 
have been done in the case of the 'Morning Star'. 
When the history of abandonment in South Africa is 
considered against the light of historical 
developments, especially those which occurred in 
Europe, it becomes apparent that the inherited 
Roman-Dutch principles of abandonment were 
shielded from further development by a number of 
circumstances. In the first place, the peculiar 
history of the country resulted in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth century Roman-Dutch law of the 
province of Holland becoming the law which 
regulated marine insurance locally, but that law 
remained static as subsequent developments in the 
Netherlands did not become part of South African 
law. In the second place, the Cape of Good Hope 
ceased to be a Dutch possession just at the time 
when the European countries were taking steps ' to 
codify their law, during which process the Roman-
Dutch principles which applied at the Cape of Good 
Hope ceased to apply in the country of their 
origin. In the third place, the conquering power, 
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its own when it took over in 1806214 . The 
remoteness of the country from the First World and 
its relative unimportance as a consumer of foreign 
goods and supplier of raw materials or finished 
goods also contributed to this process of 
stagnation. There was simply no pressure dictating 
changes to the Roman-Dutch principles of 
abandonment and consequently the law has been left 
as it was when it was inherited from Holland. 
Consequently the institution of abandonment in 
South African marine insurance has lain asleep 
like a veritable Rip van Winkle for a period of 
almost two hundred years. During that period great 
developments occurred elsewhere215 • 
The result is that the principles of the Roman-
Dutch law have survived in South Africa for three 
centuries, virtually untouched by legislative or 
judicial hand. By the same token, however, 
abandonment principles in South African law have 
lain fallow, and no development has taken place at 
all. The sources from which development of legal 
principles usually emanate, academic treatises, 
legislative intervention and judicial 
interpretation, have made no mark on abandonment 
See Chapter 15 supra . 
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in South African law. 
It is apparent that some changes will have to be 
made to the strict Roman-Dutch principles of 
abandonment. A few examples will suffice at this 
stage. The time limits attaching to the missing 
ship are no longer justifiable and will have to be 
changed to take account of advances in navigation 
and communication aids. Subrogation has since the 
early parts of the nineteenth century come to the 
fore and there would consequently appear to be no 
further need for the requirement that an 
abandonment has to be made in all cases where the 
full indemnity is claimed. The automatic vesting 
of ownership of the insured ship or goods in the 
insurer by means of the abandonment may have to be 
reconsidered . 
In the next chapter suggestions will therefore be 
made for the adaptation of the Roman-Dutch 
principles inherited by South African law to bring 








SOUTH AFRICAN LAW: GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
The origins, history and development of the 
principles of abandonment have now been traced 
from ancient Babylon to modern South Africa. In 
the process the theoretical implications of 
abandonment were explored in order to determine 
the raison d'etre of abandonment in the setting of 
its relationship with the indemnity principle, 
subrogation and the transfer of ownership of the 
abandoned property. Similarly the essential or 
basic principles of abandonment in six legal 
systems, including South African law, have been 
distilled from the available material. This allows 
some recommendations with regard to the future of 
South African law to be made l . 
Three principal recommendations are to be made in 
this chapter. The first is that the concept of a 
constructive total loss should be recognized as a 
manifestation of economic loss which in the 
In making recommendations the changes which have occurred over the 
yea:s, the need to maintain not only the precious links between South 
Afr~can law and continental and English law and also the need to 
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context of marine insurance gives rise to the 
right to the full indemnity. The second 
recommendation is that the law should give 
recognition to the distinction which is made in 
insurance theory and practice between a total loss 
and a partial loss. The third recommendation is 
that the Roman-Dutch law principles of abandonment 
should be amended in one important respect, namely 
to allow the insurer to decline the transfer of 
ownership of the abandoned ship or goods. 
The basic rules or principles of abandonment in 
South African marine insurance will be re-examined 
in the next and final chapter and compared briefly 
to the common principles of abandonment which were 
distilled from the law of the Netherlands 2 , 
Germany, France, England and America before final 
recommendations will be made with regard to the 
retention, modification or exclusion of individual 
rules 3 • 
In the process of comparison the law in the Netherlands will be taken 
to be that which applied immediately before the institution of 
abandonment in Dutch law was abolished with effect from 1 January 1992 . 
It should be remembered, however, that abandonment exists within the 
~roader principles of the law of contract, particularly the contract of 
~nsurance . Certain principles whi ch apply to all contracts will 
necessarily apply to marine insurance contracts and therefore to 
abandonment as wel l, for example the capacity to contract the 
consequ~mces of fraud, mistake and duress , waiver, prescriptiC:n and 
c~mprom~se . In the discussion which follows those general principles 
w~~l ~ot be restated as th~ p~rpose of this study is to identify the 
pr~nc~ples of abandonment w~th~n the contract of marine insurance. 
827 
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FIRST RECOMMENDATION : THE RECOGNITION OF THE 
CONCEPT OF A CONSTRUCTIVE TOTAL LOSS 
2 . 1. Marine insurance did not originally draw a 
distinction between what is now called an actual 
total loss and those losses which comprised or 
included an element of economic loss and may, for 
the moment, be termed abandonment losses. Marine 
insurance practice simply recognized that the 
assured may suffer a complete loss of the capital 
invested where his ship or goods are removed from 
his possession or control . The ship or goods might 
as well be physically destroyed; the effect is the 
same to the assured. In order to allow the assured 
to recover for this economic loss, the risks 
insured against were so defined that such losses 
were covered, but the assured was required to make 
an abandonment when he claimed for an economic 
loss which was total. Thus, save for requiring an 
abandonment l.n cases of economic loss, marine 
insurance did not distinguish between an actual 
loss, that is to say a loss affecting the insured 
object physically, on the one hand, and economic 
losses on the other. 
2.2. Before turning to the individual legal systems, 
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loss may be briefly repeated: In the case of an 
actual total loss, the thing insured itself is 
physically lost or damaged or the assured deprived 
of ownership thereof. The amount which may be 
recovered in case of such a loss is calculated by 
reference to the value of the thing and extends to 
the full value because that is what has been 
10st4 • In the case of economic loss the thing 
insured is not completely lost or damaged or 
removed from the assured's ownership, but is 
affected in such a way that it is no longer within 
the economic possession or control of the 
assuredS. The amount recoverable for such an 
economic loss would, but for abandonment, have to 
take into account the salvage value of the thing 
insured. In abandonment cases for example, there 
remains or may remain some part or salvage of the 
insured ship or goods, yet the full insured value 
of the thing insured is paid as the indernni ty6. 
Dutch law allowed an abandonment in three broad 
Whether as an indemnity or as damages ar1s1ng from breach of contract 
or from delict, the measure of the recoverable loss is the same. 
. See Feldthusen, Economic Negligence: The Recovery of Pure Economic Loss 
docto:-al th.esis, . University of Michigan , (1983), 1: 'A pure economi~ 
~o~s ~s a f~nanc~a.l lr;>ss which is not causally consequent upon physical 
~nJ ury to the pla~n t~ff' s . .. property . ' 
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categories of cases7 which are but different 
categories of economic loss. A total loss was 
created by means of the legal fiction of a 
'wettelijk geheel verlies,8, whose effect was to 
presume that the loss was complete and extended to 
the full value of the insured ship or goods 9 • The 
loss so made recoverable, or indemnifiable in 
insurance parlance, was wholly or partially 
economic in nature and is easily distinguished 
from an actual total loss, or 'feitelijk geheel 
verlies' 10. The terms 'wettelijk geheel verlies' 
and 'feitelijk geheel verlies' did not, however, 
appear in Dutch legislation, but represent the 
language of marine insurance theory and practice . 
In German law the distinction is drawn 
expresslyll between total loss, 'Totalverlust' , 
and abandonment losses. The latter category 
The first category was where the right to abandon arose immediately upon 
the happening of the event which threatened the ship or goods. The 
second category was where a prescribed period had to pass without 
recovery before the abandonment could be made. The third category was 
that of the missing ship where the right to abandon was also delayed for 
a prescribed period. See generally Chapter 6 para 2.5 supra. 
See Mens Fiers Smeding, Eenige opmerkingen over het Recht van 
Abandonnement, doctoral thesis, Leiden, (1895), 33; Molengraaff, 
Leidraad tot de Beoetening van het Nederlandse Handelsrecht , (1955), Vol 
III , 679 . 
Mens Fiers Smeding, op cit , 29; Dorhout Mees, Schadeverzekeringsrecht, 
4th ed, (1967) , (' Schade'), 637-638. 
Molengraaff , op cit , Vol III, 679. 
The German concept of a total loss is practically the same as the 
English concept of an actual total loss. 
830 
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embraces only two cases of loss which are both 
economic in nature, namely the cases of capture 
and of the missing ship12. In each of these the 
ship or goods remain or may remain in existence 
and remains in the ownership of the assured. The 
function of the 'Abandonfrist' is to create 
artificial or presumed total losses, 'Falle des 
constructiven Totalverlusts' 13 after the expiry 
of a suitable period. 
French law is similar. The French notion of a 
, perte legale' or 'perte fictive' being the 
essence of abandonment dates back to the time of 
Emerigon14 and gives vent to the basic idea, 
which is that the loss is regarded as total only 
by virtue only of the operation of a legal 
fiction. 
The English concept of a constructive total loss 
appears to be the product of judicial attempts in 
England to find a niche for pure economic loss as 
These losses are economic rather than actual because the ship or goods 
insured continue, or may continue, to exist but they are beyond the 
assured's physical and economic control . 
Barkhausen, Voraussetzungen und Wirkungen des Abandon bei der 
Seeversicherung, doctoral thesis, Erlangen, (1895), 12 et seq. 
Traite des Assurances et des Contrats a la Grosse, (1783), (Boulay-Paty 
edition of 1827), Vol II, 211: ' ... la perte entiere est presumee ... 
et cette presomption, qui est juris et de jure, suffit '" pour donner 
ouverture a l'action de delaissement.' (, ... the total loss is presumed 
and this presumption, which is juris et de jure, suffices to give 
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an indemnifiable category of total loss in English 
marine insurance. This is clear from the nature of 
the events which have traditionally given rise to 
a constructive total l oss, such as capture, 
detention, arrest, barratry, shipwreck and 
stranding15 . All these events leave the ship or 
goods or part of them in existence, and an 
abandonment is only required if there in fact 
remains something of value16 . The result, it is 
submitted, is that English law adopted the fiction 
of a constructive total loss to cater for pure 
economic loss, in the same way as Dutch, German 
and French law did. English law accepts evidence 
of a particular set of facts as conclusive 
evidence of loss and damage to the extent of the 
value of the insured thing17. Seen in this light, 
the concept of a constructive total loss does no 
more than to allow the assured to recover for an 
economic loss. 
It is worth noting that until recently English 
textbooks did not have a separate chapter headed 
The list is not conclusive. See Chapter 5, para 7.9.1 supra. 
See Chapter 5, para 7.9 .1 supra and especially the authorities referred 
to in footnote 226. 
Since this resul t follows automatically once the prescribed 
circumstc:mces are present, the presumption is actually a rule of 
substant~ve law . See Zeffertt, The South African Law ot Evidence 4th 
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, Constructive Total Loss' 18, as they now do. Nor 
did the English courts refer to abandonment losses 
as cases of constructive total loss until after 
Lord Ellenborough's famous interjection in Mellish 
v Andrews19 • The concept of a constructive total 
loss is a relatively new one but that is not to 
say that the underlying principle is new. On the 
contrary, the fact is that in English law, as in 
continental law, abandonment has always served the 
function of allowing the assured to be indemnified 
in respect of his economic 10ss20. The law simply 
presumed a loss equivalent to an actual total loss 
in such cases. This fiction, perhaps unhappily21 
termed a constructive total loss in English law, 
also emphasised the nature of the loss as economic 
but diverted attention away from the event which 
Magens, An Essay on Insurances, (1755), Park, A System of the Law of 
Marine Insurances, (1786) and Marshall, A Treatise on the Law of 
Insurance, (1802) treated abandonment in the same way as continental 
authors and did not distinguish between actual and constructive total 
losses . Even at the stage of the second edition of Arnould's A Treatise 
on the Law of Marine Insurance and Average, 2nd ed, (1857) this most 
important of textbooks on the subject of marine insurance made no 
reference to constructive total loss as a separate category of loss. 
(1812) 15 East 13. 
Consider, for example, Park's words : '(W)hen we speak of a total loss 
. . . we do not always mean that the thing is absolutely lost and 
d~stroyed: but that by some of the usual perils, it is become of so 
l~ttle value as to entitle the insured to call upon the underwriter to 
accept what is saved and to pay tbe full amount of bis insurance, as if 
a total loss bad actually bappened'; Park, op cit, 161. This is the 
language of pure economic loss . 
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caused that loss in the first place22 . 
Continental law requires the loss to be caused by 
one of the defined events, shipwreck, stranding, 
arrest, absence of news or whatever other event is 
recognized by the particular legal system23 . 
English law merely requires any event insured 
against to cause a loss in the nature of a 
constructive total 10ss24. This are important 
differences between these two systems25 . 
Nevertheless, in both English and continental law 
the assured is allowed to recover for a total loss 
when the loss is economic in nature. Seen in this 
light, the differences between the approaches of 
English law continental systems do not detract 
from the principle that abandonment is a device 
which allows the assured to recover for an 
economic or partly economic loss. 
This shift in emphasis is of the utmost importance for South African law 
as the concept of a constructive total loss does not require a precise 
definition of the event which gives rise to the loss, so long as that 
event is insured against . 
South African law would therefore not be naturally opposed to the 
concept of a constructive total loss if it, like English law, is not 
restricted to a numerus clausus of causae giving rise to the right to 
abandon. 
The difference between the two systems appears to be that continental 
law emphasises the event which causes the loss while English law 
emphasises the consequence. It is arguable that the English approach 
makes it easier to see the loss as an economic loss for which the law 
allows indemnification . 
To put it another way, continental law restricts the right to abandon 
to strictly defined cases, which are a numerus clausus, while in English 
and American law there is no such limitation as the effect of the event 
rather than the precise mechanism which results in the loss is decisive. 
834 
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South African law is in a way closer to English 
and American law than to current continental law . 
The reasons for this strange co-incidence are 
historical. The Roman-Dutch law of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries allowed the assured to 
abandon in certain specially named cases as well 
as similar cases, or 'ghelycke ghevallen,26. All 
the Roman-Dutch law required was that the loss be 
certain and irreversible27 • As in English law, 
the emphasis was on the loss rather than the event 
which caused it. However, while the Roman-Dutch 
principle that losses arising from 'ghelycke 
ghevallen' was inherited by South Africa, the 
codification process in the Netherlands put paid 
to it in Holland itself , as indeed the whole of 
the Netherlands, when the Wetboek van Koophandel 
of 1838 ('the WvK') adopted the French practice of 
the Code de Commerce of 1807 (' the CdeC') 28, to 
The Customs and Usages of the Antwerp Exchange of 1582 . This principle 
was retained in article 25 of the Amsterdam Ordonnance of 1598, article 
26 of the Middelburg Ordonnance of 1600 , article 12 of the Rotterdam 
Ordonnance of 1604, article 62 of the Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1721 and 
article 28 of the Amsterdam Ordonnance of 1744. See Chapters 4 and 17 - 18 
supra in this regard. 
In order to achieve certainty some time limits were introduced, but they 
merely served the purpose of ensuring that a loss was actually suffered 
before the obligation to indemnify to the extent of the sum insured 
arose. 
Which in turn followed the Ordonnance de la Marine of 1681. According 
to Nolst Trenite, Zeeversekering, 2nd ed, (1928), Vol I, 21 and Vol II, 
640 the French Code de Commerce of 1807 ('the CdeC') was an important 
source of subsequent Dutch marine insurance law while the Ordonnance de 
la Marine of 1681 contained a less developed marine insurance law than 
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restrict abandonment to named causes29 • It has 
been held that the definition of a constructive 
total loss in the MIA is a complete one in the 
sense that no case falling outside the categories 
of loss expressly mentioned in section 60(1) or 
(2) can be treated as a constructive total 
10ss30 . The Roman-Dutch law was not so restricted 
by virtue of the extent ion of the right to abandon 
to 'ghelycke ghevallen'. Abandonment is therefore 
allowed in South African law in a broader spectrum 
of cases than English law. This is a good reason 
why the concept of a constructive total loss as it 
applies in English and American law need not be 
introduced expressly into South African law. 
Further, it was pointed out earlier that Dutch, 
German and French theory and practice also use the 
term constructive total loss or similar terms to 
distinguish losses which are total by operation of 
a legal fiction. South African law can likewise 
accommodate the principle of a constructive total 
loss without expressly adopting its terminology. 
It can do so without giving up any of its 
Thus, while the principle that the assured was also allowed to abandon 
in c~ses whic~ res~lted in the type of losses as those specifically 
ment~oned was ~nher~ted by South Afr ican law from the Roman-Dutch law 
the principle did not survive the codification process in th~ 
Netherlands. 
Petros M Nomikos Ltd v Robertson [1939) 64 LLR 45 (HL) I 54; Irvin v Hine 
[1950) 1 KB 555. 
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inherited Roman-Dutch principles. Further, the 
whole doctrine of abandonment encompasses the 
losses which give rise to the fiction of a total 
loss which is called, in different jurisdictions, 
a 'constructive total loss', or a 'wettelijk 
geheel verlies' , or a , fingierten oder 
constuctiven Totalverlust', or a 'perte fictive' 
or 'perte legale'. It is not without significance 
that English and continental law have stumbled 
upon the same concept, namely that of a presumed 
total loss . 
2.6. It is submitted that abandonment should not be 
relegated to a mere servant of the theory which 
explains the reason for its existence. This has 
occurred in English law where abandonment's place 
has been taken by the concept of a constructive 
total loss. Continental legal systems have found 
it unnecessary to import the notion of a 
constructive total loss into their codes probably 
because the existing theory is to the effect that 
the loss is regarded as total by operation of law 
in any event. Seen from this angle there is no 
need for change in South Africa. 
2.7. These criticisms do not detract from the propriety 
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giving rise to the right to abandon, as cases 
constructive total loss. Pappenheim, in his review 
of Aschenheim's thesis31 , argued32 that the term 
fictional total loss should be avoided and 
constructive total loss preferred. He reasoned 
that the term fictional total loss would tend to 
indicate that the loss is one which is not 
ordinarily indemnifiable whereas abandonment 
losses have since time immemorial given rise to an 
obligation on the part of the insurer to pay for 
a total loss. This approach, it is submitted, 
justifies the use of the term constructive total 
loss for losses which are wholly or partly 
economic losses . The term constructive total loss 
would be appropriate for such losses in South 
African law too. 
This does not mean that the English concept of a 
constructive total loss should be incorporated in 
South African law . In South African law the right 
to abandon is not as limited than in English law 
and it is submitted that it may lead to confusion 
if the English concept is taken over without full 
consideration of the difference in approach. 
Nevertheless, the term is used widely in practice, 
Der Abandon des Versicherten in der Seeversicherung, (1893) . 
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even in the continental countries whose laws do 
not expressly recognize the term. 
An adequate result can be achieved by simply 
replacing the three existing abandonment 
categories of the inherited Roman-Dutch law33 
with a single category as follows: 
RULE: If the assured is so deprived of beneficial 
possession of or control over the ship or goods 
insured by an insured peril, (including the 
disappearance of the ship wi thout news for a 
sufficiently long period to give rise to the 
reasonable conclusion that the ship and the goods 
on her have been lost by an insured peril), that 
it is improbable that the insured ship or goods, 
as the case may be, will be recovered wi thin a 
reasonable time, the assured may claim the full 
amount of the insurance against the abandonment of 
his rights in and to the ship or goods to the 
insurer. 
The reasons for the distinction between the first 
two abandonment categories of the Roman-Dutch 
The category where there is an immediate right to abandon, the category 
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no longer exist. Modern means of 
communication and travel have made it unnecessary 
to delay the right to abandon by arbitrary and 
predetermined periods as reasonable certainty 
about the ultimate fate of the ship or goods may 
be obtained fairly soon after the initial event 
which places them at risk. Under Roman-Dutch law 
the right to abandon did not arise in any event 
until it was clear that t he loss was certain and 
final. Even in those cases where the right to 
abandon was delayed the assured could still 
abandon immediately when it became clear that the 
loss was certain and fina1 35 . The principle 
proposed solves the problem of introducing 
artificial time limits whose function is merely to 
ensure that the loss is certain and final before 
the right to abandon is granted36 • The court will 
ultimately be the final arbiter deciding whether 
there is a reasonable possibility of recovery 
within a reasonable time. 
Namely the one where the right arises immediately as opposed to the one 
where the right is delayed. 
Take the example of the ship which was arrested by a friendly power. In 
such a . case t~e assured could not abandon until the expiry of the 
prescr~bed per~od but he was allowed to abandon forthwith if the arrest 
should have been followed by a confiscation, the latter event making the 
loss both certain and final . 
The facts of individual cases and the judgment of the court, as final 
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In essence the rule proposed does not change the 
existing law as inherited from Roman-Dutch law. It 
also retains the essential character of an 
abandonment case as a case where the law 
irrebuttably presumes a total loss when certain 
facts are present. This approach would accord with 
that of the legal systems referred to earlier. The 
idea of a presumed total loss is also not foreign 
to South African law as the concept of a 
constructive total loss was part of the marine 
insurance law of the Cape of Good Hope from 1879 
to 1977 and of the Orange Free State from 1902 to 
1977. In that period no adverse reports were made 
as to its application. On the contrary, South 
African lawyers are well conversant with the 
notion of a presumed loss, whether the fiction is 
called a constructive total loss or not. 
The very soul of marine insurance reposes in the 
unique concept of abandonment. Abandonment 
distinguishes marine insurance from all other 
types of indemnity insurance. It is submitted that 
it is desirable that abandonment in South African 
law should be allowed to develop rather than 
stagnate, which it is in danger of doing. The 
express recognition that a general category of 
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insurance would assist in preserving the spirit of 
South African marine insurance law without 
estranging it from other legal systems
37
• 
SECOND RECOMMENDATION: THE RECOGNITION OF THE 
CONCEPT OF TOTAL LOSS 
South Africa is out of step with the rest of the 
maritime world in its reluctance, if not failure, 
to recognize total loss as a separate category of 
loss. English marine insurance like 
Canadian, Australian, New Zealand and Indian 
law39 , expressly recognizes the distinction 
between total loss and partial loss. So does 
American German law is to the same 
effect41 , and even Dutch law has recently 
introduced the concept of a total loss into its 
As things now stand South African law is compatible with both English 
and continental law so far as the principles of abandonment are 
concerned . The person trained in English law may abandon using the 
theory and procedures of English law without fear that his claim will 
be rejected for having failed to comply with some obscure local 
provision of South African law . The continental claimant will also 
recognize the law he encounters as being the same as or so similar to 
his own as to make no difference . 
Section 56(1) of the MIA : 'A loss may be either total or partial.' 
All these countries have marine insurance acts modelled on the English 
MIA. 
See Chapter 10, paragraph 2.1 supra. 
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marine insurance law for the first time
42
. French 
law has also adopted the term, albeit only 
recently, by allowing an abandonment in cases of 
, perte totale' 43 . 
There appears to be no obstacle in theory which 
would deny the existence of a separate category of 
loss termed a total loss. It was pointed out 
earlier that the triad at the base of the 
indemnity principle consists of the concepts of 
interest, value and 10ss44. When these concepts 
are considered in the typical marine insurance 
policy on the hull or goods, the following 
scenario unfolds: The assured's interest is his 
ownership of the ship or goods45 . The value of 
that interest is the market value of the ship or 
goods46 . The loss which is recoverable under the 
policy, which is here assumed to be for full 
Article 7.17.2.38.1 of the proposed Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek provided : 
'Er is totaal verlies: a . wanneer de zaak teni et is gegaan; b . wanneer 
de zaak zodanig is bescbadigd dat z i j beeft opgebouden een zaak van de 
verzekerde zoort te zijn; c. wanneer de zaak buiten de macbt van de 
verzekerde is geraakt en terugkoming redelijkerwijs niet is te 
verwachten. ' 
Article 48 of Law 522 of 1967. In thi s sense total loss means shipwreck 
and stranding wi t h breaking up . See Chapter 8, para 3.2.2 supra. 
See Chapter II, para 2.1.2 supra. 
There could of course be many other insurable interests in the marine 
insuranc~ setting ~ for example the charterer's interest in the ship, the 
buyer's 1nterest 1n the goods and the mortgagee ' s interest in the ship. 
In the case of insurance of interests other than full ownership , the 
value of the insured interest would ordinarily be less than the market 
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value, is the amount by which the assured's 
patrimony is reduced by the event insured 
against47 • That amount cannot exceed the value of 
the insured interest. This interaction between the 
concepts of interest, value and loss therefore 
determines the extent of the indemnity. 
The insurable interest may be so affected that it 
is either totally lost or partially damaged48 • 
The total loss of the insured interest may be 
either of a factual nature, or of an economic 
nature. In the former case we speak of an actual 
total loss. In the latter we have the legal 
fiction49 of a total loss which is introduced in 
different legal systems under different guises50 • 
What is of decisive importance is that the 
assured's recoverable loss is, and should be, the 
full value of his insured interest. His loss is 
therefore complete, or total, in relation to the 
value of the insured interest. The words 'total 
This diminution in the assured's patrimony is determined by reference 
to his before and after (the insured event) financial positions . 
Partial loss does not enter the reasoning here and may be disregarded 
for the moment. 
This may not be the appropriate terminology to use if one accepts that 
an economic loss is as real as a loss arising from the destruction of 
the thing insured. 
Whet~er this fiction is called a constructive total loss, as it is in 
Engl~sh and related legal systems, or a presumed loss, as it is in 
cont~nental law, the effect remains the same : The loss is treated as if 
there has been an actual and complete loss in fact of the thing insured 
although it may continue to exist. 
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loss' therefore accurately describe the extent of 
the loss. Why can such a loss not be called what 
it is, a total loss, and be treated as such by the 
law? 
3.4. Notwithstanding their apparent lack of express 
recognition in the old authorities and in South 
African case law, the concepts of total loss, 
partial loss and economic loss are all recognized 
and applied by insurance practice in South Africa, 
as may be demonstrated by referring to motorcar 
insurance, a type of insurance with which most 
people are familiar. 
3.4.1. 
51 
If an insured car is totally consumed by fire so 
that nothing except a heap of twisted and molten 
metal and synthetic materials of no value is left, 
the insurer habitually indemnifies the assured by 
paying the market value of the car as at the time 
immediately before the damages1 . Such a loss is 
factual and total and equates to the actual total 
loss, or 'feitelijk geheel verlies', or 
'Totalverlust' of English, Dutch and German law 
respectively. In such a case the indemnity is 
calculated with reference to the actual and real 
value of the thing insured to the assured at the 
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time of the 10SS52. 
If the insured car were to be stolen, the assured 
remains its owner in law, but he is so completely 
deprived of its use and possession that the car 
might as well have been consumed by fire, as in 
the first example. The assured's loss in this 
instance is in the nature of an economic loss as 
his car continues to exist and remains in his 
ownership 53. Nevertheless, South African insurers 
habitually indemnify the assured in case of theft 
of the car by paying the market value of the car 
at the time of the theft54 • The assured makes no 
abandonment in such a case, but if the car should 
be recovered after the indemnification has taken 
place the assured is obl i ged by the principles of 
subrogation to account to the insurer for the 
recovered value or leave the salvage to the 
insurer55 • The indemnity principle is not 
breached in this scenario. 
If, on the other hand, the insured car should be 
Joubert (ed) , The Law of South Africa, ('LAWSA ' ) , (1988), Vol 12, 
(Insurance), para 203. 
LAWSA, para 199; M Zahn Investments (Pty) Ltd v General Accident 
Insurance of SA Ltd 1981 4 SA 143 (SBCL), 147-148 . 
After a short period during which they await confirmation that the car 
has not been recovered. See generally LAWSA , para 199 . 
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damaged in a collision, the damage mayor may not 
be so severe that the car is not capable of being 
repaired economically. If economical repair is 
possible, the insurer pays the difference between 
the pre- and post-collision values of the car56 , 
which is normally but not always the cost of 
repai r 57. This is a case of partial loss. If, 
however, the car cannot be repaired for an amount 
less than its value immediately before the 
collision58 , South African insurers habitually 
pay its pre-collision market value minus the value 
of the wreck59 , if the assured keeps the wreck. 
If the insurer takes over the wreck, which the 
insurer can only do with the consent of the 
assured, he simply pays the pre-collision market 
value of the In each instance the 
assured's loss which has to be indemnified is 
determined by comparing his before and after 
LAWSA, para 202. 
LAWS A , para 203; Erasmus v Davis 1969 2 SA 1 (A), 21 . 
A situation described in the parlance of motorcar insurance as a 
'complete write-off' . 
This scenario is so similar to the 'Totalverlust' of German law that it 
lends further support to the express recognition of the concept of a 
total loss in South African law. 
The~e is not~ing extraordinary in these scenarios, and they have their 
equ1valent s1tuat~ons in marine insurance. The difference is that in the 
case of ~ ~conom1C: loss :m abandonment is required in marine insurance 
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financial positions
61
• In this comparative 
process the value of the wreck is taken into 
account where the assured retains possession of it 
and the indemnity principle is again not offended. 
This scenario is the same as that which pertains 
in German law where even in the case of 
'Totalverlust' the insurer is entitled to deduct 
the value of the wreck62 • 
It appears probable that South African law has not 
yet expressly adopted or introduced the concept of 
a total loss in insurance law because such a 
concept has not been regarded as necessary in the 
determination of the appropriate indemnity in the 
variety of scenarios postulated above. 
Nevertheless, it is submitted that there is no 
reason why such a concept should not be admitted, 
especially since it has been applied in insurance 
practice in South Africa without any difficulty. 
There is some vague justification in Roman-Dutch 
law for the express recognition of total loss as 
a separate category of loss. The Roman-Dutch law 
recognized an average loss as a separate category 
This requires in each case that the totality of his assets, his whole 
estate, ,be ~aken in~o aC,count with the car undamaged in his undisturbed 
pc:'sses~~on ~n ,th,e f~rst ~nstance as contrasted with the assured's actual 
f~nanc~al pos~t~on after the fire o r theft or collision, 
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of loss for certain purposes63 • The only type of 
loss with which an average loss could logically 
and practically be contrasted is a total loss. 
This being so, both kinds of loss must have been 
common in Dutch insurance practice from the 
earliest time. There is thus no bar in strict 
theory against the express recognition of partial 
and total loss as separate categories of loss, 
each with its own rules relating to the 
computation of the indemnity. 
It is therefore submitted that South African law 
is capable of accommodating the distinction 
between total loss and partial loss without 
difficulty and without impinging on any important 
principle of the Roman-Dutch law. Moreover, 
express recognition of such a concept would bring 
the law into line with insurance practice in South 
Africa as well as with the insurance principles 
and practice of overseas countries. It would 
further allow the concept of an economic loss a 
separate species of total loss to be accommodated 
and understood more readily. 
Van der Keessel, Praelectiones Iuris Hodierni ad Hugonis Grotii 
Intro~uctionem ad Iurisprudentiam Hollandicam, ('Praelectiones'), 
(publ~shed only in 1961-1967), 1484. Van der Keessel referred to 
articles 17 and 19 of the Middelburg Ordonnance of 1600 where total and 
partial losses were ~ea~t w~th differently so far as prescription was 
concerned. The same d~st~nct~on had earlier been made in articles 12 and 
13 of the Amsterdam Ordonnance of 1598. Partial loss was referred to in 
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The notion that Roman-Dutch law did not 
distinguish between actual and constructive total 
loss is64 , it is submitted, also incorrect . This 
misconception has led Davis to express the view 
that' ... there was only one kind of total loss, 
and in order to claim for such a loss the insured 
must give proper notice of abandonment.,65 This 
statement is refuted by the statement made earlier 
on the same page by Davis that 'abandonment is 
unnecessary as being a mere useless formality' if 
there remains nothing to abandon66 • As authority 
for the statement that there was only one kind of 
total loss in Roman-Dutch law Davis relies on Van 
der Linden and Pothier67 • 
However, at the time these authors wrote their 
works there was not yet a clear distinction 
between abandonment and subrogation. It is 
improbable in the highest degree, for the very 
reason advanced by Davis, that the Roman-Dutch law 
Friedman J in Shooter t / a Shooter's Fisheries v Incorporated General 
Insurances 1984 4 SA 264 (D) stated a 285B that' ... the distinction 
between actual and constructive total loss does not appear to be part 
of Roman-Dutch law. ' Davis, The South African Law of Insurance, 4th ed 
(1993), 406 expresses similar sentiments . ' 
Op ci~, 406, where the author relies on Van der Linden, Regtsgeleerd, 
Pract~caal ~n Koopmans Handboek, ('Koopmans Handboek') , (1806), 4 . 6 . 8, 
10 and Poth1er, Traite du Contrat d ' Assurance, (1768-1778), 3 . 1 . 1.6. 
op cit, 406 fn 273 . 
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would have required the empty formality of an 
abandonment in cases where there was nothing left 
to abandon. It is more probable that the assured 
was required to cede his rights of action against 
third parties to the insurer in cases of 
'feitelijk geheel verlies' even though that 
cession had to be made before the indemnification 
and that this was the type of 'abandonment' Van 
der Linden and Pothier had in mind in the relevant 
passages. 
In cases now referred to as abandonment losses or 
cases of constructive total loss there was always 
something of value left, or at least the 
possibility that there was something of value 
left, so that the abandonment was required to 
ensure that the assured was not enriched at the 
expense of the insurer. The abandonment made in 
such cases was wide enough to include, it is 
submitted, the rights of the assured against third 
parties. The language of the Guidon de la Mer 
makes this clear. The assured had to quit and 
abandon his 'droits, noms, raisons et actions de 
la propriete' 68 • 
When the WvK was passed into law in the 
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Netherlands in 1838 the position had clarified 
sufficiently for subrogation to take 
its 
legitimate place as a concept standing proud of 
the concept of abandonment. This final step in the 
development of man's understanding of these two 
related concepts allowed, in turn, the proper 
realisation that, while subrogation applies to all 
losses, whether they should be total, whether 
actual or constructive, or partial, abandonment 
can logically only apply to constructive total 
losses69 • 
It is submitted that South African law is unlikely 
to inculcate a proper understanding of the concept 
of abandonment and to accord it its appropriate 
place within marine insurance unless there is an 
express recognition of the distinctions between 
partial and total losses on the one hand, and 
between actual and constructive total losses on 
the other. 
-:he real,isation that some of the traditional abandonment categories were 
~n real~ty cases of 'feitelijk geheel verliee' must have been partly 
respons~~le for the suggestion made in the 1972 Ontwerp voor een Nieuw 
Burg:rl;Jk Wetboek , that a separate category of loss named ' totaal 
verl~es sh~uld , be ;mported into Dutch law . Of the three categories of 
cases const~tut~ng geheel verlies' according to the On twerp, the first 
two were true cases of actual total loss while the third was an 
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THIRD RECOMMENDATION: GRANTING THE INSURER THE 
RIGHT TO DECLINE THE TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP 
When the abandonment originally resulted in the 
abandoned ship or goods vesting in ownership in 
the insurer, such ownership was always to the 
insurer's benefit as he could dispose of the 
abandoned effects for his own profit. However, 
modern rules and laws relating to the control of 
important navigation routes and channels and the 
prevention and control of pollution have imposed 
increasingly severe obligations on the owners of 
ships and even their cargo70. If the insurer were 
to be vested with ownership of the abandoned ship 
or goods under circumstances where the owner of 
the ship or goods is held liable for the cost of 
clearing a navigational hazard or obstruction 
constituted by the ship or goods, the insurer may 
become liable for risks not undertaken by him. At 
the same time the assured may all too easily 
escape liability for his unlawful actions71 . This 
scenario is exacerbated by legislation and 
See for a discussion of recent developments in this field: Hunt, A 
comparative analysis of the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions, 
TOVALOP and CRISTAL, the U.S.Federal Oil Pollution Act and u.s. State 
legislat~on, as l ,egal mechanisms regulating compensation for tanker 
source o~l pollut~on damage, LLM thesis, University of Natal, (1995) , 
Such attempts were successful in The Crystal 1894 AC 615 but not in 
Osaka Mercantile Steamship Co Ltd v South African Railways and Harbours 
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conventions which make the shipowner or cargo-
owner liable for the cost and damage caused by oil 
pollution . For this reason it is no longer 
necessarily in the interests of an insurer to 
acquire ownership of the abandoned goods. 
Thus, while it was at first universally provided 
that the abandoned ship or goods belong to the 
insurer from the moment of the abandonment at the 
lat~st, there has been a concerted move away from 
that position. The MIA set the tone in 1906 when 
it provided that the insurer is entitled to take 
over the assured's interests in the remains and 
proprietary rights in the abandoned effects72 • 
Dutch insurance practice went so far as to exclude 
the right to abandon until the Dutch legislature 
abolished the concept of abandonment 
altogether73 • French law followed the example of 
English law in 1967, allowing the insurer to 
decline the transfer of ownership which would 
otherwise have been the result of the 
abandonment 74 • The trend is therefore to give the 
insurer the right to decline to accept the 
transfer of ownership of the abandoned things. 
Section 63(1) of the MIA . 
See Chapter 6, paragraph 5.9 supra. 
Article 32 of Law 522 of 1967. 
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4.3. Public policy supports this trend. The assured as 
party primarily responsible for the obstruction 
caused by his ship or cargo to navigation or for 
the pollution similarly caused should not be 
allowed to escape liability, whether civil or 
criminal, merely by making an abandonment to his 
insurer, nor should the insurer automatically be 
required to shoulder the assured's obligations in 
these regards. More insurers would be inclined to 
allow an abandonment by their policy terms if they 
knew in advance that they would be entitled to 
decline the transfer of ownership, and with it, 
the additional obligations which accompany such 
ownership. 
4.4. It is therefore recommended that Rule 975 should 
be amended by the addition of the following 
proviso: 
75 
'save that the insurer may decline such transfer 
by notifying the assured in wri ting wi thin a 
reasonable time after receipt of the notice of 
abandonment of his election not to accept 
transfer. ' 
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CONCLUSION 
The recommendations which were made in this 
chapter ought to put South African law so far as 
it relates to marine insurance even more in 
consonance with English law, yet none of the 
inherited principles of the Roman-Dutch law needs 
to be denied its place or abandoned as the essence 
of the Roman-Dutch law is that it is capable of 
being adapted to changing circumstances. At the 
same time South African law will retain its 
contact with continental law as the principles 
advocated are also compatible with developments in 
the Netherlands, Germany and France. 
5.2. These recommendations having been made, the 
general rules of abandonment as established by the 
historical-comparative method adopted may now be 
re-examined individually before final 
recommendations are made. Recommendations will be 
made in the next chapter for the principles of 
abandonment to be included in the proposed marine 
insurance act based on the principles of the 
Roman-Dutch law inherited by South Africa from 








SOUTH AFRICAN LAW: COMPARISON AND FINAL CONCLUSION 
INTRODUCTION 
In an unpublished LLM thesis submitted in 1991 I 
discussed the history and development of South 
African marine insurance law generally and wrote: 
'Ultimately, by means of co-ordinating scientific 
research of the sources and content of the Roman-
Dutch law of marine insurance and by a process 
comparative evaluation of its principles against 
those of other legal systems, a modern marine 
insurance act can be drafted for South Africa. ,1 
I also postulated that English law could 
legitimately be relied on to provide guidance in 
a comparative process2 and said: 
'Marine insurance law in South Africa should be 
codified ... The law of marine insurance in South 
Marnewick, A Critical Analysis of the Law to be applied to a Claim for 
Marine Insurance, with reference to Non-Disclosure and Abandonment, and 
the Need for Codification, LLM thesis, University of Natal, (1991), 242. 
This argument was also advanced by the writer at the 1995 Annual 
Conference and General Meeting of the Maritime Association of South 
Afric:a in an unpubl,ished p~per entitled The Origins, Diaspora and 
De~t~nf of S~uth,Afr~can Mar~ne ~nsurance Law, where the following was 
sa~d: A mar~ne ~nsurance act wh~ch reflects the wisdom and experience 
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Africa can benefit, not only "from the world's 
second greatest private-law system" but from the 
laws of the countries of western Europe which 
share a particular legal heritage with South 
Africa ... in Roman law (and) in the development 
of the principles of marine insurance law.,3 
English law is the 'second greatest private-law 
system,4 alluded to while Dutch, German and French 
law best fit the criteria of a common legal 
heritage coupled with substantial developments in 
the field of abandonment in the last three hundred 
years . English law, of course, also fits this last 
requirement. The research underpinning this thesis 
was done in order to find, record and compare the 
principles of abandonment in these legal systems 
so that the rules of abandonment in South African 
law may be set out clearly in an act based on more 
complete knowledge of this ancient and original 
institution. Further, if there is to be no such 
act then it is contemplated that the material 
collected and collated in this thesis may serve as 
a guide to the courts and practitioners who have 
to advance the general knowledge of abandonment 
Marnewick, op cit , 243. 
By Hahlo and Khan , Tbe Soutb African Legal SYBtem and itB Background, 
(1973), 596. 
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from case to case. 
1.3. This proj ect has developed in stages from the 
introduction of abandonment by way of the 
definitions of abandonment which were mentioned in 
the first chapter. The reasons advanced for this 
research in Chapter 2 led to the historical method 
being adopted in Chapter 3 as the natural and 
logical research method for this particular 
subject. When the distant history and development 
5 
of marine insurance and abandonment were 
considered in Chapter 4, it became apparent that 
marine insurance and abandonment in particular are 
based upon ancient mercantile customs. These 
customs spread to the trading towns and centres of 
western Europe and were confirmed in the statutes 
which were subsequently passed in individual towns 
and countries, from Barcelona in the west to Italy 
in the east, from the Mediterranean to the North 
and Baltic Seass . The historical survey of these 
customs and statutes shows that South African law, 
having no independent history nor any unique 
source of marine insurance principles, must 
inevitably be based on the same underlying customs 
and laws which have applied in western Europe and 
England for centuries. 
Chapter 5 supra. 
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4 This conclusion is confirmed by the process which 1.. 
was applied in Chapters 6 to 10, where the 
principles of abandonment in the individual 
countries chosen for comparison were discussed and 
compared. It became apparent when this comparative 
process was utilised that there are about nine or 
ten basic or main principles which are peculiar to 
abandonment, and that these basic rules apply with 
little deviation in the Netherlands6 , Germany, 
France, England and America. The inevitable 
question which then arose was whether a proper 
evaluation of South African law would bring any 
important differences to light. The answer was in 
the negative as the historical evidence and the 
sifting process in Chapters 16, 17 and 18 amply 
demonstrated. 
1.5. The consideration of the theoretical aspects of 
abandonment in Chapters 11 to 15 allowed the 
6 · 
concept to be seen in its proper context, namely 
as a servant of the indemnity principle, which is 
also the cornerstone of indemnity insurance in 
South African law . In this scenario abandonment 
shares common goals with other principles and 
concepts, some apparently unrelated to 
abandonment, like the rules relating to insurable 
Until recently, at any rate. 
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7 
Part VI : Chapter 20 : South African law : Comparison and Final Conclusion 
interest, double-insurance, over-insurance, new-
for-old insurance, valued policies and the measure 
of indemnity. One of these concepts namely 
subrogation is however clearly related to 
abandonment. All these concepts are also important 
components of the general rules of indemnification 
in South African marine insurance law. There is 
thus no reason why the principles of abandonment 
in South African law should differ in material 
respects from those applying in the countries used 
for comparative purposes7 . 
1.6. It remains then to make final recommendations with 
regard to a set of rules which may either be 
incorporated in a South African marine insurance 
act or, failing such an act, may serve as a 
concise guide to practitioners, insurers and the 
maritime fraternity. These recommendations are 
made on the basis that the principles of 
abandonment of Roman-Dutch pedigree will be used 
as the nucleus of the South African act but that 
those principles will be adapted and amended to 
bring them into line with the principles currently 
applying on the continent and in English law, so 
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far as that can be done8 . 
The South African lawmakers are, of course, not so 
limited in the approach they may wish to adopt. 
They may, for example, opt for an act based on the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906 (' the MIA'), with or 
without the more modern language of the Canadian 
Marine Insurance Act 1993. Or they may find that 
there is merit in the approach of the French 
legislature in its Law 522 of 1967 and its 
accompanying decrete. These two models appear to 
be the most recent or modern representatives of 
English and continental law respectively and in 
each case the approach adopted has much to commend 
itself. However, neither would develop the unique 
South African principles of abandonment. Adopting 
either of these models would in fact constitute a 
replacement of South African law of abandonment 
with a foreign system. Further, as will be 
demonstrated below, by adapting or amending the 
existing principles of abandonment in South 
African law in some fairly minor respects a result 
can be achieved which is compatible with both 
modern English and French law whilst also 
In this form the rules enunciated will have the merit of being in 
consonance with the inherited Roman-Dutch law while at the same time 
showing some imp.rovements necessi.tated by modern circumstances. They are 
therefore, pend1ng the promulgat1on of a South African marine insurance 
act, in a form which ,a S.ou,th African court is likely to enforce, having 
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retaining the Roman-Dutch core of the abandonment 
principles which already apply in South African 
law. 
In the comparative and evaluative process which is 
adopted in the following discussion only the rules 
and principles of abandonment which are peculiar 
to abandonment are examined . Rules or principles 
which form part of the general law of insurance or 
the law of contract will be alluded to where that 
is deemed appropriate, however. For example, the 
right to claim the full amount of the insurance is 
subject to the prescriptive periods set by the law 
and the policy itself. The assured is therefore 
bound to exercise his right to payment by 
instituting legal proceedings within the 
appli"cable time limits . Further, the right to 
abandon may be excluded by the policy or waived. 
These principles are not peculiar to abandonment 
and will therefore not be stated as rules or 
principles of abandonrnent 9 • Individual rules will 
now be stated in the form arrived at in Chapter 17 
before being put in the form recommended. 
There are numerous other general principles of insurance or of the law 
of contract . which affect the rights and obligations created by an 
aband~nment 1n some way or other just as they affect other contracts or 
relat~on~hips. Such princ~ples or rules will also be mentioned as and 
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RULE 1: THE RIGHT TO ABANDON 
RULE 1: The assured is entitled to abandon in the 
circumstances recognized by the law or the policy, 
but is not obliged to abandon. 
Abandonment is a right or privilege attaching to 
the assured alone. This age old principle has not 
been referred to expressly in South African case 
law, but is so universally applied that there is 
no reason to change it. The principle is also 
compatible with the economic loss theory of 
abandonment. Since the economic loss theory is 
based on the premise that the assured's economic 
interests are worthy of protection and are 
protected by the right to abandon, it stands to 
reason that the assured alone should determine 
whether he wishes to claim for such a loss rather 
than for an average loss. 
The principle is in consonance with the law in 
Germany10, France11 , England12 and America, as 
Article 861 of the Handelsgesetzbuch ('the HGB' ); 'Der Versicherte ist 
betugt . .. '; ('The assured is entitled ... ' ) 
Articles 48 and 55 of Law 522 of 1967 : 'Le dtUaissement peut etre 
etfectue . . . '; ('The abandonment may be made ... ') 
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well as other European countries13 , and also in 
the Netherlands until recently14. There is no 
reason to doubt nor to change this rule. 
Certain consequences follow from the fact that 
abandonment is seen as a right which vests in the 
assured by virtue of the policy. In the first 
place, the right may be limited or even excluded 
altogether by the policy. In the second place, the 
law or the policy may set time limits for the 
exercise of the right15 . Where no time limit is 
set the right to abandon must obviously be 
exercised within a reasonable time16 , as it has 
long been the rule that the assured may not 
speculate at the expense of the insurer17 . In the 
third place, the assured may waive or abandon his 
right to abandon. Lastly, the right to abandon is 
In Belgium, article 222 of the Belgian Wetboek van Koophandel : 
'Abandonnement kan gedaan worden' ; In Italy, articles 540, 541 and 542 
of the Navigation Code: 'The assured may abandon . . . ' (my translation) ; 
In Gr eece , art i c l e 280 of the Code of Private Maritime Law : 'The assured 
shall be entitled to abandon ... '; In Spain, article 789 of the 
Commercial Code; In Portugal, article 616 of the Commercial Code; In 
Russia, article 230 of the Merchant Shipping Code . 
Article 663 of the Wetboek van Koophandel ('the WVK') : 'kunnen 
geabandonneerd worden ' . 
Dutch (articl e 670 of the WVK), German law (article 864 of the HGB) and 
French law (article 4 of the Decrete accompanying Law 522 of 1967) set 
specific time limits after which the assured no longer has the right to 
abandon but must be content with an average claim. 
This is the position under English law by virtue of section 62(3) of the 
MIA . 
See Chapter 9, para 3.1 supra and the cases there referred to in 
footnote 70 . 
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subj ect to the general principles of the law 
relating to prescription and to the time limits 
set out in the policy. 
RULE 2: THE OBLIGATION TO ABANDON WHEN CLAIMING 
THE SUM INSURED 
3.1. RULE 2: If the assured elects to abandon, he is 
allowed to recover the full amount of the 
insurance provided he first makes a proper 
abandonment of the ship or goods, as the case may 
be, to the insurer. 
3.2. This rule has two components. The first is that 
the right to payment is dependent upon a proper 
abandonment. The second is that only an insured 
ship or insured cargo carried on a ship may form 
the subjects of an abandonment. 
3.2.1. The first part of the rule must be seen against 
the position of Roman-Dutch law which did not 
clearly distinguish between total loss and partial 
loss. It simply required an abandonment in all 
cases where the full amount of the insurance was 
claimed, but as was pointed out earlier, this was 
the position when subrogation was still contained 
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South African law did not make such a distinction, 
it would follow that an abandonment would be 
required in all cases where the full insured sum 
is claimed. However, such an abandonment has never 
b . d
1S 
been required, as far as can e ascerta1ne . 
The second part of the rule is that only the 
insured ship or insured cargo carried or to be 
carried on a ship may be abandoned. The 
restriction of the right to abandon to those two 
categories of insured interests has never been 
relaxed in Roman-Dutch or Dutch or South African 
law19 , nor has any need for the abandonment of 
incorporeal rights such as the right to freight, 
commissions or profits become apparent in South 
African law. 
The requirement of an abandonment applies in all 
the countries used for comparison. In allowing an 
abandonment only in respect of the ship or goods 
which are subj ect to a marine insurance policy 
South African law is the same as Dutch law under 
See Chapter 19 supra where this subject is discussed in more detail . 
In Chiappini v Jones (lS37) 3 Menzies lSl the Court, Menzies J, pointed 
out that the assured had no interest in the ship which could be 
abandoned. In an obiter dictum Menzies J suggested that there had been 
a pr?per abandon~ent , of the assured's interests in a bill, but it is 
subm~tted that th~s d~ctum was premised on the principles of subrogation 
rather ~han abandonment, the distinction between the two concepts not 
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the WvK20 and French law21 . German22, English 
and American law, however, allow an abandonment in 
respect of any insured interest under a marine 
insurance policy, including freight, commission, 
profits and other interests23 . 
The essence of abandonment as perceived by Roman-
Dutch law and Dutch law is that it relates to 
corporeal things, namely real rights in the ship 
or cargo, and that it transfers ownership in such 
corporeal things or the proprietary rights thereto 
to the insurer. The other interests which may be 
insured under a marine insurance contract appear 
to be interests in the nature of personal rights 
rather than real rights such as ownership or even 
use and possession. Subrogation ought to be a 
sufficient remedy to the insurer in respect of 
personal rights. Such interests do not lend 
themselves readily to the abandonment which 
developed out of the simulated sale. There does 
Article 663(1) of the WvK . 
Article 369 of the CdeC and articles 48 and 55 of Law 522 of 1967. 
Articles 854 -857 of the BGB. 
The interests which may be insured under a marine insurance policy in 
English and American law are a ship, the goods carried or to be carried 
on , a ship, freight, profits, commission, wages, the liability of the 
sh~powner ~o the owner of cargo, loans, advances and disbursements . See 
Ivamy, Mar~ne Insurance , 4th ed, (1985),8 -9. In terms of section 61 of 
the MIA the assured may abandon the 'subject-matter' of the insurance 
which would thus include the categories mentioned but excepting th~ 
liabi~ity of the shipowner to the owner of cargo as that does not 
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not appear to be any sound reason to disturb this 
long-standing characteristic of the Roman-Dutch 
law. 
In any event, even in the countries where the 
abandonment of freight, profits, commissions and 
other incorporeal interests is possible, (like 
Germany, England, America and in other countries 
where the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (' the MIA') 
has been adopted), abandonment of interests other 
than the ship or cargo insured occurs so 
infrequently that no practical need for the right 
to abandon such interests can be said to exist in 
South Africa. Further, there is a considerable 
body of opinion to the effect that the notion of 
a constructive total loss of freight does not 
exist, or is at least entirely artificia1 24 • There 
is no reason in practice or in principle why South 
Africa should take over the problematic concept of 
a constructive total loss of the expected freight, 
profits, commissions and the like which are 
perhaps not even rights at all but mere spes. It 
is therefore recommended that no change be made to 
the existing position of South African law in this 
respect . 
Mustill and Gilman, Arnould's Law of Marine Insurance and Average 16th 
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No abandonment appears to be required in re-
insurance. Section 62(9) of the MIA provides 
specifically that it is unnecessary for an insurer 
to abandon to the re-insurer. There does not 
appear to be any practical advantage to the re-
insured nor the re-insurer in abandonment. This is 
especially the case where there is no longer an 
automatic transfer of property as a result of the 
abandonment, as is now the law in England and 
France, and has been recommended for South Africa 
in the previous chapter. 
All the requirements of this rule have been taken 
up in the recommended general rule embracing all 
three abandonment categories as set out in the 
first general recommendation made in Chapter 19 
and no separate rule appears to be necessary to 
cope with the principles discussed under this 
heading25 • 
RULE 3: LOSSES WITHOUT HOPE OF RECOVERY 
RULE 3(a): In the case of capture of the ship or 
goods insured by the enemy or by pirates, in the 
case of innavigability ('onseylbaarheid'), and in 
~f there is any ~erceived need for an abandonment in any given case in 
1n~urance of fre1ght or anticipated profits, the policy conditions may 
st1pulate for the right to abandon in such cases . 
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any other case where the ship or goods are lost 
for certain without hope of recovery, the assured 
is entitled to make an immediate abandonment. 
4.2. The essence of this rule is that an immediate 
right to abandon, (with its corollary, the right 
to claim the full amount of the insurance), arises 
in cases where the loss is certain and there is no 
likelihood of recovery. It was pointed out earlier 
that the emphasis is not on the mere description 
of the event which causes the loss but on the 
effect of the event insured against. Therefore, as 
long as the event which causes the loss is one 
covered by the insurance, the only question is 
whether the loss is certain and recovery 
improbable. The essence of this rule is the same 
as the principle applying to a constructive total 
loss in English law, namely that a right to 
abandon arises as soon as an actual total loss 
appears to be unavoidable or the insured effects 
cannot be preserved without an expenditure which 
would exceed their repaired value26 • 
4.3. There is a remarkable correspondence between South 
African law and English in the respect mentioned. 
German law is unique in that it requires a 
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prescribed waiting period, an , Abandonfrist' , to 
elapse without recovery before the abandonment may 
be made27 • The purpose of that requirement in 
German law is to ensure that the uncertainty which 
is inherent in the cases which under German law 
may give rise to the right to abandon is of 
sufficient duration to allow the for conclusion 
that the loss is probably irreversible. In this 
respect German law is the same as for the category 
of loss referred to below as losses with some hope 
of recovery. Even in the case of the missing ship 
there does not appear to be any sound reason to 
insist on such a pre-determined waiting period 
when there is proof that the loss is certain and 
irreversible. France also no longer requires that 
a general, prescribed period has to elapse before 
the abandonment may be made 28 , save in the case 
of the missing ship 29. 
It is therefore recommended that the existing 
principle be retained but taken up in a single 
category of loss advocated as the first 
recommendation in the previous chapter. 
.See Chapter 7 supra . 
See Chapter 8 supra. 
Where the period of absence of news is now three months without 
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RULE 3 (b): If the goods insured are of such a 
nature that they would be likely to perish with 
the mere effluxion of time, detention by a foreign 
ruler (not an enemy) and unfitness of the ship to 
continue on the contemplated voyage give rise to 
an immediate right to abandon in respect of such 
goods. 
This principle has not yet been applied in a South 
Africa marine insurance case. While initially 
treated as a separate category of loss giving rise 
to the right to abandon on the continent30 and 
even in England31 , perishables are no longer 
regarded as a separate class. Such goods are 
treated according to the general principles 
applying to all other goods carried on ships. This 
confirms the shift in emphasis from the cause of 
the loss to its effect. Since it is a fact that 
perishables are damaged or become useless sooner 
than other types of goods, an exception had to be 
made in the past when time limits in the nature of 
delaying periods were prescribed. If abandonment 
is to be allowed as soon as the loss is certain 
See for example article 50 of the Ordonnance de la Marine of 1861, which 
provided for shorter periods in the case of perishables than for other 
goods; article 63 of the Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1721; article 29 of the 
Amsterdam Ordonnance of 1744; article 26 of the Konigsberg Ordonnance 
of 1730 . 
See Hagens, An Essay on Insurances , (1755), Vol II, 176. 
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and without hope of recovery32, no special rule 
would be required for perishables. It is therefore 
recommended that this rule be abolished as no need 
for it is apparent. 
RULE 4: LOSSES WITH SOME HOPE OF RECOVERY 
5 . 1. RULE 4 (a): In the case of detention by foreign 
rulers who are not enemies and in the case of 
supervening unfitness or inability of the ship to 
complete the contemplated voyage, the assured is 
entitled to abandon the insured ship or goods, as 
the case may be, after the expiry of a prescribed 
period, which runs from the date of the 
notification referred to in Rule 6. 
5 .2 . In the case of the Morning Star 3 the court had 
32 
33 
the opportunity to apply the principles of this 
rule. The ship was detained but her fate was not 
finally determined as the assured could still 
obtain her release if he paid the fine imposed on 
the skipper and the engineer. At that stage the 
loss was not yet certain as there was still a 
possibility that the ship could be released. It 
On balance of probability, as required in civil cases . 
Shooter tla Shooter's Fisheries v Incorporated General Insurances Ltd 
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was only when the ship was actually confiscated by 
and forfeited to the state of Mocambique that the 
loss became irreversible or without hope of 
recovery. 
This rule is in consonance with German law
34 
but 
not English or French law3s • The rule ought to 
fall away completely if it is accepted that there 
is a right to abandon as soon as it is clear that 
an insured loss has occurred and is, on the 
probabilities, irreversible. The need for a 
separate rule where the right to abandon is 
delayed will fall away, in any event, if the first 
recommendation made in the previous chapter is 
accepted. It is therefore recommended that this 
category of loss as a separate category no longer 
has any application and should be abolished. 
RULE 4(b): During the relevant waiting period the 
assured is entitled to tranship the goods at the 
expense and risk of the insurer. The insurer is 
entitled to tranship himself, if the assured does 
not do so, in which event the insurer is liable 
only for the costs of transhipment and the actual 
Article 861 of the HGB. 
Neither English not French law requires any pre-determined time periods 
to.elapse before the assured may abandon. The requirement appears to be 
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damage suffered in respect of the cargo as a 
result of the arrest or unfitness. 
The principles enunciated in this rule go no 
further than the general principle that the 
assured is obliged to take reasonable steps to 
prevent or minimise any threatened loss or damage . 
As such the principle is in consonance with the 
general principle that a person entitled to 
compensation must mitigate his damages. The basis 
for the principle is partly that that part of the 
loss which could have been avoided by reasonable 
steps will not be regarded as having been caused 
by the event giving rise to the liability, or in 
the case of insurance, by the insured peril. The 
rights and obligations of the assured and insurer 
in this respect are in any event covered by the 
principles of suing and labouring, as it is 
referred to in English law, or the assured's duty 
to avert to minimise loss, as it should be 
referred to in South African law36 • In South 
African law the principle is of general 
application and not restricted to insurance. 
Similar principles apply in other legal 
V~ . N~ekerk, 'Suing, labouring and the inBured'B duty to avert or 
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systems37 • The principle of this 
rule is 
therefore covered in other ways and it is 
recommended that it need not be stated as a rule 
peculiar to abandonment . 
RULE 4{C): During the relevant period the assured 
is entitled to demand security for payment of the 
insured amount from the insurer. 
This principle has never been applied in South 
Africa and is no longer applied in foreign 
countries in relation to insurance. There is no 
reason for the rule in any event as the right to 
payment ought to arise only when a proper 
abandonment is made, at which point the assured is 
entitled to claim payment, not merely security. 
There is no general right in South African law to 
claim security from a defendant who is an incola 
of the Republic, nor any reason for such a right 
to exist in marine insurance law38 • 
RULE 5: THE MISSING SHIP 
RULE 5 : The ship of which no news has been 
See Van Niekerk, 'Sue and Labour', supra . 
Such security could, however, be obtained from an peregrine insurer 
under the provisions of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 
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received for a specified period is presumed to be 
lost after the expiry of the prescribed period and 
the assured is thereupon allowed to claim the full 
amount of the insurance in respect of the ship 
(and the goods carried on her) upon making an 
abandonmen t . 
This rule has not yet been applied in South 
Africa. It was firmly part of the latest Roman-
Dutch legislation39 and common law40 and remains 
part of German41 , French42, English
43 and 
American law44 . Even where a fixed period is laid 
down the principle is expressed as a presumption 
or a presumed loss which operates as a factual 
presumption only. It could therefore be rebutted 
by contrary evidence. In English and American law 
the principle is not tied to any pre-determined 
period and the facts of individual cases prevail. 
Advances made in recent years in the means of 
Article 67 of the Rotterdam Ordonnance of 1721; article 29 of the 
Amsterdam Ordonnance of 1744. 
As expounded by De Groot, Van der Keessel and Van der Linden. See 
Chapter 17 Bupra . 
Article 862(1) (1) of the RGB. 
Articles 48 and 55 of Law 522 of 1967. 
Article 58 of the MIA. 
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communication45 and navigation46 have also made 
a fixed period inappropriate and arbitrary. 
Ships still regularly disappear without trace or 
any advance warning, especially in the southern 
oceans47 , and the rule needs to be preserved. The 
rule has been included in the first recommendation 
set out in the previous chapter, but has been 
qualified in order to replace the arbitrary 
presumptive periods with 'a reasonable time', the 
length of which will depend on the circumstances 
of each individual case. 
RULE 6: THE DUTY TO GIVE NOTICE OF ANY CASUALTY 
RULE 6(a): The assured is obliged to notify the 
majority of the insurers who are domiciled at the 
place where the contract was concluded of any 
casual ty, arrest or loss affecting the insured 
ship or goods. The notification has to be made 
Such as improved radio and television links . 
Of which satellite navigation (Satnav) is the most significant, allowing 
the master of a ship to pinpoint the position of his ship with an 
accuracy measured in metres rather than kilometres. When this facility 
is combined with radio and television communication links and radar, the 
shipowner ' s shore-side operations personnel are able to follow the ship 
wherever she may sail so that they are likely to become aware of any 
disaster as soon as it occurs . 
The South African coast is notorious for such disappearances, including 
that of passenger ship, the 'Waratah', which sailed from Durban on 26 
July 1909 and was never heard from again . In recent years a number of 
small yachts and large bulk ore carriers have disappeared in these seas 
or on routes passing the South African coast without trace or news. 
879 
Part VI : Chapter 20 : South African law: Comparison and Final Conclusion 
through a broker or public person who has to keep 
a record of the notification given. Where the 
abandonment cannot be made forthwith, time does 
not begin to run until this notification has been 
served. 
7.2. This rule has not been applied in a South African 
case. There appears to be no justification for its 
retention, particularly since notification of the 
casualty or a claim under the policy is 
customarily dealt with in the policy conditions. 
The general principles of the law of contract 
appear to be sufficient to deal with this aspect 
of the relationship between the assured and 
insurer. It is therefore recommended that the rule 
be abolished. 
7.3. RULE 6(b): The assured is liable for any damages 
suffered by the insurer as a result of his failure 
to give such notice. 
7.4. This rule ought to fall away with the Rule 6(a). 
If there were such an obligation under the policy 
conditions, the assured would be liable for such 
damages in any event under the general principles 
of the law of contract. There is thus no need for 
any special provision to the same effect in 
880 
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respect of abandonment. 
8 . RULE 7: THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE NOTICE OF 
ABANDONMENT 
8 . 1. RULE 7 (a): The abandonment has to be made in 
writing and has to be served formally through a 
public official whose duties include the service 
of such formal documents and processes. 
8.2. This rule of the Roman-Dutch law was invoked by 
8.2.1. 
48 
the insurer in the case of the I Morning Star' 48 , 
where the court held that it had not become part 
of South African law. However, sight was lost of 
the fact that the rule actually has three separate 
components, one of which applied universally and 
was not subject to the whims of the legislatures 
of individual towns of Holland . 
The first requirement of the rule is that the 
assured has to make an abandonment. This part of 
the rule falls under the substantive principle 
that the assured may only recover the full amount 
of the insurance in cases where the insured object 
is not completely destroyed or irretrievably lost 
Shooter t/a Shooter's Fisheri es v Incorporated General Insurances Ltd 
1984 4 SA 269 (D) . 
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if he abandons . It need not be restated as part of 
the subsidiary rules of abandonment . 
The second part of the rule is the requirement of 
writing . The Roman-Dutch law required notice of 
the abandonment to be in writing. English law (and 
American law) never had such a requirement but it 
was specifically provided for in some of the 
European countries . Whether writing should be 
required is a policy matter. There appear to be 
sound reasons why it should . In the first place it 
would ensure certainty and eliminate unnecessary 
disputes between the assured and insurer. In the . 
second place, the transfer of ownership of the 
insured ship or goods is of such serious 
consequence to third parties that there ought to 
be some record of the transaction giving rise to 
it. The possibility of a fraud on third parties 
would be eliminated or reduced if the abandonment 
has to be in writing. In any event, the 
abandonment occurs in writing in all but the 
rarest cases even in those countries where it is 
not required to be in writing. It is therefore 
recommended that the Roman-Dutch rule that the 
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The third part of the rule is to the effect that 
the notice of abandonment has to be served on the 
insurer by the public official whose duties 
include the service of such formal documents. In 
the Roman-Dutch law specific officials such as the 
'Bode van Zeesaken' were named. South Africa has 
neither an equivalent official, nor a Chamber of 
Insurance equivalent to those which were created 
in Antwerp and Amsterdam. While the Netherlands 
required service by the official who is the 
equivalent to the Messenger of the Magistrate's 
Court and the Sheriff or Deputy Sheriff of the 
Supreme Court49 , other countries did not impose 
such a requirement. Further, while the assured is 
at liberty to comply with his obligation to give 
written notice in any way he thinks fit, he would 
no doubt be well advised to adopt a method which 
makes proof of notice to the insurer easy and 
foolproof. Nevertheless, there appears to be no 
reason why formal service through a court official 
should be required. 
There is yet a fourth component to this rule 
namely that the abandonment has to be made within 
a specified time failing which the assured is 
limited to an average claim. This was not a 
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requirement of the local ordonnances of the Dutch 
towns, nor did De Groot50 and Van der Linden
51 
lay down such a provision, but article 670 of WvK 
stated the principle unequivocally in 183852 . The 
abandonment has to be made within three months of 
the right to abandon arising, failing which the 
assured may only claim for an average loss. Time 
runs from the time the facts which give rise to 
the right to abandon have come to the notice of 
the assured53 • In German54 and in French55 law 
the principle is the same as in English and 
American law except that no fixed period is laid 
down56 . Instead it is required that the 
abandonment be made within a reasonable time, 
which will naturally vary according to the 
circumstances of individual cases. The reason for 
the requirement that the abandonment be made 
within a stipulated or reasonable time is that the 
assured should not be allowed to 'speculate' at 
Inleidinge 3.14.10-21 . 
Koopmans Handboek 4 . 6 . 8 -11. 
See Mens Fiers Smeding, Eenige Opmerkingen over bet Recbt van 
Abandonnement , doctoral thesis, Leiden , (1895), 96-97 and Chapter 6, 
para 3. 2 supra . 
Article 671 of the WvK and see Mens Fiers Smeding, op cit , 97-98 . 
See articles 864(1) and 865(1) of the HGB . 
Article 4 of the Decrete accompanying Law 522 of 1967. 
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the insurer's expense. Allied to this reason is 
the fact that an early abandonment would allow the 
insurer to take effective steps to preserve the 
abandoned property at the earliest opportunity. 
These reasons are, it is submitted, compelling, 
and it is therefore reconunended that the 
underlying principle be adopted by South African 
It is therefore reconunended that Rule 7 (a) be 
retained but restated in the following form: 
RULE 7 (a): Notice of the abandonment has to be 
given to the insurer in writing within a 
reasonable time after the event which gives rise 
to the right to abandon has come to the notice of 
the assured. 
RULE 7 (b): The parties' rights and obligations are 
determined on the facts as they are on the date 
when the abandonment is made. 
The basic principle of this rule has not yet been 
applied in South Africa but it could have been in 
It is more likely than not that the principle advocated has always been 
pa:t of Roman ~Dutch law in any event , but the absence of recorded 
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the case of the 'Morning Star' 58. The principle 
is in accordance with Dutch59, German60 , 
French61 and American law62 , but not English 
law63 . There is direct authority for this 
principle in the inherited Roman-Dutch law in an 
opinion of Van den Ende, who pointed out that once 
a valid abandonment had occurred it remained 
effective even if the ship or goods were later to 
be recovered64 . 
Further, if the abandonment has the effect of 
vesting ownership of the abandoned ship or goods 
in the insurer, there can logically be no retreat 
from the position that the abandonment is final 
and irreversible once it has been made. The 
English law fiction of a retro-active transfer of 
proprietary rights to the insurer who accepts the 
abandonment is difficult to reconcile with Roman 
The reasoning of the Appellate Division in Incorporated General 
Insurances Ltd v Shooter t/a Shooter's Fisheries 1987 1 SA 842 (A) in 
particular . 
See Schook, Het Abandonnement, doctoral thesis, Utrecht, (1858), 79 et 
seq. 
Article 867 of the HGB. 
Emerigon, Traite des Assurances et des Contrats a la Grosse, (1783), 
(Boulay-Patyedition), (1827), Vol II, 222. 
See Chapter 10, para 3.2 supra. 
See Chapter 9, para 3.2 supra . 
Advysen 14 and 23, in BareIs, Advysen over den Koophandel en Zeevaart, 
(1780-1781), at 70-71 . 
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or Roman-Dutch law and therefore South African 
law. There is thus no reason to change the 
inherited rule that the parties' rights and 
obligations are fixed as at the time of the notice 
of abandonment. 
8.7. RULE 7 (c): The abandonment may not be partial. 
8.8. There has not yet been any occasion for the 
application of this principle in a South African 
case. The principle is a natural consequence of 
the fact that the abandonment vests ownership of 
the insured property in the insurer. But for those 
cases where the assured is under-insured with the 
result that he is entitled to retain that part of 
the insured property which is uninsured, the 
abandonment has to be so complete that ownership 
of the whole of the insured interest is offered to 
the insurer and can vest in him. It is also 
logical and just that the insurer who becomes 
liable as a result of the abandonment to pay the 
full amount of the insurance should receive, in 
turn, the whole of the insured interest. A partial 
abandonment would not be satisfactory. 
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partial also applies in Dutch65, German66, 
French67 , English68 and American law69 . It is 
therefore recommended that it be retained. 
RULE 7 (d) The abandonment may not be condi tional. 
This rule has not yet been applied in a South 
African case. The rule is also a logical and 
natural consequence of the fact that the 
abandonment transfers property. There cannot be a 
transfer if the abandonment were conditional. The 
rule applies also in Dutch70 , German71 , 
French72 , English73 and American law74 . It is 
recommended that it be retained. 
RULE 7 (e): When making the abandonment the assured 
has to declare to the insurer all other insurances 
Article 677(1) of the WvK. 
Article 866 of the HGB . 
Chapter 8 para 3.4.1 supra. 
Section 62(2) of the MIA. 
Chapter 10 para 3.3 supra. 
Article 677(1) of the WvK. 
Article 866 of the HGB. 
Chapter 8 para 3.4 .1 supra. 
Section 62(1) of the MIA. 
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taken by him on the ship or goods, as well as any 
loans on bottomry he had taken on the security of 
the ship or goods insured. 
This rule has not yet been applied in a South 
African case. There are good reasons for retaining 
the principles of this rule. 
One of the consequences of the abandonment in 
South African law as it applies at present is that 
the insurer is vested, ex lege, with ownership of 
the insured and abandoned ship or goods. The 
insurer receives such ownership subj ect to the 
real rights which third parties have over the ship 
or goods. Since the insurer is enabled and often 
required by the circumstances prevailing at the 
time of abandonment to make decisions regarding 
the fate of the ship or goods, it is essential for 
the insurer to know whether he has a free hand or 
whether third parties are affected by his actions. 
Conversely, third parties with real rights over 
the ship or goods have an interest in their 
preservation and the proceeds of any salvage. 
Further, if the insurer"were to have the right to 
elect whether he will accept ownership of the 
abandoned ship or goods he should be allowed to 
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knowledge of any obligations and burdens which may 
accompany ownership . It is therefore desirable 
that the existence of real rights such as liens 
and mortgages should be disclosed to the insurer 
at the time of the abandonment. 
In addition to these reasons, in the case of 
double- or multiple insurance the abandonment may 
be made to more than one insurer under more than 
one. policy, with the result that the relevant 
insurers are vested with a joint ownership in 
proportion to the extent of each one's individual 
liability. In such a case it is also essential 
that each insurer should know whether he is vested 
with sole or joint ownership. 
The Dutch WVK75 was to the same effect as this 
rule. The rule also still applies in Germany76 
but in France section 5 of the Decrete77 requires 
the assured only to declare the existence of other 
insurances which he has taken on the ship or goods 
or of which he has knowledge. There is no similar 
requirement in English or American law. 
Article 675(1) of the WvK . 
Article 869(1) of the RGB . 
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It is recommended that the rule be retained but 
that its principles be stated more clearly as 
follows: 
RULE 7 (e): The assured is obliged, upon making the 
abandonment, to declare to the insurer all other 
insurances taken by him on the ship or goods 
abandoned as well as any real rights held to his 
knowledge by third parties in respect of the ship 
or goods abandoned. 
If the assured should breach this obligation he 
would be liable for damages as under the general 
principles of the law of contract. There is 
therefore no need to specify a separate rule for 
marine insurance . The severe penalties which 
originally accompanied the obligation to make 
these declarations, namely forfeiture of all 
benefit under the policy, do not appear to be 
justified any longer. 
THE CONSEOUENCES OF THE ABANDONMENT 
9.1. RULE 8 : The insurer is obliged to pay the sum 
insured after the expiry of a prescribed period. 
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it is clear from the substantive rules of 
abandonment that the assured is entitled to 
immediate payment, and the insurer obliged to pay, 
the full amount of the insurance upon a proper 
abandonment being made. It is therefore 
recommended that the rule be scrapped so far as it 
stood as a separate rule. 
RULE 9{a): The effect of the abandonment is that 
the assured relinquishes his rights in relation to 
the ship or goods insured in favour of the 
insurer, who acquires ownership of them by 
operation of law. 
The rule has not yet been applied in a South 
African case but continues to apply in Germany78 
and America 79 . In France80 and England81 the 
insurer now has the right to decline the transfer 
of ownership. For the reasons advanced in the 
previous chapter it is recommended that this rule 
be amended in accordance with the third 
recommendation alluded to there to read: 
Article 868(1) of the HGB . 
See Chapter 10 paras 4.1 and 4.2 supra. 
Article 31 of Law 522 of 1967. 
Article 63(1) of the MIA. 
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RULE 9(a): The effect of the abandonment is that 
the assured relinquishes his rights in relation to 
the ship or goods insured in favour of the 
insurer, who acquires ownership of them by 
operation of law with effect from the date of the 
notice of abandonment, save that the insurer may 
decline such transfer by notifying the assured in 
writing within a reasonable time after receipt of 
the notice of abandonment of his election not to 
accept transfer . 
9.5 . It is submitted that the same reasons for the 
notice of abandonment to be in writing are present 
in relation to the insurer's election not to 
receive transfer . As was pointed out earlier, the 
assured cannot unilaterally divest himself of 
responsibility for the removal of a wreck or for 
the damage caused by pollution, and it is 
therefore important not only for the assured but 
also for the authorities to know whether the 
insurer has acquired ownership or not. The 
requirement of writing would eliminate problems 
which could arise as a result of uncertainty or 
disputes about the insurer's election. 
9 .6. RULE 9(b): The insurer acquires only that part of 
the insured ship or goods which were covered by 
893 
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the insurance . 
The principle has not yet been applied in a South 
Africa case but applies in the Netherlands
82
, 
Germany83, England84 and America85 . In France 
the point is open to some doubt as article 31 of 
Law 522 of 1967 provides that the abandonment 
transfers the rights of the assured in the objects 
insured to the insurer86 . The general principle 
is inextricably wound up with the assured's 
obligation to abandon the whole insured interest 
and appears to be merely the converse of that 
principle. Joint ownership of property is well 
known to Roman and Roman-Dutch law87 and the idea 
of joint ownership held by the assured and insurer 
in the abandoned ship or goods is therefore not in 
conflict with the essence of South African law. 
Article 678 of the WvK. 
Aschenheim, Der Abandon des Versicherten in der Seeversicherung, (1893), 
46 . 
This follows in English law as the result of deductive reasoning : In 
terms of section 62 (1 ) of the MIA the assured has to abandon 'the 
subject-matter insured' . That proportion of the subject-matter which was 
uninsured need therefore not be abandoned and therefore does not 
transfer to the insurer when he elects to take over the assured's rights 
in the 'subject-matter insured'. 
Phillips, Treatise on the Law of Insurance, 4th ed, (1854), Vol 11 , 401 
stated that the insurer is entitled to the property 'so far as it was 
covered by the policy' . 
This could be taken to mean full ownership rather than ownership merely 
to the extent of the insurance . 
See De Groot , Inleidinge, 2.3.8. 
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There is no compelling practical reason nor any 
equitable consideration for the transfer of all 
the assured's rights in the insured ship or goods 
when he is to receive but part of their full 
insurable value. Conversely, there is no reason in 
fairness and logic why the insurer should benefit 
by receiving, or possibly receiving, transfer of 
more than he insured. It is therefore recommended 
that the principle be retained. 
9.8. General recommendations were made in the previous 
chapter. Further but more specific recommendations 
were also made in this chapter. They have to be 
10. 
10.1. 
considered against the background of the 
historical record laid bare in Chapters 4 and 5, 
the comparative process adopted in Chapters 6 to 
10 and the theoretical considerations discussed in 
Chapters 11 to 14. The principles of abandonment 
in South African law may then be reorganised and 
restated in a form capable of being taken up in a 
South African marine insurance act as follows: 
THE RULES OF ABANDONMENT 
RULE 1: If the assured is so deprived of 
beneficial possession of or control over the ship 
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the disappearance of the ship without news for a 
sufficiently long period to give rise to the 
reasonable conclusion that the ship and the goods 
on her have been lost by an insured peril), that 
it is improbable that the insured ship or goods, 
as the case may be, will be recovered wi thin a 
reasonable time, the assured may claim the full 
amount of the insurance against the abandonment of 
his rights in and to the ship or goods to the 
insurer. 
RULE 2: The assured is entitled to abandon in the 
circumstances recognized by the law or the policy, 
but is not obliged to abandon. 
RULE 3: Notice of the abandonment has to be given 
to the insurer in writing within a reasonable time 
after the event which gives rise to the right to 
abandon has come to the notice of the assured. 
RULE 4: The parties' rights and obligations are 
determined on the facts as they are on the date 
when the abandonment is made. 
RULE 5: The abandonment may not be partial nor may 
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RULE 6: The assured is obliged, upon making the 
abandonment, to declare to the insurer all other 
insurances taken by him on the ship or goods 
abandoned as well as any real rights held to his 
knowledge by third parties in respect of the ship 
or goods abandoned. 
RULE 7: The effect of the abandonment is that the 
assured relinquishes his rights in relation to the 
ship or goods insured in favour of the insurer, 
who acquires ownership of them by operation of law 
with effect from the date of the notice of 
abandonment, save that the insurer may decline 
such transfer by notifying the assured in writing 
wi thin a reasonable time after receipt of the 
notice of abandonment of his election not to 
accept transfer. 
RULE 8: The insurer acquires only tha t part of the 
insured ship or goods which were covered by the 
insurance. 
CONCLUSION 
A final definition of abandonment as it applies in 
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Abandonment in marine insurance is a special 
remedy available to an assured in certain 
circumstances recognized by the law or the policy 
in terms of which the assured may claim the full 
indemni ty provided by the policy against the 
transfer or an offer to transfer his proprietary 
rights in the ship or goods insured to the 
insurer. 
Abandonment is a classic and original institution 
of marine insurance. It can rightfully be said 
that the true spirit of marine insurance reposes 
in this concept, unique to marine insurance. It is 
a multifaceted concept whose worth has been 
demonstrated over centuries and in many countries. 
Its principles have been carried to the far 
corners and seas of the world, including South 
Africa, by intrepid merchants, 
sailors. 
insurers and 
The future of abandonment in South African law is 
likely to be determined by the legislature, the 
courts, and insurance, commercial and legal 
practice. Thus far the legislature has not given 
attention to abandonment, except for the general 
ventures into English marine and fire insurance 
law in 1879 and 1902 by the Cape of Good Hope and 
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Orange Free State respectively, which venture 
terminated in 1977. The courts have not had any 
reasonable opportunity to shape the law relating 
to abandonment as there simply have been 
insufficient cases featuring abandonment to allow 
a cohesive body of modern principles to be 
developed. Insurance practice, especially so far 
as the input of practising lawyers is concerned, 
has not demonstrated any great understanding of 
abandonment either. 
There is no reason to think that other important 
aspects of marine insurance have been researched 
properly in order to determine their exact 
origins, history and development in the Roman-
Dutch law which was inherited by South Africa. 
This thesis will hopefully assist the lawmakers, 
the courts, lawyers, the insurance industry and 
importers and exporters to see abandonment in the 
light of its full history, its theoretical 
implications and its basic principles. Thus, 
whether the codification of South African marine 
insurance law is pursued or not, it is hoped that 
the material required for a better understanding 
of abandonment has been made available in this 
historical-comparative study. 
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